Category: Economy

  • ‪Wajir North MP Ibrahim Abdi Dissatisfied With2026/27 Budget, Claims It Totally Excludes North Eastern Region‬

    ‪Wajir North MP Ibrahim Abdi Dissatisfied With2026/27 Budget, Claims It Totally Excludes North Eastern Region‬

    The Wajir North Member of Parliament, Ibrahim Abdi Saney, has expressed displeasure over the 2026/2027 Budget presented by the Treasury Cabinet Secretary.

    Speaking during an interview with members of the press on Thursday, June,11,2026 shortly after CS Mbadi read the budget before the National Assembly, the MP accused the Treasury of sidelining Northern Kenya in the country’s development agenda.

    On his part, the 2026/2027 Budget has failed to address the needs of Wajir North constituency and the wider Northern region, drawing in the conversation around the exclusion of the region.

    “What are they producing? For me, probably there will be good things in the last year. So far, I’m not happy, and I can’t offer even a smile. I’m excluded, marginalised, and yet there’s always the talk of inclusion, which I feel is not honest of them,” Abdi said.

    The UDA MP further argued that the budget allocations demonstrated continued exclusion of Northern Kenya from national development priorities despite a recent apology by President William Ruto on the past neglect of the region from development.

    “It is just out of it we are further excluded. So this budget is for others, not me. There is nothing for Northern Kenya,” he explained.

    A missed call to the North Eastern leaders

    At the same time, the legislator accused leaders from the North-Eastern region of failing to stand up to the occasion and demand their rights, warning that the impact shall lead to a long-term marginalisation of the region.

    “And until those who represent Northern Kenya rise to the occasion and demand their rights, we will ever be marginalised. The unfortunate thing, MPs from Northern Kenya are silent, sleeping, pretending to be part of this development, when we have nothing for our people,” Abdi stated.

    “This is budget for south of the equator, nothing for the north of the equator, nothing for Wajir North,” he added.

    President William Ruto waving at the crowd during Madaraka feter in Wajir.

    Ruto’s apology to Wajir

    Meanwhile, his concerns come just under a month after President Ruto issued a formal apology to Northern Kenyans for what he termed decades of historical marginalisation and economic neglect.

    Speaking during the Madaraka Day celebration at the Wajir Stadium in Wajir County on Monday, June 1, 2026, President Ruto said that the people of northern Kenya have long been subjected to decades of historical marginalisation and economic neglect, committing to them that this is going to be a thing of the past.

    “Decades after independence, this region was left behind. Fellow citizens, I want to tell you that on behalf of the people of Kenya today, as I stand HERE as president and leader of our great nation, to the people of Kenya in northern Kenya for this marginalisation, I want to apologise on behalf of the nation of Kenya,” Ruto said.

    Reflecting on the historical trajectory of the nation, President Ruto emphasised that the celebration was far more than an exercise in public relations.

    Instead, he framed the occasion as a structural turning point for how the Kenyan state interacts with its northern frontier.

    “It is not a mere ceremonial gesture; it is a national declaration, it is a moment of affirmation that Madaraka, our freedom, our dignity, and our self-determination were never meant for some Kenyans, never meant for some region and withheld for others,” Ruto added.

  • ‪Kenya Picks Chinese Firm For Sh375 Billion JKIA Upgrade Project After Adani Fallout‬

    ‪Kenya Picks Chinese Firm For Sh375 Billion JKIA Upgrade Project After Adani Fallout‬

    The company reportedly being considered to take over the planned Ksh375 billion expansion of Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) is China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), one of the world’s largest state-owned infrastructure firms.

    CCCC was involved with the design and construction of two of the most important infrastructure projects in Kenya in the past ten years: the Mombasa-Nairobi standard gauge railway and the Nairobi-Naivasha railway extension.

    The company has a huge portfolio in ports, railways and highways and major transportation hubs, making it a possible contender if Kenya decides to move forward with plans for the modernisation of JKIA after the Adani deal fell through. It could also expand China’s presence in Kenya’s infrastructure sector, where its contractors have been at the centre of delivering many flagship projects.

    China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) was established on October 8, 2006, following a restructuring initiative approved by China’s State Council and spearheaded by its parent company, China Communications Construction Group (CCCG), a state-owned enterprise supervised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).

    CCCC is the world’s largest port, road and bridge design and construction enterprise, the world’s largest dredging enterprise and the owner of the world’s largest engineering fleet. It has 33 large-scale subsidiaries and is present in 139 countries and regions.

    The company has many flagship projects, such as the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, the Shanghai Yangshan Deepwater Port and China’s many high-speed railway networks.

    The company made history later that year by becoming the first ultra-large Chinese state-owned infrastructure enterprise to enter the international capital market when its shares were listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in December 2006.

    In March 2012, CCCC further strengthened its financial standing by listing its A-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, marking another significant milestone in its growth journey.

    Over the years, CCCC has grown into one of the world’s largest and most influential infrastructure companies. It is widely recognised as a leader in transportation infrastructure, with core operations spanning infrastructure construction, engineering design, and dredging.

    Drawing on decades of experience and technical expertise gained from major projects across diverse sectors, the company provides integrated solutions covering every stage of infrastructure development, from planning and design to construction and maintenance.

    The company is regarded as the world’s largest port, road, and bridge design and construction contractor, as well as the largest dredging company globally. It is also China’s biggest

    Its global portfolio includes some of the most ambitious transportation and infrastructure projects ever undertaken, cementing its reputation as a key player in the development of modern infrastructure across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

    Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) departure terminal in Nairobi.

    This follows a decision in November 2024 by President William Ruto to cancel the deal, which was to involve Adani Group spending billions of shillings on expanding and modernising the country’s busiest airport under a public-private partnership contract.

    The cancellation came as the controversy over Gautam Adani and some of his associates over bribery and fraud charges was mounting in the United States.

    The Adani Group has dismissed the charges, but the events sparked outrage among the public and further opposition to the JKIA project from politicians, aviation stakeholders, labour unions and civil society activists.

    The lack of clarity in the procurement process and the length of the proposed concession had been raised as concerns by critics, along with a question about the effects of the concession on a strategic national asset.

    President Ruto, in response, ordered government entities to immediately suspend the procurement of the airport expansion project with Adani and seek alternative investors to finance the project.

  • G-to-G Deal Fails To Cushion Kenyans As Country Stares At Adulterated Fuel After Hiked Prices

    G-to-G Deal Fails To Cushion Kenyans As Country Stares At Adulterated Fuel After Hiked Prices

    The government-to-government arrangement that President William Ruto’s administration had elevated as the centrepiece of Kenya’s energy security architecture has cracked under the weight of a Middle East war, delivering the sharpest fuel price shock in more than two decades and leaving the country simultaneously staring down an imminent subsidy collapse and a resurgent menace that the petroleum sector spent years and billions of shillings trying to kill: the deliberate adulteration of diesel with cheap kerosene.

    Diesel in Nairobi now retails at Sh206.84 per litre, a record in the commodity’s price history in Kenya, after the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority announced an increase of Sh40.30 per litre for the April 15 to May 14, 2026 pricing cycle.

    It is the largest single-month jump for any petroleum product in at least 21 years of price records, surpassing the previous record of Sh25.00 set in September 2022 by sixty-one percent.  Super petrol rose to Sh206.97 per litre. Kerosene was held flat at Sh152.78.

    The government moved quickly to blunt the political damage.

    President Ruto issued a directive that slashed VAT on petroleum from thirteen percent to eight percent, and EPRA revised the prices downward the following day, bringing super petrol in Nairobi to Sh197.60 per litre and diesel to Sh196.63.

    It was a rare same-day reversal for a regulator not known for spontaneous concessions. But beneath the political theatre of hasty relief, the deeper structural crisis was left entirely unaddressed.

    The Subsidy Tightrope

    A fund that cushions Kenyans against costly fuel is set to come under pressure in the coming months, as suppliers warned that the cost of diesel and petrol will go even higher for consignments covering the May through August period. State officials reckon the fund holds less than Sh9 billion and is unlikely to last more than two months.

    Without the Sh6.5 billion subsidy and the VAT reduction, diesel would have hit Sh233 per litre in Nairobi, an increase of nearly Sh70 from the previous cycle.

    A total subsidy of Sh6.87 billion was applied for this cycle, with the biggest allocation of Sh5.74 billion directed at diesel, Sh702 million at petrol, and Sh423.9 million at kerosene.

    The Petroleum Development Levy Fund, which finances this stabilisation mechanism, has a documented history of haemorrhaging money through politically convenient diversions.

    In the financial year to June 2025, the government collected Sh26.37 billion from the petroleum development levy, but only Sh13.68 billion was used on fuel stabilisation.

    The Auditor-General has repeatedly flagged the problem.

    A recent audit of the Petroleum Development Fund for the year ended June 2025 questioned the absence of structured mechanisms to guide budgeting and financing of petroleum price stabilisation, even as the State continued to deploy significant public resources to cushion consumers.

    The IMF has demanded a comprehensive audit of the scheme since its inception in 2021. That audit has never been published.

    The levy was always a fragile instrument.

    The State collected Sh26.37 billion from the petroleum development levy at the rate of Sh5.40 per litre of fuel in the year to June 2025, translating to an average monthly collection of Sh2.1 billion.

    Against a single-cycle subsidy bill of Sh6.87 billion, the arithmetic is unforgiving.

    The G-to-G Illusion Unravels

    The government-to-government deal was sold to Kenyans as the definitive answer to fuel supply volatility.

    The G-to-G structure was designed as a short-term fix: by securing 180-day supplier credit, Kenya eliminated the monthly scramble for half a billion dollars in spot-market foreign exchange.

    Treasury CS John Mbadi told Parliament as recently as three weeks ago that Kenya should not be overly concerned, expressing confidence that the G-to-G arrangement had cushioned Kenyans against severe fuel shocks.

    That confidence is no longer supported by the facts on the ground.

    Aramco Trading Fujairah has written to Kenya stating that its sourcing of petroleum products from alternative locations has come at higher costs, which it intends to pass on.

    The Saudi firm did not indicate which countries it has sourced petroleum from since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which up to one-fifth of global fuel supplies passes.

    Some clauses in the deal provide for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to push up the cost of petroleum sold to Kenya in the event of Material Adverse Change, a contractual mechanism covering war, route closures, and extreme rises in sourcing costs.

    The Middle East conflict has allowed the two Gulf states to initiate price increases to cushion themselves from higher costs and elevated freight and premium charges.

    In its formal communication to Nairobi, Aramco stated that the Iran war had forced it to secure cargo from alternative locations to meet its contractual obligations, and that sourcing from these locations would extend delivery timelines and, combined with the elevated price environment, would directly and materially affect the price at which it sources its cargo.

    The warning is blunt: the price cap that the G-to-G deal was supposed to guarantee is functionally dead for future consignments.

    ADNOC, which supplies petrol under the arrangement, earlier invoked the force majeure clause in its supply contract following damage to a refinery that produces Kenya’s fuel, indicating its inability to produce fuel for its clients.

    That crisis forced the government into emergency procurement. One Petroleum, a subsidiary of Mombasa billionaire Mohammed Jaffer’s Mbaraki Bulk Terminal, was among just two local firms cleared by the Ministry of Energy to import sixty tonnes of petrol each outside the existing G-to-G deal, at three times the government rate.

    The DCI is now investigating whether shipments were deliberately procured to exploit the shortage, with preliminary investigations suggesting a consignment may have been overpriced by more than Sh4 billion, with a second anticipated shipment potentially pushing taxpayer losses to nearly Sh8 billion. 

    The Adulteration Comeback

    While the subsidy story plays out in the finance pages and the One Petroleum scandal occupies the courts, a quieter and more insidious threat is reasserting itself in the supply chain: the adulteration of diesel with subsidised kerosene, a practice that brought Kenya’s fuel sector to its knees before 2018 and that the government spent eight years and over Sh50 billion in levy collections attempting to eradicate.

    Oil marketers warned that the new price gap of Sh54 between diesel and kerosene could motivate rogue dealers to pump up diesel volumes using kerosene to boost their profits.

    One executive at a major oil marketing company told Kenya Insights that the regulatory framework had once again created the ideal conditions for adulteration to thrive.

    Small independent dealers, who are the majority outside the major cities, may now have the motivation to adulterate fuel due to the huge price difference. From their view, the government was blind to this reality when setting the prices.

    The Sh18 per litre anti-adulteration levy introduced through the Finance Act of 2018 was supposed to permanently close this gap by raising the price of kerosene to near-parity with diesel, destroying the economic incentive for blending.

    For years, it worked. Official data shows that collections from the anti-adulteration levy have dipped year on year since their introduction from a high of Sh7.83 billion in 2018 to Sh1 billion in 2023 and Sh847 million in 2024.

    The declining collections were presented as evidence of success: less kerosene being bought meant less adulteration.

    But that logic collapsed the moment the government chose to hold kerosene at Sh152.78 while diesel surged past Sh200.

    The Sh18 anti-adulteration levy that once nearly eliminated the price gap between the two products is now arithmetically irrelevant.

    Even factoring in the levy, a rogue dealer adulterating a litre of diesel with kerosene still stands to pocket a margin that industry players describe as irresistible to undercapitalised independent dealers operating outside the scrutiny of EPRA’s enforcement apparatus.

    Adulteration refers to the use of kerosene to inflate the volumes of other fuel, mainly diesel, due to their closeness in properties.

    Adulterated fuel triggers premature or uneven ignition, disrupting combustion and leading to engine seizures, while also releasing higher amounts of hydrocarbons that pollute the environment.

    The damage falls most heavily on truck owners, matatu operators, smallholder farmers running diesel-powered water pumps, and small businesses running generators. These are precisely the constituencies that the kerosene subsidy was ostensibly designed to protect.

    The Structural Contradiction

    The government has thus engineered a situation in which it is spending Sh5.74 billion per cycle subsidising diesel at the pump while simultaneously creating the price conditions under which that same diesel will be corrupted before it reaches the pump.

    The right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, or does not care.

    The landed cost of kerosene surged 105.15 percent between February and March 2026, rising from US$639.48 per cubic metre to US$1,311.93, while diesel jumped 68.72 percent from US$636.45 to US$1,073.82 per cubic metre.

    The disproportionate subsidy required to hold kerosene at Sh152.78 while its landed cost had more than doubled is the direct product of a political decision to protect low-income households. It is a defensible social objective.

    What is not defensible is the failure to simultaneously account for what happens to the diesel-kerosene price differential when that subsidy is applied in isolation.

    With dwindling fiscal space and IMF-mandated austerity measures, the government’s ability to continue cushioning consumers is under extreme pressure.

    The Petroleum Development Levy Fund cannot sustain Sh6.87 billion monthly subsidies indefinitely from collections of Sh2.1 billion a month.

    The fund will run dry.

    When it does, the subsidy will collapse, kerosene prices will rise, the adulteration incentive may partially self-correct on price grounds, but the interim damage to engines, food supply chains, and public transport will already have been done.

    Global analysts have warned that oil and gas prices will not go down any time soon, even if the Middle East war ends, citing pressure on fuel supplies and tight global markets.

    Strains on public finances across countries are set to intensify further as the war damages economic activity and boosts demand for interventions to cushion the effects of high energy prices on households and companies.

    President Ruto told Kenyans on Wednesday that the government would use all viable measures to mitigate price spikes in the coming months.

    An Epra source said it would be difficult to sustain a similar subsidy of Sh6.5 billion for months if the Middle East crisis is prolonged.

    That is, in the language of regulatory euphemism, an admission that it cannot be done.

    The G-to-G deal was never a structural fix.

    It was a financing mechanism that shifted the timing of dollar exposure without eliminating the underlying vulnerability of a country that imports one hundred percent of its refined petroleum from a region now at war.

    The deal bought time. Time has run out.

    What comes next, if the subsidy fund collapses before the war ends, is diesel at Sh250 or higher, unsubsidised kerosene at prices that complete the destruction of whatever low-income cooking fuel safety net survived the past two years of attrition, and a downstream fuel supply chain running on adulterated product that EPRA has never had the enforcement capacity to police at scale.

    That is not a scenario anyone in the government appears prepared to address publicly.

    The price board at the petrol station in Eldoret was updated on April 15. By May 14, when EPRA meets again, the numbers on that board may look almost nostalgic.

  • KRA Introduces WhatsApp Tax Filing and How It Works

    KRA Introduces WhatsApp Tax Filing and How It Works

    The Kenya Revenue Authority’s (KRA) new WhatsApp-based tax filing system marks a shift from traditional online processes to a more simplified, chat-based experience, but questions remain on how the platform will function and whether it introduces anything new.

    KRA says the tool is designed to eliminate the friction many taxpayers face when filing returns through the iTax portal, where users often have to log in, reset passwords, navigate multiple forms and complete several steps before submission.

    “We’ve said it before, but this time, it’s real. Filing your taxes just got easier,” KRA said in a statement, announcing the rollout of the WhatsApp option.

    Under the new system, taxpayers will initiate the process directly on WhatsApp, removing the need to download additional applications or log into separate platforms.

    The interaction is expected to follow a guided, step-by-step format, similar to a conversation, where users respond to prompts and confirm details before submission.

    “Returns are now pre-filled where possible. The system is more guided and support and filing can now happen on WhatsApp,” KRA said.

    The pre-filled returns are central to how the system works.

    For salaried individuals, key data such as income, tax deductions and statutory contributions will already be populated, meaning users will primarily review and confirm the information rather than input it manually.

    For those with additional income streams, the system is expected to pull in available data, including withholding taxes, reducing the complexity that often discourages compliance.

    KRA says the integration of real-time assistance within the chat will also address one of the biggest challenges in tax filing, lack of immediate support.

    “Everything is designed to help you complete your filing more easily, with less back-and-forth,” the authority said.

    The move is particularly targeted at younger taxpayers and those in the informal sector, many of whom are more familiar with mobile-based platforms than traditional web systems.

    By embedding the process in WhatsApp, KRA is effectively shifting tax filing into a space already used daily by millions of Kenyans.

    However, while the platform changes how users interact with the system, the underlying tax processes remain largely the same.

    Filing requirements, deadlines and compliance obligations are unchanged, with April 30 still standing as the deadline for 2025 income returns.

    What differs is the interface and user journey.

    Instead of navigating multiple pages, taxpayers will follow a linear, guided process within a chat, reducing the likelihood of errors and incomplete submissions.

    The system is also expected to minimise time spent on filing.

    “Less time spent trying to figure things out, less stress around deadlines, more confidence and control over your filing,” KRA said.

    Tax experts note that similar approaches have been adopted in other sectors where conversational interfaces are used to simplify complex services, but success will depend on reliability, data accuracy and user trust.

    There are also questions around accessibility for taxpayers with more complex financial profiles as well as how the system will handle corrections, amendments and disputes.

    Still, KRA maintains that the initiative is part of a broader digital transformation aimed at improving compliance and expanding the tax base.

    “You don’t need to be an expert to file anymore, you just need to get started,” the authority said.

    If effectively implemented, the WhatsApp filing system could reduce the administrative burden associated with tax compliance and help address long-standing challenges such as last-minute system congestion and low voluntary filing rates.

  • You Will Pay: KRA To Monitor M-Pesa Transactions Of ‘Nil-Returns’ Filers

    You Will Pay: KRA To Monitor M-Pesa Transactions Of ‘Nil-Returns’ Filers

    The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) has revealed that it is stepping up scrutiny of mobile money transactions in a fresh crackdown targeting taxpayers who file nil returns.

    This comes in the wake of growing concerns that some individuals may be underreporting income despite active financial activity on mobile money payment platforms.

    Speaking on Wednesday, March 25, 2026, during a Creative Engagement on Fiscal Justice with the Youth and Media, Maurice Oray, KRA’s Deputy Commissioner in the Policy and Tax Division, revealed that the authority will monitor all sources of income after observing a trend among sections of Kenyans who file nil returns.

    According to the KRA’s commissioner, the surveillance now includes transactions conducted on mobile money platforms, noting that the taxman already holds significant financial data on taxpayers and will increasingly use this information to verify declarations.

    “As you file nil returns, KRA has information and details about your financial activities. We are not stopping you from filing nil returns, but we will inform you of transactions you made, especially through mobile money,” he disclosed.

    Under the new approach, KRA will introduce pre-filled tax returns, where known income streams will already be captured in the system.

    Taxpayers will then be required to confirm whether the information is accurate or provide an explanation if they dispute the figures indicated.

    “If you agree with the pre-filled data, the process moves forward seamlessly. But if you say no, you must justify the discrepancy,” he added, pointing to tighter compliance measures for individuals declaring zero income despite recorded transactions.

    Oray further disclosed that starting this year, KRA intends to track all income streams more comprehensively as part of wider reforms aimed at simplifying tax filing while enhancing accountability and reducing tax evasion.

    This also comes at a time when the taxman had initially closed the nil payment option to validate and realign its systems.

    The Deputy Commissioner also encouraged the public to file their returns in time and dismissed concerns that the nil returns option is not functional.

    “We are not stopping you from filing nil returns, but we will flag transactions you have made, especially via mobile money,” he said.

  • KRA To Impose Mandatory 16pc VAT On All Small Traders In Move That Will Shoot Up Prices Of Basic Commodities

    KRA To Impose Mandatory 16pc VAT On All Small Traders In Move That Will Shoot Up Prices Of Basic Commodities

    The Kenya Revenue Authority is preparing to detonate a tax bomb on the millions of small traders who form the beating heart of Kenya’s informal economy, plotting the total elimination of the Sh5 million annual turnover threshold that has for nearly two decades shielded hustlers, kiosk operators and mama mbogas from mandatory Value Added Tax registration.

    A KRA policy document, seen by this newspaper’s sister publication Business Daily, proposes to cut the VAT registration threshold to zero, meaning that every business in Kenya, regardless of how small, would be legally required to charge customers the full 16 percent VAT on all goods and services not specifically exempted under the VAT Act. The directive, if adopted in the Finance Bill due before Parliament this July, would repeal Section 34(1)(a) of the VAT Act, which since 2007 has protected small traders from the compliance burden carried by larger commercial enterprises.

    The immediate casualty will be the consumer. A customer walking into a neighbourhood kiosk to buy a Sh50 bottle of water, a Sh200 gas refill or a bundle of data could soon find those prices ratcheted upward to recover VAT charges that were never factored into the business model of traders who collectively turn over less than Sh5 million annually and have never issued a tax invoice in their lives.

    The KRA document names the specific products that will feel the heat: mobile phones, soft drinks, bottled water, cosmetics, snacks, cooking gas and petroleum products. Freelance consultants and service providers below the current threshold would equally be roped in, required to slap a 16 percent surcharge on every invoice. The goods exempted from VAT, a thin list, include staples like maize flour, unprocessed green tea, raw milk, bread and select medical products such as syringes — cold comfort for consumers who spend the bulk of their household budgets on items that are not exempt.

    The driving arithmetic at Times Tower is stark. Kenya currently counts only 230,000 registered VAT taxpayers against a projected base of 800,000, leaving the taxman nursing a Sh378 billion VAT gap that KRA Commissioner General Humphrey Wattanga has publicly committed to closing. The authority believes that zeroing out the registration threshold, combined with a crackdown on exemptions, could drive VAT collections above Sh1 trillion, nearly double the Sh653 billion collected in the most recent financial year.

    The KRA document is unsparing in its diagnosis of the problem. “Key challenges in closing Kenya’s Sh378 billion VAT gap include threshold exclusion which limits the tax base; high VAT leakage through exemptions; weak visibility of the informal economy and a narrow tax base with just 230,000 VAT taxpayers registered,” the document states, making no apology for the scale of disruption the proposed remedy would unleash.

    The compliance obligations awaiting newly conscripted small traders would be crushing by any standard familiar to Kenya’s informal sector. Registered traders would be required to file and pay VAT to KRA by the 20th of every month without fail, maintain detailed sales records to support their returns, notify the authority of any change in business name, address or nature of trade, and — crucially — integrate with the Electronic Tax Invoice Management System (eTIMS), transmitting every sales invoice to KRA in real time.

    The eTIMS requirement is particularly savage in its irony. It was only in December 2024 that the government specifically freed small traders with annual sales below Sh5 million from the obligation to issue electronic invoices, having watched large corporations ruthlessly drop compliant micro-suppliers unable to generate digital tax receipts. The new proposal would reverse that relief at a stroke, dragging traders back into the very compliance maze that nearly strangled their supply relationships less than two years ago.

    The KRA itself acknowledges the uphill climb: barely 41 percent of the non-VAT registered taxpayers it has already targeted have successfully onboarded eTIMS, a damning indictment of the digital readiness of Kenya’s micro-trader ecosystem. Instructing the remainder to register, file, invoice and remit simultaneously is a gamble that tax consultants say could generate mass non-compliance rather than the revenue bonanza the authority is banking on.

    The political backdrop is equally combustible. The Treasury has been explicitly cautious about new or higher taxes since the Gen Z protests of 2024 forced President William Ruto to abandon the Finance Bill that year in humiliating retreat. That reluctance to be seen raising rates has pushed the KRA toward base-broadening instead, a strategy that technically avoids new taxes while materially increasing the tax burden on Kenyans who were previously outside the net. Critics argue the distinction is cosmetic.

    The KRA’s own medium-term ambitions underline the scale of its appetite for the informal sector. The authority has set a target to grow the number of active taxpayers from the current seven million to 11.5 million by June 2027, and to increase annual income tax collections from micro and small businesses from Sh17 billion to Sh500 billion, a near thirty-fold escalation. The February 2026 roundtable between KRA Commissioner George Obell and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya confirmed that eliminating the Sh5 million VAT threshold was among the reforms formally on the table, with KRA integrating artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect and pursue businesses operating below the radar.

    The VAT Special Table introduced in June 2025 provides a glimpse of the enforcement machinery awaiting small traders who fail to comply once registered. Traders placed on the table by KRA are blocked from filing VAT returns and have their input VAT claims suspended, effectively freezing their ability to trade compliantly until the authority is satisfied. The categories of non-compliance targeted include repeated failure to pay, suspected VAT fraud and failure to transition to eTIMS invoicing.

    The Sh5 million threshold has its roots in 2007, when it was raised from the previous Sh3 million mark. Eighteen years later, the KRA has decided that inflation, digital systems and aggressive revenue targets have overtaken whatever economic wisdom underpinned the exemption. The Finance Bill for the year commencing July 2026, expected to land in Parliament by end of April, will reveal whether the Treasury is willing to hand the taxman the legislative ammunition to carry out the most sweeping expansion of Kenya’s VAT net in living memory.

    For the mama mboga in Mathare, the mitumba trader in Gikomba and the kiosk owner in Kibera, the question is simple and brutal: does a business that survives on margins thinner than the paper a KRA return is printed on have any chance of absorbing 16 percent VAT, monthly filings and digital invoicing without shutting its doors? The answer, economists warn, may not be what the taxman is hoping for.

  • How Kenya Is Harvesting a Windfall From the Ruins of the US-Israeli War on Iran

    How Kenya Is Harvesting a Windfall From the Ruins of the US-Israeli War on Iran

    When the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on 28 February 2026, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggering the most severe disruption to global maritime trade since the Second World War, nobody in Nairobi was thinking about Lamu. Kenya’s policymakers were, like everyone else, braced for the shocks: surging fuel costs, crumbling trade routes, a currency under pressure.

    What nobody anticipated was that a port on a UNESCO-listed island paradise, 340 kilometres north of Mombasa, would emerge as one of the more improbable commercial beneficiaries of the worst geopolitical crisis of the decade.

    In the three weeks since Operation Epic Fury began, the Strait of Hormuz has effectively been closed to Western-linked shipping. Iran declared the waterway off-limits within days of the strikes, and the IRGC backed the threat with action.

    Since 1 March, at least 16 vessels have been struck in or near the strait. Tanker traffic has fallen by roughly 90 per cent compared to pre-war volumes, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, which described conditions in the region as representing “maximum disruption.”

    The four titans of container shipping, Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM, all suspended passages through the strait simultaneously. Jebel Ali, Dubai’s giant container port and the ninth busiest in the world, was struck by Iranian missiles on 1 March and temporarily closed.

    The Red Sea, already partly strangled by Houthi attacks since the Gaza war, became wholly impassable.

    Vessels that had nowhere safer to go turned south. They turned towards Kenya.

    The White Elephant That Wasn’t

    Lamu Port was announced in 2012 as the anchor of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, a $23 billion regional infrastructure plan designed to link Kenya’s northern coast to landlocked Ethiopia and South Sudan via a network of roads, rail, pipelines and airports.

    Critics were brutal.

    The port struggled to attract commercial traffic after opening three of its planned 32 berths in 2021, and operated at roughly five per cent capacity. It received just two container ships in the entire first quarter of last year. For over a decade, it was the favourite exhibit for those who argued that Kenyan public infrastructure spending was, at best, optimistic.

    The Iran war has rewritten that narrative in a matter of days. By 11 March, the Kenya Ports Authority reported that Lamu had already received 43 vessels in the year to date. By 19 March, that figure had jumped to 74, representing roughly a third of all ships the port had serviced since it opened. KPA Managing Director Captain William Ruto confirmed that revenues already run into “hundreds of millions of shillings” from the current surge alone.

    “We are overwhelmed. The conflicts come with both blessings and challenges in business.” — Captain William Ruto, KPA Managing Director

    The physics driving the diversion are straightforward. Lamu is one of East Africa’s closest deep-water gateways to the Middle East, lying roughly 3,300 to 3,600 kilometres from Dubai. Its 17.5-metre draught is deeper than Mombasa’s 15-metre berths, allowing it to accommodate the ultra-large vessels that the crisis is sending southward.

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    Its 400-metre quay lengths can berth ships capable of carrying up to 12,000 twenty-foot equivalent units, compared with Mombasa’s capacity of 10,000 TEUs. With Jebel Ali under Iranian missile threat and war-risk insurance premiums on vessels entering the strait running at multiples of their pre-war levels, Lamu’s infrastructure advantages have translated into commercial reality at a speed no government promotional campaign could have achieved.

    Porsches in a Paradise

    The arrival that captured global attention came on the second Tuesday of March, when the MV Grande Auckland, a 9,000-capacity pure car carrier operated by Italy’s Grimaldi Lines, made its maiden call at Lamu’s Kililana terminal.

    It had left Europe with a full load of high-end vehicles bound for Jebel Ali. Instead, it discharged 469 of those cars at Lamu, including gleaming Porsches that were photographed inside a port warehouse in images that circulated internationally, before continuing to Mumbai with the remainder.

    Days later, the MV Grande Florida Palermo arrived from Yokohama laden with 3,800 motor vehicles originally destined for the same Gulf port.

    Another vessel with 5,000 cars is expected imminently.

    The total vehicles already offloaded at Lamu exceed 4,000 units, all effectively stranded there until the security situation in the Gulf improves sufficiently for onward movement.

    Munir Minas Hussein, Chartering and Business Development Manager for Africa at Nisomar Group, the official East African agent for Grimaldi Shipping Line, was candid about the calculation that brought his vessels south. “As an agency, we managed to convince the vehicle owners to divert and bring the vessel to Lamu Port, which has substantial economic advantages compared to other countries and ports within the Indian Ocean,” he said.

    The port charges ten dollars per car for storage after a free ten-day period, a figure that will generate modest but real revenue as thousands of high-end vehicles sit waiting for the Gulf to reopen.

    Shipping lines that have made maiden calls at the facility have already signalled interest in returning on a long-term basis. What years of government promotion could not achieve, the deaths of thousands of kilometres away, apparently has. Lamu Port General Manager Abdulaziz Mzee was measured in his response to the windfall.

    “There are still ships with cargo that are destined for the Gulf, but since the situation there has deteriorated, those ships are more or less just wandering or drifting at sea,” he told local media. “It is not something to celebrate, but at the same time it is a commercial blessing.”

    Mombasa: Feast and Famine on the Same Quay

    Mombasa Port, Kenya’s dominant maritime gateway and the principal entry point for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, is experiencing the crisis as both opportunity and ordeal simultaneously.

    The Shippers Council of Eastern Africa has confirmed that one shipping line alone increased its vessel calls to Mombasa from eight to twenty following disruptions at regional transshipment hubs.

    Vessels that would ordinarily call at Jebel Ali or transit through the Suez Canal are being redirected around the Cape of Good Hope, adding ten to fourteen days to transit times and over one million dollars in additional costs per journey.

    That longer routing is delivering more ships to Kenyan shores than normal schedules would ever produce.

    The other side of the ledger is less cheerful. KPA’s Captain Ruto acknowledged that the surge in vessels is straining handling capacity. “We are overwhelmed,” he said. The longer voyages around southern Africa reduce the frequency and volume of inbound shipments of manufactured goods, electronics, grain and edible oils. The goods arriving are fewer, later and far more expensive. Importers will eventually pass those costs on. The irony of Kenya’s coastal ports is that they may simultaneously bustle with diverted vessels and feed imported inflation into the inland economy.

    The Bunkering Bonanza

    Beyond cargo handling, the maritime crisis is generating revenue in a form that rarely makes headlines but is proving highly lucrative along Kenya’s coast: bunkering.

    Ships rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope travel thousands of additional nautical miles, exhausting fuel reserves and requiring reprovisioning at Indian Ocean ports. Mombasa and Lamu are among the closest viable stops.

    The Shippers Council of Eastern Africa has identified the surge in demand for vessel provisioning, spares, stores and refuelling as creating “a ripple effect of job creation and economic stimulation in the coastal regions” that extends well beyond the port gates themselves.

    The closure of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea has effectively redirected the arterial flows of global commerce through the Indian Ocean and around Africa’s southern cape, and Kenya sits squarely athwart that rerouted corridor.

    Freight rates from Shanghai to Jebel Ali more than doubled within days of the initial strikes.

    CMA CGM applied a $3,000 emergency surcharge per container on Gulf-bound cargo. Shipping charter rates quadrupled. Each of those cost increases generates revenue at some point along the new route, and Kenya’s ports are positioned to capture a share.

    The Fuel Bill That Cancels the Party

    The same war producing revenue at the port is extracting a steep price at the fuel pump, and the arithmetic is unambiguous. Kenya imports virtually all of its refined petroleum products, the great majority of them historically sourced from the United Arab Emirates and the broader Gulf region.

    Murban crude oil, the principal grade Kenya imports, had been trading at approximately $76 per barrel in early March.

    By 17 March, Cash Dubai crude hit a record $157.66 per barrel. The Middle Eastern blends that Kenya depends on have, in the assessment of geopolitical economist Aly-Khan Satchu, “effectively doubled” in price. “The biggest expense item for Kenya is the monthly fuel bill, and that has effectively doubled,” Satchu told local media. “The government of Kenya will have to be dynamic and innovative.”

    The exposure is structural. More than 75 per cent of refined petroleum imports into Eastern and Southern Africa originate in the Middle East, according to energy consultancy CITAC, making the region disproportionately exposed to exactly this kind of shock.

    Iranian drone strikes on the UAE’s major bunkering hub and crude export terminal in mid-March compounded the supply disruption. Kenya’s government controls retail fuel prices and will eventually have to pass the higher import cost to consumers in what analysts describe as a regressive increase that will hurt lower-income households most severely.

    Annual inflation had been running at 4.3 per cent in February; economists warn that if disruptions persist, the energy shock alone will add significant upward pressure.

    Kenya and other African importers are now exploring emergency alternatives. According to multiple sources, Dangote Petroleum Refinery in Nigeria has received enquiries from Kenya and Ghana about sourcing refined products.

    The refinery, which operates at 650,000 barrels per day with roughly 25 per cent of capacity available for export, has emerged as a potential lifeline for countries cut off from Gulf supply chains. “Availability is currently more important than price,” Dangote told The Economist.

    For Kenyan oil marketing companies, that sentiment captures the entire dilemma: the war has separated supply from price logic, and Kenya must navigate both simultaneously.

    Exporters Counting the Losses

    Kenya’s exporters are not sharing in the bonanza. The country’s meat industry, which relies on the Middle East for the overwhelming share of its foreign sales, has seen shipments collapse to under five per cent of usual levels since the war began, according to Geeska.

    The UAE historically takes the largest share of Kenyan meat exports, particularly during the high-demand Ramadan period.

    The combination of suspended Middle East flights, closed airspace across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria and the UAE, and sky-high cargo insurance premiums has made air freight prohibitively expensive.

    Prices per kilogram for perishable exports have more than doubled. Slaughterhouses are struggling with excess stock. Some processing facilities have cut casual labour by as much as 80 per cent.

    If the disruption extends beyond Ramadan, industry players warn of structural damage to a sector that was previously registering strong growth.

    Tea, coffee, avocados and horticultural produce face less immediate disruption given their routing through European markets, but longer voyage times and elevated freight costs are beginning to feed through. Exporters warn that extended delivery timelines threaten product quality for time-sensitive goods.

    Renewable energy expert Juliana Kainga framed the currency dimension bluntly: “We might see an ease in our exports in terms of the people who import our goods, which means there is a lot less that is coming into our country in terms of dollars, and we need a lot more to pay out for the oil. So this puts a lot of pressure on the shilling.”

    LAPSSET’s Moment, and Its Limits

    The war has done more to advance the strategic case for the LAPSSET corridor than fifteen years of diplomatic promotion managed.

    The argument that Lamu could serve as a regional maritime hub, providing landlocked Ethiopia and South Sudan with an alternative to Djibouti and a safer entry point for Indian Ocean trade, has been validated in weeks by commercial reality.

    Shipping lines that previously had no interest in Lamu are now calling, some for the first time. Minas of Nisomar Group said what the port’s advocates had long argued but struggled to demonstrate: “Once the hinterland infrastructure of East Africa is well built and lit, we will be able to discharge more vehicle cargo and other goods destined for Kenya and neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and South Sudan.”

    The corridor’s incomplete infrastructure remains the binding constraint.

    The highways connecting Lamu to South Sudan and Ethiopia are unfinished. Without those road links, diverted cargo can be stored at Lamu but not efficiently distributed into the hinterland markets that justify the port’s full commercial logic. The LAPSSET corridor’s full 32 berths remain unbuilt, with only three operational. The war has delivered commercial validation at scale; it has not delivered the infrastructure needed to absorb it.

    The Reckoning

    Kenya’s relationship with the US-Israel-Iran war is, ultimately, a study in simultaneous gain and loss. The country is harvesting real revenue from Lamu, real bunkering income along its coast and real commercial visibility for infrastructure that had struggled to attract attention. It is absorbing a fuel bill that has effectively doubled, pressure on the shilling, collapsing export earnings in its most Middle East-dependent sectors and the certainty of consumer price increases that will eventually arrive at the pump. Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, addressing an audience at Chatham House in London, called on African nations to use the crisis as a warning to “reassess their global role and strengthen their economic independence.”

    The net position is deeply uncertain. Kenya is a net importer of oil products. Every barrel that costs more erodes purchasing power, raises production costs and amplifies the pressure on an economy that was already navigating fiscal tightening.

    The shipping revenue and bunkering gains are real but bounded. The fuel cost increase is real and systemic. Whether the former outweighs the latter depends on how long the war lasts, how quickly Iran’s pressure on the Hormuz can be degraded, and whether the commercial relationships forged in crisis survive into calmer conditions.

    What the war has already settled is the question nobody was seriously asking before 28 February: whether Lamu Port was worth building. Scores of Porsches, parked in an Indian Ocean warehouse on a UNESCO World Heritage island, have answered that definitively.

    The question Kenya now faces is whether it can extract lasting commercial advantage from a tragedy it did not cause, cannot control, and cannot fully afford.

  • World Bank Bans 3 PwC African Subsidiaries

    World Bank Bans 3 PwC African Subsidiaries

    The World Bank Group has barred Mauritius-based PricewaterhouseCoopers Associates Africa Ltd., along with PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited Kenya and PricewaterhouseCoopers Rwanda Limited, from its projects for 21 months, with the possibility of early reinstatement if certain conditions are met. The action follows findings of misconduct tied to a major cross-border electricity project linking Ethiopia and Kenya.

    The sanctions relate to the Eastern Electricity Highway Project, which forms part of a wider regional effort to strengthen power integration across East Africa. The project is intended to enable Ethiopia to export surplus electricity to Kenya, while helping to lower energy costs across the region.

    The move also comes against the backdrop of PwC’s history of regulatory scrutiny in different parts of the world, where it has faced penalties ranging from fines and reprimands to temporary bans and suspensions—making the latest sanction in Africa broadly in line with previous disciplinary actions.

    According to the World Bank, the issues arose during the selection and execution of the Fixed Asset Inventory and Revaluation contract for the Ethiopian Electric Utility. It found that PwC Associates misrepresented the availability, qualifications, and employment status of key experts, and did not fully disclose all subconsultants involved in the project.

    World Bank Bans 3 PwC African Subsidiaries for 21 Months

    “The debarment makes PwC Associates, PwC Kenya, PwC Rwanda, and any affiliates they control ineligible to participate in Bank Group-financed projects and operations. It is part of a settlement agreement under which the three companies admit culpability for sanctionable practices.” the report added.

    One of the entities provided misleading details on the expertise and availability of key personnel and did not release the full subcontracting arrangements, an action that didn’t meet World Bank’s integrity standards.

    As part of a negotiated settlement, the companies acknowledged their role in the misconduct and agreed to corrective measures. These include internal disciplinary steps, compliance reforms, staff training, and cooperation with ongoing oversight processes. The reduced length of the ban reflects these remedial efforts.

  • US Temporarily Allows Sale of Russian Oil

    US Temporarily Allows Sale of Russian Oil

    The United States is temporarily permitting the sale of Russian oil already at sea, the Treasury Department announced Thursday, as energy prices surged following US‑Israeli strikes on Iran that have intensified conflict in the Middle East.

    The move represents a limited easing of sanctions on Russia, which has faced economic restrictions over its invasion of Ukraine.

    The Treasury issued a licence allowing the delivery and sale of Russian crude oil and petroleum products loaded on vessels on or before 12:01 a.m. ET March 12, valid through 12:01 a.m. ET April 11.

    This follows a similar decision last week, which allowed Russian oil stranded at sea to be sold to India.

    US Temporarily Allows Sale of Russian Oil. Credit: Bloomberg

    Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the latest authorisation aims to “increase the global reach of existing supply” but stressed it is a “narrowly tailored, short-term measure.”

    He added that it would not provide “significant financial benefit to the Russian government, which derives the majority of its energy revenue from taxes assessed at the point of extraction.”

    Bessent had previously stated that the administration of President Donald Trump was considering removing additional sanctions on Russian oil.

    The announcement comes during disruptions in the global energy and transport sectors due to the Middle East conflict, including near-total halts in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for a fifth of the world’s oil supply.

  • Kenya’s Public Debt Explodes Past Sh12 Trillion, Devouring Nearly Half of All Tax Revenue

    Kenya’s Public Debt Explodes Past Sh12 Trillion, Devouring Nearly Half of All Tax Revenue

    Kenya’s total public debt has surged to Sh12.29 trillion, a staggering figure that now stands at 67.8 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product and blows well past the 55 per cent ceiling Parliament set as the legally acceptable threshold, according to a damning new report by Controller of Budget Margaret Nyakang’o.

    The debt stock, which stood at Sh11.80 trillion at the close of the 2024/25 financial year in June 2025, swelled by four per cent in just six months, adding nearly half a trillion shillings between July and December 2025 alone.

    The numbers, drawn from the National Government Budget Implementation Review Report for the first half of the 2025/26 financial year, expose the full weight of a borrowing addiction that critics say has become structurally irreversible under President William Ruto’s administration.

    Of the Sh12.29 trillion total, domestic lenders hold Sh6.82 trillion while external creditors are owed Sh5.46 trillion.

    The domestic pile has grown aggressively, rising by more than Sh514 billion in the first six months of the financial year, driven almost entirely by an unrelenting government appetite for Treasury bills and bonds.

    At its peak, the government was borrowing roughly Sh2.8 billion every single day from local markets, a pace that has alarmed economists and now draws a direct rebuke from the country’s own constitutional budget watchdog.

    “To enhance fiscal impact and ensure debt sustainability, borrowing should be strictly aligned with development projects that have measurable economic and social returns.” — Controller of Budget Margaret Nyakang’o

    The most alarming detail buried in the report is not the headline debt figure itself but what servicing it is costing ordinary Kenyans. In the six months to December 2025, the government spent Sh923.14 billion simply keeping up with existing debt obligations, including principal and interest.

    Of that sum, Sh545.9 billion was consumed by domestic debt servicing alone, comprising Sh183.66 billion in principal repayments and Sh362.24 billion in interest payments.

    Put another way, for every shilling collected in tax revenue during the period, 44 cents went directly toward servicing domestic debt. Nothing was left for schools, hospitals, roads or the millions of Kenyans living below the poverty line who were promised a bottom-up economic transformation.

    Dr Nyakang’o did not mince her words. She warned that the government’s domestic borrowing trajectory directly crowds out private sector investment, driving up interest rates and making credit unaffordable for businesses and individuals.

    Her report notes that financial corporations, including commercial banks and insurance companies, held the largest share of the domestic debt pile, with commercial banks alone sitting on Sh5.25 trillion in government paper by December 2025.

    Banks that lend to the government at guaranteed high rates have little incentive to take the credit risk of lending to Kenyan businesses, a dynamic that the Parliamentary Budget Office has separately described as an existential threat to Kenya’s long-term growth story.

    The national government budget for the 2025/26 financial year stands at Sh4.69 trillion, up seven per cent from Sh4.37 trillion the previous year. But revenue performance is struggling to keep pace with the country’s ambitions.

    In the first half of the year, the government collected Sh2.17 trillion, representing 49 per cent of the full-year revenue target. Against that backdrop, total government spending in the same period reached Sh2.18 trillion, marginally exceeding collections, with the resulting gap financed through yet more borrowing.

    The Education sector drew the fattest slice of the budget at Sh703.07 billion, trailed by the Energy, Infrastructure and ICT cluster at Sh534.63 billion. Yet even as headline allocations rise, the Controller of Budget flagged persistently low absorption of the development budget as a systemic failure.

    Money is being appropriated. It is not being spent. Procurement automation remains incomplete. Key projects are stalled.

    The gap between budgeted development spending and actual disbursements has widened year after year, calling into question whether Kenya’s ballooning borrowing is actually translating into assets that could justify the cost.

    One of the more incendiary revelations in the report concerns the use of Article 223 of the Constitution, the emergency spending provision that permits the National Treasury to draw from the Consolidated Fund without prior parliamentary approval, provided it seeks ratification within two months.

    During the first half of the 2025/26 financial year, the Treasury invoked Article 223 to approve Sh115.11 billion in spending, the bulk of which, Sh86.29 billion or 75 per cent of the total, was deployed to fund a sovereign Eurobond buyback.

    The government used a constitutional emergency mechanism, designed for disasters and unforeseen crises, to execute an international capital markets transaction.

    That Eurobond buyback forms part of what the Treasury frames as proactive liability management. Kenya has now executed four sovereign bond buybacks in just over two years. In October 2025, the government repurchased $628.44 million of its 7.25 per cent notes due 2028, paying bondholders a 3.75 per cent premium over face value.

    In February 2026, Kenya returned to international capital markets and raised $2.25 billion in a dual-tranche Eurobond, issuing $900 million in seven-year notes at 8.1 per cent and $1.35 billion in 12-year bonds at 8.95 per cent, using the proceeds in part to conduct further buybacks of its 2028 and 2032 notes. The strategy has earned Kenya cautious praise from rating agencies.

    Moody’s upgraded the country’s sovereign credit rating from Caa1 to B3 in January 2026, citing improved foreign exchange reserves, which reached $12.2 billion, equivalent to 5.3 months of import cover. S&P Global had upgraded Kenya to B in August 2025.

    But the ratings improvement, welcome as it is, papers over a deeper structural crisis. Kenya’s interest-to-revenue ratio now stands at over 30 per cent, a level the World Bank has described as indicative of serious debt distress.

    The Parliamentary Budget Office projects that interest payments alone will average Sh1.2 trillion annually over the medium term, consuming roughly 41 per cent of total government revenue. Interest costs are set to become the single largest line item in the national budget, outstripping what the government spends on healthcare, agriculture and social protection combined, and reaching 150 per cent of total development spending over the 2026/27 to 2028/29 period.

    The 2026 Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy, tabled before the National Assembly, reveals the full trajectory of the crisis.

    The government plans to borrow an additional Sh5.9 trillion between the 2026/27 and 2028/29 financial years, a pace equivalent to Sh5.5 billion a day or Sh3.8 million a minute around the clock. On current projections, total public debt will reach Sh15.7 trillion by June 2029.

    The strategy anchors 82 per cent of new borrowing in the domestic market, a figure that the Parliamentary Budget Office says breaches the limits set under the Public Finance Management Act and risks compounding the very crowding-out effect Nyakang’o has warned against.

    The International Monetary Fund, whose $3.6 billion extended programme with Kenya lapsed in April 2025 without completion of its final review, dispatched a staff mission to Nairobi in late February 2026 to lay the groundwork for a new programme.

    The mission’s priorities were familiar: fiscal consolidation, debt sustainability, governance reforms and revenue mobilisation. Kenya Revenue Authority has been set a target of Sh3.5 trillion for 2026/27, a stretch goal that most analysts regard with scepticism given that the authority has missed its targets in each of the past three consecutive years.

    Dr Nyakang’o’s recommendations are technically sound but politically difficult. She has called on the government to reduce its fiscal deficit in the medium term, shift borrowing toward concessional external financing, accelerate full automation of the Electronic Government Procurement System and integrate it with the Integrated Financial Management Information System, and restrict Article 223 spending to genuine emergencies.

    Whether a government that has already spent the constitutional emergency piggybank on a Eurobond transaction will choose fiscal restraint over its borrowing habit remains the defining question for Kenya’s economic future.

  • THE MAN WHO OWNS YOUR GOVERNMENT: How a Private Firm Seized Kenya’s Digital State and Refuses to Let Go

    THE MAN WHO OWNS YOUR GOVERNMENT: How a Private Firm Seized Kenya’s Digital State and Refuses to Let Go

    KEY FACTS: The eCitizen Money Trail

    Sh1.45 billion collected by Webmasters consortium in FY2024 alone. Sh700 million processed daily on eCitizen. Sh127.85 million transferred to private entities without documentation. Sh7.05 billion held in unsanctioned settlement accounts. Sh44.8 billion in total collections whose accuracy cannot be confirmed. Sh2.57 billion in receipts with no matching invoices. Sh195.7 million paid irregularly for gateway services. Zero Data Protection Impact Assessments conducted. Zero signed Service Level Agreements with payment providers.


    It takes a particular kind of audacity to look the President of the Republic in the eye at State House, agree to surrender control of the country’s most critical digital infrastructure, and then, three years later, still be running that same infrastructure while billing the government hundreds of millions of shillings every month.

    It takes an even rarer kind of impunity to respond to a major newspaper investigation exposing your firm’s collection of Sh1.45 billion in public fees by posting on Facebook that the figure is, in your own words, ‘very little money for what government is getting in return. We actually need more.’

    That is James Ayugi Panaito in a sentence.

    He is the founder and chief executive of Webmasters Kenya Limited, the private firm that built the eCitizen platform in 2014 and has, through a labyrinthine web of associated companies, managed to transform a World Bank-funded government project into what amounts to a private toll road through which every Kenyan must pass to access the most basic of state services.

    From applying for a passport to registering a business, from paying university fees to renewing a driving licence, the platform that sits between you and your government is controlled not by the state, but by James Ayugi.

    And he has made abundantly clear that he has no intention of giving it back.

    “We’ve run eCitizen for 10 years. We are still young and will continue serving Kenyans.” — James Ayugi, CEO Webmasters Kenya, LinkedIn, March 2026

    The Architecture of Capture

    The eCitizen story begins in the early years of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration, when the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation bankrolled an ambitious initiative to digitise Kenya’s government services.

    The contract for development and maintenance went to Webmasters Kenya Limited, a firm whose principal shareholder, director and chief executive was then better known publicly as James Panaito.

    The name change would come later, once his foothold in government was secure enough that obscuring his identity was no longer necessary.

    The platform launched in December 2014 with an initial roster of ten services.

    In its original design, according to court documents filed by Treasury auditor Willis Odhiambo Okwacho, eCitizen was intended to be free to citizens, funded instead through budgetary allocations.

    No documentation existed, Mr Okwacho told the court, to show that citizens would be charged any fee over and above the normal transaction costs. What followed was a departure from that founding principle that has cost Kenyan citizens billions of shillings.

    Webmasters introduced a Sh50 ‘convenience fee’ on every eCitizen transaction without approval from the National Treasury, without gazettal as appropriation-in-aid, and without any enabling provision in the Appropriation Act.

    It was, in the measured language of the audit, introduced outside the laid-down procedures. In less measured terms, it was a private tax levied on citizens accessing their own government, collected by a private firm into private accounts, for years before anyone in authority raised a formal objection.

    By the time Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu’s latest special audit landed before Parliament, the numbers had grown to staggering proportions.

    In the single financial year ending June 2024 alone, the Webmasters consortium collected Sh591.9 million in convenience fees and an additional Sh857.2 million in maintenance fees, a combined Sh1.45 billion extracted from public funds and citizen pockets.

    The platform, by that point, was processing upwards of Sh700 million daily. At current transaction volumes, Ayugi’s consortium bills the government between Sh100 million and Sh200 million every month.

    Three Companies, One Man

    What makes the eCitizen arrangement so extraordinary, and so difficult to challenge, is the deliberate fragmentation of the enterprise into multiple legal entities that confuse accountability while consolidating control under a single beneficial ownership structure.

    The platform is operated by a consortium formally constituted as Electronic Citizen Services, or ECS LLC, comprising three companies.

    Webmasters Kenya Limited, Ayugi’s original vehicle, provides customer care and technical coordination. Pesaflow Limited handles all payment processing across the platform. Olive Tree Media Limited manages bulk messaging, security notifications and revenue mobilisation.

    Together they touch every dimension of eCitizen’s operations. Together, they are all roads leading to James Ayugi.

    The story of Pesaflow is particularly instructive. Between 2014 and 2017, the payment function on eCitizen was handled by Goldrock Capital Limited, a firm that Webmasters Africa, Ayugi’s other vehicle, had subcontracted to manage fund flows from citizens to the government’s consolidated fund account at KCB.

    The National Treasury, when it eventually discovered the arrangement, declared it illegal on the grounds that it had never approved the subcontracting. Goldrock was ejected.

    The Directorate of Criminal Investigations launched an inquiry, writing to Webmasters Africa seeking information on suspected fraud and embezzlement of funds flowing through the eCitizen payment system. Government ministries and departments, the DCI letter noted, had lost funds paid through the platform.

    That investigation, remarkably, appears to have gone nowhere.

    Instead, in August 2017, at the precise moment Goldrock was locked in court battles with the government and Webmasters over the Sh127.8 million frozen in eCitizen wallets, a new company was quietly incorporated to take over the payment function. That company was Pesaflow Limited.

    At first glance, Pesaflow appeared to be an entirely new entity. Its largest shareholders were listed as Evid Araka Sibi and Frank Lawrence Ochieng Weya, with 3,000 shares each, and Charles Wambani Sewe and Larry Ochieng Agoro holding 2,000 shares apiece. Closer examination revealed that all four individuals had previously worked for Webmasters Africa.

    Evid Sibi, who became Pesaflow’s managing director, had in fact been a director at Webmasters Kenya before departing to co-found the payment firm.

    The individuals who had been operating an illegal payment arrangement had, through a new corporate vehicle, simply resumed the same function. The DCI probe that never materialised had cleared the path.

    Mr Ayugi, when pressed on his connections to Pesaflow by Business Daily Africa, declined to explain the links. He acknowledged being the principal shareholder, director and chief executive of both Webmasters Kenya and Webmasters Africa but insisted the companies were separate legal entities.

    The individuals who had been operating an illegal payment arrangement had, through a new corporate vehicle, simply resumed the same function. The DCI probe that never was had cleared the path.

    The Billion-Shilling Handover That Never Happened

    When President William Ruto swept to power in September 2022, there was, briefly, reason to believe the Webmasters arrangement might finally be unwound.

    His administration moved quickly. Within weeks of being sworn in, Ruto summoned Ayugi and the Webmasters team to State House and delivered a blunt message: hand over the platform and abandon all financial claims, because the firm had paid itself enough from convenience fees across nearly eight years of operations.

    A follow-up meeting was convened on November 30, 2022, at 7:15 in the morning in the National Treasury’s 14th-floor boardroom.

    Treasury Cabinet Secretary Njuguna Ndung’u and his ICT counterpart Eliud Owalo led the government’s delegation.

    The resolution was unambiguous. Webmasters was to transfer everything, including front-end and back-end rights, source code, system architecture, user manuals, and all associated materials, and then train government staff to take over. The deadline for full completion, including staff capacity building, was July 13, 2023.

    On January 13, 2023, the Ministry of ICT and Webmasters formalised a handover agreement. Goldrock and Webmasters dropped their outstanding financial claims and withdrew their court suits.

    The government sent sixty-two officials to an eight-day workshop at the PrideInn Paradise Beach Resort in Mombasa, at a cost of at least Sh11.9 million in accommodation alone, to be trained by Webmasters on platform onboarding.

    Jambopay and Safaricom staff participated as trainers. The government paid. The training happened. The deadline passed.

    Three years later, Webmasters and its consortium are still running eCitizen.

    More troubling than the failure to hand over is what the January 2023 agreement reveals when examined against the platform’s earlier history. In 2017, the World Bank’s IFC had handed over the eCitizen platform to the National Treasury in its entirety, transferring all source code, contracts and documentation with a formal handover letter dated August 7, 2017.

    In legal terms, the government had owned eCitizen since that date. By 2022, however, the government found itself negotiating with Webmasters as though the platform still belonged to the vendor.

    MPs on the Public Accounts Committee, reviewing the matter in 2025, put the question directly: it was not explained, they noted in their report, how ownership and control of eCitizen ended up back in the hands of the vendor after having already been handed over to the National Treasury by IFC in 2017.

    No answer has been provided. The mystery of the double transfer, in which a platform that legally belonged to the state somehow reverted to private hands without any documented legal or administrative justification, sits at the heart of the scandal.

    The Kill Switch

    If the story of the convenience fee represents an act of prolonged financial extraction, the contract signed on May 25, 2023, between the ICT Authority and the ECS consortium represents something potentially far graver: the formalisation of a private veto over the functioning of the Kenyan state.

    The agreement, reviewed by multiple media organisations, contains a clause whose implications should alarm any serious constitutionalist or national security analyst.

    In the event of termination, it states, ‘the suppliers shall be entitled to rescind, withdraw or otherwise uninstall all their proprietary infrastructure and resources, including all technical infrastructure whether software or otherwise, that may have been deployed in order to enable them to provide their services under this agreement.’

    Put plainly: if the government falls out with James Ayugi, Webmasters and its consortium have a contractual right to switch off eCitizen.

    In a country where over 22,000 government services, from passport applications and immigration control to university fee payments, business registrations, national identification, tax compliance and NHIF contributions, flow exclusively through this single platform, that is not a commercial contract clause. It is a weapon.

    MP Dido Raso, serving as vice-chair of the National Assembly Committee on Security and National Administration, questioned the legality of the contract’s execution, noting the conspicuous absence of a signature from the Principal Secretary for ICT.

    Rarieda MP Otiende Amollo described the situation as a monumental scandal.

    Mathioya’s Edwin Mugo warned that Kenya was staring at a monumental monster it would be unable to deal with in future. Turkana MP Joseph Namwar was more direct, calling the platform itself a scam.

    In July 2023, a distributed denial-of-service attack on eCitizen disrupted access to government services nationwide for several days. No government entity controlled the response.

    The Auditor-General has since formally warned that the absence of a state-controlled backup system means a sustained cyberattack could bring the economy to its knees. The Communications Authority and relevant security ministries have been tasked with oversight. They have yet to act.

    If the government falls out with James Ayugi, the consortium has a contractual right to switch off eCitizen. That is not a commercial clause. It is a weapon.

    The Missing Billions

    The financial irregularities documented in Gathungu’s audits read less like the failures of an imperfect system and more like the methodical exploitation of one deliberately kept opaque.

    The special audit for the financial year ending June 30, 2024, flagged over Sh9.6 billion in questionable transactions.

    At the centre of the figure is Sh7.05 billion sitting in eCitizen collection and settlement accounts as of that date, the product of an absence of any signed Service Level Agreements between the National Treasury and the platform’s financial service providers.

    Without SLAs, the Auditor-General warned, nothing prevents service providers from utilising that float for their own benefit.

    Four payments totalling Sh127.85 million were transferred from the official government M-Pesa Paybill 222222 directly to private entities on January 25, 2024, without a single document to justify or authorise the transfers.

    An undisclosed Equity Bank account named ‘Pesaflow,’ which had not been approved by the National Treasury, received Sh68.7 million and an additional Sh6.2 million. A separate ‘Pesaflow2’ account processed Sh68.7 million and USD 48.1 million through what the audit termed unapproved channels.

    Furthermore, Sh549.69 million was paid to a company called Electronic Citizens Solutions Limited, which was not party to the ICT Authority contract, meaning public money flowed to an entity with no legal standing in the arrangement.

    A further Sh195.7 million was paid for ‘payment gateway services,’ a charge the audit deemed irregular on the grounds that the government should not pay external parties to use its own platform.

    Discrepancies in revenue reporting mean the accuracy of Sh44.8 billion in total collections through eCitizen cannot be confirmed. The government’s own departments, including the State Law Office, were found unable to access financial reports on revenues generated from their own services on the platform.

    No Data Protection Impact Assessment has ever been conducted for a platform that holds the identity, payment and service records of virtually every adult Kenyan. Government agencies resolved technical problems by contacting the vendor via WhatsApp.

    The Impunity of the Indispensable

    What has shielded Webmasters from the consequences that would, in any functional accountability environment, have long since followed is the impunity of the indispensable.

    The firm and its associated entities have, over eleven years, made themselves so deeply embedded in the architecture of government that removing them now carries genuine risk of service disruption. That condition was not an accident.

    It was the product of a conscious strategy to expand eCitizen’s footprint, to onboard thousands of services beyond the original ten, and to resist every attempt to transfer technical knowledge to government officials.

    Ayugi has been remarkably candid about the logic.

    In a February 2025 interview following the Business Daily investigation, he acknowledged that his group bills the government between Sh100 million and Sh200 million every month, and suggested those figures should be higher. When the government attempted the 2023 handover, he told another interviewer, no team in government possessed the capacity to handle the platform’s complexity. He used the word ‘primitive’ to describe the idea that the public sector, rather than his firm, should earn revenue from running public digital infrastructure.

    His vision extends well beyond Kenya.

    Having built what he describes as the world’s most advanced integrated government services platform, Ayugi has been explicit that eCitizen Kenya is merely a proof of concept for a global commercial enterprise.

    Webmasters has delivered related services to Rwanda, Somalia and Iraq.

    He has spoken publicly of making ‘real money’ when the model is exported internationally. The question Kenyans should be asking is whether their compulsory participation in his platform, their data, their transactions, their government services, is the capital investment funding his global expansion.

    Consumer advocate Stephen Mutoro has alleged that Ayugi’s grip on the platform is protected by a cartel with interests spanning the National Treasury, the Central Bank of Kenya and State House, with ethnic affiliations providing additional insulation for the beneficial owners who remain, in Mutoro’s characterisation, hidden from public view.

    A State That Cannot Govern Itself

    What the eCitizen scandal ultimately exposes is not simply the avarice of a single entrepreneur or the negligence of a few civil servants. It exposes a structural failure of the Kenyan state, a failure to develop and retain the technical capacity to run its own critical infrastructure, to enforce its own contracts and presidential directives, and to protect public funds and citizen data from private exploitation.

    The government has known about the Webmasters problem since at least 2017, when its own internal audit first raised the alarm. It has known about the illegal convenience fee, the unapproved payment arrangements, the absence of data protection assessments, and the concentration of operational control in private hands. It has received the same recommendations from the Auditor-General in successive annual reports.

    It has summoned principal secretaries, held parliamentary committee sessions, commissioned special audits and signed handover agreements. And every time, the platform has remained exactly where it was: in the hands of James Ayugi.

    President Ruto stood before cameras on June 30, 2023, to relaunch eCitizen with fanfare as a flagship achievement of his administration’s digital agenda. Behind the spectacle, the man whose firm retained the kill switch over the entire enterprise had attended the same event. A platform built with World Bank money, declared government property in 2017, remained, in every operational and practical sense, a private business.

    The May 2023 contract with the ECS consortium runs for three years. It expires in May 2026. As the deadline approaches, the question is whether this government will, at last, do what two administrations have failed to do, or whether James Ayugi will once again demonstrate that in the contest between a determined private operator and a diffident state, the one who actually controls the infrastructure wins every time.

    In the meantime, every Kenyan who logs onto eCitizen to apply for a document, pay a fee or register a service is, whether they know it or not, enriching a private consortium that has turned the machinery of democratic governance into a revenue stream. The state they are paying to access is not, in any meaningful sense, theirs.

    The state they are paying to access is not, in any meaningful sense, theirs.

  • Putin Says Energy Crisis Has Arrived But Russia Is Ready To Work With Europe

    Putin Says Energy Crisis Has Arrived But Russia Is Ready To Work With Europe

    Summary

    • Putin says oil output relying on Hormuz Strait could stop in a month
    • Russia says it is ready to supply oil and gas to Europe
    • Putin says Russian firms should make use of situation
    • Putin says high oil prices may be ​temporary

    MOSCOW, March 9 (Reuters) – Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Monday that the U.S.-Israeli war ‌on Iran had triggered a global energy crisis and cautioned that oil production dependent on transport through the Strait of Hormuz could soon come to a halt.

    Putin said that Russia — the world’s second-largest oil exporter and holder of the biggest natural gas reserves — was ready to work ​again with European customers if they wanted to return to long-term cooperation.

    Western powers, however, have spent the past ​four years sharply reducing their reliance on Russian oil and gas in response to Moscow’s ⁠war in Ukraine and subsequent EU and G7 sanctions.

    The loss of the European market has deprived Russia of its ​most lucrative customers and forced it to sell oil and gas at steep discounts to Asia.

    Speaking at a televised meeting with ​government officials and the heads of Russia’s leading oil and gas producers, Putin said that Russia had repeatedly warned that destabilising the Middle East could lead to an energy crisis with grave implications for the global economy — a turn of events he said had now ​materialised.

    Oil prices exceeded $100 per barrel on Monday to reach peaks unseen since 2022 as the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts ​for roughly a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows, has been effectively closed due to the Iran war.

    “Oil production ‌dependent on ⁠the Strait of Hormuz risks halting completely within the next month. It has already begun to decline, and storage facilities in the region are filling with oil that cannot be transported…is extremely difficult to transport, or is extremely expensive to transport,” Putin said.

    He said Russian companies should take advantage of the current situation in the Middle East, though he noted ​that the spike in prices ​was probably temporary. Oil ⁠and gas revenues make up around a quarter of total federal budget proceeds.

    G7 nations said on Monday they were prepared to implement “necessary measures” in response to surging global oil prices, ​but stopped short of committing to release emergency reserves.

    “We’re ready to work with Europeans too. ​But we ⁠need some signals from them that they’re ready and willing to work with us and will ensure this sustainability and stability,” Putin said.

    Last week he instructed the government to consider switching remaining Russian oil and gas flows away from Europe, before the ⁠European Union ​starts enforcing its decision to completely ban Russian fossil fuels.

    Before the Ukraine ​war, Europe was buying more than 40% of its gas from Russia, but combined sales of pipeline gas and LNG from Russia accounted for only ​13% of total EU imports in 2025.

  • KPA To Be Dissolved, Replaced By A Liability Firm As Govt Sets To Privatise Lamu Port And Two Mombasa Berths

    KPA To Be Dissolved, Replaced By A Liability Firm As Govt Sets To Privatise Lamu Port And Two Mombasa Berths

    KEY FIGURES AT A GLANCE

    Sh44bn Projected annual cash flow increase from Mombasa and Lamu ports post-PPP

    Sh45bn Estimated rehabilitation cost for Mombasa berths 11 to 14, to be funded by the private concessionaire

    Sh44.5bn Private investment being sought for Lamu Port development, including agri-bulk and liquid bulk terminals

    5% Current capacity utilisation at Lamu Port, against a designed annual capacity of 1.2 million TEUs

    45.46 million tonnes Total cargo handled at Mombasa Port in 2025, a record and up from 41 million tonnes in 2024

    66 Commercial state entities being restructured into profit-oriented public limited companies under the GOE Act 2025

    25 years Duration of proposed concession periods for Lamu Container Terminal berths and Mombasa Container Terminal 1

    10,000 KPA employees whose employment conditions are at the centre of stakeholder concerns


    The Kenya Ports Authority, the statutory body that has controlled every scheduled seaport on the country’s Indian Ocean coastline since 1978, is on the verge of extinction in its current legal form.

    The government is in the final stages of repealing the KPA Act, a move that will dissolve the authority as a state corporation and reincorporate it as a Public Limited Liability Company under the Companies Act, simultaneously opening the door for private operators to take charge of three berths at Lamu Port and four berths at the Port of Mombasa under a public-private partnership framework.

    Confidential disclosure documents from the government’s PPP process, seen by the Business Daily, show that KPA has already commenced the selection of private operators for Lamu Port berths 1 to 3, the Lamu Special Economic Zone, Mombasa berths 11 to 14, and Mombasa Container Terminal 1. The government expects the transition to generate additional cash flows of Sh44 billion annually from the two ports combined.

    The legal scaffolding for the transformation was enacted in November last year when President William Ruto assented to the Government Owned Enterprises Act, 2025, which came into force in December.

    The law repeals the State Corporations Act and converts commercial state bodies into profit-oriented public limited companies under the Companies Act, with the National Treasury as the central shareholder of record. It applies to entities where the government holds more than 50 per cent of share capital, and reorganises 66 commercial entities to operate as businesses rather than government departments, with dividends channelled directly to the Exchequer.

    THE STRUCTURAL BREAK

    Roads and Transport Cabinet Secretary Davis Chirchir has confirmed that KPA management will henceforth have full autonomy to make key decisions, including procurement of equipment, without prior clearance from the national government. Under the current model, KPA has been heavily dependent on concessional loans secured by the government to fund capital expenditure, a dependency the new framework seeks to permanently sever.

    “The GOE Act will increase pressure on KPA to become profitable and self-sustainable. Public-private partnership transactions are the most effective way to achieve these goals. Once becoming a GOE, the authority is expected to operate as a commercial, profit-oriented entity,” the government’s PPP disclosure document states.

    The reincorporation as a PLC is specifically designed to make KPA self-financing, ending its reliance on the National Treasury for borrowing.

    The GOE Act separates ownership roles between the National Treasury and relevant line ministries, establishing performance contracts with each entity and a skills-based, largely independent board structure with tighter accountability and measurable targets. For KPA, adopting a PLC structure is projected to align terminal performance with Kenya’s growing port throughput, which reached 45.46 million tonnes at Mombasa in 2025, up from 41 million tonnes the prior year.

    Constitutional law firm TripleOKLaw described the GOE Act as the most significant reset of Kenya’s state-owned sector since independence, noting that it makes “a further watershed” by repealing bespoke statutes that created commercial state corporations by legislative fiat, and converting them into limited-liability companies with an explicit mechanism to transfer their assets, liabilities, and businesses into the new vehicles.

    WHAT THE PPP COVERS

    At the heart of the restructuring exercise is the concurrent push to bring private capital into specific port facilities that the government has acknowledged it cannot upgrade on its own. The PPP framework as currently disclosed covers four distinct transactions.

    For Lamu Port berths 1 to 3, the government is proposing a landlord concession model in which a private investor takes full responsibility for terminal handling operations for a period of 25 years, paying KPA agreed fixed and variable fees.

    The port, constructed between 2014 and 2021 at a cost of approximately $480 million financed by the government, has been a colossal underperformance since it was commissioned.

    KPA’s own data shows Lamu handled just 382 TEUs in 2021 and 1,779 TEUs in 2022, against an annual design capacity of 1.2 million TEUs. The port is currently estimated to be operating at just five per cent of that capacity.

    The government is seeking up to Sh44.5 billion worth of private investment into the Port of Lamu alone, with a substantial portion targeted at developing the port’s agri-bulk and liquid bulk terminals, along with the Lamu Special Economic Zone, a 500-hectare parcel earmarked mainly for agricultural processing and warehousing activity servicing the LAPSSET Corridor connecting the port to Ethiopia and South Sudan.

    For Mombasa berths 11 to 14, the proposed structure is a Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain arrangement, under which the private investor would fund and execute a complete rehabilitation of a facility that was developed in 1967 and has not been modernised to international standards.

    The PPP disclosure document puts the cost of this refurbishment at Sh45 billion. The work would include strengthening and deepening the quay, constructing a modern multipurpose terminal, building a container storage yard, and establishing a truck waiting area.

    For Mombasa Container Terminal 1, comprising berths 16 to 19 built from 2012 onwards with Japanese financing, the proposed model mirrors Lamu, with a 25-year landlord concession requiring the private party to pay fixed and variable fees to KPA.

    Under all four models, no public infrastructure will be sold. KPA retains ownership and regulatory oversight of the assets. Cargo operations are temporarily transferred to the private sector. The document’s language is unambiguous on the point: “The landlord model is expected to provide the private party undertaking day-to-day operations with the flexibility to make timely decisions while preserving public control over the strategic assets and functions.”

    The model is not novel globally. Ports in Los Angeles, New York, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Tanger, Santos and Singapore all operate under landlord-type frameworks. Tanzania tapped DP World to operate part of Dar es Salaam port for 30 years in a deal that has piled significant competitive pressure on Mombasa’s traditional dominance of the northern corridor.

    A FIVE-YEAR ROAD PAVED WITH OBSTRUCTION

    The road to this point has been neither straight nor quiet. The government’s ambition to bring private operators into KPA’s port facilities has been in train since at least 2022, when the National Treasury under the previous administration first approached Dubai-based DP World with an invitation to table a proposal to finance, build and manage five major port projects. That process collapsed amid accusations of a secret deal, triggering fierce political opposition from politicians who are today in government.

    When the Kenya Kwanza administration reversed course and embraced the same concept in September 2023, KPA Managing Director Captain William Ruto formally invited sealed bids for the qualification of private operators across the same four facility tranches. The tender, numbered KPA/052/2023-2024/CPS, set an initial submission deadline of October 12, 2023.

    Within weeks, the process ran into the courts. The Taireni Association of Mijikenda, a civil society group that had previously challenged a 2019 attempt to hand Container Terminal 2 to a private operator, filed a constitutional petition in November 2023. Justice Chacha Mwita of the Milimani High Court issued conservatory orders suspending the tender on November 27, 2023, directing the government to respond within three days.

    The association argued that the targeted berths were fully funded from public money and could not lawfully be disposed of under the PPP Act, citing the Sh60 billion construction cost of the Lamu berths alone and the Sh30 billion price tag of Container Terminal 2 berths 16 to 18 as evidence of the scale of public investment at stake.

    The case was assigned to a three-judge bench constituted by then Chief Justice Martha Koome. The litigation extended into 2024, before the parties arrived at a consent agreement signed on April 2, 2024, and subsequently adopted as a court order by the bench.

    The consent required KPA to comply with constitutional requirements and PPP legislation on public participation, value for money assessments, stakeholder involvement and local content obligations. It cleared the path for the process to resume, provided those conditions were met.

    Then came a further legal blow. On September 24, 2025, the High Court ruled the Privatisation Act 2023 unconstitutional, invalidating a parallel government effort to privatise 11 additional parastatals including the Kenya Pipeline Company and the Kenyatta International Convention Centre.

    That ruling did not directly extinguish the KPA PPP process, which is proceeding under the PPP Act 2022 and the newly enacted GOE Act 2025, but it reinforced the legal fragility of Kenya’s broader privatisation ambitions.

    The Commission on Administrative Justice added its own pressure in February 2025, directing KPA Managing Director Captain William Ruto to release all privatisation-related documents to the public within 21 days, acting on a complaint from a human rights organisation that had been denied access. KPA’s information handling remained contested even as the transaction documentation was being finalised.

    WORKFORCE: THE MOST EXPLOSIVE VARIABLE

    Of all the fault lines in the restructuring, none is more politically combustible than the question of what happens to KPA’s employees. The authority employs approximately 10,000 staff. The Taireni Association’s 2023 petition was blunt: “With the coming in of the investors, the restructuring and staff reorganisation will ensue with attendant risks of redundancies and retrenchment.”

    The PPP disclosure document attempts to address the concern through a voluntary secondment model. Under this arrangement, existing agreements between KPA and its employees are transferred to the new company. Staff would remain formally employed by KPA but have their services leased to the private operator. “The secondment will be voluntary,” the document states. KPA retains some berths under its own management, which the government argues creates a pricing counterbalance and preserves a pool of direct employment.

    Maritime analyst Andrew Mwangura, who has closely tracked the port restructuring process, acknowledged the operational logic of the move but warned that workforce transitions must strictly comply with labour laws.

    He noted that feasibility studies project KPA’s valuation could increase from three per cent to 13 per cent under various partnership scenarios, and that operational risk would be transferred to whichever entity is best positioned to manage it.

    Shippers Council of Eastern Africa Chief Executive Agayo Ogambi said the rising throughput figures at Mombasa, growing at over 10 per cent annually, made private capital investment not only attractive but necessary.

    He however issued a direct warning to the government: “The PPP must be transparent, ensuring public and national interests are safeguarded. Job security must remain a priority as the port supports millions of livelihoods and resultant job loss could be catastrophic.”

    THE COMPETITIVE IMPERATIVE

    Behind the bureaucratic restructuring lies a hard commercial reality. Mombasa handles cargo for over 200 million people across Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Tanzania. It is the largest port in East Africa and the second largest on the continent. But its position is no longer uncontested.

    Tanzania has handed DP World a 30-year concession at Dar es Salaam port, with the Dubai operator investing heavily in capacity expansion.

    The shift has already been felt at Mombasa: total cargo throughput dropped to 33.74 million metric tonnes in 2022 from 34.76 million tonnes in 2021, as landlocked Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda moved increasing volumes through the Tanzanian route. The 2025 rebound to 45.46 million tonnes signals a recovery, but the competitive threat from Dar is structural and long-term.

    Mombasa currently requires 14 reach stackers, 43 terminal tractors and 11 forklifts to handle existing volumes. Tenders have been issued for 10 rubber-tyred gantry cranes and two ship-to-shore gantry cranes to match increasing cargo volumes.

    KPA’s master plan for 2018 to 2047 envisages Lamu as a landlord port from the outset, with private operators running the terminals and KPA acting as infrastructure owner and regulator. Private participation is not a deviation from that plan but its intended fulfilment.

    Whether the current iteration of that plan survives political pressure, legal challenge and the rigours of financial closure is a separate question.

    The National Treasury has previously estimated that reaching financial closure on the PPP transactions would take at least three years from the point of financial structuring.

    Bidders must form joint ventures with Kenyan firms holding not less than 15 per cent of the project company. The government has been simultaneously courting international port operators including DP World, whose managing director for sub-Saharan Africa told Bloomberg that the firm was actively eyeing Lamu under a lease arrangement.

    What is certain is that the government has now assembled more legal architecture for this project than at any prior point in its long and turbulent history. The GOE Act provides the restructuring vehicle.

    The PPP Act 2022 provides the concession framework. The 2024 court consent provides the procedural cover. What remains to be demonstrated is whether the execution will match the ambition, or whether Kenya’s most profitable state corporation will again find itself trapped between an urgent commercial need and an unresolved political fight.

  • After Venezuela Blow, Iran Supply Risks Test China’s Oil Strategy

    After Venezuela Blow, Iran Supply Risks Test China’s Oil Strategy

    – ‘About 50 million barrels of Iranian crude are currently sitting offshore China and Malaysia, providing a supply cushion to any disruption,’ says Kpler analyst Matt Smith

    – Halt in Iranian flows could force Chinese refiners to sharply cut processing rates or seek more expensive replacement crude on global markets, according to Argus Media analyst Tom Reed

    Tensions in the Middle East have pushed oil prices higher and cast new uncertainty over Iranian crude flows, a development that experts say could ripple through China’s refining sector just as another key source of discounted oil, Venezuela, becomes increasingly constrained.

    China is the world’s largest crude oil importer, bringing in roughly 11.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025, according to the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University. Analysts estimate that around 2.6 million bdp of these imports consist of discounted or sanctioned crude, including approximately 1.38 million bpd from Iran, making Tehran one of China’s most significant external suppliers.

    These discounted barrels have become particularly important for independent refiners, often referred to as “teapot” refineries, which operate largely in the eastern province of Shandong. Unlike large state-owned companies, these installations typically rely on lower-cost crude supplies to remain competitive in domestic fuel markets.

    But the supply cushion is now under pressure from two directions. Iran’s exports face growing risks as its war with Israel and the US escalates, while shipments from Venezuela – another key source of heavy discounted crude for Chinese refiners – have already begun to shrink after Washington captured President Nicolas Maduro and diverted Venezuelan oil toward American markets.

    Iranian crude flows provide critical supply

    Despite the potential risks, as Iran faces large-scale US-Israel attacks, including strikes on oil depots, analysts say China’s supply chain currently includes buffers that could mitigate the immediate impact of any disruption.

    Matt Smith, lead oil analyst at energy analytics firm Kpler, said a significant volume of Iranian crude is already positioned near China in storage or transit. “About 50 million barrels of Iranian crude are currently sitting offshore China and Malaysia, providing a supply cushion to any disruption,” Smith told Anadolu.

    He added that Iran increased shipments ahead of the recent escalation in the Middle East, meaning additional cargoes are already en route to Chinese buyers.

    These barrels could help Chinese refiners manage short-term supply disruptions if exports from Iran were temporarily interrupted.

    Smith, however, added that refiners have already begun adjusting their crude sourcing strategies amid shifting market conditions.

    “China has increasingly been pulling in more Russian crude in recent months, given growing discounts as India has dialed back purchases,” he said.

    According to him, Russia has become the leading supplier for Shandong since late last year, overtaking Iran as refiners search for alternative discounted barrels.

    Middle Eastern supply routes remain key

    While disruptions to Iranian exports would affect certain refiners, analysts say the larger concern lies in the stability of Middle Eastern supply routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, which is effectively closed to oil shipping due to the war.

    Smith said that nearly half of China’s seaborne crude imports originate from the Middle East, making the region a critical pillar of its energy security.

    “Supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are a much, much bigger issue than the loss of Venezuelan crude,” he said.

    The strait carries about 20% of the world’s oil shipments and is considered one of the most important energy chokepoints. Any sustained disruption could affect not only Iranian exports but also shipments from other major Gulf producers that supply Asian markets.

    Independent refineries most exposed

    The most immediate effects of any Iranian supply disruption would likely be felt by independent refineries clustered in eastern China.

    Tom Reed, China crude analyst at Argus Media, said these facilities depend heavily on Iranian oil as a core part of their feedstock mix.

    “Shandong independent refineries process around 2.5 million bpd of crude, so Iranian supplies are absolutely central to their operations,” Reed told Anadolu. “It would be extremely difficult for the teapots to replace the 1.3 million bpd of Iranian crude they currently receive.”

    These refiners have historically relied on discounted crude from sanctioned producers to remain profitable in a competitive domestic market. In recent years, Iranian supplies have become one of the most important components of that strategy.

    Limited alternatives for refiners

    If Iranian flows were interrupted, Reed said independent refiners would face difficult choices in securing replacement supplies.

    “They would either have to cut runs drastically or compete in the global market for replacement grades,” he said.

    Before 2022, Shandong refiners were among the largest buyers of Brazilian crude, which could once again become an alternative source if Iranian shipments were disrupted.

    However, Reed said, switching to those supplies would come with a significant cost increase.

    “That would mean accepting costs of around $15 per barrel higher than what they currently face,” he said.

    Such a price increase could quickly erode refining margins, particularly for smaller facilities that already operate on relatively thin profit margins.

    Potential refinery run cuts

    Reed said the loss of discounted Iranian and Venezuelan crude could force refiners to adjust their operating rates.

    “Both refinery run cuts and potential shutdowns are likely if discounted Iranian and Venezuelan crude becomes unavailable,” he said.

    Lower refinery runs could then tighten fuel supply in domestic markets and push prices higher. “This would force up prices for gasoline and diesel in China,” Reed added.

    But structural changes in China’s transport sector may limit the long-term impact of higher fuel prices.

    Demand for gasoline and diesel has already been gradually declining as electric vehicles and alternative fuel technologies expand across the world’s second-largest economy.

    “Demand for both fuels is currently being destroyed at the rate of about 200,000 bpd each year due to increasing use of electric vehicles and electric or gas-fueled trucking,” Reed said.

    Petrochemicals likely less affected

    Despite potential pressure on fuel markets, analysts say China’s petrochemical sector is less exposed to disruptions affecting independent refineries.

    According to Reed, much of China’s petrochemical feedstock is supplied through large state-owned companies rather than independent refiners.

    While Shandong refiners produce some petrochemical products such as ethylene and aromatics, the majority of China’s output comes from major state-owned firms or specialized cracking facilities that process imported naphtha.

    As a result, disruptions affecting discounted crude supplies would likely have a greater impact on transport fuels than on petrochemical production.

    Despite the potential risks associated with Iranian supply disruptions, analysts note that China maintains a relatively diversified crude import portfolio compared with many other Asian economies.

    “China is the largest single market for Brazilian crude, West African crude and Canadian crude, giving it more supply options than other countries in the region,” Reed said.

    Anadolu Agency

  • ‪US Allows India To Buy Russian Oil During US-Israel With Iran‬

    ‪US Allows India To Buy Russian Oil During US-Israel With Iran‬

    The US government has temporarily eased sanctions to allow India to buy Russian oil currently stranded at sea, amid escalating tensions in the Middle East.

    Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the 30-day waiver was a “deliberate short-term measure” to allow oil to keep flowing in the global market.

    Millions of barrels of oil and gas are stuck near the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow Gulf chokepoint through which nearly half of India’s crude oil and gas imports transits. Tehran has threatened to attack vessels attempting to pass through since the US and Israel began their war against Iran.

    The US sanctioned Russian oil following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, forcing buyers to seek alternatives.

    Washington has put particular pressure on India – a major buyer of Russian energy – to stop buying its oil in an effort to reduce money flowing to fund the invasion.

    Bessent said the waiver would “not provide significant financial benefit” to Russia as it only authorised transactions involving oil already stranded at sea.

    “This stop-gap measure will alleviate pressure caused by Iran’s attempt to take global energy hostage,” Bessent said on X.

    The indefinite halt in supplies has triggered fears of an impending energy crisis in India, which reportedly has crude oil and gas stocks to last for about 25 days.

    Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has warned the war against Iran, which began last Saturday, could stretch on for four to five weeks or longer.

    On Wednesday, Petronet LNG, India’s ‌top ⁠gas importer, issued a force majeure notice to its supplier, QatarEnergy and its local buyers after its LNG tankers were unable to reach the loading terminal at Ras Laffan in Doha.

    The Gas Authority of India Ltd (Gail) and Indian Oil Corp (IOC) have already begun reducing gas supplies to industrial customers, Reuters news agency reported on Tuesday.

    In terms of oil, India imports 90% of its crude.

    Around half of this, which amounts to 2.5 to 2.7 million barrels a day, travels through the Strait of Hormuz, largely from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

    Experts say that a supply crunch due to the closure of the strait could to lead to inflation and push up India’s fiscal deficit.

    With the waiver in place, about 145 million barrels of Russian crude which remain on the water could potentially be redirected toward Indian ports if commercial deals are finalised, Sumit Ritolia, lead research analyst at Kpler, told the BBC.

    “However, the waiver does not fundamentally change India’s structural exposure to Middle Eastern supply flows,” he added.

    Russian oil makes up an estimated 20% of India’s total imports. The waiver marks a notable shift in the US approach to India’s Russian oil imports.

    Not long ago, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on India, including a 25% levy for importing oil from Russia. Trump alleged India’s purchase of Russian oil was helping fund Russia’s war in Ukraine.

    India has always defended its purchase of Russian crude, saying that it needs to meet the energy needs of its vast population and has the right to do business with its trading partners.

    But since late 2025, India reportedly began reducing its imports of Russian crude and has since boosted its crude oil purchases from the US.

    He wrote on his Truth Social platform that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had “agreed to stop buying Russian oil, and to buy much more oil from the United States and, potentially, Venezuela”.

    India has never officially confirmed reducing its imports of Russian crude and maintains it will not allow its trading relations to be dictated by other countries.

    BBC

  • How US-Israeli Strikes on Iran Are Hitting Kenya’s Economy

    How US-Israeli Strikes on Iran Are Hitting Kenya’s Economy

    NAIROBI, March 3 — The economic aftershocks of joint military strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran are being felt thousands of kilometres away in Kenya, threatening trade flows, raising fuel costs and unsettling key foreign exchange earners.

    The escalation has rattled global energy and shipping markets, with crude oil prices climbing sharply amid fears of supply disruption through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow channel that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil shipments. Any sustained blockage or security threat along that corridor translates directly into higher freight, insurance and energy costs for import-dependent economies such as Kenya.

    For Nairobi, the exposure is significant. Kenya imported goods worth more than Sh550 billion from Gulf economies last year, led by refined petroleum products, fertiliser, machinery and electronics. At the same time, exports to the region have nearly doubled in three years, reaching about Sh165 billion, dominated by tea, coffee, meat, flowers and re-exported jet fuel.

    A spike in oil prices would feed quickly into pump prices at home. Fuel is a major input cost across transport, agriculture and manufacturing. Diesel powers trucks that move goods inland, generators that support industrial production and irrigation systems in farming belts. Higher fuel prices therefore risk reigniting inflationary pressures just as households grapple with elevated food and borrowing costs.

    The government-to-government fuel import arrangement with Gulf suppliers could also face stress. Kenya currently sources cargoes from firms including Saudi Aramco, Emirates National Oil Co and Abu Dhabi National Oil Co under a credit framework designed to ease pressure on foreign exchange reserves. While the agreement cushions the country from spot market volatility, prolonged conflict could push up premiums and freight rates embedded in the supply chain.

    Air transport has already taken a hit. Middle Eastern hubs that connect Africa to Europe, Asia and North America have experienced disruptions, forcing rerouting and flight suspensions. Kenya Airways has in recent days reviewed its Gulf schedules as airspace closures complicate operations. The impact extends beyond passenger travel. Kenya’s horticulture industry depends heavily on air freight to ship fresh produce to high-value markets. Delays and higher cargo charges erode margins for exporters already contending with currency fluctuations and compliance costs.

    The Gulf also plays an outsized role in Kenya’s aviation fuel re-export business. Carriers such as Emirates and Qatar Airways regularly uplift jet fuel in Nairobi, making refuelling at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport a significant source of foreign exchange. Any reduction in traffic through these hubs threatens that revenue stream.

    Trade data underline the scale of exposure. The United Arab Emirates is Kenya’s largest Middle Eastern trading partner, accounting for the bulk of both exports and imports. Saudi Arabia follows closely, particularly in energy supplies. Disruptions in these markets could squeeze Kenyan exporters of tea and meat while raising import bills for fuel and industrial inputs.

    President William Ruto has called for de-escalation and diplomatic engagement, warning that wider conflict in the Middle East poses a threat to global stability and economic recovery. For policymakers in Nairobi, the immediate challenge lies in containing inflationary spillovers while safeguarding foreign exchange reserves.

    Analysts say the depth of the impact will depend on the duration and scale of the conflict. A brief flare-up may cause temporary volatility in oil and freight markets. A protracted confrontation that draws in additional regional actors would amplify risks to shipping lanes, commodity prices and investor sentiment across emerging markets.

    For Kenya’s private sector, the calculus is already shifting. Importers face higher landed costs, exporters must navigate uncertain logistics, and consumers brace for possible increases in fuel and transport charges. In an interconnected global economy, shocks in the Gulf rarely remain regional. For Nairobi, the geopolitical tremors now carry tangible economic consequences.

  • Marine Insurers Cancel War Risk Cover, Tanker Costs To Rise as Iran Conflict Intensifies

    Marine Insurers Cancel War Risk Cover, Tanker Costs To Rise as Iran Conflict Intensifies

    SINGAPORE, March 2 (Reuters) – Marine insurers are cancelling war risk coverage for vessels and oil shipping rates are set to surge further after the widening Iran conflict left at least three tankers damaged, a seafarer killed and 150 ships stranded around the Strait of Hormuz.

    Iran has responded to U.S. and Israeli strikes that began on Saturday with retaliatory attacks that have sharply increased risks to commercial shipping in the past 24 hours.

    In the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters, at least 150 vessels including oil and liquefied natural gas tankers had dropped anchor, shipping data showed on Sunday.

    Typically, ships carrying oil equal to about one-fifth of global demand from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait sail through the Strait along with tankers hauling diesel, jet fuel, gasoline and other products.

    The disruption sparked a 9% jump in global oil prices on Monday.

    INSURERS CANCEL WAR RISK COVER

    Companies including Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, the London P&I Club and the American Club said their cancellations would take effect from March 5, according to notices dated March 1 on their websites.

    War risk cover will be excluded in Iranian waters, as well as the Gulf and adjacent waters, according to the notices.

    Skuld added in its notice that it was working on a buy-back option to reinstate cover.

    Japan’s MS&AD Insurance Group told Reuters it had suspended underwriting of a range of insurance policies covering war risks in the waters around Iran, Israel and neighbouring countries.

    OIL SHIPPING COSTS TO RISE FURTHER

    Meanwhile, costs of shipping oil from the Middle East to Asia – already at six-year highs – are set to rise further as the widening Iran conflict is deterring shipowners from sending vessels to the region, market sources and analysts said on Monday.

    Spot shipping rates from the Middle East to Asia, more commonly known as TD3C , are expected to extend gains, shipbrokers said. The benchmark has nearly tripled since the start of 2026.

    Brokers pegged the spot rate for hiring a very large crude carrier on the key Middle East to China route early in Asia on Monday about 4% higher than on Friday, near W225 on the Worldscale industry measure or equivalent to at least $12 million.

    EXPONENTIAL RISE

    “TD3C rates were rising exponentially before the attacks and will continue to remain elevated as countries scramble to meet their energy needs,” said Emril Jamil, a senior LSEG analyst.

    There is still a lot of uncertainty on where the final rate would be on Monday but all Middle East loading routes are expected to hold firm, a shipbroker said. They declined to be named as they were not authorised to speak to the media.

    Meanwhile, the market will need more ships to load crude from the U.S. and West Africa on longer voyages which could support freight on those routes, a source from a shipping company said.

  • Trump Hikes US Global Tariff Rate To 15%

    Trump Hikes US Global Tariff Rate To 15%

    President Donald Trump raised the global duty on imports into the United States to 15 percent on Saturday, doubling down on his promise to maintain his aggressive tariff policy a day after the Supreme Court ruled much of it illegal.

    Trump said on his Truth Social platform that after a thorough review of Friday’s “extraordinarily anti-American decision” by the court to rein in his tariff program, the administration was hiking the import levies “to the fully allowed, and legally tested, 15% level.”

    The US leader had announced an initial 10 percent duty in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court ruling.

    And Trump added that over the next few months, his administration would seek further alternative ways to impose “legally permissible” tariffs.

    Saturday’s announcement is the latest in a careening process that has seen a multitude of tariff levels for countries sending goods into the United States set and then altered or revoked by Trump’s team over the past year.

    It also appears on its face to be an attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court’s latest ruling, which offered perhaps the firmest rebuke yet of the Republican leader’s sweeping and often arbitrary duties, his signature international trade policy.

    The new duty by law is only temporary — allowable for 150 days. According to a White House fact sheet, exemptions remain for sectors that are under separate probes, including pharma, and goods entering the US under the US-Mexico-Canada agreement.

    Trump spent much of the past year imposing various rates to cajole and punish countries, both friend and foe.

    On Friday, the White House said US trading partners that reached separate tariff deals with Trump’s administration would also face the new global tariff.

    The conservative-majority high court ruled six to three on Friday that a 1977 law Trump has relied on to slap sudden rates on individual countries, upending global trade, “does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.”

    Trump, who had nominated two of the justices who repudiated him, responded furiously, alleging without evidence that the court was influenced by foreign interests.

    “I’m ashamed of certain members of the court, absolutely ashamed, for not having the courage to do what’s right for our country,” Trump told reporters.