Kenya Insights

Category: Africa

  • Kenya Starts Pullout From Haiti as MSS Mission Ends

    Kenya Starts Pullout From Haiti as MSS Mission Ends

    Kenya has started drawing down its police deployment in Haiti as the mandate of the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission comes to an end, marking a transition to a new, more robust international force tasked with confronting the country’s powerful criminal gangs.

    The deadline for the deployment of Kenyan officers under the newly constituted Gang Suppression Force falls today, Saturday, February 7, signalling the formal close of the MSS mission that Nairobi spearheaded amid widespread scepticism over its feasibility and risks.

    Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’oei said Kenya was exiting the mission having achieved what many doubted was possible when the first contingent of officers landed in Port-au-Prince.

    “We have done our job, which was to bring peace and a form of stability,” Sing’oei said. “We are in a good place to begin to draw down our deployment at this point in time.”

    He said the mission had faced doubts from the outset, with critics questioning whether Kenya was overstretching itself and whether the risks outweighed the benefits. More than a year later, he argued, the results demonstrated the impact of the Kenyan deployment.

    “There was pessimism when we deployed. A year plus later, it is clear that the Kenyan deployment has made a huge difference,” Sing’oei said.

    The MSS mission was primarily designed to stabilise key areas and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police rather than pursue gangs directly. Sing’oei acknowledged that the narrow mandate and chronic under-financing limited its operational reach, even as it restored a degree of order around critical infrastructure.

    “Our mandate did not include the pursuit of the gangs themselves and that affected the overall ability,” he said, adding that Kenya had pushed at the United Nations for an expanded framework to allow more decisive action.

    Those efforts culminated in the approval of the Gang Suppression Force in late 2025. The new force is a 5,550-strong multinational unit supported by the UN and guided by a Standing Group of Partners that includes the United States, Canada, Kenya, The Bahamas, Jamaica, Guatemala and El Salvador.

    Unlike the MSS, which was structured largely as a policing and stabilisation operation, the GSF blends policing, counter-insurgency and maritime enforcement capabilities, with a mandate to dismantle gang strongholds, disrupt weapons trafficking and create space for a political process.

    The transition is already visible on the ground. United States soldiers have arrived in Haiti in recent days, while American warships have taken positions off the Haitian coast to block arms smuggling routes that have fuelled gang expansion.

    Godfrey Otunge, the MSS commander, said the handover to the new force was ongoing, with officers from various countries still arriving to join Kenyan and Haitian personnel.

    “The process of transforming the MSS mission to the GSF mission is ongoing,” Otunge said.

    Washington has publicly praised Kenya’s role, describing it as decisive at a moment when Haiti’s institutions were close to collapse. US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who recently visited Kenya to meet returning officers, said Nairobi’s intervention prevented the country from falling entirely under gang control.

    “The government of Haiti would not have survived the onslaught of these gangs without your presence,” Landau told Kenyan officers, calling Kenya an indispensable partner.

    Even as the security architecture is reconfigured, Haiti’s political transition remains fragile. The United States has said it will continue working with Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime despite growing opposition from the Presidential Transitional Council, whose mandate also expires today.

    The CPT, created under an April 2024 political accord after the resignation of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry, has been racing to install a successor leadership as its term lapses. Internal divisions have deepened, with some members proposing a new executive authority while others insist the council’s time is over.

    Political actors and civil society groups have meanwhile launched a nomination process for the presidency and prime minister’s office in a bid to forge consensus leadership and pave the way for elections, even as some factions boycott the talks.

    For ordinary Haitians, the withdrawal of Kenyan officers and the arrival of a new international force brings both hope and uncertainty. Diplomats warn that security gains will remain fragile without a credible political settlement and functioning state institutions.

    As Kenya begins to bring its officers home, the coming weeks will test whether Haiti can align a reinforced security presence with a legitimate transitional leadership, a balance many observers say will determine whether the country stabilises or slides back into renewed chaos.

  • Somali Lawmaker Exposes How Minnesota Fraud Is Rooted in State Corruption and Is Directed From Mogadishu

    Somali Lawmaker Exposes How Minnesota Fraud Is Rooted in State Corruption and Is Directed From Mogadishu

    WASHINGTON — A Somali member of parliament has intensified the debate over a sprawling fraud scandal in Minnesota, asserting in a letter to Senator Ted Cruz that the abuse of U.S. taxpayer funds under investigation in the state is part of a far larger, state-enabled system of corruption directed from Mogadishu.

    The lawmaker, Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib, sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee of Somalia’s House of the People and has emerged as one of the most vocal internal critics of his own government. In his letter to Mr. Cruz, Dr. Abib said he possesses extensive documentary evidence showing that fraud uncovered in Minnesota represents only the downstream effects of what he described as a “state-sanctioned fraud architecture” embedded within Somali institutions and protected by senior political leaders.

    Dr. Abib urged Congress not to focus solely on Minnesota officials, including Governor Tim Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison, arguing that state and municipal authorities are not the originators of the schemes now under federal scrutiny. Minnesota, he wrote, functions primarily as a distribution point for funds that are later transferred, laundered and recycled through transnational networks tied to Somalia’s political and financial elite.

    The letter arrives as federal prosecutors and congressional committees continue to examine fraud involving pandemic-era food aid, health care and social services programs in Minnesota, cases that have already resulted in dozens of indictments and allegations involving hundreds of millions of dollars. Republican lawmakers, including Mr. Cruz, have raised concerns that proceeds from these schemes were routed abroad, including to Somalia, through informal money-transfer systems.

    Dr. Abib’s claims echo arguments he has made previously in interviews and written submissions to U.S. officials. In January, he told The Daily Caller that Somalia effectively functions as a “fraud pipeline,” siphoning U.S. taxpayer money from aid, health care and child care programs into one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries  . He said corruption exposed in Minnesota and other American states did not arise spontaneously but reflected predictable outcomes of Somalia’s governing structure, which relies heavily on foreign aid and lacks effective oversight.

    According to material Dr. Abib shared with U.S. lawmakers and journalists, international partners have allocated more than $3.5 billion in humanitarian assistance to Somalia in recent years, with roughly 90 percent coming from the United States.

    He alleges that large portions of this money are systematically diverted through inflated contracts, cash withdrawals without receipts and payments to shell advisers and family-linked businesses embedded within government agencies.

    Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib
    Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib

    In one 2023 report cited by Dr. Abib, Somali parliamentary investigators compiled hundreds of gigabytes of expenditure data that they say show illegal spending by the executive branch, including inflated travel costs and purchases from politically connected firms without competitive bidding.

    He has also accused senior officials at Somalia’s central bank and disaster management agency of facilitating or benefiting from the diversion of aid, claims that Somali authorities have not publicly addressed in detail.

    Dr. Abib’s second letter, sent earlier this year and also reviewed by U.S. officials, argued that U.S. oversight failures under the Biden administration allowed billions of dollars in aid fraud to go unaddressed for years.

    He documented what he described as a multibillion-dollar gap between donor-reported project revenues and actual deposits into Somalia’s Treasury Single Account, which receives international assistance.

    The World Bank and the United Nations World Food Program, both key channels for aid to Somalia, have rejected accusations that they knowingly facilitate fraud. A World Bank spokesman has said its Somalia projects are subject to strict fiduciary controls and monitoring procedures and that the institution has zero tolerance for corruption. The bank has encouraged whistleblowers to submit allegations through formal reporting mechanisms.

    U.S. officials have acknowledged concerns about diversion of aid and fraud but have stopped short of endorsing Dr. Abib’s most sweeping claims. Treasury Department representatives have said they are examining whether fraud proceeds from Minnesota cases were transferred abroad and have pledged to strengthen enforcement tools to combat money laundering and terror financing. No U.S. agency has publicly confirmed evidence that Somalia’s government formally authorized or directed fraud committed inside the United States.

    Within Somalia, Dr. Abib’s accusations have made him a polarizing figure. He has portrayed himself as a whistleblower acting at personal risk, saying he has received threats and faced political retaliation for exposing corruption. Supporters see him as a rare internal critic in a system long plagued by graft, while detractors accuse him of politicizing aid and damaging Somalia’s international standing.

    In his letter to Mr. Cruz, Dr. Abib said he has already submitted a detailed oversight report to congressional leaders and offered to testify publicly under oath. He argued that hearings focused solely on American state officials would generate headlines but fail to address what he called the sovereign-level decision makers who enable fraud and protect its proceeds.

    Whether Congress will take up that offer remains unclear. But Dr. Abib’s intervention adds an international and diplomatic dimension to a scandal that has already shaken confidence in U.S. safeguards for taxpayer-funded programs, raising questions about how domestic fraud, foreign aid and fragile states intersect in an increasingly interconnected financial system.

  • Rwanda Bans Banknotes Bouquet During Valentines

    Rwanda Bans Banknotes Bouquet During Valentines

    Rwanda has banned the folding, glueing, taping, pinning, clipping, and affixing of its Franc banknotes using adhesives and fastening materials as part of gifts for social events and ceremonies.

    In a statement, the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) said such practices compromise the integrity of the banknotes, rendering them unsuitable for use in cash-handling and processing equipment, including cash counting machines and automated teller machines (ATMs), which are critical components of the national cash distribution system.

    “This damage results in the premature withdrawal and replacement of banknotes, leading to avoidable costs,” the statement signed by Nick Barigye, the Deputy Governor and Acting Governor, says.

    NBR is the sole authority mandated to manage the Rwandan currency.

    In the statement, NBR explained that banknotes and coins are produced using durable materials and enhanced security features to ensure longevity, maintain public trust in the national currency, and support economic stability.

    However, the continued use of banknotes and coins in floral arrangements, bouquets, and similar decorative creations by florists, traders, event decorators, designers, gifting stylists, and their clients, where they are folded, glued, taped, pinned, clipped, or otherwise affixed using adhesives and fastening materials as part of gifts for social events and ceremonies, leads to their getting damaged.

    “NBR reminds the public that anyone who willfully defaces, mutilates, or otherwise impairs the Rwandan currency note commits an offence punishable by Law. NBR remains committed to safeguarding the integrity of the national currency in circulation and will continue to undertake public sensitisation and stakeholder engagement to protect the quality, usability, and public confidence in Rwandan Franc banknotes,” the statement adds.

    On Monday, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) issued a similar ban, saying the actions constitute misuse of currency banknotes.

  • U.S. Sends Troops to Nigeria Against Militants

    U.S. Sends Troops to Nigeria Against Militants

    The United States military has sent a small team of troops to Nigeria to support efforts against Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and armed bandit groups, U.S. officials said Wednesday.

    General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), said the U.S. team is working with Nigerian forces to share “unique capabilities.”

    Anderson did not give details about the team’s size or specific activities.

    “That has led to increased collaboration between our nations, to include a small US team that brings some unique capabilities from the United States,” Anderson told journalists at a briefing yesterday.

    U.S. Sends Troops to Nigeria Against Militants.
    U.S. Sends Troops to Nigeria Against Militants.

    Nigeria’s Defence Minister, General Christopher Musa, confirmed the presence of U.S. forces but offered no further information.

    A former U.S. official said the team primarily gathers intelligence and assists Nigerian forces in planning operations against terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and ISWAP.

    The United States has previously carried out airstrikes in Nigeria, most recently on Christmas Day, against militants in Sokoto State who are affiliated with the Islamic State and killed many militants.

    The strike was also coordinated with Nigerian authorities.

  • South Sudan Appoints Dead Man to Election Panel

    South Sudan Appoints Dead Man to Election Panel

    South Sudan’s government has apologised after appointing a deceased man to a presidential panel set up to negotiate talks on the country’s long-delayed elections.

    Last week, President Salva Kiir announced several appointments aimed at advancing preparations for elections now scheduled for December 2026.

    Among those named was Steward Sorobo, who local media reported died about five years ago.

    “The Office of the President has learned with regret that one of the signatories… has regrettably died,” Kiir’s press secretary, David Amour Majur, said in a statement on Monday.

    “It is now evident that thorough verification was not done by one of the stakeholders, resulting in this unfortunate administrative oversight,” he added.

    Majur was dismissed the next day with immediate effect, along with Valentino Dhel Malueth, according to a statement released by the Office of the President.

    Marik Nanga Marik will take over as the Ministry of Presidential Affairs’ new Chief Administrator, replacing Malueth.

    “Note: The appointment for the position of Press Secretary, Office of the President, is currently pending and will be announced in due course,” the statement added.

    “The President further wishes to express his profound gratitude to the outgoing officials for their dedicated service and contributions to the Nation during their tenure, and conveys his best wishes to the newly appointed official in his new role.”

    Sorobo’s name has since been removed from the list of appointments, but his family said the mistake caused deep distress.

    Family representative Boboya James Edimond called for “cultural and moral reparation for the spiritual harm caused” in a statement, calling the incident “not only an administrative error but also a serious cultural and spiritual violation.”

    On social media, the mistake was widely mocked as well. The government seems to be “doing copy and paste from the previous list but they don’t know who’s there and who’s not there,” according to one Facebook user.

    The error also drew widespread ridicule on social media. One Facebook user said the government appeared to be “doing copy and paste from the previous list, but they don’t know who’s there and who’s not there.”

    Another user suggested that the deceased be retained as “a coordinator between the living and dead to embrace our peace in South Sudan.”

  • Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Son Of Ex-Libyan Leader, Reportedly Shot Dead

    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Son Of Ex-Libyan Leader, Reportedly Shot Dead

    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of Libya’s former leader Col Muammar Gaddafi, has reportedly been shot dead.

    The death of the 53-year-old, who was once widely seen as his father’s heir apparent, was confirmed by the head of his political team on Tuesday, according to the Libyan News Agency.

    His lawyer told the AFP news agency a “four-man commando” unit carried out an assassination at his home in the city of Zintan, though it was not clear who may have been behind the attack.

    In a competing version of events, his sister told Libyan TV that he had died near the country’s border with Algeria.

    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was long seen as the most influential and feared figure in the country after his father, who ruled Libya from 1969 until being ousted and killed during an uprising in 2011.

    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's sister told Libyan media he had died near the Libya-Algeria border
    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s sister told Libyan media he had died near the Libya-Algeria border

    Born in 1972, he played a key role in Libya’s rapprochement with the West from 2000 until the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.

    After his father’s removal, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi – who was accused of playing a key role in the brutal repression of anti-government protests – was jailed by a rival militia in the city of Zintan for almost six years.

    The International Criminal Court wanted to put him on trial for crimes against humanity for his alleged role in the suppression of opposition protests in 2011.

    In 2015, he was given a death sentence in absentia for his role in the crackdown by a court in Tripoli, in the west of the country, where control is in the hands of the UN-backed government.

    But he was released by militia in Tobruk, in the east, under an amnesty law two years later.

    Since the overthrow of Gaddafi, Libya has been split into areas controlled by various militias and is currently divided between two rival governments.

    During his father’s time as leader, he shaped policy and led high-profile negotiations despite having no official role in government, including those which led his father to abandon his nuclear weapons programme.

    Such agreements saw international sanctions on the north African country lifted, and some considered Gaddafi a reformist and acceptable face of a changing Libya.

    Gaddafi had always denied that he wanted to inherit power from his father, saying the reins of power were “not a farm to inherit”.

    However, in 2021 he announced he would run for the presidency in elections which were then postponed indefinitely.

  • Probe Opened as Hijacked Petronas Exit Deal Costs South Sudan $600m in Lost Oil Revenue

    Probe Opened as Hijacked Petronas Exit Deal Costs South Sudan $600m in Lost Oil Revenue

    A high-stakes probe has been launched in South Sudan’s oil sector after investigators concluded that a botched takeover of Petronas assets has bled the country an estimated $600 million in lost revenue, deepening a fiscal crisis marked by unpaid salaries and widening deficits.

    The investigations, initiated after the appointment of Emmanuel Athiei Ayual as Nile Petroleum Corporation managing director and Dr Chol Thon Abel as Secretary General at the Ministry of Petroleum in November 2025, are now tracing what officials describe as systemic governance failures and possible institutional capture under the previous administration.

    At the centre of the scandal is the stalled acquisition of Petronas’ stakes in South Sudan’s oil blocks, a deal originally sanctioned by President Salva Kiir and billed as a national game-changer. When Petronas announced its exit on August 7, 2024, it held major interests across all three national oil consortia, including 40 per cent of DPOC, 30 per cent of GPOC and a controlling 67.8 per cent of SPOC. The buyback was designed to give the state immediate control of producing assets without upfront capital, with payments structured against future oil output.

    Fifteen months later, the ownership transfer remains incomplete. Arbitration proceedings initiated by Petronas at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes are still ongoing, while officials estimate the country has already forfeited about $600 million that should have flowed to the Treasury from production-linked revenues.

    Sources within Nilepet and the Ministry of Petroleum insist the problem was not the deal itself. Instead, they point to paralysis that set in after operational oversight shifted to then Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, former Petroleum Ministry Secretary General Deng Lual Wol and former Nilepet chief executive Ayuel Ngor Kacgor. Approvals stalled, timelines slipped and international partners were left in limbo, even as oil continued to flow with little benefit to the state.

    Senior officials privately describe the situation as economically irrational. With public servants enduring months of salary arrears, they argue that unlocking revenue from producing assets should have been an urgent priority. “This was meant to generate cash immediately,” said one official involved in the negotiations. “Instead, we imposed austerity while money sat trapped in administrative deadlock.”

    Attention has also turned to the role of foreign partners. Multiple sources accuse Chinese state firms CNPC and Sinopec of refusing to grant key technical and operational approvals required to complete the transfer, effectively blocking the deal. Their stance contrasts with India’s ONGC and Egypt’s Tri-Ocean Energy, which have supported the takeover.

    China’s dominance in South Sudan’s oilfield services sector, from drilling to logistics, has given it outsized leverage over production decisions. Policymakers now warn that this influence has become a structural threat to South Sudan’s economic sovereignty, allowing external actors to dictate the pace at which national revenues are realised.

    Investigators are further examining controversial consultancy payments made during the period. A Dutch national, Cornelis Nicolaas Abraham Loos, a reported associate of former Nilepet CEO Ayuel Ngor Kacgor, is said to have been hired on a $100,000-a-month contract while nearly 3,000 Nilepet workers went unpaid for months, triggering strikes in June 2025. Authorities are probing whether Loos or linked entities had commercial interests in Chinese oilfield service companies, potentially shedding light on inflated contracts, rising operating costs and declining output.

    The probe has also exposed what officials call a shocking lack of professional safeguards. While Petronas relied on top-tier international law firms and financial advisers, Nilepet allegedly engaged no reputable external counsel or investment bank. Negotiations over assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars were reportedly conducted in hotel rooms in Dubai and Nairobi, with thin documentation and little institutional oversight.

    To make matters worse, investigators say key contracts were destroyed or removed by former officials, leaving the current leadership without access to crucial agreements. Although Ayuel Ngor Kacgor was dismissed in November 2025, he is believed to still sit on boards of operating companies registered in Mauritius and to receive remuneration linked to legacy arrangements.

    The political backdrop has sharpened scrutiny. On November 12, 2025, President Kiir dramatically sacked Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, stripped him of his general’s rank, demoted him to private and placed him under house arrest in Juba. Yet fundamental questions remain unanswered: where did the international financing for the acquisition go, who authorised the lavish consultancy fees and why the transfer remains stalled nearly 18 months after Petronas walked away.

    The crisis fits a broader pattern. The UN Human Rights Commission estimates that about $25.2 billion in oil revenues generated since independence in 2011 remain almost entirely opaque in their use, fuelling public anger and mistrust.

    Now, a new leadership team led by Petroleum Minister Dr Bak Barnaba Chol, Emmanuel Athiei Ayual and Dr Chol Thon Abel is racing to untangle what insiders describe as a toxic legacy. They face missing paperwork, legal disputes, operational disruptions at the Heglig oil field and what they believe is deliberate obstruction by entrenched interests.

    For many in South Sudan’s energy sector, finalising the Petronas–Nilepet deal is still within reach and could mark a turning point by restoring revenue flows and reinforcing national sovereignty. Until then, the country remains trapped between reform efforts and the heavy cost of past mismanagement, with hundreds of millions of dollars still locked out of reach.

  • Why South Sudan Is Blaming Riek Machar For A ‘Ghost’ Army

    Why South Sudan Is Blaming Riek Machar For A ‘Ghost’ Army

    The UN issued warnings of potential mass violence between the South Sudanese government and the White Army in January 2026. A peace agreement ended a five-year civil war in the country in 2018. This was followed by a period of relative calm that ended in 2025 in the wake of clashes between the government and White Army. Attempts to bring peace since have faltered. The government has charged and suspended first vice-president Riek Machar over claims he commanded the White Army during the violence in Nasir, Upper Nile State. Jan Pospisil, who has studied South Sudan’s conflict dynamics, explains the origins of the White Army and its political impact.

    What is the White Army?

    The White Army is best understood as a set of temporary, community-mandated self-defence mobilisations, organised along sectional and clan lines.

    The term “White Army” refers to the ash traditionally used in Nuer cattle camps to repel mosquitoes. The ash is smeared on the bodies and faces of young men and gives them a whitish appearance. The Nuer are one of South Sudan’s largest ethnic groups. They primarily keep cattle and inhabit the greater Upper Nile region.

    Authority in the White Army flows upward from communities, not downward from political leaders.

    The White Army’s orientation is primarily defensive: protecting cattle, land and local autonomy in an environment where the state is experienced less as a provider of security than as a source of threat.

    But this defensive logic coexists with raiding and inter-communal violence.

    Its history explains its ambivalent role.

    The White Army grew out of Nuer youth self-defence formations that had existed since the 1960s.

    In 1991, the White Army started to pro-actively use this name and was drawn into national conflict around the so-called Nasir split. This is when suspended vice-president Riek Machar and other predominantly Nuer commanders broke with John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Garang, who died in 2005, was from another of South Sudan’s major ethnic groups, the Dinka.

    South Sudan's Vice President Riek Machar addresses a news conference, as the first case of coronavirus was confirmed in the country, in Juba, South Sudan April 5, 2020. Photo credit: Reuters
    South Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar addresses a news conference, as the first case of coronavirus was confirmed in the country, in Juba, South Sudan April 5, 2020.
    Photo credit: Reuters

    White Army forces fought alongside the Nasir faction (led by, among others, Machar) and were central to a massive attack on Bor later in 1991. The Bor massacre led to the death of several thousand Bor Dinka, a sub-group of the Dinka people who primarily inhabit Jonglei State.

    Attacks were carried out largely by White Army fighters pursuing revenge over cattle raids and local objectives that aligned only partially with Machar’s political aims. This is an episode Machar apologised for in 2011, saying he was responsible for both the good things and the bad things that came as a result of the Nasir Declaration.

    The apology was revealing. It acknowledged political responsibility without implying operational command.

    The Bor massacre remains a dominant lens through which many Bor Dinka understand the White Army: as an organised anti-Dinka force opposing the ruling party. This is understandable, but is also a source of lasting misperception about how the group operates.

    What’s the relationship between Riek Machar and the White Army?

    Machar has benefited politically from White Army mobilisation. But he does not direct it.

    His current prosecution is therefore deeply ironic. Machar is accused of commanding a force that has, time and again, demonstrated its structural resistance to sustained external control, including his own.

    He is now being tried for exercising a form of command that he has long sought but never fully possessed.

    From the 1991 Nasir split to the civil war between the government and the Machar-led opposition that erupted in December 2013 and the renewed violence of 2025, White Army forces have repeatedly fought alongside Machar’s forces.

    However, the White Army exists as an amalgamation of community militias that are tied to particular areas rather than as one organised force. Their size depends on the capacity of regional leaders to mobilise the youth at a given time.

    First Vice President of South Sudan Riek Machar.Photo credit: File | AFP
    First Vice President of South Sudan Riek Machar.
    Photo credit: File | AFP

    During the civil war, White Army mobilisations delivered some of the opposition’s most significant battlefield successes.

    Yet these forces often withdraw once immediate objectives – such as the defeat of militias aligned with the government in a certain territory – are achieved. This leaves opposition units unable to hold territory.

    The assumption that’s made is that these temporary alliances equate to control of the White Army. They don’t. Confusing the two has repeatedly distorted how South Sudan’s conflicts are understood – and mismanaged.

    Conflating the White Army with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) serves a political purpose. It legitimises state counterinsurgency, including airstrikes over the course of 2025 that hit civilian areas. It recasts local resistance as elite manipulation.

    But it also obscures deeper drivers of South Sudan’s violence: the collapse of civilian protection, the outsourcing of force to allied ethnic militias such as the Agwelek or the Abushok, and the ethnicisation of political belonging since 2013.

    If the White Army continues to be misunderstood, the danger is further ethnicisation of South Sudan’s politics. This is where complex communal violence is reduced to criminal conspiracy and used to legitimise militarised state responses.

    Treating political crises as matters for prosecution rather than compromise risks deepening the very dynamics that have fuelled South Sudan’s wars since 2013.

    The state portrays the White Army as a terrorist group: why is this a problem?

     

    In the case it has brought against Machar, the government is advancing a familiar claim: that the White Army is an armed wing of the SPLM/A-IO acting on Machar’s orders.

    The charge matters. It underpins not only Machar’s prosecution, but also a wider narrative that treats community mobilisations as opposition conspiracy in South Sudan.

    The claim rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what the White Army is, and has been for more than three decades.

    Firstly, the group draws on long-standing Nuer community self-defence traditions, even if it became politically visible in national conflict in the early 1990s. It is neither purely protective nor purely predatory. This makes the White Army difficult to incorporate into elite peace agreements, and easy to mischaracterise as irrational or terrorist.

    Secondly, the White Army is not a standing militia, nor an insurgent organisation with a central command. Authority flows from the community.

    To understand why the White Army mobilises as it does, it is important to consider December 2013. The mass killing of Nuer civilians in Juba at the outbreak of civil war marked a decisive rupture in South Sudan’s political order. Violence that had previously been mediated through elite rivalry and fragmented local conflicts became overtly tribalised.

    For many Nuer communities, December 2013 was experienced not as a power struggle within the ruling party, but as an existential attack marked by mass killings, displacement and the collapse of civilian protection.

    This interpretation – whether accepted or rejected by external observers – has shaped mobilisation ever since. White Army fighters interviewed by journalists and researchers over the past decade have been consistent: they did not fight because Machar was removed from office, but because Nuer civilians were killed.

    And since 2013, Nuer diaspora networks across North America, Europe and east Africa have played a role in supporting White Army mobilisations. This support has taken multiple forms: fundraising, advocacy and social media campaigning, logistical assistance, and political pressure on opposition leaders.

    Diaspora involvement reinforces White Army mobilisation by amplifying narratives of collective victimhood and unfinished justice, often from a distance that strips away the everyday constraints faced by communities on the ground.

    As a result, South Sudan’s 2013 war did not merely fragment the state; it reshaped political identities far beyond its territory.

    Written by Jan Pospisil.

    Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik, OIIP).

  • Muhoozi Kainerugaba: Uganda’s Army Chief Who Threatened To Castrate Opposition Leader and Claimed Descent From Jesus

    Muhoozi Kainerugaba: Uganda’s Army Chief Who Threatened To Castrate Opposition Leader and Claimed Descent From Jesus

    A fiery tweeter who is in charge of Uganda’s military, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba is decried by his critics as being in the middle of an unholy trinity, or alliance, of three men who rule the East African nation with an iron fist.

    Kainerugaba, the son of the country’s long-time leader Yoweri Museveni, has posted on social platform X about the killing of opposition supporters during this month’s fiercely contested presidential election.

    In posts which were subsequently deleted, he also threatened to have the testicles of defeated opposition candidate Bobi Wine removed.

    With the 81-year-old president winning a seventh term, analysts say this is likely to be his last term and he is grooming his 51-year-son to succeed him.

    The so-called “unholy alliance” – a play on the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity – is made up of Museveni, Kainerugaba, and the president’s powerful brother and special adviser, Salim Saleh.

    Kenya-based analyst for the Institute for Security Studies think-tank, Nicodemus Minde, tells the BBC that he heard the description during a recent research trip to Uganda.

    “The Father being Museveni, then the Son being Muhoozi, then the Unholy Spirit could be the uncle, Salim Saleh,” he says.

    Minde describes Saleh as a “power behind the scenes”, saying he was “influential in terms of money, business and access”.

    Opposition supporters accuse the family of believing they have a God-given right to rule Uganda, with Museveni extending his 40-year-rule after he was declared the winner of the election with more than 70% of the vote.

    “We believe in God the Father – and God the Father is President Museveni. God the Son is MK [Muhoozi Kainerugaba], and now you [the voters] are the Holy Spirit. Therefore, vote for them,” she was quoted as saying in comments that came in for some criticism.

    After getting just 24% of the vote, Wine dismissed the results as “fake”, claiming widespread “ballot-stuffing” was behind Museveni’s victory.

    This incurred the wrath of Kainerugaba, who threatened the opposition leader, giving him “exactly 48 hours to surrender himself to the police”.

    “If he doesn’t we will treat him as an outlaw/rebel and handle him accordingly,” he wrote.

    Those tweets – and the one in which he threatened to remove Wine’s testicles – have since been deleted.

    Wine, who had gone into hiding after a raid on his house following the election, later called out the general on X and included a screengrab of some of the deleted tweets – to which Kainerugaba responded with the comment: “Boo hoo hoo Mr. 24%.”

    The army chief later accused the US of helping Wine escape and said that all military co-operation between the two countries would be suspended.

    On Friday, he apologised, saying he had been given “wrong information”.

    Kainerugaba has a long history of controversial posts, some of which have been later deleted, and is also known as the “tweeting general”.

    He has also invoked religion to advance his political aspirations.

    “I fear no one on this planet because my bloodline is from Jesus Christ,” he posted earlier this month. This tweet has also been deleted.

    A long-time friend of the general, who spoke on condition of anonymity, says he is “incredibly loyal”, and compares his posting to US President Donald Trump.

    “He might be Trumpian, but that’s him expressing himself,” the friend tells the BBC.

    He says “it is wrong to try to understand him from the tweets that he posts”, adding that Kainerugaba is “a man of complex character”.

    Minde describes the general’s posts as often “wild”, but says that many of his comments can make sense when viewed within the context of Uganda’s succession politics – in particular Kainerugaba’s bid to position himself as his father’s heir.

    President Museveni won the 15 January elections by a landslide
    President Museveni won the 15 January elections by a landslide

    “He probably wants to endear himself to his father,” Minde tells the BBC, but adds that some of the posts are deliberate “provocations”.

    He says that Kainerugaba’s statements do little to win him public favour.

    Kainerugaba’s friend, on the other hand, tells the BBC the general would be an “incredible successor” to his father.

    He points out that Uganda is a post-conflict country where security is all-important.

    “This is our number-one priority, to make sure that you are peaceful and stable and [Kainerugaba] is very experienced in that sphere. He’s been doing this all his life,” he adds.

    However, some of his posts could threaten international relations if taken at face-value.

    In 2022 he threatened to invade neighbouring Kenya, triggering a backlash from Kenyans who trolled him for his “reckless” comments.

    He responded by urging them to “relax”, but as the row escalated, Museveni was forced to phone his Kenyan counterpart William Ruto to apologise for his son’s “mistake”.

    Kainerugaba has in the past downplayed some of his remarks as “musings” and “abstractions” that do not need to be taken seriously.

    Uganda-based security analyst Freddie David Egesa observes that the military chief “enjoys having that kind of vibe”.

    “He sometimes likes joking around it,” Egesa says.

    Ugandan security forces have been accused of rights violations
    Ugandan security forces have been accused of rights violations

    Kainerugaba’s friend says the general is “a kind, generous, intensely smart person who spends all his time thinking about the peace and security of this country”.

    He adds that the general executes his responsibilities to the best of his abilities.

    “And that’s why he serves in the role that he serves.”

    Critics say Kainerugaba has brooked little opposition in the country, acting decisively against anyone perceived as a threat to his father’s administration.

    By the general’s own admission on X, at least 30 people were killed and 2,000 others detained by security officers following the recent elections.

    Kainerugaba played a role in the four-day internet blackout that lasted until after the elections, Reuters news agency quoted Andrew Mwenda, a Ugandan political commentator and close ally of the general, as saying.

    The internet remained partially restricted afterwards, but on Monday, Kainerugaba posted that access to all social media platforms was being restored.

    “We are releasing all social media today,” he wrote.

    She had alleged from her hospital bed on Saturday that military officers had assaulted her overnight as they searched for her husband.

    According to Minde, Kainerugaba’s actions appear driven by loyalty or a desire to protect Museveni’s administration. The general’s first name, Muhoozi, means avenger.

    “I named him Muhoozi, which means vengeance, such that when someone wrongs me, he avenges,” Museveni once explained.

    Kainerugaba, who was born in 1974, grew up in exile in Tanzania, Kenya and Sweden before his father took power in 1986 after overthrowing the brutal regime of Milton Obote.

    He joined the military in 1999, enrolled at the UK’s elite Sandhurst military academy and graduated the following year. He is married with several children.

    He rapidly rose through the military ranks shortly after joining the army, reaching the rank of lieutenant-general 10 years later. He was promoted to a full general in 2022.

    He played a pivotal role in the formation of the Special Forces Command (SFC), an elite military unit responsible for his father’s security.

    The SFC has been accused of involvement in a wave of abductions and torture of opposition members. It has denied the allegations, but some of its officers have been convicted of abusing their power.

    The most prominent case was that of a 32-year-old SFC soldier, who was court-martialled and sentenced to death in 2024 for shooting dead three people and injuring two others, including a one-year-old child.

    And after a bodyguard of Wine, Edward Sebuufu went missing last May, Kainerugaba revealed on X that he was in detention “in my basement”, and sparked a social media storm after he published a photo of him appearing half-naked and with his beard shaved off.

    As with Wine, he threatened to castrate Sebuufu.

    Wine has alleged that members of the SFC, as well as the military, were behind a raid on his home the day after the election.

    The unit is viewed as a shadow army that has helped Museveni, along with his ever-growing family dynasty, to consolidate power.

    The latest addition to the political dynasty is Kainerugaba’s son, Ruhamya, who has joined the army – seen as the first step to acquiring power in Uganda.

    In the years to come, the composition of the trinity could change, with Kainerugaba as the Father, Ruhamya as the Son and another family patriarch succeeding Saleh as the Spirit.

  • South Africa Expels Israeli Top Diplomat

    South Africa Expels Israeli Top Diplomat

    South Africa ordered Israel’s top diplomat to leave the country within 72 hours on Friday, citing a “series of violations” and prompting the Israeli government to expel Pretoria’s own diplomatic representative. [Getty]

    South Africa has declared Israel’s top diplomat in the country “persona non grata” and given him 72 hours to leave, the foreign ministry said on Friday, citing a “series of violations”.

    Ties between the two nations are already strained, with South Africa bringing a case before the United Nations top court in 2023 to argue that Israel’s war on Gaza, an illegally occupied Palestinian territory, amounted to genocide.

    The Israeli government had been informed that its charge d’affaires, Ariel Seidman, has been “declared persona non grata” and “required to depart from the Republic within 72 hours”, the ministry said in a statement.

    “This decisive measure follows a series of unacceptable violations of diplomatic norms and practice which pose a direct challenge to South Africa’s sovereignty,” it said.

    They included “the repeated use of official Israeli social media platforms to launch insulting attacks” on President Cyril Ramaphosa.

    The foreign ministry also accused the embassy of a “deliberate failure” to inform South Africa of “purported visits by senior Israeli officials”.

    The Israeli foreign ministry swiftly responded that South Africa’s senior diplomatic representative “is persona non grata and must leave Israel within 72 hours”.

    In a statement on X, it accused Pretoria of “false attacks against Israel in the international arena” and described Seidman’s expulsion as a “unilateral, baseless step”.

    He was Israel’s most senior representative in South Africa after Tel Aviv recalled its ambassador in 2023.

    Screenshot

    ‘Abuse of privilege’

    South African officials were angered by a tweet from the Israeli embassy in November that commented: “A rare moment of wisdom and diplomatic clarity from President Ramaphosa.”

    The post was in reaction to a news story citing Ramaphosa as saying “boycott politics doesn’t work”, in reference to US President Donald Trump’s decision to not attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg.

    South African government officials also condemned as a breach of protocol a visit by an Israeli delegation this month to the Eastern Cape province where it reportedly offered to provide water, healthcare and agriculture expertise.

    The visit, which appeared to take the government by surprise, was hosted by a traditional king from the Xhosa people who had met Israeli President Isaac Herzog on a trip to Israel in December last year.

    In its statement, the foreign ministry accused representatives of Israel of actions that “represent a gross abuse of diplomatic privilege and a fundamental breach of the Vienna Convention”.

    “They have systematically undermined the trust and protocols essential for bilateral relations,” it said.

    South Africa, which hosts the largest Jewish community in sub-Saharan Africa, is largely supportive of the Palestinian cause and sharply critical of Israel.

    Pretoria’s embassy in Tel Aviv has been closed since November 17, 2023.

    The government filed a case against Israel with the International Court of Justice in 2023 saying that its war on Gaza — which followed the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Palestinian group Hamas — breached the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

    Israel has denied that accusation.

    When more than 150 Palestinians flew into South Africa in November without departure stamps from Israel on their passports, the South African foreign minister said there appeared to be “a clear agenda to cleanse Palestinians out of Gaza and the West Bank”.

    “We are suspicious as a South African government about the circumstances surrounding the arrival of the plane,” Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola said.

    There have been regular protests in South Africa against the Israeli government’s and military’s actions in Gaza, including calls for the embassy in Pretoria to be closed.

    In an editorial in November, Seidman criticised South Africa for maintaining full ties with Iran but framing any engagement with the Israel state as “illegitimate”.

    South Africa’s ties with the Trump administration — a strong ally of Israel — have also deteriorated over the past year, with the case before the ICJ a major sticking point.

  • US Expands Military Base in Kenya

    US Expands Military Base in Kenya

    The United States has begun a $70 million runway expansion at a military base in coastal Kenya, reinforcing its counter-terrorism footprint in Africa.

    The project is underway at Manda Bay airbase in Lamu County, a Kenya Defence Forces facility that hosts US troops and serves as a key operational centre against Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group active in Somalia and the wider region.

    The expansion follows Washington’s 2024 designation of Kenya as its first major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally in sub-Saharan Africa, a move that deepened defence and diplomatic cooperation without a formal security treaty.

    The US Department of State awarded a $71.3 million (Sh9.2 billion) contract in July 2024 for the design and construction of the expanded airfield.

    Once complete, the new runway will nearly triple the length of the existing strip, which is more than 30 years old and cannot accommodate larger aircraft required for modern military and humanitarian missions.

    Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Musalia Mudavadi described the project as a foundational investment in long-term economic and security stability.

    “With reliable security the economy is going to grow, jobs will be created,” Mudavadi said during the ceremony.

    The expanded runway, expected to be completed by mid-2027, will support a wider range of aircraft and missions, including rapid response deployments, logistics operations and joint efforts against terrorism, piracy and other threats to regional stability.

    The US expands its military base in Kenya.
    The US expands its military base in Kenya.

    Speaking at the project’s groundbreaking on Thursday, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said the upgrade showcased both countries’ resolve to deter attacks and protect shared interests.

    He described the base as a concrete symbol of joint defence efforts and a clear message to hostile actors.

    “We have to show those who would attack us that we are resolved to defend ourselves,” he said.

    During his three-day visit, Landau also praised Kenya’s role in international security efforts, particularly its leadership of the United Nations-backed mission in Haiti.

    He stated that Kenya had played a central role in deploying forces and planning a new gang-suppression operation aimed at restoring order and supporting Haiti’s national police.

    Kenya currently leads the multinational mission seeking to curb gang violence that has overwhelmed large parts of the Caribbean nation.

  • Safaricom Faces Explosive Market Abuse Claims as Ethiopia’s Telecom Giant Threatens Return to Monopoly

    Safaricom Faces Explosive Market Abuse Claims as Ethiopia’s Telecom Giant Threatens Return to Monopoly

    Ethiopia’s telecoms liberalisation hangs in the balance after the state-owned incumbent unleashed a blistering attack on Safaricom, accusing the Kenyan operator of flagrant market misconduct and threatening to reverse reforms that ended a century of monopoly control.

    In an extraordinary escalation that could reshape the Horn of Africa’s telecoms landscape, Ethio Telecom has warned that continued violations by Safaricom Ethiopia risk forcing authorities to reconsider the competitive framework introduced just three years ago, potentially restoring single-operator dominance in a market of 120 million people.

    The bombshell came as Firehiwot Tamiru, who has steered Ethio Telecom for seven years, delivered a scathing rebuke of Safaricom’s operational practices during a results briefing on Thursday, declaring that the competitor’s conduct falls below international standards and amounts to systematic abuse of market regulations.

    The explosive row erupted after M-PESA Ethiopia publicly alleged that Ethio Telecom had blocked access to its newly launched Lehulm mobile money platform, preventing users on the state operator’s network from transacting. Safaricom channeled the complaint through its financial services subsidiary, triggering regulatory scrutiny and international attention.

    Ethio Telecom has categorically rejected the accusations, insisting it acted only after repeated infractions threatened customer security and critical national infrastructure. The company has demanded a formal apology from Safaricom for making unsubstantiated claims before domestic and international audiences.

    The dispute has now escalated into a formal corporate confrontation, with Ethio Telecom’s chief executive dispatching an official letter demanding retraction of the allegations. When Safaricom responded by redirecting the matter to M-PESA Ethiopia, tensions intensified further, with the state operator accusing its rival of attempting to exploit its customer base without proper infrastructure investment.

    Tamiru told reporters that verbal warnings had previously been issued to Safaricom over its market behavior, but the infractions continued unchecked, forcing the state operator to take decisive protective measures. Her comments represent the most aggressive public stance Ethio Telecom has taken since the market opened to competition.

    The chief executive issued a stark warning that appeared to question the viability of Ethiopia’s duopoly experiment. She insisted there exists no international precedent permitting one operator to commandeer a competitor’s customers without establishing requisite digital systems and infrastructure, suggesting Safaricom had attempted precisely such an overreach.

    Her remarks strike at the heart of Ethiopia’s telecoms reform agenda, which saw Safaricom Ethiopia awarded a nationwide license in 2022 after a competitive bidding process that attracted global attention. The Kenyan consortium, which includes Vodafone and Vodacom, paid $850 million for market entry and committed billions more in infrastructure investment.

    The liberalisation marked a watershed moment for Ethiopia, ending Ethio Telecom’s stranglehold over fixed line, mobile, internet and international gateway services. For decades, the monopoly structure allowed government to maintain strategic oversight while channeling revenues into public expenditure, but chronic underinvestment and service deficiencies ultimately prompted reform.

    Safaricom Ethiopia positioned itself as a catalyst for digital transformation, leveraging M-PESA’s formidable reputation across East Africa to accelerate financial inclusion. The mobile money platform rapidly gained traction, but Thursday’s revelations suggest the expansion has triggered fierce resistance from the entrenched operator.

    Tamiru emphasized that digital security remains paramount, declaring that safeguarding customers and critical infrastructure constituted a non-negotiable responsibility. She stressed that Digital Ethiopia must remain safe and secure, implying Safaricom’s approach had jeopardized those objectives.

    Although Safaricom subsequently issued an apology, Ethio Telecom’s chief executive made clear the state operator would not share its subscriber base with the competitor. She left the door open for collaboration, but only on terms that respect market regulations and conform to international norms.

    The confrontation raises fundamental questions about the sustainability of Ethiopia’s competitive telecoms environment. With Ethio Telecom now explicitly warning that the liberalisation framework could be reconsidered, investors and industry observers face the prospect of a dramatic policy reversal that would eliminate competition barely three years after its introduction.

    The standoff also exposes deeper tensions over market conduct in a sector where the state retains overwhelming legacy advantages. Ethio Telecom controls the vast majority of subscribers, infrastructure and distribution channels, while Safaricom struggles to establish equivalent reach despite substantial capital commitments.

    Industry analysts warn that any regression to monopoly would deal a devastating blow to Ethiopia’s economic reform credentials and could trigger contractual disputes with Safaricom’s consortium partners. The telecom license represents one of the largest foreign direct investments in Ethiopian history, and its value depends entirely on competitive market access.

    For Safaricom, the dispute threatens to tarnish its regional expansion strategy and raises uncomfortable questions about due diligence before entering one of Africa’s most challenging operating environments. The company has staked significant resources and reputation on Ethiopian success, making retreat or failure particularly costly.

    The allegations of market abuse, infrastructure deficiencies and regulatory overreach now sit before Ethiopian authorities, who must determine whether Ethio Telecom acted legitimately to protect national interests or wielded incumbent power to frustrate genuine competition. Their verdict will determine whether Ethiopia’s telecoms future remains competitive or reverts to centralized control.

  • Norway Police File Charges Over Suspected Oil Bribery in Congo Republic

    Norway Police File Charges Over Suspected Oil Bribery in Congo Republic

    Norwegian police said on Monday they had charged an oil company and two executives in Norway on suspicion of paying millions of dollars in bribes to close family members of Congo Republic President Denis Sassou Nguesso.

    Norwegian police said the investigation was launched after Monaco police sought legal assistance related to a suspicious bank transaction, and that substantial assistance also came from other countries, including France and the United States.

    “The bribes … are linked to the President of Congo and his close family members, and the value of the bribes is particularly high,” the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime said in a statement.

    Congo’s government dismissed reports linking Nguesso and his entourage to alleged corruption in the awarding of oil licences, saying in a statement on Tuesday that no legal proceedings target the government.

    The government condemned “interpretations,” “allusions” and “shortcuts” that harmed the honour and reputation of the head of state and his associates without an established legal basis, the statement said.

    It added that Nguesso and members of his circle were not the subject of prosecution, investigation or a court decision in the case, and it noted that judicial authorities involved had acknowledged they had no jurisdiction over them.

    Part of the investigation has been closed “due to lack of sufficient evidence,” according to the statement.

    Offshore Licence

    The accused company, Hemla Africa Holding AS, is a fully owned indirect subsidiary of Oslo-listed oil group PetroNor and controls a 20 percent stake in the offshore PNGF Sud licence via Hemla E&P Congo.

    PetroNor said in a statement it categorically contested the indictment and welcomed the chance to have the case examined in court. The company’s share price was down 10.5 percent as of 1516 GMT on Tuesday.

    MGI International, which was controlled by the president’s family, was given a 25 percent stake in Hemla E&P Congo, and MGI received dividends of close to $25 million between 2018 and 2024, according to the indictment seen by Reuters.

    Other payments took place in parallel with the application for the oil licence in Congo, investigators said.

    Hemla co-founders Knut Soevold and Gerhard Ludvigsen, who will stand trial alongside the company, denied any criminal guilt and will defend themselves “with full force,” their lawyers Halvard Helle and Arild Dyngeland said in a statement.

    “All agreements with the Congolese company are made on commercial terms and purely commercial considerations, and have nothing to do with corruption,” the lawyers said.

    Soevold stepped down from the position of PetroNor CEO in 2021 after a police raid in the case on the company’s premises.

    Norway has no jurisdiction over the individuals who received the payments and no consideration has been made of any criminal liability on their part, the police said.

    The PNGF Sud licence lies in shallow waters about 25 km (15 miles) off the coast, and encompasses several producing fields. It is operated by Perenco, an independent Anglo-French oil company.

    Perenco did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    Sassou first came to power in 1979 and ruled until he lost Congo’s first multi-party elections in 1992, before returning to office in 1997 after a civil war.

  • Ivory Coast President Appoints Brother As Vice Prime Minister

    Ivory Coast President Appoints Brother As Vice Prime Minister

    ABIDJAN, Jan 23 (Reuters) – Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara reshuffled his cabinet on Friday, maintaining most senior ministers while appointing his brother, Defence Minister Tene Birahima Ouattara, to the newly created role of vice prime minister, which he will hold alongside his defence portfolio.

    The move elevates the younger Ouattara within the government hierarchy, while most key portfolios remained unchanged, signaling continuity rather than a comprehensive overhaul.

    The reshuffle follows Ouattara’s re-election in October and his party’s victory in December’s legislative elections, securing a parliamentary majority.

    Ouattara, 84, a former deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, has led the country since 2011 and has said that he intends to prepare the ground for a new generation of political leaders during his tenure.

    The changes come as Ivory Coast, the world’s largest cocoa producer, seeks to build on nearly 15 years of sustained economic growth that has made it among the region’s fastest-growing economies.

  • 30 Killed in Uganda Post-Election Crackdown

    30 Killed in Uganda Post-Election Crackdown

    Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, said on Friday that 30 opposition supporters had been killed and around 2,000 detained following the January 15 presidential election.

    Kainerugaba, who is known for his provocative social media posts and has publicly expressed ambitions to succeed his father, wrote on X that authorities had arrested “over 2,000 hooligans” linked to Wine’s party, the National Unity Platform (NUP), and that 30 NUP members had been killed.

    Uganda Army Chief Says 2,000 Opposition Supporters Arrested.
    Supporters of opposition leader and presidential candidate for the National Unity Platform (NUP) Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, popularly known as Bobi Wine, hold electoral banners as they chant slogans during the party’s final campaign rally ahead of the 2026 general elections in Kampala on January 12, 2026. (Photo by Luis TATO / AFP)

    “We have arrested over 2,000 hooligans that Kabobi thought he would use. So far, we have killed 30 NUP terrorists,” he wrote, using his nickname for Bobi Wine.

    Opposition leader Bobi Wine remained in hiding after reportedly accusing security forces of raiding his home in the wake of the vote, which he described as “blatant theft.”

    According to the Electoral Commission. Museveni, 81, was declared the winner with 72 per cent of the vote, while Wine received 25 per cent.

    Among those detained is opposition lawmaker Muwanga Kivumbi from Butambala, one of the areas hardest hit by election-day violence. Kivumbi said 10 of his campaign agents were killed when security forces stormed his home.

    Police said his supporters had been shot after allegedly attempting to burn down a vote-tallying centre and police station.

    A lawyer representing opposition figures said more than 600 people had been arrested in connection with post-election protests. He added that many detainees were unaware of the charges against them and claimed they were picked up from their homes before appearing in court.

    Human rights groups and African election observers have criticised the heavy repression of opposition supporters, including a nationwide internet shutdown, following the vote.

     

  • DR Congo’s Human Statue Becomes AFCON’s Most Famous Fan

    DR Congo’s Human Statue Becomes AFCON’s Most Famous Fan

    His team were knocked out of the Africa Cup of Nations in agonising fashion on Tuesday, but the Democratic Republic of Congo’s human statue Michel Kuka Mboladinga will be remembered as the tournament’s most remarkable supporter.

    The colourfully-dressed Kuka has earned fame as the fan who stands completely immobile throughout his team’s games, looking towards the sky with his right arm raised and palm open.

    He has become a media star and on Tuesday was accompanied by a delegation of several hundred Congolese supporters whose trip to Morocco was paid for by the country’s government.

    They took their place in the stands in Rabat for the last-16 tie against Algeria which the Leopards lost 1-0 to a goal late in extra time.

    Kuka’s pose is inspired by that of a statue of Congolese independence leader and former prime minister Patrice Lumumba which stands in Kinshasa.

    Lumumba briefly served as the country’s first prime minister in 1960 and was assassinated the following year by a combination of separatists from the region of Katanga and Belgian mercenaries.

    His body was dissolved in acid and never found, although it was discovered decades later that remains, including a tooth, had been kept in Belgium.

    Kuka’s pose is inspired by that of a statue of Congolese independence leader and former prime minister Patrice Lumumba which stands in Kinshasa.

    Lumumba briefly served as the country’s first prime minister in 1960 and was assassinated the following year by a combination of separatists from the region of Katanga and Belgian mercenaries.

    His body was dissolved in acid and never found, although it was discovered decades later that remains, including a tooth, had been kept in Belgium.

    The killing is one of the darkest moments in the history of relations between Belgium and its former colony.

    Congolese fans at the Cup of Nations who spoke to AFP expressed pride at seeing Kuka’s tribute to Lumumba.

    Kuka is “our brother”, said 30-year-old Laetitia Malula during a gathering of supporters in Casablanca on the eve of the Algeria game.

    “He has chosen to imitate Lumumba…our hero. That is we why we chant his name.”

    DR Congo’s participation in the Cup of Nations has come amid an ongoing conflict in the east of the country along its border with Rwanda, where conflict has flared since 2021 with the resurgence of the Rwandan-backed M23 armed group.

    Kuka did not speak to AFP having apparently taken himself out of the limelight due to the overwhelming media attention.

    But 35-year-old Jered Bitobo, head of communication of the supporters group to which Kuka belongs, described his compatriot’s pose as “a sign of peace”.

    “He is sending out a strong message, both at local and international level. The open palm is a sign of peace and we need peace in our country,” Bitobo said.

    It is understood that Kuka first performed the pose several years ago during matches of leading Congolese side AS Vita Club.

  • Rwanda Closes Thousands of Evangelical Churches

    Rwanda Closes Thousands of Evangelical Churches

    Rwanda has closed over 10,000 evangelical churches for failing to comply with a 2018 law designed to regulate places of worship. The law introduced new rules on health, safety, and financial disclosures, and requires all preachers to have theological training.

    President Paul Kagame has been vocal in his criticisms of the evangelical churches that have sprouted across the small country in Africa’s Great Lakes region.

    “If it were up to me I wouldn’t even reopen a single church,” Kagame told a news briefing last month.

    The vast majority of Rwandans are Christian, according to a 2024 census, and many now travel long, costly distances to find places to pray.

    Observers say the real reason for the closures is control

    The 2018 law requires churches to submit annual action plans stating how they align with “national values”. All donations must be channelled through registered accounts.

    Rwanda Closes Thousands of Evangelical Churches. Photo; AFP
    Rwanda Closes Thousands of Evangelical Churches. Photo; AFP

    Pastor Sam Rugira, whose two church branches were shut down last year for failing to meet fire safety regulations, said the rules mainly affected new evangelical churches that have “mushroomed” in recent years.

    But Kagame has described the church as a relic of the colonial period, a chapter of its history that the country is still grappling with.

    The closure of Grace Room Ministries came as a shock to many across the country. Pastor Julienne Kabanda had been drawing massive crowds to the shiny new BK Arena in Kigali when the church’s licence was revoked.

    The government had cited unauthorised evangelical activities and a failure to submit “annual activity and financial reports”.

    But some say the clampdown on places of worship is linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which around 800,000 people, mostly ethnic Tutsis, were slaughtered.

  • Disgraced Oil Trader Idris Taha Sneaks Into Juba as Empire Crumbles

    Disgraced Oil Trader Idris Taha Sneaks Into Juba as Empire Crumbles

    JUBA – In a remarkable display of desperation, Idris Taha, the controversial oil trader at the center of allegations involving the systematic looting of South Sudan’s petroleum wealth, has quietly slipped into Juba in recent days, marking his first known personal visit to the capital in years as his once-formidable commercial empire teeters on the brink of collapse.

    The arrival of the Managing Director of Euroamerica Energy represents a stunning reversal for a man who for years operated from the safety of offices in Turkey and London, content to send his son Mahmoud as his proxy while pulling strings from thousands of miles away. That Taha felt compelled to make the journey himself speaks volumes about how dramatically his fortunes have shifted in the space of just weeks.

    Sources close to the matter say Taha’s mission was straightforward but ultimately futile. He came to Juba hoping to rebuild the intricate network of political connections that had allowed his firm to capture more than 80 percent of South Sudan’s crude oil exports in recent months. What he found instead were locked doors and turned backs as the new leadership made clear through their refusal to engage that the days of opaque oil deals are over.

    The collapse of Taha’s operation began last month when President Salva Kiir dismissed three key figures who had allegedly facilitated Euroamerica Energy’s stranglehold on the country’s economic lifeline. Former Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, former Nilepet Managing Director and former Undersecretary Engineer Deng Lual Wol were all removed from their positions in a move that investigators say effectively decapitated the network that had enabled what one source described as infrastructure-level theft.

    Without his carefully cultivated political protectors, Taha arrived in Juba to find himself treated as radioactive. The newly appointed Vice President declined to meet him. The Minister of Finance refused an audience. Officials at the Ministry of Petroleum, once so accommodating to his requests, kept their distance. For a man whose business model depends entirely on political access and official blessing, the cold shoulder represents nothing less than commercial death.

    The scale of what Taha allegedly helped orchestrate is staggering. Documents and industry sources indicate that Euroamerica Energy, working in partnership with Hong Kong-based Cathay Petroleum, controlled the vast majority of crude cargoes exported from South Sudan through a system designed for maximum opacity. No prepayments reached the Ministry of Finance. No proper records landed at the Central Bank. The lack of transparency was so complete that it directly contributed to the recent arrest of the Central Bank Governor, sources confirmed.

    Taha’s career reads like a handbook for operating in the world’s most corrupt and sanctioned oil markets. He cut his teeth in Libya during the embargo years of the 1990s, working through systems that were systematically corrupted by parallel networks. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, he shifted operations to Iran, managing large contracts with the United Arab Emirates until those relationships collapsed amid accusations of deception. Declared persona non grata in the Emirates, he moved his base of operations to Turkey and the United Kingdom.

    Along the way, he represented some of the biggest and most controversial names in commodity trading. He worked for Trafigura before that company fled South Sudan following a bribery scandal. He joined Litasco, the trading arm of Russian oil giant Lukoil, which withdrew from South Sudan leaving behind an unpaid debt of 90 million dollars. Each time a company he worked for exited under a cloud, Taha simply shifted to a new vehicle and continued operating.

    The alleged theft operated on multiple levels. On the surface, there were questions about whether South Sudan received fair prices for crude sold through Euroamerica and Cathay channels. But investigators say the more insidious looting occurred through what is known as the cost oil mechanism, a system designed to allow oil companies to recoup exploration and production expenses before the government receives its share.

    In theory, cost oil is standard industry practice. In South Sudan, sources allege, it became a vehicle for organized overbilling on a breathtaking scale. Oil service companies allegedly linked to the network charged up to three times standard rates for drilling and services, knowing the cost oil system would reimburse every inflated dollar before a single cent reached public coffers. A well that should cost 20 million dollars was allegedly billed at 100 million, with the state absorbing the entire loss.

    Facilitating these flows was Cornelis Nicolaas Abraham Loos, a Dutch national who sources say has been in South Sudan for more than seven years serving as a close associate of the dismissed former Vice President. Loos allegedly managed money laundering operations through Dubai and handled UAE real estate assets on behalf of senior officials. Sources describe him as the man who made the mechanics of corruption work smoothly across jurisdictions and banking systems.

    What made the network particularly effective was its institutional depth. The traders working through Cathay Petroleum learned their craft at Arcadia Petroleum and Glencore, companies known for aggressive trading in frontier markets. When Arcadia collapsed in 2018 amid allegations of massive fraud involving 349 million dollars, and when Glencore exited South Sudan under the weight of scandal after publicly admitting it paid bribes in the country, the traders simply migrated to new employers and continued the same practices.

    For South Sudan, one of the world’s youngest and poorest nations, the implications have been catastrophic. Oil revenues that should fund hospitals, schools and basic infrastructure instead allegedly disappeared into offshore accounts. The Ministry of Finance and Central Bank were effectively cut out of the export process, unable to track revenues or verify that the country received fair value for its resources.

    The dismissal of Benjamin Bol Mel and the other key figures last month signaled that at least some elements within the South Sudanese government recognized the severity of the crisis. The refusal of the new leadership to meet with Taha during his recent visit suggests they understand that rebuilding trust in the oil sector requires not just removing compromised officials but also closing the door to the traders who allegedly worked with them.

    For Taha, the rejection marks a dramatic fall. Just weeks ago, his firm controlled the vast majority of the country’s crude exports. Now he wanders the corridors of power in Juba, unable to secure a single meaningful meeting. His political protectors are gone. His commercial arrangements are in jeopardy. His business model, built entirely on cultivated relationships with officials willing to bend rules and ignore oversight, has hit a wall.

    Industry observers say Taha’s desperation visit underscores a broader truth about corruption in resource-rich developing nations. Systems of theft can appear impregnable when they have political protection, but they are remarkably fragile once that protection is withdrawn. Without officials willing to provide cover, even the most sophisticated networks can unravel with shocking speed.

    The question now is whether South Sudan’s new leadership can maintain its resolve. Taha and the traders he works with have spent decades perfecting their craft in sanctioned and conflict-affected markets. They know how to wait out political transitions. They know how to identify new officials who might be susceptible to inducements. They know that even when caught, as Glencore was when it admitted to bribery, the consequences are often manageable and the networks can survive to operate under new names.

    But by treating Taha as toxic and refusing to engage with him, Juba’s new leadership is sending an unmistakable signal. The systematic looting that allegedly characterized recent years will not be tolerated going forward. Political access cannot be purchased. The country’s oil wealth will no longer be treated as a private resource to be diverted through opaque channels.

    Whether this resolve holds in the face of pressure and inducements remains to be seen. For now, Idris Taha’s lonely and fruitless visit to Juba stands as a symbol of a system in collapse. The man who once controlled South Sudan’s economic lifeline from comfortable offices abroad now prowls the capital in person, searching for sympathetic ears and finding none. His empire is crumbling, and for a country bled dry by years of corruption, that represents the first faint hope that things might finally change.

  • DR Congo Fighting: M23 Rebels Advance Uvira Despite Trump Peace Deal

    DR Congo Fighting: M23 Rebels Advance Uvira Despite Trump Peace Deal

    Sporadic gunfire and explosions have been reported as M23 rebels advance towards a key city in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in an offensive that has forced thousands to flee across the border into Burundi.

    Residents and military sources said soldiers were fleeing the assault on Uvira, the last government-held city in the mineral-rich region.

    US President Donald Trump brokered a peace deal last week between DR Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame to end the long-running conflict but fighting has continued.

    Shops and schools have closed, with terrified residents staying indoors amid fears that rebels had taken control of some government buildings.

    But South Kivu Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi dismissed reports that the rebels were in the city as “completely unfounded rumours”.

    Residents told the BBC that Uvira was in lockdown on Wednesday, with some reporting gunfire in the city that is just 27 km (17 miles) from Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura.

    A local rights official told AP news agency that there was a “risk of a massacre” if the remaining soldiers mounted strong resistance.

    “It’s chaotic, nobody’s in charge. Uvira is done for,” a Burundian officer told AFP news agency.

    “Three bombs have just exploded in the hills. It’s every man for himself,” a resident told AFP, while another added: “We are all under the beds in Uvira – that’s the reality.”

    Military and security sources said the rebel fighters advanced from the north, near the Burundian border.

    In an interview with UN-backed Radio Okapi, Purusi denied Uvira had fallen to the M23, saying the city remained under the control of government forces.

    The US, European Union, and eight European nations have accused Rwanda of supporting the rebel offensive, and have called for an immediate halt to the fighting

    In a joint statement, they voiced “profound concern” about the violence, and said it had a “destabilising potential for the whole region”.

    They urged the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to “immediately halt offensive operations” in eastern DR Congo, and called on its troops to withdraw from the region.

    But Rwanda has denied any involvement in the fighting, accusing DR Congo’s government and its ally, Burundi, of violating a ceasefire.

    In a statement on X, the Rwandan foreign ministry said the ceasefire violation “cannot be placed on Rwanda” and said the Congolese and Burundian armies had “systematically” bombed villages close to Rwanda’s border.

    UN experts say Rwanda’s army is in “de facto control of M23 operations”.

    About 200,000 people have fled their homes in eastern DR Congo since the latest round of fighting started early this month, the UN says.

    It said at least 74 people had been killed, mostly civilians, and 83 admitted to hospital with wounds.

    A Burundian administrative source told AFP that he had recorded more than 8,000 daily arrivals over the past two days, and 30,000 arrivals in one week.

    The latest offensive comes nearly a year after the M23 rebels seized control of Goma and Bukavu, the other two main cities in eastern DR Congo.

    The M23 is not part of the US-brokered peace deal, and is in separate talks with DR Congo’s government in mediation efforts led by Qatar.

    In a national address on Monday, Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of “deliberate violations” of the peace accord.

    “This is a proxy war aimed at challenging our sovereignty over a highly strategic area, rich in critical minerals and economic potential that is crucial to the future of our nation,” Tshisekedi said.

    For its part, Rwanda accused the armies of DR Congo and Burundi of bombing villages near its border, forcing more than 1,000 civilians to flee into its territory.

    Eastern DR Congo has been wracked by conflict for more than 30 years, since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Several peace deals going back to the 1990s have collapsed.

    Numerous armed groups have competed with the central authorities for power and control of the potential fortune in this vast nation.

    (BBC)

  • Tanzania Issues Fresh Warning Against Protests After Failed Independence Day Planned Demos

    Tanzania Issues Fresh Warning Against Protests After Failed Independence Day Planned Demos

    Tanzania’s security agencies have intensified a crackdown on organisers of anti-government demonstrations after calls for nationwide protests on Independence Day collapsed.

    The Police Force on Wednesday issued a fresh warning, saying the country remained calm despite days of online mobilisation for what activists had described as peaceful and indefinite demonstrations.

    Authorities said the planned December 9 protests did not take place because organisers failed to mobilise supporters.

    The police credited joint operations with other defence and security organs for what they termed a peaceful national mood.

    In their statement, they said they had been monitoring the network behind the planned protests through online platforms and other communication channels used to coordinate the mobilisation.

    Protesters in Tanzania.
    Protesters in Tanzania.

    The force reiterated earlier warnings issued on December 3 and December 5, insisting that the demonstrations had been outlawed because they did not meet requirements under the 1977 Constitution and the Police and Auxiliary Police Act.

    The police accuse the organisers of promoting 13 criminal tactics aimed at disrupting the country’s economic and social stability, although they have not publicly detailed the alleged methods.

    Officials also claim organisers shifted their strategy after failing to draw crowds on Independence Day and were now pushing for fresh street protests on December 10.

    The police insisted that the gatherings remained illegal and would not be allowed under any circumstances.

    According to the statement, security agencies will continue surveillance and enforcement to stop any attempts to destabilise the country.

    The warning comes amid heightened political tension following the controversial October 29 presidential election in which President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared winner with nearly 98 percent of the vote.

    Major opposition candidates were barred from running, prompting widespread anger and sparking deadly post-election unrest that drew global attention.

    Rights groups say hundreds of protesters may have died during clashes with security forces, although the government has not released an official casualty count.

    In the days leading up to Independence Day, the government advised citizens to stay home and cancelled the usual celebrations.

    Security personnel were deployed across major cities including Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Mwanza. Roadblocks, patrols and ID checkpoints were mounted as part of what the police described as preventive measures.

    International bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Office, urged Tanzania to respect the right to peaceful assembly and called for restraint from security agencies.

    Some foreign governments have hinted at reviewing relations with Dodoma over concerns about the shrinking civic space and allegations of excessive force.

    Despite the warnings and heavy presence of police and soldiers on the streets, many Tanzanians appeared to have chosen to remain indoors on December 9.

    Social media users reported unusually quiet roads and limited movement between neighbourhoods.

    The police have maintained that anyone attempting to stage demonstrations or disrupt economic activity will face consequences.

    They accused protest organisers of misleading the public and attempting to destabilise the country under the guise of peaceful demonstrations.

    The force said it will continue safeguarding national security and urged citizens to comply with the law.

    Authorities say the goal is to ensure Tanzania remains peaceful and stable as the country navigates one of its most politically charged periods in recent years.

    On Tanzania’s Independence Day, government banned protests and ordered people to stay home. Police checked IDs everywhere.
    On Tanzania’s Independence Day, government banned protests and ordered people to stay home. Police checked IDs everywhere.