Through trade, defence, and infrastructure, Turkey is building an enduring influence across Africa. From ports to schools, Ankara is embedding systems that could shape Africa’s economic and geopolitical future.
Turkey is courting African countries with a strategy aimed at expanding its footprint on a continent long contested by the United States, China, and Russia. Unlike these powers, Ankara is converting a network of trade deals, energy projects, drone deployments, infrastructure and port investments, social institutions, and construction contracts into durable, operational influence across Africa.
According to Jamie Akol, an Africa policy expert at the Africa Policy Institute in Nairobi, “Turkey combines hard and soft power in ways few external actors have attempted, linking military deployments, infrastructure, and institutional initiatives to create influence that can survive political shifts and the natural cycle of contracts.”
Turkey’s engagement across the continent has expanded rapidly over the past two decades, with trade between Ankara and African countries exceeding US$37 billion in 2024 and targeting US$40 billion in 2025, according to Turkey’s Trade Ministry.
To date, Turkish contractors have completed more than 2,000 infrastructure projects across Africa, valued at about US$100 billion, covering airports, roads, hospitals, and housing.
That commercial foundation now underpins a broader set of strategic levers. One of the most visible is Turkey’s growing energy partnership with Somalia. This month, on February 15, Turkey’s deep‑sea drilling vessel Cagri Bey left Taşucu Port bound for Somali waters, marking the first time Turkey deployed such a vessel abroad for energy exploration.
Taşucu, a port on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast in Mersin province, serves as a logistics base for the ship’s voyage toward the Indian Ocean. Drilling operations are expected to begin in April or May, after transit and security arrangements are put in place, according to statements from the Turkish energy ministry.
The drilling mission builds on a hydrocarbon cooperation agreement signed in March 2024, which granted the Turkish Petroleum Corporation rights to explore, develop, and produce oil and gas in Somalia’s onshore and designated offshore blocks, according to Reuters.
Turkey’s Energy Minister has described the pact as “strengthening Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa” and committing Ankara to bringing Somalia’s energy resources into production.
Somalia has long been believed to hold significant untapped oil and gas potential, and the agreement combines Turkish technical capacity with Somali sovereign rights to develop that sector.
The Somalia engagement also links to other aspects of Turkey’s influence architecture. Ankara opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu in 2017 and regularly trains Somali security forces. Also, Turkish contractors manage Mogadishu’s port and airport under long-term concessions, and Turkey built a major national hospital in the country.
In addition to drone and training programs, Turkey has recently expanded its air power in the Horn of Africa. Turkish officials disclosed that F‑16 fighter jets have been deployed to Mogadishu.
The deployment followed Ankara’s condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, emphasising the use of military presence to project influence and defend Somali sovereignty. Other regional powers are also boosting air capabilities: the United States is expanding Manda Bay airbase in Kenya with a US$70‑million runway project to support counter-terrorism operations, highlighting the Horn of Africa as a contested space for multipolar strategic engagement, according to US officials.
Beyond Somalia, Turkey’s strategic engagement in Ethiopia reached a new peak during President Erdoğan’s visit to Addis Ababa on February 17, 2026, his first official trip to the country in over a decade. Turkish investments in Ethiopia exceeded US$2.5 billion in 2025, spanning textiles, railway infrastructure, and energy, while bilateral trade reached approximately US$253 million, making Türkiye the country’s second-largest foreign investor after China.
During the visit, the two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation, establishing a framework for joint electricity generation, hydroelectric development, grid infrastructure, and renewable energy projects. The agreements provide Ethiopia with technology transfer and engineering expertise while giving Turkish construction and energy firms expanded access to one of East Africa’s fastest-growing markets.
The 9th Türkiye-Ethiopia Joint Economic Commission also adopted a protocol that reinforces commitments on trade, investment, and technical cooperation, with both sides aiming to raise bilateral trade to US$1 billion.
“Africa represents a strategic horizon for Ankara,” Akol said. “It offers both new markets and geopolitical leverage: access to ports, untapped energy resources, and regions where traditional powers are retreating gives Turkey a chance to set new norms in trade, security, and governance.”
In Mozambique, Turkish contractor ENKA is building a 456‑megawatt power plant, followed by long-term operations and maintenance work, creating multi-year technical links, according to regional energy reporting. Ports form another strategic dimension.
According to the Observer Research Foundation, Turkish firms operate long-term concessions at Mogadishu Port and have pursued redevelopment deals at historic Suakin Port in Sudan, aimed at reviving Ottoman-era infrastructure with civilian and dual-use potential.
In Libya, Turkish companies and naval presence support access to key maritime infrastructure in Misrata and other ports, reinforcing Ankara’s Mediterranean links. Indirect engagement is also underway in Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania, including tugboat provision, Ro-Ro transit agreements, and private investment, creating a broad network of influence in East and North Africa.
Turkey’s diplomatic outreach reinforces these commercial and security investments. Ankara has nearly quadrupled the number of its embassies in Africa since the early 2000s, creating a dense network of bilateral missions that facilitate contracts, projects, and political dialogue, according to diplomatic reporting.
Turkish Airlines now connects Istanbul to dozens of African cities, expanding people-to-people links that support trade, tourism, and institutional cooperation, according to airline data.
Yet Turkey’s expansion in Africa is not only contractual or military. It is increasingly institutional. Banking, logistics, health, and security infrastructure are concentrated under a single foreign umbrella. This concentration creates operational depth. It embeds Turkish systems, compliance practices, and financial channels directly into the continent.
“Unlike the United States, China, or Russia, Turkey is embedding itself institutionally,” Akol explained. “Schools, banking, media, and regulatory standards allow Turkish influence to be operational and persistent rather than transactional.”
The model is now visible elsewhere. In Senegal, Turkish firm Summa constructed the Dakar Arena and the 50,000-seat Abdoulaye Wade Stadium, and manages Blaise Diagne International Airport under contract.
Education is also an area of interest for Turkey on the continent. The Maarif Foundation operates schools in more than 20 African countries, teaching Turkish curricula and language, while state scholarship programmes have brought thousands of African students to Turkish universities over the past decade.
In North Africa, Turkish companies have paired construction and finance with cultural institutions in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, embedding language centres and educational initiatives alongside commercial projects, according to regional reporting.
Yet this layered approach also carries risks. Observers have raised concerns about governance and transparency in long-term port concessions and construction contracts, and the political implications of defence exports are debated in capitals where accountability and civilian oversight are contested.
Frontier energy exploration, as in Somalia, carries operational and security challenges that could delay projects and impose high insurance and maritime safety costs. Critics also warn that a dense web of institutional ties can create dependencies that are difficult to unwind once embedded within national systems.
“By systematically replacing older external dependencies with Turkish systems, technology, and networks, Ankara is quietly redefining the parameters of influence on the continent,” Akol noted.
Banking links, educational networks, and media influence are long-term assets that shape perceptions and institutional behaviour beyond project timelines.
Finally, Akol added, “Fragile states, emerging energy markets, and shifting post-colonial orders are spaces Turkey arrives early, builds trust, and links economic, military, and cultural influence, positioning itself to shape the region’s trajectory over the long term.”
Credit: Bonface Orucho, Bird Story Agency.
