Author: Our Correspondent

  • The Lawyer at the Centre of Kenya’s State Machine: Eric Gumbo, the AG’s Bypassed Office, and the Half-Billion-Shilling Question

    The Lawyer at the Centre of Kenya’s State Machine: Eric Gumbo, the AG’s Bypassed Office, and the Half-Billion-Shilling Question

    CASE FILE: LCIA — TELKOM / JAMHURI HOLDINGS

    Forum

    London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)

    Claimant

    Jamhuri Holdings Ltd / Helios Investment Partners

    Stake

    Sh6.19 billion Telkom Kenya shares transaction

    Law firm engaged

    G&A Advocates LLP — Eric Gumbo, Ken Melly, Moses Kipkogei

    Contract value

    Sh358 million

    Procurement route

    Specially Permitted Procedure (SPP) — no open competition

    PPARB ruling

    March 9, 2026 — upheld G&A award over Okoth & Kiplagat

    CASE FILE: ICSID — TRAVIZORY BORDER SECURITY

    Case reference

    ICSID Arbitration No. R20250103 / ARB/25/54

    Claimant

    Travizory Border Security SA (Switzerland)

    Treaty invoked

    Kenya-Switzerland BIT (2006)

    Law firms engaged

    G&A Advocates LLP and MMA Advocates

    Procurement route

    Single-sourced — no competitive process whatsoever

    Protest filed

    Okoth & Kiplagat Advocates, March 31, 2026

    Prior protest ignored

    February 10, 2026 letter — no response from AG’s office

    NAIROBIThere is a photograph circulating in Kenya’s legal and government circles that captures, without a word of explanation, the nature of the relationships now under public scrutiny. It shows Eric Onyango Gumbo, managing partner of G&A Advocates LLP, standing at the far left of a gathering that includes Attorney-General Dorcas Oduor, National Treasury Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo, and PS Ouma Oluga. The occasion was a Huduma Mashinani event at Lwak Girls Secondary School in Rarieda. The location is in Siaya County, the political heartland of Kenya’s government-opposition axis. The photograph is not incriminating on its face. What makes it remarkable is its timing: it emerged at the precise moment that G&A Advocates was being handed, through non-competitive routes, sovereign legal mandates worth at least Sh716 million — with the Attorney-General’s personal approval.

    That figure covers the Sh358 million brief to defend Kenya before the London Court of International Arbitration in the Jamhuri Holdings case, and the separately awarded ICSID mandate in the Travizory Border Security arbitration, whose fee has not been publicly disclosed but which, by the standards of international investor-state proceedings, will be substantial. Both awards went to G&A. Neither was subject to full open competitive tendering. And in the case of the Travizory ICSID matter, according to a formal protest letter now in public circulation, there was no competitive process at all.

    On April 8, Senior Counsel Nelson Havi published his endorsement of that protest on X, asking pointedly why a sitting Attorney-General would bypass her own office’s advocates — advocates whose superior track record in exactly these proceedings is documented by a Jus Mundi certificate — to single-source a brief to what he called “little known abbreviated Advocates.” By Wednesday morning, the post had reached every senior lawyer, parliamentarian and government official in the country’s digital conversation. Sheria House had not responded.

    Former Law Society of Kenya President Nelson Havi at the Milimani law courts in Nairobi on Wednesday, July 14, 2021 where he obtained orders from the High Court stopping his prosecution over allegations of assault. PHOTO DENNIS ONSONGO.

    THE LETTER THE AG CHOSE TO IGNORE

    The formal paper trail begins in February. On February 10, 2026, Okoth and Kiplagat Advocates — a firm led by Dr. Kenneth Kiplagat — wrote to AG Oduor objecting to the appointment of G&A Advocates LLP and MMA Advocates to represent the Republic of Kenya in ICSID Arbitration No. R20250103, the case filed by Travizory Border Security SA of Switzerland. That letter received no response from the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, or any official at the State Law Office.

    On March 31, 2026, Kiplagat wrote again. The second letter, delivered by recorded hand delivery to Sheria House and copied to Solicitor-General Hon. Shadrack Mose, CBS, is a document of extraordinary bluntness for a formal legal correspondence. It does not merely object to the procurement irregularity. It accuses the AG of being constitutionally prohibited from making the appointments at all, alleges that “incredulous agreements have been secretly reached to siphon off public funds as purported fees or amicable settlement,” and serves explicit notice of imminent court proceedings.

    “The appointments are without any merit and are altogether not permitted by applicable statutory as well as constitutional imperatives.” — Okoth & Kiplagat Advocates, March 31, 2026

    The letter’s constitutional argument is precise and, in the view of several senior advocates Kenya Insights consulted, legally sound. It invokes Article 156(7) of the Constitution, which confines the AG’s power of delegation to “subordinate officers acting in accordance with general or special instructions.” Kiplagat’s firm argues that G&A Advocates and MMA Advocates are not gazetted subordinate officers of the State Law Office and that there is therefore no constitutional authority for the AG to appoint them. This is not a procedural quibble about procurement regulations. It goes to the fundamental architecture of the Attorney-General’s constitutional mandate.

    The letter further accuses the AG of inverting what it calls a foundational principle of the Commonwealth legal tradition: that private lawyers build expertise by cycling through government work, not the other way around. “What is now being compelled,” Kiplagat wrote, “is an absurd preposition in which public sector experience is being gained by private sector lawyers and state counsels, as public sector employees, are denied the very experience that attracted them to join the State Law Office in the first place.”

    Point five of the letter ventures into territory that reads almost as an allegation of corruption: it claims that accounting officers are being “compelled to issue contracts for the payment of fees in excess of fees that we have disclosed,” that expenditure beyond the market rate Okoth and Kiplagat offered “would immediately invite an abuse of office charge,” and that the firm has been informed that “incredulous agreements have been secretly reached to siphon off public funds.” Kenya Insights is unable to independently verify the last of those claims, but its presence in a formal legal letter delivered to the AG and the Solicitor-General places it squarely on the public record.

    THREE YEARS OF WARNING IGNORED — THEN A SH358 MILLION EMERGENCY

    The Jamhuri Holdings LCIA case is, in a sense, the bill arriving for a transaction whose recklessness was apparent from the moment it happened. In August 2022, just days before the general election, the Kenyatta administration’s Treasury withdrew Sh6.09 billion from the Consolidated Fund without parliamentary approval to buy back a 60 per cent stake in Telkom Kenya from Helios Investment Partners through its Mauritius-registered vehicle Jamhuri Holdings Limited. The Controller of Budget, Dr. Margaret Nyakang’o, subsequently told Parliament she had been pressured to sign off on the withdrawal. The payment cleared without her proper authorisation.

    The share purchase agreement, tabled before Parliament, contained a clause referring all disputes to the London Court of International Arbitration. That clause was flagged publicly at the time. The Ruto Cabinet formally rescinded the deal in October 2022. Parliament later declared the expenditure irregular. Investigators attempted to trace the money through Mauritius into Jersey, where Helios’s parent entity is registered, and ran into a wall. Former Treasury CS Ukur Yatani, former ICT CS Joe Mucheru and State House Chief of Staff Josphat Kinyua were summoned to explain the deal. Billions had already left the country.

    For three full years after all of this, the government failed to organise a proper competitive tender for the legal representation it knew it would need. When Treasury finally moved in January 2026, it declared an emergency and invoked the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure — a mechanism designed for genuine crises where normal tendering is truly impossible — to award the brief to G&A Advocates without open bidding. Treasury told the PPARB that the SPP was justified by “the urgency of the matter and the risk of financial exposure for the Government of Kenya.” The PPARB accepted this argument and upheld the award in its March 9 ruling.

    For three full years, Kenya’s government sat on the knowledge that an LCIA confrontation with Helios was inevitable — then declared an emergency to hand the brief to a politically connected firm without open competition.

    Okoth and Kiplagat Advocates, which had tendered Sh380 million for the same work — Sh22 million more than G&A’s winning quote of Sh358 million — were the losing bidder in that procurement dispute. The PPARB accepted Treasury’s position that G&A had the requisite experience in international commercial and investment arbitrations. That finding is supported by the record: Ken Melly, who will lead the dispute resolution work alongside Gumbo, was part of the legal team that defended Kenya in a multi-billion-dollar ICSID arbitration that the state won in 2018. He holds a Master of Laws in Dispute Resolution from the University of Cape Town and the designation of Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.

    But the PPARB’s acceptance of G&A’s credentials in the LCIA matter does nothing to resolve the separate and more serious allegation in the ICSID matter: that in the Travizory arbitration, the AG’s office dispensed with any competitive process at all, handing the brief directly to G&A and MMA Advocates without testing the market, obtaining comparator quotes, or — on Kiplagat’s account — even responding to a formal objection lodged six weeks before the second protest letter.

    WHO IS ERIC GUMBO AND HOW DEEP IS THE ENTANGLEMENT?

    G&A Advocates LLP was founded in 2006 in Eldoret under the name Gumbo and Associates Advocates. It transitioned to a limited liability partnership in 2017 and now maintains offices in Nairobi and Eldoret. The firm is legitimately regarded: it holds recognition from the IFLR1000 guide to financial and corporate law firms, has signed an international partnership with South Korean firm Jipyong LLC, and has worked alongside global names including White and Case on sovereign transactions. Chambers and Partners and the Legal 500 both reference its dispute resolution and corporate practices.

    Eric Gumbo himself is a technically accomplished lawyer. Over a twenty-one-year career, he has appeared in all three presidential election petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Kenya since the 2010 Constitution, including in 2022 — the election that brought President Ruto to power. He has served on the Council for Legal Education, chairs the board of the Legal Aid Centre for Eldoret, and has undertaken specialised training in financial markets at Yale University, arbitration at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, fintech law and policy at Duke University, and green business strategy in Hong Kong.

    What distinguishes Gumbo from other accomplished lawyers, however, is the density and recency of his entanglement with the specific machinery of the Ruto state. In October 2024, he was the legislature’s lead counsel in the Senate proceedings to remove Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua — widely characterised at the time as a Ruto administration-driven political operation. He argued successfully. Gachagua was removed. Gumbo also appeared before the High Court resisting conservatory orders that would have blocked Kithure Kindiki’s swearing-in as the replacement Deputy President.

    Within weeks of the Gachagua impeachment, G&A was co-appointed alongside TripleOKLaw as co-legal adviser on the Kenya Pipeline Company’s initial public offering — the first IPO in Kenya in nearly seventeen years, the centrepiece of the Ruto privatisation agenda, listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange on March 9, 2026, after being 105.7 per cent oversubscribed. The KPC IPO advisory fee, shared between the two firms, was set at Sh31.9 million. Earlier, G&A had served as co-counsel to the National Treasury alongside an international firm in Kenya’s 2025 Eurobond liability management operation, which extended the country’s debt maturity profile.

    Gumbo argued the Gachagua impeachment. He advised on the KPC IPO. He sits on a Treasury-linked state board. He hosts the AG at school events. And he now holds at least two sovereign arbitration mandates without open competitive bidding.

    Gumbo also sits on the board of Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, a state-owned listed insurer whose board includes an alternate director nominated directly by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury — the very ministry now writing G&A a Sh358 million cheque. He was additionally appointed by the President to the panel tasked with recruiting the Auditor-General, the constitutional officer responsible for oversight of public expenditure including Treasury’s own accounts. The photograph of Gumbo standing alongside Oduor, Treasury PS Kiptoo and PS Oluga at Lwak Girls Secondary School is a visual summary of these connections: the boundaries between the private practice and the public establishment, if they ever existed sharply, have become substantially blurred.

    THE CONSTITUTIONAL GHOST OF THE NAKURU ORDER

    Complicating the political and legal picture further is a court order that hovered over the entire G&A engagement from its earliest days. On January 12, 2026 — days after Treasury had already awarded G&A its brief under the SPP — the High Court sitting in Nakuru issued conservatory orders in Petition E001 of 2026, filed by activist Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and others. Justice Samuel Mukira ordered a suspension on public entities engaging or paying private advocates where in-house government lawyers already existed.

    The Central Organisation of Trade Unions welcomed the orders, framing them as a blow against the billions routinely diverted to private law firms through what COTU called outrageous fee notes, at a time when public sector workers suffered delayed salaries and stalled collective bargaining agreements. The Law Society of Kenya mounted fierce resistance, with president Faith Odhiambo arguing that the Office of the Attorney General Act expressly provides for the retention of external counsel in specialised matters. Treasury justified the G&A appointment on exactly that basis: that LCIA proceedings before a specialist London tribunal required expertise the AG’s office could not supply. The PPARB accepted the argument.

    But the Nakuru order’s ghost is not fully exorcised. Kiplagat’s letter invokes the constitutional framework directly, arguing that the AG has no authority to delegate to non-subordinate officers regardless of what any procurement board has held. If a High Court bench agrees — and Kenya Insights understands that Okoth and Kiplagat Advocates’ stated intention to “shortly advance court proceedings” is being acted upon — the result could be an injunction stopping G&A’s engagement in the ICSID Travizory matter, or even the LCIA Jamhuri Holdings case, at the precise moment Kenya most needs effective legal representation.

    THE TRIPLEOKLAW THREAD AND THE WHISTLEBLOWER

    Woven through this entire controversy is the name of another law firm: TripleOKLaw LLP, a top-tier Nairobi practice ranked by Chambers and Partners, Legal 500 EMEA and other leading directories, and a member of the Meritas worldwide alliance spanning ninety-two countries. TripleOKLaw was co-legal adviser with G&A on the KPC IPO. The Global Arbitration Review’s Kenya chapter is authored by TripleOKLaw’s leading partners. And TripleOKLaw has now become the centre of the most explosive allegation in this entire controversy.

    Circulating widely on social media — reportedly shared by Havi himself — is a letter purportedly authored by a TripleOKLaw associate. The whistleblower claims that AG Oduor maintains a private office within TripleOKLaw’s premises and is conducting government business from within the firm’s offices. The letter alleges that classified files from the National Treasury and other ministries, some stamped “SECRET,” are visible on the premises, and that official government correspondence has been stamped with TripleOKLaw’s firm markings.

    The implications, if the allegations are accurate, are severe. An Attorney-General operating her constitutional office from the premises of a private commercial law firm would be in potential breach of the Leadership and Integrity Act, the Office of the Attorney General Act, and multiple provisions of the Constitution governing conflicts of interest and the proper discharge of constitutional duties. The confidentiality of privileged state communications — in matters ranging from international arbitration to regulatory advice — would be fundamentally compromised if such files were accessible within a commercial law firm’s environment. Kenya Insights has not independently verified the whistleblower’s claims, but they are on the public record and demand an official response that has not materialised.

    A whistleblower claims the AG conducts government business from TripleOKLaw’s offices, with Treasury files stamped ‘SECRET’ visible on the premises. Sheria House has not denied it.

    WHAT KENYA IS ACTUALLY DEFENDING

    Behind the procurement scandal and the political controversy lies a substantive legal exposure that no amount of institutional rearrangement will make disappear. In the LCIA case, Kenya is defending a claim brought by one of the most battle-hardened private equity operations on the African continent, arguing in effect that a completed commercial transaction can be unilaterally rescinded by a successor government on grounds of governance irregularity committed by its predecessor. Helios can credibly argue that it entered into a lawful contract, received payment, and has since watched Kenya’s government declare the expenditure irregular without paying back the money, returning the shares, or offering any compensation for the sudden termination of its investment.

    In the ICSID Travizory case, Kenya is defending allegations of intellectual property theft and treaty breach brought by a Swiss technology company under a bilateral investment treaty signed by Kenya in 2006. Travizory, represented by Geneva-headquartered LALIVE — one of the foremost investor-state arbitration practices in the world — claims that the Kenyan government not only terminated its contract without compensation but replicated its proprietary technology in a replacement system procured from an undisclosed local vendor. The allegation, if proved before the ICSID tribunal, carries the risk of damages that could substantially exceed the original contract value, compounded by the treaty’s full-reparation standard.

    Against Helios and LALIVE, Kenya has deployed Eric Gumbo, Ken Melly, Moses Kipkogei and an English barrister — a team whose credentials are genuine but whose selection process is mired in controversy. Whether the controversy around how G&A was chosen will impair its ability to mount an effective defence is a question that only time and tribunal proceedings will answer. What is certain is that if either arbitration is lost, and the damages paid from the public purse, the question of why a non-competitive procurement was used to select defence counsel will be asked with considerably greater force by Parliament, the Auditor-General, and the public alike.

    A SILENCE THAT SPEAKS

    As of Wednesday evening, April 9, 2026, the Attorney-General’s office has not responded to Nelson Havi’s public challenge, Kiplagat’s March 31 letter, the TripleOKLaw whistleblower allegations, or Kenya Insights’ request for comment. The Solicitor-General, copied on the March 31 protest, has maintained silence. The National Treasury, whose procurement decisions are at the heart of the LCIA controversy, has made no public statement beyond the filings submitted to the PPARB in February and March.

    This silence, in a matter that now touches the constitutional authority of the AG’s office, the integrity of sovereign procurement, the handling of classified state files, and the management of international legal exposure worth billions, is not sustainable. Nelson Havi’s intervention, coming from a former Law Society president with a documented record of taking on both the judiciary and the executive, signals that the pressure will not diminish. Okoth and Kiplagat’s stated intention to file court proceedings signals that the matter will shortly pass from social media discourse into the formal record of the judiciary.

    The photograph of Eric Gumbo standing alongside the Attorney-General and two Principal Secretaries will remain in circulation. The protest letter from Okoth and Kiplagat Advocates, with its formal accusations of unconstitutional delegation and secret agreements to siphon public funds, is on the public record. The whistleblower letter alleging a private office for the AG inside TripleOKLaw has not been denied. And Kenya, facing two simultaneous international arbitrations with opponents represented by world-class counsel, has chosen to defend itself through a procurement process that its own legal establishment is now challenging in court.

    Kenya Insights will continue to report on all aspects of this matter as litigation proceeds and as further disclosures emerge.

  • Mombasa Lawyer Exposed In Sh600 Million Alleged Double-Dealing Diani Property Transaction

    Mombasa Lawyer Exposed In Sh600 Million Alleged Double-Dealing Diani Property Transaction

    A Mombasa courtroom is being asked to resolve a question that cuts to the very heart of Kenya’s legal profession: can an advocate who allegedly served as the financial conduit for a Sh600 million fraudulent property transaction turn around and represent the accused as their defence counsel in the criminal trial that has followed? The Directorate of Criminal Investigations says the answer is an unequivocal no, and has filed sworn court papers seeking the immediate disqualification of Mombasa-based Adams Muthama from the explosive fraud case in which his own firm, Muthama Advocates, sits directly within the prosecution’s line of fire.

    The case involves some of the most valuable beachfront land on Kenya’s entire Indian Ocean coastline. Kwale/Diani Beach Blocks 806, 807 and 808 lie within a tourist corridor that commands among the highest per-acre valuations outside Nairobi’s prime suburbs. Once home to a property known as Diani House, acquired through a family arrangement in the 1960s, the three parcels have been at the centre of a property dispute that has moved through the Environment and Land Court, the Court of Appeal, and now the Mombasa Magistrate’s Court in criminal proceedings that have reverberated across Kenya’s legal community.

    “An advocate who is a material and necessary witness cannot appear as counsel in the same matter.” — DCI sworn affidavit, Mombasa 2026

    Six accused persons stand charged with conspiracy to defraud, fraudulent disposal of trust property, and obtaining registration of titles by false pretences. They are Annelise Lulu Archer Clark, John Christopher Clark, Hellen Kay Hartley, Richard Hartley and Christine Inger Clark, all elderly Kenyans of British origin aged between 65 and 67, together with a Kenyan national, Peter Mutwiwa. The prosecution alleges that between 2017 and 2021, the group subdivided the three trust parcels into six separate plots and transferred them to three companies for a combined consideration of Sh600 million, knowing the transactions were designed to defraud the rightful beneficiaries: James Howard Archer, Joana Trent and Robert Archer.

    THE FIRM AT THE CENTRE OF THE STORM

    What transforms this land fraud case into a legal crisis is where those transactions are alleged to have been executed. Court filings by the DCI state, in unambiguous terms, that the disputed sales were concluded at the offices of Muthama Advocates. The charge sheet itself identifies the firm’s premises as the location where the alleged fraudulent disposal of the trust properties took place. Investigators further allege that the Sh600 million in proceeds was processed through the firm’s accounts, embedding the advocate squarely within the financial trail that prosecutors regard as the skeletal structure of their entire case.

    According to the sworn DCI affidavit filed in Mombasa, Mr Muthama did not merely render passive legal services to the parties. Investigators allege that he was actively involved in the subdivision and transfer of the properties despite court-ordered restrictions that were in force at the time, and that he prepared or oversaw the sale agreements and related instruments used to effect the transactions. These are not, the DCI insists, the acts of a lawyer rendering routine conveyancing advice. They are, on the prosecution’s case, the acts of a participant.

    The State further accuses the advocate of withholding critical documents, including sale agreements and bank account details, behind claims of legal professional privilege. Investigators argue that this posture risks shielding material evidence from scrutiny, potentially amounting to obstruction of justice. The DCI’s position is direct: where communication is made in furtherance of an alleged illegal purpose, it cannot attract the shield of privilege that ordinarily protects advocate-client exchanges.

    A FAMILY TRUST UNRAVELS

    The roots of this extraordinary legal confrontation run back six decades. The Archer family, a mixed-nationality clan of siblings with British passports but deep Kenya connections, acquired the Diani beachfront land in 1967. Howard Archer contributed five thousand pounds sterling towards the purchase. The property was registered in the name of his brother Christopher John Archer, then the only Kenyan citizen among the siblings and therefore the only one legally entitled under the prevailing Beach Land Act to hold such a title in his name. The understanding within the family, according to the subsequent civil litigation, was that Christopher held the land in trust for all the siblings.

    Christopher Archer died. The property passed into the hands of Hellen, Christine and Annalise, the women among the siblings, who then became the registered holders. James Archer and Joana Trent, believing themselves to be beneficial owners, filed suit in the Environment and Land Court in 2012 seeking recognition of their interests. The lower court declined to recognise those interests. The matter went to the Court of Appeal, which in 2023 delivered a landmark ruling reversing the trial court, declaring the properties trust assets and ordering that beneficial interests be divided equally in four tranches of 25 percent each, allocated to Hellen, Christine and Annalise jointly, James, Trent and Robert Archer respectively.

    The criminal case, however, had already arisen from what happened between the 2012 filing and the 2023 appellate ruling. During that litigation window, prosecutors allege, the accused subdivided the three parcels into six titles and transferred them to Snapdragon Limited, Kamakawaida Properties Limited and Baroness Holdings Limited for the combined Sh600 million. The prosecution further alleges that Annelise Archer Clark swore a false affidavit in the 2021 Court of Appeal proceedings falsely representing that the subdivisions had been transferred for legitimate valuable consideration, a charge of perjury that now forms a separate count in the criminal indictment. All six accused have denied every charge.

    OFFSHORE STRUCTURES AND CONCEALED OWNERSHIP

    Investigators have raised particular alarm about the company structures used as the ultimate recipients of the Diani properties. According to the DCI’s court filings, Baroness Holdings Limited, the entity involved in the final transfer of the parcels, was linked to nominee arrangements through which the true beneficial ownership of the company could be obscured. The prosecution argues that this corporate architecture was deliberately assembled to complicate any effort to trace the final destination of the Sh600 million, and to frustrate any future attempts at recovery or restitution.

    The Mombasa court has issued warrants of arrest for the directors of all three companies who failed to appear when the matter was called. Interpol has been enlisted to assist in tracing those individuals, a development that signals investigators believe the network of interests in this case may extend beyond Kenyan borders. The offshore dimension of the alleged scheme places this prosecution in a category of coastal land fraud cases that have historically proven most resistant to resolution, given the difficulties in piercing nominee structures and compelling disclosure from foreign jurisdictions.

    “This is not a peripheral issue. It goes to the core of whether the trial can proceed fairly.” — State filings, Mombasa Magistrate’s Court

    THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE: A SETTLED PRINCIPLE

    The legal principle the DCI invokes against Mr Muthama is not novel. Rule 8 of the Advocates (Practice) Rules, made under the Advocates Act, is categorical: no advocate may appear before any court in any matter in which he has reason to believe he may be required as a witness, and if during proceedings it becomes apparent that he will be required to give evidence, he must cease to appear. The rationale for the rule is understood by any first-year student of professional ethics: an advocate who occupies the dual role of witness and counsel creates an inherent impossibility of fair representation. He cannot simultaneously challenge evidence he may be called to give, and he cannot put to the court an account of events that might differ materially from what he knows as a participant.

    The Law Society of Kenya’s Code of Standards of Professional Practice and Ethical Conduct reinforces this position. A conflicting interest, the Code states, is one that gives rise to a substantial risk that the advocate’s representation of the client will be materially and adversely affected by the advocate’s own interests. Few configurations could more squarely meet that definition than the one the DCI describes in the Diani case. If Mr Muthama is called as a prosecution witness, he would be in the position of giving testimony that could incriminate his own clients. If he is not, but knows facts that ought to be disclosed, his silence as counsel may itself constitute professional misconduct.

    Kenyan courts have, in a line of decisions, emphasised that the right of an accused person to counsel of their choice is a constitutionally protected guarantee under Article 50(2)(g) of the Constitution of Kenya. The threshold for displacing that right is therefore not merely evidence of inconvenience or theoretical prejudice. Courts have held that the applicant seeking disqualification must demonstrate real mischief and real prejudice that will in all human probability result from the continued appearance of counsel. The DCI’s filing appears acutely aware of this standard: the detail with which investigators describe Mr Muthama’s alleged transactional involvement is clearly designed to meet it.

    PRECEDENT IN THE MAKING

    Whatever the court decides, the ruling on Mr Muthama’s disqualification will be closely watched by Kenya’s legal community and by property practitioners along the Coast, where the model of a single advocate handling both the transaction and the long-term legal welfare of the client is deeply embedded. The case raises a structural question that professional bodies have never been required to confront with such public forcefulness: at what point does an advocate’s involvement in facilitating a commercial transaction cross the threshold from legitimate legal work into participation in the transaction itself, and what consequences flow from that crossing?

    The Law Society of Kenya has not publicly commented on the disqualification application. Its Code of Conduct provides the framework but not the specific answer. Section 60(1) of the Advocates Act defines professional misconduct as disgraceful or dishonourable conduct incompatible with the status of an advocate. The DCI’s case, if substantiated, would go considerably beyond dishonourable conduct and enter the territory of criminal complicity. That is territory from which no advocate-client privilege, and no professional rule, can offer safe passage.

    The criminal trial itself continues in Mombasa before the magistrate’s court, where all six accused remain on bond of Sh1 million each with cash bail alternative of Sh300,000. Their passports remain deposited with the court. The prosecution is expected to open its case in full once the preliminary contest over counsel’s role is resolved. For Kenya’s legal profession, the more consequential proceedings may prove to be those on the disqualification application, not the fraud trial itself.

    WHAT THE DCI MUST NOW PROVE

    For the disqualification application to succeed, the State must satisfy the court of three core propositions. First, that Mr Muthama possesses first-hand knowledge of the transactions that is not merely incidental to his legal mandate but material to the prosecution’s case. Second, that this knowledge could only be conveyed through his testimony as a witness, rather than through documents or other evidence. Third, that allowing him to continue as defence counsel would so compromise the fairness of the proceedings as to prejudice the administration of justice in a manner that outweighs the accused’s right to counsel of choice. The DCI’s affidavit has made its most direct assertions on the first ground. The second and third are where the court’s reasoning will ultimately have to do the most work.

    Mr Muthama has not, in public reporting, offered a detailed defence of his position. His firm’s continued appearance on the record signals that he contests the application. The outcome of that contest will determine whether Kenya’s most dramatic coastal property fraud case proceeds with its original defence team intact, or whether it begins again, reshaped by a ruling that could redefine the boundaries of legal representation in transaction-linked criminal prosecutions for years to come.

  • Eric Omondi Tops Kenya Influencers With Sh57mn Earnings

    Eric Omondi Tops Kenya Influencers With Sh57mn Earnings

    NAIROBI, Kenya, April 9 – Comedian Eric Omondi has emerged as Kenya’s top-earning social media influencer, pulling in an estimated Sh57 million in 2025, according to new industry data.

    A report by Odipo Dev shows Omondi led the earnings chart through brand partnerships, reflecting the growing commercialization of Kenya’s digital content space.

    Top influencers collectively earned Sh296 million last year, while total payouts to creators surpassed Sh1.07 billion, underscoring the sector’s rising economic significance.

    The findings highlight entertainment—particularly comedy—as the most lucrative content category, with creators leveraging strong audience engagement to secure repeat brand deals.

    Brands in sectors such as beauty, food and beverage, telecommunications, and financial services are increasingly shifting advertising budgets to digital platforms, with SMEs driving the bulk of influencer partnerships.

    However, the report notes a gap between audience reach and revenue, especially on TikTok, where creators struggle to convert views into income.

    Instagram remains the most effective platform for monetization, while Facebook delivers moderate returns.

    With limited direct earnings from platforms, most Kenyan creators still rely heavily on brand deals and external income streams.

    Analysts say improving monetization models and expanding access to brand partnerships will be critical as the creator economy continues to grow beyond the Sh1 billion mark.

  • The Fuel Deal That Exposed Wandayi’s Lies As Pressure Mounts For His Resignation

    The Fuel Deal That Exposed Wandayi’s Lies As Pressure Mounts For His Resignation

    For weeks, Opiyo Wandayi stood before cameras and microphones and told Kenya there was nothing to worry about. No fuel crisis. No shortage. No cause for panic. He said it on March 13. He said it again on March 27. He said it with the serene confidence of a man who had read every brief, studied every data point, and arrived at an informed and commanding conclusion. It now turns out that he had read every brief. That is precisely the problem.

    Leaked internal correspondence from the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, authenticated by investigators and now before the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, establishes that Wandayi was not merely a passive recipient of good news. He was an active participant in the approval chain for a KSh 4.8 billion fuel consignment that his own ministry’s documents acknowledge was substandard, overpriced, and procured in flagrant violation of Kenya’s government-to-government framework with Gulf oil suppliers. The documents show that the Principal Secretary for Petroleum, Mohamed Liban, copied Wandayi on correspondence to the Kenya Bureau of Standards in which he explicitly sought a quality waiver for a cargo aboard the MT Paloma carrying petroleum products with dangerously elevated levels of sulphur, manganese, and benzene. Condition two of the waiver letter states unambiguously that the MT Paloma consignment was not compliant with Kenya’s mandatory fuel standards. Wandayi was on notice.

    “If he knew, he must be arrested immediately for criminal culpability. If he didn’t know, he must immediately take political responsibility and resign or be sacked for gross incompetence.” — Senator Boni Khalwale

    The paper trail begins on March 26, 2026. On that day, Liban wrote to Kenya Bureau of Standards Managing Director Esther Ngari requesting a temporary waiver on quality certification requirements for the incoming consignment. In that letter, Liban invoked the disruption caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of global oil supplies flow, as justification for bypassing standard pre-export verification. What that letter omitted was the sequence that investigators now consider most damning.

    On March 25, the day before Liban wrote to KEBS, he had already written directly to One Petroleum Limited director Ali Balala and Oryx Energies chief executive Angeline Maangi, authorising each firm to import approximately 60,000 tonnes of petroleum. The authorisation preceded the quality waiver request by a full day, suggesting, in the language of investigators at the DCI, that the emergency narrative was constructed to justify a deal they believe was already pre-arranged.

    A Cargo Intended for Angola

    The MT Paloma docked at the Port of Mombasa between March 27 and 29, carrying 68,000 tonnes of petroleum products imported by One Petroleum Limited, a firm linked to Mombasa tycoon Mohamed Jaffer. According to investigators, the consignment was originally destined for Angola before being diverted to Kenya in circumstances that remain under active investigation.

    A second shipment of 60,000 tonnes imported by Swiss-owned Oryx Energies was blocked from docking before it could unload, following the eruption of the scandal. The financial motive embedded in the deal is staggering. One Petroleum quoted a price of KSh 37,691 per tonne for its cargo, more than three times the KSh 10,917 per tonne charged under the regular government-to-government arrangement.

    Wandayi himself inadvertently confirmed the price disparity in his belated public statement on April 5, citing invoice comparisons showing that One Petroleum’s landed in-tank Mombasa price stood at KSh 198,855 per metric tonne while the G-to-G equivalent was KSh 140,111.

    That gap of KSh 58,744 per metric tonne, translating to KSh 43.40 per litre, was being absorbed by consumers who had been told there was nothing to worry about.

    On March 28, Trade Cabinet Secretary Lee Kinyanjui wrote directly to Wandayi formally recommending a waiver for the importation of the petroleum products aboard the MT Paloma. That letter listed six conditions to be met before the waiver took effect, including destination inspection of the cargo, full compliance with automotive gasoline specifications, and a written indemnity from the importer protecting KEBS against any fallout.

    None of the six conditions was verified before the MT Paloma began discharging its cargo. The KPC quality assurance manager who detected the anomaly through laboratory testing halted distribution and escalated the matter to senior officials. What followed was not corrective action from the top. It was internal disagreement over whether to release the product anyway.

    The Silence and Then the Statement

    When the DCI descended on the energy sector on the night of April 2, conducting coordinated raids and detaining the most powerful figures in the petroleum supply chain, Wandayi disappeared into silence. Petroleum PS Mohamed Liban, KPC Managing Director Joe Sang, EPRA Director-General Daniel Kiptoo, Petroleum Deputy Director Joseph Wafula, and KPC Supply and Logistics Manager Joel Mburu were arrested, interrogated, and eventually either resigned or remained in custody facing economic sabotage charges. Liban was released on medical grounds. Kiptoo, Sang, and Wafula remained in custody heading into the Easter weekend. Reports surfaced that more than KSh 500 million recovered during raids of the suspects’ homes had allegedly vanished from police custody, with accounts suggesting a senior Kenya Kwanza-linked politician had the cash delivered to him without any official receipt or inventory.

    As five officials fell and the public clamoured for answers, Wandayi remained in office and said nothing. Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi stepped into the vacuum, telling Parliament in measured and distinctly more honest terms that Kenya had only 16 days of petrol stock and 19 days of diesel, a stark contradiction of the boundless reassurance Wandayi had offered weeks earlier. The burden of explaining the crisis had quietly passed from the man who caused the problem to a colleague attempting damage limitation.

    Wandayi finally broke his silence on April 5. His statement offered no acknowledgement of the internal letters. He did not explain why he had approved the waiver despite knowing the consignment was non-compliant. He did not address why he was copied on correspondence from his own PS to KEBS seeking waivers for carcinogenic fuel parameters. He warned against disinformation. He called for patience. He announced an internal review. He insisted the G-to-G framework remained stable and resilient. It was, by every measure of accountability journalism, a statement designed to outlast scrutiny rather than meet it.

    “It is no longer about the junior officials. The focus must move to decisions made at the highest policy levels.” — Senior DCI officer, on record with investigators

    The Impossible Defence

    Kakamega Senator Boni Khalwale has framed the political calculus with forensic precision. If Wandayi knew the fuel was substandard and approved its release anyway, he is criminally culpable and must be arrested.

    If he did not know, then a KSh 4.8 billion deal procured outside the government-to-government framework, at more than three times the regulated price, involving cargo originally bound for Angola and carrying carcinogenic levels of sulphur, manganese, and benzene, passed through the entire Ministry of Energy and Petroleum without the Cabinet Secretary learning a word of it.

    That too is not innocence. That is incompetence of a magnitude that demands the immediate surrender of office. Khalwale has warned that if President Ruto fails to sack Wandayi, the National Assembly must exercise its constitutional mandate and impeach him.

    The Consumer Federation of Kenya revealed on April 5 that KEBS had already allowed the substandard MT Paloma fuel to be sold in the Kenyan market. The implications are not abstract.

    Fuel contaminated with excess sulphur damages catalytic converters, destroys engine seals, accelerates corrosion in vehicle fuel systems, and over time increases harmful emissions to levels that cause respiratory damage in urban populations.

    The Kenyans who filled their tanks in Mombasa in late March and early April were not told what they were putting in their engines. Wandayi had assured them, as recently as March 27, that there was no crisis and that all petroleum products met the requisite quality standards.

    The Political Calculation

    Wandayi’s survival in office is not principally a question of evidence. It is a question of political architecture. He joined President Ruto’s Cabinet on August 8, 2024, as part of the broad-based government arrangement that followed the late Raila Odinga’s defection from opposition following the Gen Z protests. His appointment was part of the donation of senior ODM figures, including John Mbadi, Ali Hassan Joho, and Wycliffe Oparanya, to the Ruto administration. Firing him carries consequences that extend beyond his personal culpability.

    It risks fracturing the ODM component of the broad-based government at a moment when Ruto’s political coalition is still consolidating ahead of the 2027 election cycle.

    Those who defend Wandayi’s continued presence in Cabinet deploy the language of stability. Remove the Energy minister now, they argue, and you inject more uncertainty into an already volatile sector. The counter-argument, advanced by a growing number of legislators, civil society organisations, and ordinary Kenyans, is that what looks like stability from inside State House looks like selective accountability from everywhere else.

    It cannot have escaped notice that President Ruto, speaking at a church service in Kilgoris on April 5, spoke with considerable force about cartels and accountability. He vowed that the energy sector cartels would not operate freely. He declared that developments in the Middle East would not be used as an excuse to create artificial problems at home. He reached for the language of moral resolve.

    What he did not do was mention Opiyo Wandayi by name. He did not demand a resignation. He did not acknowledge that leaked letters show his own Cabinet Secretary was copied on the very correspondence that authorised the release of condemned fuel into the Kenyan market.

    The Karen Question

    Questions intensified when reports surfaced that Wandayi had recently acquired a palatial residential property in the Hardy area of Karen, with market valuations ranging between KSh 200 million and KSh 275 million.

    The property has become shorthand in public discourse for the disparity between ministerial assurances and ministerial enrichment, even as investigators have not established a direct link between the property and the fuel transaction.

    A senior DCI officer privy to the investigation has confirmed that the two Cabinet Secretaries, Wandayi and Kinyanjui, will be required to explain their roles. The authenticated letters, the officer stated on record, are critical because the focus must now move to the decisions made at the highest policy levels.

    The MT Paloma has already discharged its cargo. Its fuel is already in the system. The second consignment was stopped. Five officials have left their posts or are under arrest.

    A plea bargain is reportedly in negotiation with some of the detained officials. KSh 500 million in recovered cash has reportedly gone missing from police custody. The DCI has summoned Oryx executives.

    And Opiyo Wandayi, the man whose name is on the ministry letterhead, whose PS signed the waiver request, whose correspondence trail forms the backbone of the DCI probe, remains in his office, urging patience and warning against disinformation. That is where Kenya finds itself this Tuesday morning.

  • Inside Nyayo House: The Kitchen Cartel That Demands Sh100,000 for a Stove

    Inside Nyayo House: The Kitchen Cartel That Demands Sh100,000 for a Stove

    Nairobi, Kenya. It is barely 7 a.m. on a weekday morning and the 27-floor tower at the corner of Uhuru Highway and Kenyatta Avenue is already thick with the familiar desperation of ordinary Kenyans queuing for government services.

    But beyond the immigration lines and the national registration counters, deeper inside the cavernous geometry of Nyayo House, a different kind of transaction has been quietly conducted for years, one that has nothing to do with passports and everything to do with power.

    A female insider who operates from within the building has come forward with detailed allegations of an entrenched extortion syndicate, in which caretakers and security personnel allegedly demand colossal bribes from vendors seeking to secure kitchen spaces on the premises.

    She told Kenya Insights that she personally paid Sh100,000 to obtain the cooking space from which she currently operates, money she says she had no choice but to raise.

    “I had no option. They made it clear that without paying, I would never get the space. It is something that has been normalised here.”

    The woman, who requested anonymity citing fear of reprisals from individuals she describes as well-connected and capable of ending her livelihood overnight, is not alone.

    Multiple sources within the building corroborate the broad architecture of the scheme, describing a cartel that has effectively privatised access to commercial space inside a public government facility and runs its illicit revenues through a web of mobile money accounts designed to frustrate any paper trail.

    FLOOR BY FLOOR: THE CARTEL’S TERRITORIAL MAP

    What emerges from weeks of interviews and cross-corroborated accounts is not a disorganised shakedown but a territorially sophisticated operation, with named individuals allegedly controlling specific floors of the building.

    The 16th floor is reportedly managed by a woman identified only as Milly, who is said to maintain a close operational relationship with an Administration Police Reserve Sergeant Major identified as Dalba.

    That pairing, according to insiders, fuses financial leverage with physical coercion, creating a structure that is difficult for a prospective vendor to challenge or circumvent.

    On the 15th floor, a figure known as Dorrys is alleged to control allocation. Makena is said to hold sway on the 14th floor, while Eliza is mentioned in connection with the 7th floor.

    The pattern repeats across other floors, with sources suggesting the network also implicates immigration department caretakers Oonje and Mugambi, another caretaker identified as Wanjala, and a Deputy County Commissioner whose office sits within the building’s administrative hierarchy.

    Kenya Insights was unable to independently verify all the names at the time of publication and has extended requests for comment to the relevant authorities.

    Sources allege that the individuals entrenched at each floor do not merely collect entry fees. They are said to determine who stays, who is expelled, and at what cost a vendor may remain in operation, creating a perpetual revenue stream sustained through the threat of eviction.

    “This is not an isolated case. There is a well-established network that controls who gets what space, and it operates with impunity. The same individuals have entrenched themselves and continue to exploit applicants.”

    M-PESA LINES AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONCEALMENT

    The alleged cartel has reportedly adapted with sophistication to Kenya’s mobile money infrastructure.

    Rather than collecting bribes in cash, sources claim that specific Safaricom M-Pesa lines linked to named individuals within the network are used to receive payments, a technique that replicates patterns investigators have previously documented in other sectors of Kenya’s public service.

    The KRA bribery scandal, prosecuted in the courts in late 2025, revealed how government officers disguised corrupt payments through M-Pesa as soft loans and merry-go-round contributions, successfully obscuring the transactions from cursory scrutiny.

    Sources allege the Nyayo House network employs comparable methodology, routing money through accounts that appear connected to legitimate small businesses operating in and around the building.

    “Some of these payments are not made in cash. There are specific M-Pesa lines linked to individuals within the network, making it easier to move money without raising suspicion.”

    This digital dimension of the alleged scheme significantly elevates its complexity. Investigators probing such networks require forensic access to mobile money records, a process that ordinarily demands a court order and the cooperation of Safaricom, and which in past cases has moved at a pace that allows suspects to dissipate funds long before any accountability mechanism is triggered.

    A BUSINESS EMPIRE ALLEGEDLY BUILT ON A GOVERNMENT BUILDING’S BACK

    The most detailed individual profile to emerge from the investigation centres on Eliza, the figure allegedly in control of the 7th floor.

    Sources accuse her of operating a constellation of commercial interests that draw their lifeblood from her alleged position within the network.

    These businesses are said to include M-Pesa outlets, an establishment identified as Everest Media Small Village Bar and Restaurant, a registered entity named Everest Media Planning SLNS Ltd, and a general retail shop linked to a Kibra DC address.

    Crucially, insiders allege that some of these businesses were previously shut down over corruption-related concerns and subsequently reopened under the protection of influential networks spanning immigration services, the national registration bureau, and local administration units.

    If that allegation is accurate, it would suggest that the Nyayo House scheme is not merely a street-level racket but one that enjoys layers of institutional insulation.

    Sources further allege that a senior government official benefits from the proceeds of the network, with cash routed to them through proxies.

    Kenya Insights has not been able to verify the identity of this official and the allegation is treated, for now, as an unverified claim requiring further investigation.

    CORRUPTION FINDS A HOME IN A BUILDING ALREADY SYNONYMOUS WITH IT

    Nyayo House carries a singular weight in Kenya’s political imagination.

    Built between 1979 and 1983 under the government of President Daniel arap Moi, the 27-floor tower was designed to house the headquarters of Nairobi Province, the immigration department, and several other national government functions.

    Its basement cells, where political detainees were tortured during the 1980s and early 1990s, remain among the most documented sites of state violence in post-independence Africa, described by survivors including Raila Odinga, Koigi wa Mwere, and Gitobu Imanyara.

    The building’s modern reputation has not shed entirely its association with corruption and coercion. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki declared it a crime scene in 2023, referencing the passport cartel that had paralysed the immigration department and pushed the backlog of unprocessed applications to over 58,000.

    Seventeen immigration officers were subsequently arrested and charged following intelligence-led operations. Yet the broader ecosystem of institutional exploitation within the building, sources insist, was never fully dismantled.

    The kitchen allocation racket, if the allegations hold up under scrutiny, would represent an extension of that ecosystem into the building’s secondary commercial infrastructure, turning even the provision of food into a gatekeeping mechanism for graft.

    It would also reinforce what Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index confirmed in its 2025 ranking, placing Kenya at 130th out of 182 countries with a score of 30 out of 100, two points lower than the previous year, a deterioration that watchdogs attribute to weakening institutional accountability.

    IMPUNITY AND THE SILENCE OF OFFICIAL KENYA

    The Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has in recent years secured notable convictions, including a historic Sh9.8 billion graft fine in the NSSF case and the conviction of former Kiambu Governor Ferdinand Waititu in the Sh588 million procurement scandal.

    Yet enforcement at the level of mid-tier institutional corruption, the kind that does not make front pages but drains thousands of ordinary Kenyans one transaction at a time, has remained inconsistent.

    The vendor who paid Sh100,000 for her kitchen space did not report the demand to any authority.

    She knew, she said, that reporting carried consequences and that the individuals she would be reporting to were often the same individuals she would need to protect herself from.

    That calculation, repeated across thousands of transactions in dozens of government buildings across Nairobi, is what has allowed the kitchen cartel and networks like it to survive, refresh themselves after periodic crackdowns, and reopen for business under new arrangements.

    Kenya Insights formally sought comment from the relevant county and national government offices, including the Office of the Nairobi County Commissioner and the State Department for Immigration. No response was received before publication. The named individuals were not reachable for comment at the time this report went to press. This investigation is ongoing.

  • JSC Rot: “Why I Paid Over Sh4 Million for a High Court Slot” — Explosive Claims by ‘Incoming Judge’

    JSC Rot: “Why I Paid Over Sh4 Million for a High Court Slot” — Explosive Claims by ‘Incoming Judge’

    Fresh allegations of deep-rooted corruption within the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) have emerged after a man who recently underwent interviews for a High Court judgeship sensationally claimed he paid millions of shillings to secure the position.

    The individual, who spoke on condition of anonymity but described himself as an “incoming judge,” alleged that the process of appointing judges in Kenya has been compromised by powerful cartels operating within and around the judiciary.

    Speaking during a closed-door meeting at a high-end Nairobi hotel, the man reportedly boasted that merit plays little to no role in determining who ascends to the bench.

    “I have paid over Sh5 million for this slot. Call me incoming Justice… we are already judges,” he claimed.

    He went further to suggest that the ongoing recruitment process by the Judicial Service Commission is merely a formality, alleging that successful candidates are predetermined through financial influence and connections.

    “You poor Magistrates and advocates think that you will be selected based on merit? If you don’t have cash, don’t even bother applying,” he added.

    According to the claims, a senior official within the commission is acting as a key intermediary, linking wealthy lawyers and individuals from influential families to decision-makers inside the system.

    The official allegedly coordinates payments and ensures that preferred candidates are shortlisted and eventually appointed.

    Sources familiar with the matter claim that these networks have been entrenched for years, with aspiring judges required to part with between Sh5 million and Sh10 million depending on the court level and competition.

    The High Court, being one of the most influential divisions within the judiciary, is reportedly among the most expensive slots to secure.

    We understand that the allegations come at a time when the Kenyan judiciary has been under increasing public scrutiny over integrity concerns.

    While the Judicial Service Commission has consistently maintained that its recruitment processes are transparent and merit-based, critics argue that such claims point to a widening trust deficit.

    “Judicial independence is the backbone of any democratic society. If appointments are influenced by money, then justice itself is effectively on sale,” said a Nairobi-based constitutional lawyer who declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter.

    Analysts note that compromised appointments could have a direct impact on the quality of rulings and public confidence in the courts. Judges who allegedly buy their way into office may feel beholden to benefactors or compelled to recoup their “investment” through corrupt dealings once in office, a situation that could perpetuate a cycle of corruption within the system.

    Civil society groups are now calling for an independent probe into the allegations, urging bodies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to intervene.

    “There is an urgent need for a thorough and transparent investigation. These are not light claims, they strike at the core of our justice system,” said one governance activist.

    By the time of publication, neither the Judicial Service Commission nor judiciary officials had publicly responded to the claims. Efforts to reach the alleged official within the commission were unsuccessful.

    Meanwhile, the identity of the self-proclaimed “incoming judge” remains withheld as further investigations continue.

    Observers say the coming days could prove crucial in determining whether these revelations will trigger reforms, or be quietly ignored.

    This is a developing story.

  • KRA Introduces WhatsApp Tax Filing and How It Works

    KRA Introduces WhatsApp Tax Filing and How It Works

    The Kenya Revenue Authority’s (KRA) new WhatsApp-based tax filing system marks a shift from traditional online processes to a more simplified, chat-based experience, but questions remain on how the platform will function and whether it introduces anything new.

    KRA says the tool is designed to eliminate the friction many taxpayers face when filing returns through the iTax portal, where users often have to log in, reset passwords, navigate multiple forms and complete several steps before submission.

    “We’ve said it before, but this time, it’s real. Filing your taxes just got easier,” KRA said in a statement, announcing the rollout of the WhatsApp option.

    Under the new system, taxpayers will initiate the process directly on WhatsApp, removing the need to download additional applications or log into separate platforms.

    The interaction is expected to follow a guided, step-by-step format, similar to a conversation, where users respond to prompts and confirm details before submission.

    “Returns are now pre-filled where possible. The system is more guided and support and filing can now happen on WhatsApp,” KRA said.

    The pre-filled returns are central to how the system works.

    For salaried individuals, key data such as income, tax deductions and statutory contributions will already be populated, meaning users will primarily review and confirm the information rather than input it manually.

    For those with additional income streams, the system is expected to pull in available data, including withholding taxes, reducing the complexity that often discourages compliance.

    KRA says the integration of real-time assistance within the chat will also address one of the biggest challenges in tax filing, lack of immediate support.

    “Everything is designed to help you complete your filing more easily, with less back-and-forth,” the authority said.

    The move is particularly targeted at younger taxpayers and those in the informal sector, many of whom are more familiar with mobile-based platforms than traditional web systems.

    By embedding the process in WhatsApp, KRA is effectively shifting tax filing into a space already used daily by millions of Kenyans.

    However, while the platform changes how users interact with the system, the underlying tax processes remain largely the same.

    Filing requirements, deadlines and compliance obligations are unchanged, with April 30 still standing as the deadline for 2025 income returns.

    What differs is the interface and user journey.

    Instead of navigating multiple pages, taxpayers will follow a linear, guided process within a chat, reducing the likelihood of errors and incomplete submissions.

    The system is also expected to minimise time spent on filing.

    “Less time spent trying to figure things out, less stress around deadlines, more confidence and control over your filing,” KRA said.

    Tax experts note that similar approaches have been adopted in other sectors where conversational interfaces are used to simplify complex services, but success will depend on reliability, data accuracy and user trust.

    There are also questions around accessibility for taxpayers with more complex financial profiles as well as how the system will handle corrections, amendments and disputes.

    Still, KRA maintains that the initiative is part of a broader digital transformation aimed at improving compliance and expanding the tax base.

    “You don’t need to be an expert to file anymore, you just need to get started,” the authority said.

    If effectively implemented, the WhatsApp filing system could reduce the administrative burden associated with tax compliance and help address long-standing challenges such as last-minute system congestion and low voluntary filing rates.

  • Sold And Abandoned: How Diageo and Asahi Are Locking Kenya’s EABL Minority Shareholders Out Of East Africa’s Biggest Corporate Heist

    Sold And Abandoned: How Diageo and Asahi Are Locking Kenya’s EABL Minority Shareholders Out Of East Africa’s Biggest Corporate Heist

    The mathematics of corporate betrayal in Kenya rarely gets as naked as this. On one side of the ledger, Diageo Plc, the British multinational that has controlled East African Breweries Limited for decades, is walking away from Nairobi with a windfall that values its 65 percent stake at Sh303.5 billion — a price of Sh590.78 per share, a 97 percent premium over what ordinary investors on the Nairobi Securities Exchange could ever dream of receiving.

    On the other side sit tens of thousands of Kenyan retail shareholders, the small investors who believed in the promise of East Africa’s most iconic brewer, who are being left at the door of the most consequential corporate transaction this country has witnessed in a generation.

    Behind the share price ticker and the regulatory filings lies something else entirely: a decade-long legal endurance race between a market-dominant multinational and two Kenyan companies that built their businesses within EABL’s orbit, paid for that privilege, and are now watching the exit door close before a single shilling of what courts at every level have said they are owed has been paid.

    For Bia Tosha Distributors and JILK Construction Company, the Diageo-Asahi transaction is not a corporate milestone. It is an enforcement cliff.

    A formal legal objection filed at the Capital Markets Authority by Nairobi law firm Wamalwa and Echesa Co. Advocates, on behalf of minority shareholder Shane Ngechu, has forced the regulatory dimension into the open.

    The petition demands that the CMA compel Asahi to make a mandatory takeover offer to all EABL shareholders on terms no less favourable than those agreed with Diageo, arguing that allowing the deal to proceed without such an offer would constitute unjustifiable differential treatment in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, which guarantees equality before the law.

    “The Diageo consideration does not represent, and should not be construed as, a direct price per share or valuation of the ordinary shares of EABL.” — Asahi Group Holdings, December 2025

    A PREMIUM THAT EVAPORATED OVERNIGHT

    When Diageo announced on December 17, 2025 that it had agreed to sell its controlling stake to Asahi, the market response was predictable and immediate. EABL shares, trading at Sh252 on the NSE, surged 18.94 percent to Sh299.75 the following day as retail investors piled in, believing a mandatory buyout offer was imminent.

    Analysts pointed to Asahi’s implied valuation of Sh590.78 per share and concluded, not unreasonably, that an offer at or near that price was coming.

    They were wrong. Asahi moved quickly to disabuse the market of that notion, warning publicly that the Diageo price should not be taken as an indicator of the company’s general market value. The share price retreated.

    By January 2026, EABL was trading at Sh254.75.

    The brief euphoria had wiped Sh12.45 billion from the paper wealth of minority shareholders who had bought in on the announcement, leaving them nursing losses on a premium they never received.

    The Asahi announcement was not timed for market sentiment. Diageo Interim CEO Nik Jhangiani said the deal delivers significant value for Diageo shareholders and accelerates the group’s commitment to strengthening its balance sheet.

    The announcement was made on December 17. Courts operate at reduced capacity over the Christmas holiday period.

    Counsel is difficult to mobilise. This timing was noted in the urgent court filings that followed weeks later — and the observation has not been rebutted.

    THE REGULATORY TRAP

    Kenya’s Capital Markets Regulations set a clear threshold. Any entity acquiring 25 percent or more of effective control in a listed company must extend a mandatory takeover offer to all remaining shareholders.

    The purpose of this rule is straightforward: when a controlling shareholder exits at a premium, ordinary investors must have the same opportunity to sell.

    Asahi is not acquiring 25 percent of EABL. It is acquiring 65 percent — more than two and a half times the statutory threshold. Yet Asahi has confirmed publicly it intends to apply for an exemption from the mandatory offer requirement, citing its stated desire to maintain EABL’s listing and what it describes as the commercial benefits of retaining minority shareholders.

    The Wamalwa and Echesa petition draws a pointed comparison with the Sanlam Kenya rights issue of 2025, in which the CMA granted an exemption because the transaction involved a rescue of a financially distressed company with no premium being paid to a controlling shareholder.

    The EABL transaction involves none of those circumstances. Diageo and Asahi are profitable multinationals transacting at their leisure over a brewer that posted a net profit of Sh11.2 billion in the half-year to December 2025, declaring an interim dividend of Sh4.00 per share against Sh1.50 a year earlier.

    In Nigeria, Ghana, and Seychelles, Diageo’s exits triggered mandatory buyout offers. Only in Kenya are minority shareholders being left with nothing but a polite warning not to get their hopes up.

    The petition also highlights what ought to be a damning continental precedent.

    When Diageo sold its 80.4 percent stake in Guinness Ghana Breweries in July 2025, the transaction triggered a mandatory takeover offer to minority shareholders.

    The October 2024 sale of Guinness Nigeria to Singapore’s Tolaram included a mandatory tender offer at a 63 percent premium over market price. Seychelles Breweries followed the same structure.

    In every African jurisdiction where Diageo has recently divested, regulators compelled the acquirer to extend a buyout offer to all shareholders. Kenya appears to be the sole exception, and the CMA has offered no public explanation for why.

    WHERE IT STARTED: 22 ROUTES AND A BROKEN PROMISE

    The story of how Bia Tosha Distributors Limited ended up fighting not just EABL and Diageo but now arguably the Chief Justice herself begins in Nairobi West in 1997. That was the year Anne-Marie Burugu’s company entered its first distribution agreement with Kenya Breweries Limited, the dominant EABL subsidiary.

    Over the next nine years, Bia Tosha paid millions in goodwill fees to acquire exclusive rights across 22 routes spanning some of the most lucrative beer-drinking territory in the country — Athi River, Kitengela, Kajiado, Kiserian, Langata, Rongai, Nairobi West, South B, Industrial Area, and a dozen others.

    These were not informal handshakes.

    They were commercial contracts that Bia Tosha negotiated, paid for, and operated.

    In 2006, Kenya Breweries began repossessing the routes. Routes that Bia Tosha had paid goodwill to acquire were handed to new distributors. The Sh38 million goodwill Bia Tosha had paid was declared non-refundable.

    The agreements, KBL now insisted, had never been exclusive. Bia Tosha went to court. What followed is one of the most instructive case studies in how a market-dominant multinational can use every legal, financial, and corporate instrument available to it — year after year, court after court — to frustrate a smaller party’s access to justice while simultaneously expanding and entrenching its market position.

    The High Court issued conservatory orders protecting Bia Tosha’s routes in June 2016. EABL and KBL, Burugu alleges in sworn affidavits, simply ignored them.

    The brewer continued supplying the new distributors in Bia Tosha’s territories, defied the order at every level, and when the matter reached the Court of Appeal, used its decision as the basis for arguing the High Court’s orders had been discharged.

    The Supreme Court, sitting as a five-judge bench in February 2023, cut through this argument definitively. It reinstated the June 2016 conservatory orders, found that EABL had committed contempt, and sent the matter back to the High Court to assess punishment.

    The bench was categorical: the respondents could only appear before the High Court to purge the contempt before they could be given any further audience.

    Bia Tosha sought a fine equivalent to 20 percent of EABL’s gross turnover — roughly Sh39 billion — and civil jail sentences of up to six months for EABL CEO Jane Karuku, Uganda Breweries MD Andrew Kilonzo, and former EABL CEO Andrew Cowan, the three executives found in contempt.

    EABL’s response was to file a review application at the Supreme Court arguing the executives had been condemned without a hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed this attempt in May 2023, confirming the punishment must be addressed at the High Court.

    The three executives named in the contempt proceedings then received promotions. Jane Karuku was elevated to EABL Group CEO. Andrew Kilonzo was sent to run Uganda Breweries. Andrew Cowan was made MD for Diageo’s Africa Travel Retail division. The signal inside the company — that disobeying court orders leads to advancement rather than accountability — was not lost on those watching. Kilonzo’s Uganda tenure later produced its own COMESA violation findings, after which he was rotated back to Kenya as KBL MD, reuniting with Karuku in the same leadership structure the Supreme Court had found in contempt. The circle was complete.

    EABL’S PLAYBOOK: HOW YOU WEAPONISE PROCESS

    Diageo and EABL’s public line is that Bia Tosha is the one weaponising the courts — using decade-old commercial litigation to interfere with a nationally significant transaction. In documents filed by Diageo’s legal team, Bia Tosha’s application is described as hollow, a brazen attempt to advance private commercial interests under the guise of constitutional litigation, and an attempt to hoodwink the court. These characterisations deserve scrutiny.

    Between June 2016 and March 2026, every court that examined Bia Tosha’s core claim has found in the distributor’s favour.

    The High Court issued conservatory orders in 2016. The Court of Appeal sustained the orders. The Supreme Court in February 2023 reinstated those orders and found EABL in contempt.

    A High Court ruling in December 2024 struck down the competing claims of two new distributors — Ngong Matonyok and Manara — who had been given Bia Tosha’s territories, ruling their appointments violated the 2016 conservatory orders. The judiciary at every level has confirmed that EABL violated the contract and defied the orders.

    What EABL has demonstrated in this case is a different kind of weaponisation: the use of superior legal resources, institutional relationships, and procedural complexity to delay, dilute, and ultimately outlast a smaller opponent.

    The company’s legal team — led in this matter by Njoroge Regeru, with Senior Counsel Prof. Githu Muigai’s firm involved in parallel proceedings — is on a retainer that industry insiders estimate at close to Ksh3 million per month, separate from per-matter billings. The incentive structure of retainer-funded litigation does not naturally produce recommendations for arbitration or settlement when the legal budget is large, annual, and guaranteed.

    Bia Tosha also alleges that after the Supreme Court ordered reinstatement, EABL effectively sponsored the new distributors it had placed on its routes to file their own petitions at the High Court, arguing their rights would be violated if Bia Tosha was reinstated.

    The High Court in December 2024 rejected those petitions. But the strategy of manufacturing competing litigation to create procedural obstacles is itself instructive. When courts find against you, you generate fresh litigation to relitigate what has already been decided.

    “The respondents have acted with reckless abandon and with total contempt for the authority of this court, have continued to infringe upon the applicant’s distribution areas.” — Anne-Marie Burugu, Managing Director, Bia Tosha Distributors

    THE COMESA VERDICT: WHAT DIAGEO ADMITTED

    The systemic nature of EABL’s conduct toward its distributor network is not a matter of allegation alone. In October 2025, the COMESA Competition Commission validated what distributors had been whispering for years.

    A four-year investigation into Diageo’s distribution practices, formally registered as Case No. CCC/ACBP/4/1/2021, concluded that contracts in Uganda, Eswatini, and Zambia contained clauses imposing minimum resale prices, single-branding restrictions, and territorial segmentation that violated regional competition law.

    Diageo settled the case for $750,000 and committed to removing all restrictive clauses and notifying distributors within 30 days. The settlement was signed in London on September 30, 2025.

    For a company of Diageo’s size, the fine was a rounding error.

    The significance lay elsewhere: an internationally mandated competition body had formally found that Diageo’s distribution practices breach fair trade principles across the region. The practices were not confined to one market. They were the architecture.

    Within Kenya, EABL’s Distributor Finance Scheme, introduced in 2018, requires all distributors to hold their working capital in accounts linked to five nominated banks including KCB, Equity, and Absa, with payments flowing through Safaricom till numbers connected to these accounts.

    The practical consequence is that EABL has direct access to the bank accounts of its distributors and can debit funds without prior reconciliation or consultation.

    Distributors who raised concerns about erroneous or delayed debits were told to top up their accounts immediately. Those who considered protesting knew the lesson Bia Tosha had already taught the network: complain, and your contract disappears.

    Distributors are also rigidly segmented by product. Those selling Senator Keg cannot distribute mainstream beer or spirits. Those selling Tusker and Johnnie Walker cannot touch Keg. Cross-selling between product lines is prohibited even where consumer demand clearly exists.

    Taken together, the system creates a network of commercially dependent operators who own their vehicles, warehouses, and working capital but function, to all intents and purposes, as captive distribution arms of EABL — bearing all the commercial risk without any of the pricing or operational autonomy that genuine independent commerce requires.

    THE KISUMU FILES: JILK AND PROJECT NAFASI

    Running parallel to the distributor dispute, and increasingly intertwined with it, is the JILK Construction case — a story that adds allegations of sexual harassment, fabricated whistleblower reports, and arbitration corruption to an already combustible picture.

    In October 2017, JILK Construction Company Limited was awarded three civil works contracts by Kenya Breweries Limited for what was branded Project Nafasi — the Ksh15 billion revival of the dormant Kisumu Brewery, described at the time as one of the largest private investments in Western Kenya since independence.

    The project was designed to integrate more than 15,000 sorghum farmers into KBL’s supply chain and create over 100,000 jobs. JILK completed the works and handed over the site. Disputes emerged over the final amount owed.

    JILK initially claimed Ksh163 million. The matter was referred to arbitration, with Mutinda Mutuku appointed as sole arbitrator by the Architectural Association of Kenya. What KBL discovered — or so it alleges — was that Mutuku had undisclosed prior financial dealings with JILK, having received payments totalling hundreds of millions of shillings from JILK before his appointment, and maintained regular contact with JILK’s CEO during proceedings.

    KBL moved to have Mutuku recuse himself. Both the Architectural Association and the High Court declined. By the time the arbitration neared an award, the claim had escalated from Ksh163 million to Ksh2.45 billion — a 1,400 percent increase that KBL describes as evidence of a compromised process.

    In December 2024, KBL filed a petition seeking to annul the arbitration proceedings entirely and obtained ex parte conservatory orders barring the arbitrator from delivering his award. The orders were granted by Justice Freda Mugambi and described by legal observers including former Law Society of Kenya President Nelson Havi as unprecedented in duration — three months, when such orders typically last no longer than 14 days.

    Havi publicly asked why Diageo, the majority EABL shareholder and not a registered trading company in Kenya, appeared to have acted as the effective client and project supervisor during construction. If JILK’s allegations are correct and the whistleblower report is fabricated, Havi noted, the implications in criminal law would be severe.

    JILK alleges the whistleblower mechanism was deployed as a retaliatory instrument.

    In January 2020, two female employees of JILK filed reports at Muthaiga Police Station alleging that a foreign contractor on the Kisumu project had sexually harassed and indecently assaulted them.

    JILK wrote a formal complaint to KBL. The DCI wrote to EABL’s managing director noting the investigation. KBL, through Group Corporate Relations Director Eric Kiniti, acknowledged the complaint — but only after the foreign contractor had already left the country.

    JILK’s CEO now alleges that EABL facilitated the contractor’s departure before he could be investigated, then deployed a whistleblower report two years later as retaliation for the harassment complaint. EABL has denied this characterisation entirely and called it malicious.

    Justice Mugambi subsequently recused herself from the KBL constitutional petition, citing concerns about impartiality — the same judge who had granted KBL the controversial ex parte order.

    The file was sent to the Principal Judge of the Commercial Division for reassignment.

    As with the Bia Tosha matter, a judicial recusal at a critical moment has left the smaller party scrambling for continuity in proceedings that are, by design, time-sensitive.

    THE BOND THAT RAISED QUESTIONS

    Against the backdrop of these compounding legal exposures, EABL’s financial engineering in October 2025 deserves scrutiny. The company redeemed its Ksh11 billion five-year corporate bond a full year before its October 2026 maturity date, invoking its call option. It simultaneously issued a replacement five-year bond of identical size at a coupon rate of 11.8 percent versus the original 12.25 percent.

    EABL presented this as a balance sheet optimisation, saving Ksh1.347 billion in interest over the combined bond period. Critics characterised the saving as financial sleight of hand — the reduction in interest costs derived entirely from skipping the final year’s payments on the original bond, not from any genuine refinancing efficiency. But the more pointed question concerns the VAT suit running alongside it.

    EABL is suing the Kenya Revenue Authority for Ksh800 million, which it claims was overpaid as VAT in 2018.

    The Ksh800 million in question was recovered by EABL from its distributors via direct debit from their DFS accounts, even though those distributors had individually met their own tax obligations.

    EABL collected the money from over 120 distributors without their consent.

    Now it is suing KRA to get that money back.

    If the courts rule in EABL’s favour, the question of where that money goes — to the 120-plus distributors who originally bore the burden, or into EABL’s treasury — has not been addressed by the company. The distributors who bore the burden have no mechanism for recovery and no visibility into proceedings that directly concern their own money.

    THE VAT RECOVERY SILENCE

    This VAT episode sits at the intersection of several of this story’s running themes: the Distributor Finance Scheme as an instrument of control rather than efficiency; the asymmetry between EABL’s legal resources and those of its distributor network; and the question of what governance obligations a company owes to the smaller parties within its commercial ecosystem.

    No distributor has been formally notified that EABL is litigating on their behalf, or that a successful outcome might produce a refund.

    None has been offered standing in the proceedings.

    If EABL wins and the money flows back into the corporate treasury, the 120-plus distributors whose accounts were debited without authorisation will have funded a legal victory they never authorised and from which they will not benefit.

    This is the Distributor Finance Scheme’s ultimate expression: control over the commercial relationship so complete that the operator’s own money can be used to pursue the operator’s legal opponent, without the operator’s knowledge or consent.

    DIAGEO’S INSIDERS STACKING THE DECK

    As the sale process advances toward a second-half 2026 closing, Diageo has been systematically installing its own loyalists in EABL’s C-suite in what observers on the Nairobi Securities Exchange have characterised as a quiet colonisation of the brewer’s leadership structure ahead of the handover.

    Justin Mollel, currently Finance Director at Diageo Ireland — a career Diageo executive who previously served as Finance Director at Guinness Ghana Breweries and Serengeti Breweries in Tanzania — has been named EABL’s Group Chief Financial Officer Designate, effective May 1, 2026, with full duties assumed on July 1.

    His appointment coincides almost exactly with the expected closing of the Asahi transaction. He replaces Risper Ohaga, the first African woman to serve as EABL’s Group CFO, who is departing to become Group Chief Executive Officer at APA Apollo Group.

    Mollel is not alone. Anthony Njenga, formerly of Diageo Australia, was installed as EABL’s Supply Chain Director in January 2025. Lorna Benton, formerly Group Performance and Reward Director at Diageo PLC, joined the EABL board in March 2025.

    Anne Joy Michira, currently Marketing and Innovations Director for Diageo South, West and Central Africa, has been named EABL’s Group Marketing and Innovations Director.

    The brewer that is nominally transitioning out of Diageo’s orbit is being filled, floor by floor, with Diageo’s people at the precise moment when Asahi will need impartial management to navigate the post-acquisition period.

    A LEGACY OF COMPETITOR SUPPRESSION

    EABL does not arrive at this transaction with clean hands in the matter of market conduct. In the 1990s, it engaged in what analysts of the period described as a bruising turf war with South African brand Castle Brewery, which ultimately closed its multimillion-dollar factory in Thika in 2002 at the cost of 800 jobs.

    In 2019, the company was embroiled in a dispute with Keroche Breweries over the embossing of brown beer bottles, with Keroche accusing it of buying up bottles on the open market and stamping them to lock rivals out of the supply chain.

    In 2020, multiple senators hauled EABL before the Senate Committee on Trade, Industrialisation and Tourism to answer allegations of restrictive trade practices and monopolistic tendencies.

    The company denied the allegations.

    In 2024, Nairobi-based alcohol startup African Originals accused EABL of replicating its flagship cider range under a competing brand called Manyatta and orchestrating a social media smear campaign through digital marketing firm Wowzi, whose influencer network posted about falling ill after consuming African Originals products.

    The timing of the posts followed immediately after EABL launched its competing line. EABL dismissed the African Originals allegations as false, defamatory and lacking any evidence.

    The matter was never publicly resolved.

    A Senate committee in 2024 was also convened to examine allegations that Diageo had fraudulently evaded tax liabilities at EABL through what a petitioner described as massive bribery of Kenya Revenue Authority and National Treasury officials.

    The KRA Commissioner General appeared before the committee but no charges were ever filed. The allegations remain unproven. But their ventilation in Parliament illustrates the depth of institutional suspicion that has surrounded EABL’s corporate conduct under Diageo’s stewardship.

    THE FEBRUARY 26 ABDICATION AND THE CJ ACCUSATION

    The sequence of events on February 26, 2026 is, even stripped of any conspiracy theory, a remarkable coincidence of timing. Bia Tosha’s substantive application — seeking to block the share transfer as a constitutional matter — had been scheduled for hearing on that date before Justice Bahati Mwamuye.

    When parties logged into the virtual platform, Justice Mwamuye informed them he had been transferred to Kiambu High Court, effective April 1. He declined to extend the interim orders that had temporarily restrained the share transfer.

    He directed the file to an incoming judge and proposed April 9 as the next mention date.

    EABL issued a press release celebrating the outcome later that day, noting that regulatory processes could now continue uninterrupted.

    The critical window within which Bia Tosha believed the regulatory approvals could be obtained had narrowed significantly.

    Judicial transfers are routine administrative matters. But for a petitioner who has spent nine years in court, whose Supreme Court-backed contempt proceedings are still unresolved, and whose application has now been postponed past the point at which it can practically matter, routine administrative action and targeted obstruction produce exactly the same result.

    It is this indistinguishability that has driven Bia Tosha to language that has no precedent in Kenyan commercial litigation.

    In documents filed before Chief Justice Martha Koome, Burugu alleges that impermissible diplomatic interventions to secure a desired outcome in this matter present a most dangerous and unparalleled surrender of the sovereignty of the people of Kenya. She invokes what she calls Epstein-Prince-Andrew-type interferences through diplomatic and Royal intercessions as the mechanism.

    The reference gains contemporary precision from the February 19, 2026 arrest of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor on suspicion of misconduct in public office for allegedly sharing confidential trade documents with Jeffrey Epstein while serving as UK trade envoy.

    Whether any of this constitutes anything approaching the interference Bia Tosha alleges, the court filings do not substantiate with documentary evidence.

    But the intensity of the language reflects an accumulation of grievance that is, on the documented record, entirely proportionate to the sequence of events the company has experienced. The company has asked the Chief Justice to appoint a fresh judge and reinstate the expired orders. The Judiciary has made no public response.

    “There is no other effective means by which this court can compel obedience other than through prohibition of the sale.” — Bia Tosha court filing, January 2026

    THE ENFORCEMENT CLIFF

    Everything in this accumulation — the Bia Tosha contempt findings, the COMESA fine, the JILK arbitration, the DFS VAT recovery, the bond manoeuvre — converges on a single fulcrum point: the Diageo-Asahi transaction.

    Diageo currently holds its 65 percent EABL stake through Diageo Kenya Limited, a 100 percent Diageo-owned Kenyan vehicle.

    The transaction will see this stake pass to Asahi at Ksh590.51 per share — a premium of 134 percent over the Ksh252 market price when the deal was announced. Diageo’s affidavit argues that the deal concerns shareholder-level assets and that EABL, KBL, and UDV Kenya will remain as Kenyan operating entities fully capable of satisfying any future judgment. The technical argument has merit as far as it goes.

    But it misses the practical reality that has been clearly articulated: the contempt proceedings named Diageo and its officers.

    The scale of damages Bia Tosha seeks — potentially in the tens of billions of shillings — would be enforceable against a parent company with $48 billion in market capitalisation far more readily than against a mid-cap Kenyan brewer suddenly owned by a Tokyo conglomerate with no pre-existing connection to the dispute.

    JILK’s application similarly notes that regulatory approvals from the Capital Markets Authority and the Competition Authority of Kenya are anticipated between May and June 2026, and that an April 30 judgment deadline was calculated with this timeline in mind.

    If the courts rule against it after Diageo has divested, JILK will be left with an award against a UK company with no Kenyan assets and every legal incentive to contest enforcement from London.

    Bia Tosha’s advocate Kenneth Kiplagat put the central anxiety without ambiguity in a statement in January 2026: if they succeed in disposing of their only known asset in Kenya, we will not be able to execute a judgment against Diageo.

    Diageo retains no operational presence in Kenya after this sale. Its general counsel’s assurances of continued submission to Kenyan jurisdiction have no physical backing once the stake is transferred.

    THE STRUCTURAL QUESTION KENYA CANNOT IGNORE

    The question posed by the convergence of these cases reaches beyond Bia Tosha and JILK. It concerns the capacity of Kenya’s legal system to provide credible protection to domestic parties in their dealings with multinational corporations — particularly when those corporations are in the process of exiting the jurisdiction.

    Kenya has consistently sought to position itself as a reliable arbitration and commercial dispute resolution hub for the region.

    The Kisumu Brewery case, in which KBL obtained ex parte orders blocking an arbitral award for three months and then saw the presiding judge recuse herself, raises uncomfortable questions about arbitration integrity.

    The Bia Tosha case, in which a decade of Supreme Court-endorsed findings has not produced a single day of compliance from the named contemptors, raises uncomfortable questions about enforcement.

    Together, they illustrate the limits of formal legal rights in the face of a determined, well-resourced corporate actor.

    EABL controls approximately 90 percent of the formal beer market in Kenya.

    Its annual legal budget exceeds what most litigants can sustain over a lifetime of litigation. Its ability to rotate implicated executives, promote them out of the jurisdiction, generate competing litigation, and deploy the tools of the Distributor Finance Scheme against the very parties it is supposed to be compensating is not matched by any mechanism that forces expedited compliance.

    Diageo’s exit is not a judgment on this record. Markets do not adjudicate legal disputes.

    The Asahi Group, acquiring a dominant regional brewer at a substantial premium, has every incentive to complete the transaction quickly and has no obligation to resolve disputes it did not create.

    The Ksh303.5 billion changing hands will make Diageo’s shareholders considerably wealthier. Whether it will ever produce a single shilling for Bia Tosha, or for the 120-plus distributors who had Ksh800 million withdrawn from their bank accounts without consent, or for the two women whose harassment reports were allegedly used as raw material for a corporate retaliation campaign, is a question the transaction documents do not address.

    Anne-Marie Burugu has won in the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. She has watched each win become the basis for new litigation by her opponent.

    She watched the judge hearing her latest application announce a transfer and walk off the virtual platform. She has now written to the Chief Justice using language borrowed from a global scandal. That language may prove to be overreach. The grievance it expresses is not.

    WHAT THE REGULATOR MUST ANSWER

    The Wamalwa and Echesa petition has placed three specific demands before the Capital Markets Authority.

    The firm wants the regulator to disclose whether any exemption from the mandatory offer requirement has been granted, and if so, on what legal basis. It wants confirmation of what specific measures are being taken to protect minority shareholders.

    And it wants the CMA to compel Asahi to make a mandatory takeover offer on terms no less favourable than those Diageo negotiated for itself.

    The CMA has not responded publicly to the petition. Asahi has not addressed the mandatory offer question beyond its December 2025 statement.

    EABL has maintained that the deal is at the shareholder level and has no bearing on its relationship with minority investors beyond the ordinary obligations of a listed company.

    None of these positions engage with the core question: why should Kenyans who hold shares in EABL receive fundamentally different treatment from the treatment Diageo received when it decided it was time to leave?

    For the thousands of ordinary Kenyans who invested in EABL expecting fair treatment, the April 9 court date and the ongoing regulatory silence represent the final opportunity for Kenya’s institutions to demonstrate that the rules they have written apply equally to the powerful and the small.

    The Asahi transaction will close.

    The court proceedings will continue, slowly, expensively, in the wake of a Sh303.5 billion exit that has already happened.

    What remains to be seen is whether any of the money changing hands will ever find its way to the parties who built EABL’s market, paid their goodwill, built the brewery in Kisumu, and kept faith with an institution that, on the record, did not keep faith with them.

  • Treasury Hands Sh358M Brief to Eric Gumbo’s Firm While Bypassing Standard Rules — and the Lawyer Is Already Deep Inside Ruto’s State Machine

    Treasury Hands Sh358M Brief to Eric Gumbo’s Firm While Bypassing Standard Rules — and the Lawyer Is Already Deep Inside Ruto’s State Machine

    AT A GLANCE

    Arbitration forum: London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)

    Claimant: Jamhuri Holdings Ltd, special purpose vehicle of Helios Investment Partners

    Amount at stake: Sh6.19 billion

    Law firm engaged: G&A Advocates LLP led by Eric Gumbo, MBS

    Contract value: Sh358 million

    Procurement route: Specially Permitted Procedure (SPP) — fast-track, no competitive bidding

    PPARB ruling: March 9, 2026 — upheld Treasury award over rival Okoth & Kiplagat (Sh380 million bid)

    Engagement date: January 4, 2026

    The National Treasury has quietly handed a Sh358 million international arbitration brief to G&A Advocates LLP, a law firm whose managing partner Eric Onyango Gumbo has over the past two years accumulated an extraordinary portfolio of politically charged state mandates — from arguing before the Senate to remove Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, to advising on Kenya’s Sh106 billion Kenya Pipeline Company initial public offering, to serving as a board member at the Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, a state enterprise whose alternate director is drawn directly from the Treasury itself.

    The brief concerns a London Court of International Arbitration case filed by Helios Investment Partners through its special purpose vehicle, Jamhuri Holdings Limited, seeking to recover or obtain compensation on the Sh6.19 billion paid to it in 2022 for 60 per cent of Telkom Kenya’s shares under the administration of former President Uhuru Kenyatta — a deal that President William Ruto’s Cabinet subsequently rescinded in October 2022 amid governance controversy.

    “The procurement of legal services was necessitated by urgent international arbitration proceedings under the LCIA…due to the urgency of the matter and the risk of financial exposure for the Government of Kenya.” — PPARB ruling, March 9, 2026

    Treasury’s engagement of G&A was made under a Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure, a provision in Kenya’s procurement law designed for genuine emergencies where standard competitive processes are impractical. Treasury told the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board that its supply chain management unit was authorised to use that fast-track route to expedite the process and sign the contract quickly, citing strict procedural timelines at the London court and the risk of significant financial exposure.

    The Attorney General approved the engagement of an international barrister alongside two local firms. Leading the state’s defence team will be G&A’s own Eric Gumbo and his partners Ken Melly and Moses Kipkogei, supported by English barrister Michael Sullivan as external counsel based in England.

    THE PROCUREMENT BATTLE THAT REVEALED IT ALL

    Details of the arrangement came to light not through any government gazette or parliamentary notification, but through an unseemly public dispute between two rival law firms that both wanted the brief. Okoth and Kiplagat Advocates, which had tendered Sh380 million for the same work — Sh22 million more than G&A’s winning quote — challenged the award before the PPARB in February this year, alleging that Treasury’s evaluation of G&A’s bid was irregular.

    The PPARB rejected that challenge in a ruling dated March 9, 2026, clearing the way for G&A to proceed. But the dispute’s court documents laid bare previously undisclosed information: that Kenya has been under intense pressure to appear before the London tribunal, that the government’s Solicitor General had warned of the risk of financial exposure if legal representation was delayed, and that Treasury had in fact already engaged four top legal minds in January under the SPP before the procurement dispute was even formally resolved.

    Treasury’s own submissions to the PPARB described the situation in terms of urgency consistent with a crisis: the words ‘financial exposure’ appear repeatedly in the board’s ruling. Yet the government had known since March 2023, when Controller of Budget Margaret Nyakang’o publicly accused former Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani of pressuring her to sign off on the Sh6.19 billion withdrawal without parliamentary approval, that this dispute would almost certainly end in formal proceedings.

    For three years, Kenya’s investigative machinery was left stranded. Now Sh358 million of the same public money is being directed to a firm woven deep into the state’s political fabric.

    That is three full years during which the government sat on the knowledge that a legal confrontation with Helios was coming, and during which it did not use that time to organise a proper competitive tender for legal representation. By the time Treasury moved, it declared an emergency and used a shortcut that conveniently removed the need for open competition.

    WHO IS ERIC GUMBO, AND HOW CLOSE IS HE TO POWER?

    G&A Advocates LLP was founded in 2006 under the name Gumbo and Associates Advocates, originally operating out of Eldoret. It transitioned into a limited liability partnership in February 2017 and now maintains offices in both Nairobi and Eldoret, styling itself as ‘intentionally atop’ in its marketing. The firm has five practice arms: Dispute Resolution, Real Estate and Finance, Policy and Legislative Drafting, Corporate and Commercial, and Technology and Innovation.

    The firm is widely regarded as competent and internationally networked. It holds a recognition from the IFLR1000 guide to financial and corporate law firms, has signed an international partnership memorandum with South Korean firm Jipyong LLC, and has worked alongside global giants including White and Case on sovereign transactions. It is also co-ranked alongside heavyweights such as TrippleOKLaw and ENS Africa for finance and projects work in Kenya.

    But it is Eric Gumbo’s relationship with the current administration that raises the most pointed questions in the context of this particular procurement. Over a twenty-one-year legal career, Gumbo has appeared for Kenya’s elections management body in all three presidential election petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Kenya since the 2010 Constitution came into force — including in 2022, the election that brought President Ruto to power. He was on the winning side.

    In October 2024, when the National Assembly sought to impeach Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua in what political observers widely characterised as a Ruto administration-driven purge, it was Gumbo who appeared as the legislature’s counsel before the Senate. Alongside Senior Counsel James Orengo and a fourteen-strong team fielded by G&A, Gumbo argued strenuously and successfully that Gachagua should be removed.

    He also appeared before the High Court when Gachagua sought judicial intervention to block the implementation of the Senate vote, arguing against conservatory orders and in favour of the swearing-in of Kithure Kindiki as the new Deputy President. Gachagua was removed. Kindiki took office.

    Weeks later, Gumbo’s firm was appointed co-legal adviser alongside TripleOKLaw (a firm that has been adversely linked to AG Dorcas Oduor) for the Kenya Pipeline Company’s landmark initial public offering, the first IPO in Kenya in over a decade and the centrepiece of the Ruto government’s privatisation agenda. The legal advisory fee for that transaction was set at Sh31.9 million, shared between the two firms.

    Eric Gumbo (extreme left) recently hosted government officials including Attorney General Dorcas Oduor, Treasury PS Chris Kiptoo, PS Ouma Oluga for a Huduma Mashinani event at Lwak Girls Secondary School in Rarieda.
    Eric Gumbo (extreme left) recently hosted government officials including Attorney General Dorcas Oduor, Treasury PS Chris Kiptoo, PS Ouma Oluga for a Huduma Mashinani event at Lwak Girls Secondary School in Rarieda.

    At the same time, Gumbo sits as a board member of the Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, a state-owned listed insurer whose board structure includes an alternate director nominated directly by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury — the very ministry now writing G&A a Sh358 million cheque. Gumbo joined the Kenya Re board in June 2019, making his tenure there longer than his more recent political engagements, but the cumulative interlocking of relationships is notable.

    The President also appointed Gumbo to the panel tasked with recruiting the Auditor General, a constitutional position responsible for oversight of public spending including Treasury’s own expenditures.

    A SCANDAL THAT NEVER DIED

    The Telkom Kenya share buyback is among the most troubled state transactions of recent memory. In 2022, the Kenyatta administration’s Treasury paid Sh6.19 billion to purchase a 60 per cent stake in Telkom Kenya from Helios Investment Partners through Jamhuri Holdings, effectively reversing the earlier privatisation of the telecoms firm. The payment was made without parliamentary approval, with Yatani invoking Article 223 of the Constitution, which allows emergency spending without legislative sanction.

    Nyakang’o subsequently told Parliament she had been pressured to sign off on the withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund. The Auditor General and the Finance and Economic Planning Committee of the National Assembly later declared that no adequate justification had been provided for invoking the emergency provision. The public auditor noted there was no reason the payment could not have gone through the normal budget process.

    Investigators from the Office of the Auditor General and the Financial Reporting Centre attempted to trace the money. It passed through Mauritius into Jersey Island, where Helios’s parent entity is registered, and then went cold. Requests to visit Jamhuri Holdings’ registered offices were either declined or went without response.

    The Ruto Cabinet formally rescinded the transaction in 2023 and Parliament declared the expenditure irregular. Neither action had any practical effect, since the money had already left the country. The National Assembly at the time summoned former Treasury CS Yatani, former ICT CS Joe Mucheru and State House Chief of Staff Josphat Kinyua to explain the deal.

    MPs renewed their frustration last November, demanding a special audit of the transaction while complaining publicly about the slow pace of investigations. Now Helios, unmoved by Nairobi’s political declarations, has pressed its arbitration claim before the London Court of International Arbitration, and Kenya needs lawyers badly enough to spend Sh358 million on the task.

    THE GHOST OF THE NAKURU ORDER

    The timing of the G&A engagement is additionally awkward given a separate legal controversy that erupted in January 2026. On January 12, days after Treasury had already awarded G&A its brief under the SPP, the High Court sitting in Nakuru issued conservatory orders — in Petition E001 of 2026, filed by activist Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and others — suspending public entities from engaging or paying private advocates where in-house government lawyers already exist.

    The orders were issued by Justice Samuel Mukira and applied to entities that already have the Attorney General, state counsel, the Solicitor General, county attorneys and other in-house legal officers available to them. The Central Organisation of Trade Unions publicly welcomed the orders, arguing that billions of shillings were being paid to private law firms through what it termed outrageous fee notes, even as public workers suffered delayed salaries and stalled collective bargaining agreements.

    The Law Society of Kenya mounted fierce resistance, calling the orders a nefarious scheme aimed at crippling the legal profession and vowing radical surgery on the Judiciary if the orders were not reversed. LSK President Faith Odhiambo noted that both the Office of the Attorney General Act and the Office of the County Attorney Act expressly provide for the retention of external counsel as may be necessary for specialised matters.

    Treasury justified the G&A contract on precisely that grounds — that the matter was an urgent international arbitration before a specialist London tribunal requiring expertise that the Attorney General’s office could not readily supply. The PPARB’s ruling accepted this logic. But the broader environment in which Sh358 million is being paid to a firm embedded in the ruling establishment’s political networks, while the courts and civil society are simultaneously debating whether such payments are a vector for corruption, is one that demands scrutiny.

    A EUROBOND, A PIPELINE AND A PATTERN

    The G&A Advocates brief on the Telkom LCIA case is not a one-off. In recent months the firm has been at the centre of Kenya’s most consequential sovereign financial transactions. When Kenya undertook a liability management operation in early 2025, exchanging part of its 2028 Eurobond for new longer-dated instruments, G&A was co-counsel to the National Treasury alongside an international firm. The Eurobond transaction, Gumbo later noted in a LinkedIn post, extended Kenya’s sovereign debt maturity profile in line with the country’s medium-term debt strategy and achieved competitive terms that reflected strong investor confidence.

    The KPC IPO, in which G&A was co-legal adviser alongside TripleOKLaw, was the biggest equity capital markets transaction Kenya had seen since the Safaricom IPO in 2008. It was also the first electronic IPO in the country’s history and was oversubscribed by 105.7 per cent when it closed in February 2026, with shares listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange on March 9.

    In 2024 the firm signed a formal international partnership agreement with Jipyong LLC, a South Korean law firm with operations in seven countries across Asia, positioning G&A as the preferred entry point into African markets for Korean corporate and investment clients.

    Across all of this, the same names appear at the centre of the Telkom brief. Ken Melly, who will work alongside Gumbo in the LCIA proceedings, is the head of G&A’s Dispute Resolution practice and holds the designation of Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. Moses Kipkogei, also named in the LCIA team, leads G&A’s Policy, Legal Compliance and Legislative Drafting practice and appeared alongside Gumbo in the Gachagua impeachment matter.

    WHAT IS KENYA ACTUALLY DEFENDING?

    The substantive details of the LCIA arbitration remain private under the rules of the London court. Helios has not commented publicly on the proceedings. But the government’s own PPARB submissions describe the legal challenge in terms that suggest Kenya is defending the legitimacy of Ruto’s Cabinet decision to rescind a transaction that had already been completed and paid for by his predecessor.

    Helios and Jamhuri Holdings can credibly argue that they entered into a lawful contract with the Government of Kenya, received payment, and have since been subjected to a unilateral reversal driven by political considerations rather than legal defect. The auditors’ finding that the original payment was irregular speaks to governance failings within the Kenyatta administration, not to the contractual rights of Helios as a commercial counterparty.

    Whether the government can successfully defend a position that amounts to repudiating a completed commercial transaction, and on what grounds, is the core legal question before the London tribunal. If it cannot, the damages Kenya faces could substantially exceed the Sh6.19 billion originally paid — and would join a growing ledger of international arbitration losses that have cost the Kenyan taxpayer billions over the past decade.

  • Understanding Crash Betting: How It Works and What to Know Before You Play

    Understanding Crash Betting: How It Works and What to Know Before You Play

    Online gambling has changed a lot over the past decade, and one format that has picked up real momentum across Africa and beyond is the crash bet. It pairs fast gameplay with a simple premise, making it easy to pick up for beginners while still holding the interest of more experienced players.

    What Is a Crash Bet?

    A crash bet is an online wagering game where a multiplier starts at 1x and climbs continuously. Players place their stake before the round begins, then decide when to cash out as the multiplier rises. The catch: the multiplier can crash at any random moment, and anyone who hasn’t cashed out by then loses their bet.

    The appeal is simple. There are no complicated rules, no cards to memorize, no opponents to read. The whole experience comes down to timing and risk tolerance, two things that connect naturally with how modern bettors think.

    How the Gameplay Actually Works

    Placing Your Bet

    Before each round, players have a short window to enter their stake. Some platforms allow dual bets, meaning you can set two separate wagers with different cash-out targets in the same round. It adds a layer of strategy without making things complicated.

    Watching the Multiplier Rise

    Once the round starts, the multiplier begins climbing from 1x. It might reach 1.5x, 5x, or even 100x before crashing. The core decision every player faces is whether to lock in a modest gain early or hold out for a bigger return.

    The Random Crash Point

    When the game crashes is determined by a provably fair algorithm, meaning neither the platform nor the player can predict or influence the outcome. That randomness is what creates the tension and, equally, the risk.

    Why Crash Betting Has Grown in Kenya

    Kenya has one of the most active online betting communities in Africa. Mobile-first platforms have made it easy for players to try new formats, and crash betting fits naturally into that ecosystem. Rounds are short, usually under a minute, which suits the on-the-go habits of many Kenyan bettors.

    The social side matters too. Many platforms feature live chat or leaderboards during rounds, which creates a shared experience even in a digital setting.

    Key Things to Keep in Mind

    Before getting started, a few practical points are worth understanding:

    – Set a clear cash-out target before each round rather than deciding in the moment

    – Avoid chasing losses by increasing stakes after a bad round

    – Use platforms that display verified fairness certificates for their crash algorithm

    – Treat each round as independent — past results have no bearing on when the next crash will occur

    Managing Risk Over Time

    The biggest mistake new players make is assuming patterns exist where there are none. A multiplier that has crashed early several times in a row is not “due” for a high run. Each round resets entirely.

    Responsible play means deciding what you’re willing to lose before a session starts and sticking to it regardless of how the rounds go. The most sustainable approach to crash betting is treating it as entertainment with a fixed budget, not a reliable income strategy.

  • How Firm Linked To Mombasa Tycoon Jaffer Was Allowed To Import Fuel At Bloated Price And Set To Make Billions In Profits From Iranian War Crisis In Kenya

    How Firm Linked To Mombasa Tycoon Jaffer Was Allowed To Import Fuel At Bloated Price And Set To Make Billions In Profits From Iranian War Crisis In Kenya

    A petroleum company linked to Mombasa billionaire Mohammed Jaffer was quietly allowed to import expensive petrol at three times the normal cost in early March, positioning the politically connected businessman to reap billions in profits as Kenya grappled with the fallout from the US-Israel war with Iran.

    One Petroleum, a subsidiary of Jaffer’s Mbaraki Bulk Terminal Ltd, was among two local firms cleared by the Ministry of Energy to ship in 60 tonnes of petrol each outside the government-to-government deal that Kenya signed with three Gulf oil majors.

    The emergency imports came as the government scrambled to avert shortages tied to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian drone attacks on oil facilities in the Gulf region.

    Industry sources revealed at the time that One Petroleum quoted a premium of $290 per tonne, equivalent to Sh37,691.3, which was three times the $84, or Sh10,917.48, quoted for a similar quantity of fuel under the G-to-G deal involving Saudi Aramco, Emirates National Oil Company, and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

    The two cargo consignments imported outside the deal were to be part of those used in setting monthly pump prices from April 15, meaning Kenyan consumers were staring at a potential steep climb in fuel costs.

    “We are looking at an increase of at least Sh19 per litre on account of the premiums alone. Then we also add the global benchmark prices of fuel for the month of March which are higher than those from the month of February. The effect is going to be huge unless the government goes for a significant subsidy,” an industry source was quoted at the time.

    The empire of Mohammed Jaffer

    One Petroleum is a subsidiary of Mbaraki Bulk Terminal Ltd, a multi-petroleum products handling facility at the port of Mombasa that is partly owned by Jaffer, a businessman who has managed to secure safe ties with political regimes since the era of President Daniel arap Moi.

    Jaffer, who founded the MJ Group conglomerate now valued at over Sh16.3 billion, was previously a supporter of the late opposition leader Raila Odinga but has since made peace with President William Ruto, whom he had opposed in the last election.

    Company records show Jaffer’s family members, including Mojtaba Mohamed Jaffer, Ali Abbas Jaffer and Mohamed Husein Jaffer, are listed as directors of One Petroleum.

    Others are Solomon Esebwe Mwanjuma Ondego, Ali Salaah Balala, who serves as executive director, and Jonathan James Stokes. Nicholas Kokita is the company secretary.

    The Jaffers are also associated with Africa Gas and Oil Company, One Gas Ltd and Grain Bulk Handlers.

    Africa Gas is partly controlled by the billionaire, who also owns Grain Bulk Handlers, which imports the bulk of the liquefied petroleum gas consumed in Kenya and controls a significant transit market to neighbouring countries.

    A monopoly under threat

    The businessman has been able to maintain a monopoly not only in port operations but also in the LPG industry.

    His empire, however, came under threat from President Ruto’s decision to bring in a new entrant, Taifa Gas, owned by Tanzanian billionaire Rostam Aziz, who put up a 30,000-tonne gas plant at the Dongo Kundu Special Economic Zone in Likoni.

    Jaffer appeared to have made peace with the president and won another tender.

    His company, Grain Bulk Handlers, launched a new grain-handling and storage terminal in Embakasi, Nairobi, in April 2023, with President Ruto attending the event and expressing confidence that the terminal would play a vital role in addressing food security in the country.

    But the Jaffer empire has faced scrutiny before. In 2021, the Kenya Revenue Authority went to court accusing the family’s oil and gas firms of Sh68 million tax evasion.

    How the crisis created opportunity

    The emergency imports that allowed One Petroleum to charge inflated premiums were necessitated by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following Iran’s drone attacks on oil facilities in Gulf countries.

    Iran attacked at least 18 merchant ships along the strategic waterway in response to US-Israel strikes against it, significantly hindering the movement of fuel from the oil-rich region.

    Nearly 25 per cent of the global liquefied natural gas and fuel passes across the Strait of Hormuz, enabling its movement from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and beyond.

    Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain rely on the strait to deliver the vast majority of their oil exports.

    A vessel carrying 114.7 million litres of super from Emirates National Oil Company was unable to leave the Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai due to the closure, prompting the Ministry of Energy to float the idea of shipping fuel outside the G-to-G deal.

    Sources said a section of importers under the deal did not support the idea, citing the potential impact of steep premiums compared to the fixed ones under the government-backed arrangement.

    But the ministry went ahead and cleared One Petroleum and Oryx Energies to ship in the combined 120 tonnes of petrol.

    One Petroleum discharged its cargo, while that for Oryx arrived later.

    The G-to-G deal under the spotlight

    The G-to-G deal, which was designed to address dollar shortages and stabilise fuel supply through six-month credit arrangements backed by Kenyan bank letters of credit, has been a centre of controversy since its inception in March 2023.

    The deal involves Gulf firms Saudi Aramco, Emirates National Oil Co, and Abu Dhabi National Oil Co, and has been running through three main oil companies, Galana Energies, Gulf Energy, and Oryx Energies, which have been distributing fuel on behalf of the three Gulf oil companies.

    According to the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Kenya extended the G-to-G deal with the Gulf oil firms to 2028. The three firms will continue to supply gasoline, diesel, kerosene and jet fuel under the 180-day credit arrangement until early 2028.

    By mid-November 2023, oil imports under the scheme amounted to about $3.7 billion, equivalent to Sh592 billion. Letters of credit worth over $784 million, or Sh125.4 billion, were also settled, underlining the lucrative nature of the deal for players involved.

    What the windfall meant for One Petroleum

    With One Petroleum importing petrol at a premium three times higher than the G-to-G rate, the potential profits were staggering.

    The company invoiced oil companies, with the price build-up showing a premium of $290 per tonne. For a 60-tonne consignment, this translated to a premium payment of $17,400, or approximately Sh2.26 million, above the normal rate.

    But the real money lay in the fact that the cargo was to be used to set pump prices nationwide.

    With the premium factored into the pricing formula, the company stood to make billions in additional revenue from the inflated cost structure that would be passed on to consumers.

    Political connections paying off

    The addition of One Petroleum to the exclusive circle of firms allowed to import fuel represents a significant victory for Jaffer, who has maintained a delicate balancing act in Kenya’s turbulent political landscape. His ability to secure favour from successive regimes, from Moi to Ruto, speaks to a sophisticated understanding of how political connections translate into business opportunities.

    Jaffer’s empire spans grain handling, oil and gas, and port operations, giving him control over critical infrastructure that handles the bulk of Kenya’s imports. With the government allowing his firm to import fuel at bloated prices during a national crisis, his dominance over the country’s energy sector was set to grow even further.

    Global disruptions and the changing landscape

    Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil exporters from the Gulf, including Saudi Aramco which is part of the G-to-G deal, turned to alternative routes. They began using the Sikka Port in India, the Port of Antwerp-Bruges in Belgium and the ports situated along the Red Sea for the transportation of oil to markets such as Kenya.

    About 239.1 million litres of petrol were set to be loaded onto two vessels at the Port of Antwerp-Bruges in Belgium. The vessels were to sail towards Kenya via the Red Sea-Mediterranean route and dock at the Port of Mombasa between April 16 and April 27. Another 81.15 million litres of dual-purpose kerosene and 75.6 million litres of diesel were to be loaded onto vessels at the Sikka Port in India, with those vessels expected to dock at the Port of Mombasa between April 12 and April 21.

    The cost to Kenyans

    While One Petroleum and its politically connected owners stood to make billions from the arrangement, ordinary Kenyans faced the prospect of yet another punishing price hike. The April 15 price review was expected to deliver the highest pump prices in months, reflecting the impact of the fuel supply disruptions caused by the attacks on oil facilities in the Gulf.

    The global energy markets reacted sharply to the crisis, with oil prices surging after Iran threatened shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi warned lawmakers that the longer the conflict dragged on, the greater the economic shock could become, cautioning that prolonged disruptions to global energy and trade routes could have massive consequences for Kenya’s economy.

    But for Jaffer and One Petroleum, the crisis presented a golden opportunity. The company not only secured a place in the exclusive circle of importers but was also allowed to import fuel at bloated prices that would be passed directly to consumers. It was a classic case of crisis capitalism, where those with the right connections turn national emergencies into personal windfalls.

    What followed

    The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum did not immediately respond to queries over the two vessels and how the government would treat the significantly high premiums in order to protect consumers. Without a steep subsidy, the April 15 to May 14 prices were expected to be the highest in months.

    Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority Director General David Kiptoo later revealed in a television interview that the regulator had incorporated One Petroleum and Asharami Synergy into the G-to-G deal, bringing the number of oil firms to five. Under the current arrangement, three Kenyan oil marketing companies, Galana Oil, Gulf Energy and Oryx Energy, own cargo upon delivery to Mombasa port by the international Gulf-based oil giants.

    The expansion of the deal to include Jaffer’s company raised fresh questions about transparency and whether the government was using the cover of a global crisis to reward its political allies. For now, one thing was certain. While ordinary Kenyans braced for another round of punishing price hikes, the politically connected players in the lucrative oil import game were counting their billions.

  • Forged Legacy: How Kaplan and Stratton’s Peter Gachuhi Is Accused of Faking a Top AG’s Will as State Claims Damning Evidence

    Forged Legacy: How Kaplan and Stratton’s Peter Gachuhi Is Accused of Faking a Top AG’s Will as State Claims Damning Evidence

    The walls are closing in on Kaplan and Stratton.

    Within weeks of each other, two senior partners at one of Kenya’s oldest and most celebrated commercial law firms have been dragged into separate but thematically identical storms — allegations of document fraud, manufactured evidence, and the manipulation of Kenya’s highest judicial processes.

    But it is the case against Peter Mbuthia Gachuhi, accused of forging the will of Kenya’s second Attorney General, James Boro Karugu, that now poses the gravest threat to the firm’s storied reputation.

    The charge is as stark as it is extraordinary. Gachuhi, a senior partner at the same institution that once acted for Karugu in his lifetime, stands accused by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of conspiring with five other individuals to fabricate the last will and testament of a man whose legal integrity was the defining feature of his public life.

    The DPP approved charges on December 23, 2025, for forgery, uttering false documents, and conspiracy to defraud. For a firm whose letterhead has graced the most consequential transactions in East African commerce, the reputational consequences are incalculable.

    THE DEAD MAN’S SIGNATURE

    James Boro Karugu died on November 9, 2022, aged 86, at his Kiamara farm in Kiambu County. He was a man of towering legal intellect and fierce personal integrity.

    He had resigned as Attorney General under President Daniel arap Moi in 1981 rather than bend his office to political pressure — a resignation that made him a singular figure in a generation of lawyers whose most common instinct was accommodation.

    For four decades after leaving public life, he quietly built one of the most substantial private estates in the country’s legal history.

    That estate spans over 753 acres across five counties, includes Treasury bonds valued at Sh404.7 million, shareholdings in Kenya Power and Nation Media Group, and a commercial building along Kenyatta Avenue in Nairobi’s central business district.

    Control of the estate’s corporate holdings sits under Mathara Holdings Limited, a vehicle that Karugu’s firstborn daughter Victoria Nyambura Karugu ran as Chief Executive after her father’s dementia took hold in 2015.

    Weeks after Karugu was laid to rest, a will dated April 2, 2014 was presented to family members at what has since been described as a carefully choreographed hotel event.

    Alongside it came a trust deed establishing the JBK Foundation. Nyambura rejected both documents immediately.

    She pointed to a will drawn up by Patel and Patel Advocates in 2010 as the authentic expression of her father’s wishes, and she noted that neither document had surfaced at any point during the former Attorney General’s lifetime.

    She lodged a formal complaint with the DCI’s Economic and Commercial Crimes Unit, and the machinery of the State began to turn.

    A FORENSIC RECKONING

    What investigators uncovered has since become the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case.

    Chief Inspector Duncan Maina, acting on behalf of the DPP and the DCI, filed an affidavit detailing how forensic examiners found that the contested will and trust deed bore grammatical errors, arithmetic mistakes, spelling blunders, and erratic page numbering entirely inconsistent with the standards of a man who had served as the country’s chief law officer.

    The investigators characterised the documents as having been assembled in a cut-and-paste fashion from multiple sources.

    The forensic report found that the initials appearing across all pages of both documents, purportedly those of Karugu, were forged, and that the signature page had been fraudulently attached to the main body of the will.

    The execution page bore what the affidavit described as deliberate obscurity concealing its page number, raising the inference of deliberate tampering at the point of purported execution.

    Witnesses to the will gave conflicting accounts of when and how it was signed, with some admitting they appended their signatures on different days. None could confirm witnessing the settlor or other trustees sign — a fundamental requirement under Kenyan law for a valid testamentary execution.

    The DCI’s conclusion was unambiguous: the questioned initials and signatures were not those of James Boro Karugu. In the affidavit of Chief Inspector Maina, the State put its position with unusual bluntness.

    The impugned will and trust deed, it said, bore several drafting concerns that did not resonate with the professional standards of a man of the stature of the deceased, described as an impeccable lawyer and the second Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya.

    The initials, it stated plainly, were a forgery.

    THE LAWYER WHO BARELY KNEW THE MAN

    The inclusion of Gachuhi among the six suspects is not merely sensational. It is, according to Nyambura’s court filings, the logical product of a sustained pattern of conduct.

    She has alleged in detailed affidavits that Gachuhi met her father only once in the eight years preceding his death — a meeting she says she attended and in which nothing about an executorship was discussed.

    She further states that Gachuhi was not present at Karugu’s funeral or his memorial service and was never described by the former Attorney General as a close friend or confidant.

    The conflict of interest angle is particularly damaging. Court papers reveal that Gachuhi and Kaplan and Stratton had previously represented Karugu in 2016 when a woman, Lucy Githire Muthoni, claimed to have been married to the former Attorney General.

    A similar claim by another woman, Wambui Mwangi, also saw the firm instructed to deny all allegations of marriage while acknowledging paternity.

    Having acted for Karugu in matters of the most intimate personal sensitivity, Gachuhi was now presenting himself as the executor of a will that Karugu’s own daughter says was manufactured after her father’s death.

    On July 5, 2023, Gachuhi and two others filed a petition for a grant of probate through Kaplan and Stratton Advocates, seeking permission to execute the contested will.

    The trio simultaneously applied to have the copy of the will sealed from parties outside the succession proceedings — a move Nyambura has argued in court was designed to obstruct DCI investigators who were simultaneously seeking access to the document for forensic examination.

    Court papers further reveal that at least one petitioner initially resisted producing the originals before eventually surrendering copies.

    Nyambura has gone further, alleging that the motive for the entire scheme is not difficult to identify.

    A trust managed by executors under the direction of Kaplan and Stratton would have placed Karugu’s entire estate under the firm’s effective management for an indefinite period, generating a retainer whose financial value she describes as extraordinary.

    The assets of the deceased, she has alleged in an affidavit, would have been placed under the direct control of Kaplan and Stratton until their full depletion, to the grave prejudice of the legitimate beneficiaries.

    THE STATE SPEAKS

    Attorney General Dorcas Oduor formally entered the arena on February 17, 2026, with grounds of opposition that described the petition by Gachuhi and his co-petitioners as incompetent, misconceived, and an abuse of the court process.

    The Attorney General argued that the existence of the succession cause pending before the Family Division of the High Court created no bar to criminal investigations and prosecution. Forgery is a crime under the Penal Code, the State said, and cannot be resolved in a succession court that has no jurisdiction to determine criminal culpability.

    The AG further argued that no constitutional rights of the petitioners had been violated by the investigations and that the conservatory orders obtained on January 19, 2026 — which had temporarily restrained the DPP and DCI from summoning, arresting, or charging the suspects — should not be extended. The State asked the court to dismiss both the application and the petition with costs and allow the criminal process to run its lawful course.

    Senior Counsel Philip Murgor, acting for Nyambura, applied to have his client joined to the proceedings as an interested party, arguing that she is both the complainant in the criminal inquiry and an objector in the succession cause, and that her interests are proximate and identifiable rather than peripheral.

    The constitutional petition is scheduled before Justice Bahati Mwamuye on April 21, 2026.

    THE RIVAL REPORT

    Gachuhi and his co-petitioners have not taken the DCI findings lying down.

    They have produced a competing forensic report, authored by Anthony Ngige, the founder of Stealth Africa Consulting, a Nairobi-based risk management and forensic advisory firm.

    Ngige’s report, presented to the court as part of the petitioners’ response, reached conclusions diametrically opposed to those of the State’s examiners.

    He found no evidence of page insertion, document assembly, or material alteration and declared the allegations of forgery to be unsupported by forensic evidence.

    He attributed variations in the handwriting to natural differences expected in genuine signatures and criticised the DCI for failing to employ advanced forensic methods including infrared photography.

    The clash of forensic opinions is now itself a central issue in the litigation and will ultimately determine whether the criminal trial proceeds in earnest.

    Courts will be asked to decide not only which examiner is more credible but whether the methodological differences between the two reports are material to the question of authenticity.

    Gachuhi’s affidavit states that while Karugu had asked him in 2013 to serve as an executor and trustee for a planned foundation, he neither drafted the will nor the trust deed and is not a beneficiary under either document.

    THE SECOND STORM

    The crisis at Kaplan and Stratton deepened dramatically on February 16, 2026, when former Cabinet Secretary Raphael Tuju walked into DCI headquarters and formally recorded a criminal complaint against Senior Counsel Fred Ojiambo — the most senior partner at the firm and the same advocate who appeared in court to defend Gachuhi in the constitutional petition.

    The two crises are now inextricably linked in public perception and, increasingly, in legal argument.

    At the centre of Tuju’s complaint is a 27-acre prime property in Karen valued at approximately Ksh 1.5 billion, which has been the subject of a protracted dispute with the East African Development Bank arising from a 2015 loan facility that grew to more than Ksh 4.5 billion.

    Tuju alleged that Ojiambo and other Kaplan and Stratton advocates procured affidavits from the bank’s former Kenya Country Manager that contained deliberate falsehoods, and that those affidavits were presented as having been properly commissioned before a Commissioner for Oaths when they were no such thing.

    If established, the consequence would be that sworn evidence filed before both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Kenya was fraudulent.

    Tuju told investigators that Ojiambo had also persuaded the High Court to recognise a diplomatic immunity claim on behalf of the EADB — an immunity Tuju flatly asserts does not exist in law — thereby freezing a separate criminal matter at the Magistrates Court for more than a year.

    He further alleged the deployment of a fraudulent international warrant of arrest, attributed to a Ugandan magistrate’s court, as a mechanism of intimidation against him and his family.

    Ojiambo denied every allegation. Speaking to journalists in a phone call, he was categorical: no affidavit had been falsified on any matter whatsoever.

    A separate complaint was filed before the Senior Counsel Committee by Tuju’s lawyer seeking the removal of Ojiambo and former Attorney General Githu Muigai from the list of Senior Counsel on grounds of gross professional misconduct — a proceeding that, if successful, would constitute the most severe professional sanction short of disbarment that Kenya’s legal system can impose.

    Outside DCI headquarters on the day he recorded his statement, Tuju delivered the line that has since defined the public character of the whole affair.

    Fred Ojiambo, he declared, is a Bible-carrying fraud with a fake British accent.

    The remark, intemperate but precisely aimed, has entered the lexicon of a scandal that is rewriting Kenyan legal history in real time.

     

    A FIRM AT A CROSSROADS

    Kaplan and Stratton was founded on the quiet conviction that commercial law, practised with rigour and discretion, could anchor itself above the turbulence of politics and scandal.

    It has carried that reputation across decades and through multiple cycles of political upheaval.

    The firm counts among its alumni and retainers some of the most significant transactions in East African corporate history. Its name has been synonymous with a kind of colonial-era solidity that newer firms have neither inherited nor replicated.

    That name is now at the centre of what the Director of Public Prosecutions describes as a coordinated criminal scheme, and what the Attorney General has characterised as an abuse of the court process. Two of its most senior partners face formal criminal complaints.

    Its letterhead appears on the probate petition at the centre of the forgery case.

    Its managing partner appeared in court not to handle a client’s case but to defend a colleague facing prosecution for document fraud.

    For Gachuhi and Ojiambo, the presumption of innocence is absolute. No charges have been formally laid and tried.

    The DCI investigation into Tuju’s complaint remains at an early stage. The constitutional petition is yet to be determined. Conflicting forensic reports remain unresolved. The law will take its course.

    But for an institution whose currency has always been reputation — whose value to clients rests precisely on the assumption that its word is its bond — the question of what the court finds is almost secondary to the question of what the market has already decided. And the market, in Kenya’s legal profession, has a long memory.

    James Boro Karugu left school barefoot and sat in the gallery of the High Court mesmerised by men in white wigs.

    He rose to become the one man who wore those wigs and refused to let them be used for anything other than justice.

    The irony that his name and his estate are now at the centre of Kenya’s most consequential legal scandal is one that history will not easily forgive — whoever is ultimately found to be responsible.

  • Lobbyist’s Tweet Ignites Storm Around Equity Boss in Sh9.4B e-Citizen Saga

    Lobbyist’s Tweet Ignites Storm Around Equity Boss in Sh9.4B e-Citizen Saga

    NAIROBI, April 1 — A late-night phone call, a defiant tweet and a trail of billions moving through opaque accounts have thrust Stephen Mutoro into the eye of a fast-escalating financial and political storm now brushing up against James Mwangi and one of Kenya’s most critical digital revenue systems.

    The Secretary General of Consumer Federation of Kenya says he is standing his ground after accusing powerful interests of attempting to intimidate him into deleting a post in which he labelled Mwangi a “suspect” in the alleged Sh9.4 billion e-Citizen revenue scandal.

    He insists the characterization was not an accusation of criminal guilt but a question of accountability grounded in parliamentary proceedings.

    Screenshot
    Screenshot

    At the centre of the uproar is a special audit by Nancy Gathungu that paints a troubling picture of how billions of shillings flowed through the government’s eCitizen system between 2021 and 2024.

    The audit suggests that Sh6.3 billion was channelled through a “Pesaflow” account held at Equity Bank without the requisite approvals from the National Treasury, raising red flags about parallel revenue streams operating outside formal government controls.

    What makes the transaction trail particularly controversial is not just the scale but the method.

    According to audit queries tabled before Parliament, the funds were allegedly withdrawn in cash or transferred in ways that have proven difficult to reconcile due to missing bank statements and incomplete documentation.

    In Kenya’s tightly regulated banking environment, large cash withdrawals from accounts handling public funds typically trigger compliance protocols, including suspicious transaction reporting to regulators.

    The apparent opacity in this case has therefore deepened suspicion.

    Mutoro’s follow-up remarks sharpened the stakes. He publicly questioned how such volumes of money could exit a public-facing system without senior-level awareness within the banking chain.

    His argument hinges less on direct culpability and more on fiduciary responsibility, a distinction that has nevertheless placed Mwangi under intense public scrutiny.

    The audit further implicates a network of private firms contracted around the e-Citizen ecosystem, including Webmasters Africa Ltd, Electronic Citizen Solutions, Pesaflow Ltd and Goldrock Capital Ltd.

    These entities are accused of collecting at least Sh2.6 billion in so-called convenience fees, often through flat-rate charges that appear inconsistent with official government gazette notices.

    The structure of these fees, investigators note, may have effectively created a parallel revenue model benefiting private actors while eroding public collections.

    Treasury Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo has confirmed to lawmakers that some of the questioned accounts linked to the flow of funds were later frozen and shut down.

    That intervention, however, came after significant sums had already moved through the system, raising concerns about delayed oversight and fragmented institutional coordination.

    The matter is now squarely before the National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee, chaired by Tindi Mwale, which has summoned Mwangi, Kiptoo, Attorney General Dorcas Oduor and representatives of the implicated firms.

    Lawmakers are expected to interrogate not only the legality of the transactions but also the governance architecture that allowed them to occur.

    Inside banking and regulatory circles, the case is being viewed as a stress test of Kenya’s public-private partnership model in digital finance.

    Commercial banks routinely act as collection agents for government services, but such arrangements are governed by strict service-level agreements, treasury approvals and audit trails.

    The alleged use of an unapproved account introduces questions about whether established controls were bypassed or simply failed.

    Political undertones are also beginning to surface.

    Figures such as Rigathi Gachagua have amplified claims around the missing billions, injecting the scandal into a broader narrative of elite capture and state-linked financial leakages ahead of a potentially charged electoral cycle.

    For now, no charges have been filed against Mwangi, Equity Bank or any of the entities named in the audit queries. Being summoned before Parliament does not imply wrongdoing.

    Yet the combination of a whistleblowing tweet, alleged behind-the-scenes pressure and unresolved audit gaps has transformed what began as a technical financial review into a high-stakes public accountability test.

    Whether the parliamentary probe will untangle the money trail or deepen the intrigue now depends on what emerges from the hearings.

    What is already clear is that the e-Citizen platform, once touted as a flagship of Kenya’s digital governance, is now under its most serious scrutiny since inception.

  • Newly Confirmed KeNHA Boss Luka Kimeli Dragged In Alleged Multimillion Tender Scam

    Newly Confirmed KeNHA Boss Luka Kimeli Dragged In Alleged Multimillion Tender Scam

    The ink on his official appointment letter had barely dried when the questions began to follow Eng. Luka Kipchumba Kimeli through the corridors of KeNHA’s upper hill offices. On 17 February 2026, the Kenya National Highways Authority Board, acting in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary for Roads and Transport, formalised his elevation to Director-General, ending a seven-month acting tenure that had itself been turbulent.

    The Board, through its Chairperson Winfrida Ngumi, assured the public of a recruitment process it called “competitive and transparent” conducted in line with the Kenya Roads Act, 2007. What the statement did not address was the cloud of allegations, court findings and institutional controversy that had accumulated around Kimeli and the agency he now helms during the very months he was auditioning for the role permanently.

    A wave of claims circulating across public platforms since the announcement allege that Kimeli’s office may have played a facilitative role in the award of a multi-million-shilling contract to a foreign entity under circumstances that have raised serious questions about competitive bidding, preferential treatment and due process.

    The allegations, which have yet to be tested before any formal body, describe a procurement environment in which internal processes may have been tailored to accommodate an outcome already decided elsewhere. As of the time of this investigation, neither KeNHA nor the Ministry of Roads and Transport had issued any public response to the claims, and no oversight authority had publicly pronounced itself on the matter.

    What makes the allegations particularly combustible is the context in which they land. KeNHA is not an agency with a pristine reputation. It has spent the better part of two decades at the centre of Kenya’s most consequential and most contested infrastructure governance controversies.

    Its procurement architecture has drawn sustained fire from the Auditor-General, parliamentary committees, and anti-corruption investigators. Its project files are laden with cost overruns, vanished documentation, unexplained contract variations, and billions in pending bills to contractors who in turn have dragged the agency into protracted, expensive court battles. Kimeli now presides over all of it, and the allegations against him are arriving at a moment when the institution he leads can least afford further reputational damage.

    The Contempt Conviction That Preceded the Appointment

    Long before the current tender allegations surfaced, Kimeli’s tenure as acting Director-General had already attracted the attention of the High Court in a manner that would ordinarily give any appointing authority cause for reflection. On 25 November 2025, the High Court found Kimeli guilty of contempt of court for defying a binding judicial order directing KeNHA to settle a debt of Sh536,464,436 owed to SBI International Holdings (Kenya) Limited, an Israeli construction firm.

    The court was unambiguous in its language. It characterised Kimeli’s conduct as adopting a posture of waiting to see what consequences may follow, in the hope that none will, and declared such conduct wholly unacceptable.

    Kimeli was summoned to appear before the Nairobi court on 19 December 2025 for mitigation and sentencing, a proceeding that unfolded while his permanent appointment was already being processed.

    He had argued before the court that KeNHA’s failure to pay was not wilful disobedience but a consequence of budgetary constraints and administrative processes.

    He told the court that KeNHA had proposed a structured repayment plan in December 2023 involving six equal instalments beginning January 2024, that partial payments had been made, and that the agency had written to the Principal Secretary for Roads in May 2025 to notify the balance outstanding. The court rejected this framing entirely. It ruled that the continued default, in the face of a binding consent order and available statutory funding mechanisms, constituted wilful contempt. A statutory body that elects to disobey orders, it held, undermines public confidence in lawful administration.

    The SBI International dispute is itself a decades-long saga that illuminates the chronic dysfunction at the heart of KeNHA’s contract management. SBI, the Kenya subsidiary of the Israeli construction giant Shikun and Binui, had been awarded a series of major highway contracts including the dualling of the Kisumu Boys Roundabout to Mamboleo Junction and stretches of the Mau Summit to Kericho to Kisumu corridor.

    In December 2018, the company abandoned works on the Kisumu dual carriage, citing unpaid arrears and delayed completion. A Disputes Adjudication Board subsequently awarded it Sh1.3 billion in April 2019 for the illegal termination of contracts, a figure that KeNHA contested in court and lost. The cascade of litigation that followed has cost the Kenyan taxpayer over Sh6 billion in payments to SBI across nine contract disputes, accounting at its peak for more than 80 percent of all payments made by road agencies for contract breaches in a single financial year.

    The SBI saga carries an additional layer of toxicity that predates Kimeli’s tenure but that continues to shadow the institution he has inherited.

    Israeli investigators established that SBI’s parent company, Shikun and Binui, had paid bribes to Kenyan public officials to secure road tenders.

    The Israeli probe, which culminated in a court fine exceeding Sh9 billion, named 18 Kenyan nationals as implicated, including two former Transport Ministers and a former Principal Secretary, as well as officers drawn from KeNHA, KURA, and KeRRA. Coordinated raids by Kenyan and Israeli detectives on SBI offices in February 2018 yielded seized documents, false invoices and a twenty-page notebook detailing transactions. The stain of that episode has never fully lifted from the institutional memory of Kenya’s roads agencies.

    The Kiambu Road Debacle and the Question of Foreign Contractor Preference

    One of the most legally contentious procurement episodes of Kimeli’s acting tenure unfolded in July 2025, when KeNHA published Tender Number KeNHA/2889/2025 for the capacity enhancement of the Pangani-Muthaiga-Kiambu-Ndumberi road, the busy B32 corridor linking Nairobi’s northern suburbs to Kiambu County.

    The notice attracted immediate controversy for a single, striking reason: it restricted eligible bidders exclusively to Chinese firms or consortia led by Chinese enterprises, citing financing arrangements with the China Export-Import Bank.

    Prospective applicants were required to demonstrate a minimum annual construction turnover of Sh32 billion over the preceding five years, a threshold that, combined with the nationality restriction, effectively closed the procurement to virtually the entire Kenyan construction industry.

    Stakeholders and legal observers reacted with alarm, arguing that limiting bidders to Chinese companies on a government procurement was a direct violation of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, which reserves preferential treatment for Kenyan firms.

    One week after publishing the notice, KeNHA silently revoked it through a second advertisement in the government’s official MyGov publication, without explanation. The agency did not respond to press inquiries.

    The abrupt reversal left the project in limbo and raised questions about who had approved the original notice, what instructions had been received from the Ministry, and whether the restriction was demanded by the Chinese financier or volunteered by KeNHA officials. Kimeli was acting Director-General at the time and was therefore the accounting officer on whose watch the controversial tender was issued and then withdrawn without public explanation.

    The affair drew parliamentary attention.

    The Senate mounted an inquiry into the agency’s use of exclusionary foreign tender restrictions on a project of national significance. Separately, a Kiambu County Assembly official who sought formal clarification from KeNHA was assured, through a letter, that the project would eventually be re-tendered under the Kenya Urban Roads Authority, an explanation that raised further questions about why KeNHA had originated the procurement for a project that fell within KURA’s jurisdiction.

    No formal accountability mechanism has since been triggered. Kimeli was confirmed as substantive Director-General without being required to publicly address the circumstances of the controversial tender or its unexplained withdrawal.

    An Auditor-General’s Graveyard: KeNHA’s Long Procurement Record

    To understand the gravity of the current allegations against Kimeli and the fragility of KeNHA’s institutional standing, one must reckon with the depth of the agency’s documented governance failures.

    The Office of the Auditor-General has for years produced reports that read less like routine financial reviews and more like indictments of a procurement system that operates with remarkable indifference to the law.

    Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu has, across successive reports, flagged KeNHA for missing board minutes, contracts awarded without supporting documentation, consultancy fees paid without underlying contracts, unexplained cost variances running into the billions, and payments made for services that cannot be independently verified.

    A forensic audit of the Mombasa-Mariakani highway project, presented to Parliament in 2024, exposed some of the most egregious examples.

    The audit found that KeNHA had implemented a project alternative that exceeded the cheapest feasible option by more than Sh5 billion without documenting any justification for the change.

    A difference of Sh9.7 billion between the project’s cost and its approved budget went unexplained. The National Land Commission was found to have irregularly paid public funds to acquire parcels of land that belonged to other state entities, including Kenya Power, KenGen, Kenya Revenue Authority and Kenya Railways. Board minutes for the project were absent.

    Multiple consultancy contracts, including those awarded to AECOM, SAI Consult and other firms, could not be supported by documentation. Missing exchequer and receipt vouchers worth Sh127 million were flagged in donor-funded accounts for the same project.

    Cost overruns across KeNHA’s project portfolio have been equally disturbing. An analysis of official Transport Ministry data tracking infrastructure spending between 2007 and 2017 identified at least 26 KeNHA projects that had exceeded their initial cost estimates, collectively overshooting their budgets by more than Sh20 billion.

    A single project, the rehabilitation of the Kakamega-Webuye Road, ran Sh1.3 billion over estimate.

    The Mwatate-Taveta Road, commissioned with fanfare during the Kenyatta era, cost Sh10.5 billion against an initial estimate of Sh9.55 billion.

    The Kisumu-Kakamega road was varied by 78.8 percent beyond its contract sum in violation of procurement law.

    Such variations, the auditor noted, effectively doubled the cost to the taxpayer while providing no corresponding accountability.

    The cumulative pending bills owed to road sector contractors at the time stood at Sh145 billion, representing a quarter of the government’s entire pending bill backlog.

    A March 2026 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on competition law and public procurement in Kenya lent international credibility to what domestic auditors had been documenting for years.

    The OECD found that while Kenya possessed sound legal frameworks against collusion and bid-rigging, enforcement was weak, penalties were rarely applied, and the oversight agencies responsible for monitoring procurement, most notably the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority and the Competition Authority of Kenya, operated in institutional silos with little coordination.

    Digital procurement systems that could flag suspicious bidding patterns in real time covered only a small fraction of public agencies.

    The consequences of this enforcement vacuum were described by the OECD as systemic and economically costly, with road infrastructure repeatedly identified as among the sectors most vulnerable to cartel activity.

    The Succession That Raised Its Own Questions

    Kimeli inherited the acting role under circumstances that were themselves unexplained. On 11 July 2025, his predecessor Eng. Kung’u Ndung’u resigned with immediate effect, on the very same day that the Director-General of the Kenya Rural Roads Authority, Eng. Philemon Kandie, also stepped down.

    The simultaneous resignation of the heads of two of Kenya’s three principal road agencies on a single day, without public explanation from either agency, was treated by observers as either a coordinated political manoeuvre or the consequence of pressure emanating from the political transitions of mid-2025.

    KeNHA’s Board accepted Ndung’u’s departure and appointed Kimeli in his place within hours, a speed of transition that suggested the succession had been anticipated.

    Ndung’u’s own tenure had not been without controversy.

    A petition was filed at the High Court in connection with allegations that his KeRRA counterpart Kandie had used state machinery to facilitate anti-government protests, and the broader wave of leadership exits was widely read as a political cleansing within the transport infrastructure bureaucracy.

    Into this environment Kimeli stepped, armed with credentials that were individually impressive, a First Class Honours degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Nairobi, an MBA from the same institution, 27 years across multiple roles in the road sector, and a 2025 award for contributions to the digitalisation of weighbridge operations.

    Whether credentials alone are sufficient armour against the institutional forces that have made KeNHA a byword for procurement opacity is the question that the current allegations are forcing into the open.

    Silence as a Policy: The Accountability Deficit

    The most troubling aspect of the controversy surrounding the current tender allegations is not the allegations themselves, which remain unverified and whose full details have not been placed before any formal investigative body, but rather the institutional posture they have provoked. KeNHA has not issued any statement.

    The Ministry of Roads and Transport has been silent. No parliamentary committee has publicly called for an explanation.

    The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, whose mandate expressly covers procurement irregularities in state agencies, has made no public pronouncements. This silence is itself a governance failure.

    KeNHA does maintain a public portal through which quarterly tender awards are published, a transparency mechanism that governance advocates have cautiously welcomed.

    But publication of tender awards is only meaningful if the process that produces those awards is itself subject to scrutiny. The Auditor-General’s repeated findings suggest that documentation, the evidentiary paper trail that procurement law requires, has been systematically absent or manipulated.

    An agency that can award contracts without supporting documentation, vary project costs by billions without board approval, and miss exchequer vouchers worth hundreds of millions in donor-funded accounts is not made more transparent by a public portal. The portal becomes, in that environment, a fig leaf.

    The Kenya Railways Corporation offers a cautionary parallel. In March 2026, reporting revealed that the corporation had awarded a Sh29.5 billion Nairobi Railway City Central Station contract to China Road and Bridge Corporation despite a lower competing bid, only for the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board to nullify the award after finding that CRBC had improperly submitted its technical and financial proposals in a single envelope.

    Kenya Railways then re-awarded the same tender to the same disqualified bidder, triggering a second appeal and prompting reports that representatives of the competing firm had been detained and deported.

    The episode illustrated precisely the culture that the OECD report had warned against: oversight institutions acting, but accounting officers treating their decisions as negotiable inconveniences.

    Billions at Stake and a Test of Institutional Character

    The stakes at KeNHA are not abstract. The agency has secured Sh77 billion in funding to revive stalled projects, including the Sh85 billion Isiolo-Mandera highway, a strategic corridor whose completion has been deferred across multiple administrations. In late 2025, KeNHA also accessed a Sh389.1 billion World Bank grant for rural roads across nine counties.

    The government has separately allocated Sh175.6 billion for road construction and rehabilitation in the 2025-26 financial year and has committed to investing Sh394 billion over the next five years in highway construction and rehabilitation. Kimeli is the accounting officer for all of it.

    The decisions made at KeNHA over his tenure will shape Kenya’s road network for a generation and will also determine how much of that public money survives the procurement process intact.

    For an agency trusted with funds of this magnitude, the allegations now in circulation cannot be allowed to fester in an accountability vacuum. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority possesses the mandate to investigate complaints about procurement irregularities in public bodies.

    The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has jurisdiction over conduct that constitutes corrupt practice in state institutions.

    Parliament’s relevant committees have the power to summon accounting officers and demand documentation. What has been conspicuously absent in the weeks since the allegations surfaced is any indication that any of these mechanisms is being engaged. Accountability in Kenya’s roads sector has historically moved only when institutional pressure made inaction politically costly. That pressure has not yet been applied.

    Kimeli personally has taken no public position on the tender allegations and has not addressed the circumstances of his contempt conviction in the context of his permanent appointment.

    He was, at the time of going to press, instead conducting site visits alongside KeNHA Board Chair Winfrida Ngumi as part of what the agency described as efforts to accelerate road development. The optics of senior leadership on site tours while procurement allegations circulate unaddressed will not escape observers who have watched this agency manage its public relations through activity rather than accountability.

    The broader Kenya governance context in which Kimeli’s appointment sits is one defined by the Auditor-General’s own words, repeated in her latest public briefing in early 2026: year after year, we continue to flag the same issues, weak procurement systems, unsupported expenditures, and lack of accountability.

    The roads sector has been a reliable entry in that catalogue of recurring failure. Whether Kimeli’s tenure at KeNHA will represent a departure from that record or an extension of it is the question that the current moment is asking.

    The answer will not emerge from a press release or a site visit. It will emerge from whether the men and women with oversight authority over this agency choose, this time, to exercise it.

  • Mombasa Lawyer On Radar Over Scandalous Garbage Collection Deal

    Mombasa Lawyer On Radar Over Scandalous Garbage Collection Deal

    A Mombasa-based lawyer has been thrust into the centre of one of Kenya’s most explosive procurement controversies after her name appeared on the incorporation documents of a local shell company engineered to capture a multibillion-shilling Nairobi garbage contract, in a saga that has already claimed the life of a senior City Hall official at the departure terminal of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, triggered a High Court conservatory order, prompted a parallel investigation by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and drawn comparisons to the very country from which the Ghanaian waste firm at the heart of the deal has been effectively expelled.

    Heeral Vishal Soni, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya operating out of Mombasa and listed as a partner at Soni and Associates Advocates LLP, is the sole Kenyan director in Zoomlion Waste Services Limited, a company incorporated on August 23, 2025 in which Zoomlion Ghana Limited holds all the shares.

    The two Ghanaian principals behind the venture are Joseph Kwame Siaw Agyepong, the flamboyant executive chairman of the Jospong Group of Companies and the man who built Zoomlion into a continental sanitation behemoth, and Said Haidar, a Ghanaian national who has travelled frequently with Soni in recent months.

    That Soni holds no shares, serving as a director without equity, has done nothing to quiet the questions swirling around her role in an arrangement that procurement experts say was structured from the inside out.

    The timing of Zoomlion Waste Services Limited’s birth in the Kenyan company registry is, on its own, damning. The entity was incorporated on August 23, 2025.

    The Nairobi City County government only advertised the tender it was destined to win on December 18, 2025, nearly four months later. Bids closed and were opened on January 8, 2026. Zoomlion Waste Services was the only entity to submit a response.

    In a project of this scale, complexity and projected duration involving the primary waste infrastructure of a capital city of more than six million people, a single bid is not a market outcome. It is an administrative outcome: the product of deliberate choices about how a tender is structured, timed and classified to guarantee a result already decided elsewhere.

    The contract, formally designated Tender No. NCC/ENV/RFP/100/2025-2026, grants Zoomlion Ghana Limited exclusive rights to design, construct, operate, maintain and eventually transfer to the county an integrated solid waste management system for Nairobi.

    Its scope takes in waste collection and haulage across the capital, control of the 76-acre Dandora dumpsite, sorting, recycling and disposal infrastructure, and the construction of a waste-to-energy facility that the national government has projected could generate electricity and produce fertiliser by 2027. Its duration was advertised as twenty-five years, a period that will outlast at least three gubernatorial terms and bind administrations not yet elected to financial obligations whose full terms have never been disclosed to the public.

    “A single bid in a project of this scale is not a market outcome. It is an administrative outcome: the product of deliberate choices about who was meant to win.”

    Procurement expert, speaking on condition of anonymity

    The notification of award was issued in United States dollars rather than Kenya shillings, an irregularity that alarmed Treasury officials who reviewed the agreement.

    No dedicated funding mechanism, no escrow arrangement, no clearly defined management fee schedule and no guaranteed minimum waste supply commitment appears in the contract as reviewed by City Hall’s own technical team.

    That team characterised the document in language that ought to have stopped the deal cold, warning that the absence of provisions addressing ISPO arrangements, escrow mechanisms, management fee schedules, minimum waste supply guarantees and dedicated funding sources exposed the project to serious operational and financial risk. City Hall signed it anyway.

    The procurement pathway chosen by the county government is itself a confession of irregular intent. By virtue of its financing, construction and long-term operational components, the contract falls squarely within the Public Private Partnership Act 2021 and should have been processed through the PPP Directorate under the National Treasury, a route that would have imposed independent technical review, public participation obligations and mandatory Attorney General approval before execution.

    Instead, the county ran it under the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2015, a statutory choice that stripped the deal of those safeguards and allowed a tender that should have attracted global competitors to be compressed into a window so short that only a company already incorporated in Kenya and already in conversation with City Hall could realistically respond.

    The tender document adds insult to that injury. It carries a clause stating the process is open to both local and international bidders while bearing none of the classification initials that legally designate a tender as an Open International Tender.

    In the absence of those designations, Kenyan companies were nominally eligible while the structural conditions of the process ensured that only a firm already positioned and incorporated in Kenya before the advertisement could realistically respond within the compressed window available. Zoomlion Waste Services Limited had been in existence for exactly that purpose since August.

    A DEATH AT THE DEPARTURE GATE

    It was on February 16, 2026, at 5:05 in the morning, that Charles Gathara, who had served for over a decade as a senior official in City Hall’s Water and Sanitation department and who had been appointed to chair the county’s tender evaluation committee for the Zoomlion project, arrived at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport at the head of a technical due diligence team bound for Accra.

    The mission, shrouded in the kind of secrecy that had defined the entire procurement, was to tour Zoomlion’s operations in Ghana and return satisfied that the company they had already awarded the contract to was capable of delivering on it.

    That sequence, due diligence conducted after contract award rather than before it, is the procedural equivalent of buying a house and only then inspecting the foundations.

    An aviation workers’ strike grounded the airport. Gathara and his colleagues waited. Sources with knowledge of the internal dynamics at City Hall told Kenya Insights that Gathara had, in the weeks preceding the trip, raised objections to aspects of the deal that his colleagues were unwilling to discuss openly and that those objections had placed him in sharp conflict with figures whose financial interests in the contract’s smooth progress were considerable.

    The Weekly Citizen, which first reported details of the incident, stated that Gathara had specifically differed with Soni over questions relating to kickbacks associated with the procurement. Then, while waiting for the strike to resolve, Gathara collapsed. He was pronounced dead at the airport.

    His colleagues departed without him. Kenya Airways flight KQ508, a Boeing 737-86N, eventually lifted off at 8:53 in the evening after a delay of more than fifteen hours.

    A Zoomlion protocol team had been waiting in Accra since early morning. The delegation spent three days at the company’s facilities, touring sites and receiving a presentation prepared by the very contractor whose capacity they were supposed to be independently verifying.

    Walter Omwenga, the deputy director for environment and final disposal who was among those who made the trip, would later confirm to journalists that the exercise involved physically inspecting what a bidder had claimed it could do, without explaining why that verification was happening after the contract had been signed rather than before. Gathara was buried on February 27, 2026 at his family home in Gathoni, Embu. He was 55.

    The decision to proceed with the Ghana trip on the day of Gathara’s death, without pausing to investigate the circumstances of his collapse or to question the propriety of an exercise that was already ethically compromised, has drawn quiet condemnation from governance advocates and procurement law practitioners who reviewed the episode at Kenya Insights’s request. One senior advocate, speaking without attribution, described the optics as extraordinary even by the standards of Kenyan county procurement, which are not known for their exacting ethical rigour.

    PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR AND A GHANAIAN TYCOON

    The fingerprints of the national government are visible throughout a transaction that City Hall has presented as a routine county procurement.

    On August 13, 2025, at the Devolution Conference in Homa Bay, the Jospong Group of Companies was allocated a stand at the exhibition grounds, which President William Ruto visited on the opening day.

    The President subsequently praised Zoomlion for its waste management model and told Kenyans that his administration was working with Nairobi Governor Johnson Sakaja to resolve the capital’s garbage crisis.

    Ten days later, Zoomlion Waste Services Limited was incorporated in Nairobi with Soni as its Kenyan director. The tender was advertised four months after that. In a January 20, 2026 address in Nairobi, Ruto confirmed that the national government had been party to the procurement process. The deal, in other words, was State House before it was City Hall.

    What was kept from Nairobians is what the President and the Governor already knew: that the company they were endorsing had, by the time of their public enthusiasm for it, accumulated a record in its home country that Ghana’s own new government found sufficiently alarming to terminate their relationship with it entirely. In June 2025, President John Mahama of Ghana cancelled Zoomlion’s long-standing contract with the Youth Employment Agency over transparency concerns and fairness failures affecting thousands of low-paid street cleaners. Mahama directed that all payments to Zoomlion made after the contract’s expiration would undergo a thorough audit.

    Civil society in Ghana had spent years documenting what critics described as a monopoly over public sanitation built on political connections and procurement structures that crowded out competitors.

    The Jospong Group and Zoomlion had previously been blacklisted by the World Bank over integrity concerns. None of that history appeared to trouble the administration that was simultaneously rolling out the red carpet for the same firm in Nairobi.

    MOMBASA ALREADY BURNING

    The Nairobi scandal did not arrive in a vacuum. Mombasa County had already walked the same road, and the results were no less troubling. Governor Abdulswamad Shariff Nassir signed a 35-year waste management contract with Zoomlion valued at Sh17 billion, a sum that amounts to roughly 131 million United States dollars, in circumstances that civil society organisations on the coast described as a procurement conducted entirely in darkness, without public participation and without transparency on the terms binding Mombasa residents for a generation.

    The Centre for Litigation Trust, a Mombasa-based civil rights group, sued the county government and obtained a court order demanding disclosure. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in Mombasa subsequently opened an investigation into the contract, a probe that remains active.

    It is in the context of that Mombasa contract that Soni’s presence becomes still more significant.

    As the sole Kenyan director of the vehicle through which Zoomlion has sought to embed itself in both of Kenya’s most populous county jurisdictions, she sits at the intersection of two procurement controversies, both involving the same Ghanaian principals, both under judicial and anti-corruption scrutiny, and both structured in ways that excluded competitive participation and public oversight.

    Whether she played a facilitative legal role, a commercial intermediary role or something still more substantive is a question that investigators at the EACC in Mombasa are now formally examining.

    COURTS STEP IN WHERE OVERSIGHT FAILED

    On March 5, 2026, Justice Moses Ado of the Milimani Commercial and Tax Division issued a conservatory order barring the Nairobi county government, its environment chief officer, its director of supply chain management and the county secretary from executing or implementing the Zoomlion contract pending the hearing and determination of a petition challenging the deal.

    The order was obtained on an application filed by Jeremy Emilio, who argued that the award was illegal and unconstitutional on multiple grounds, including the absence of the Attorney General’s approval, which is legally required for any contract of this nature and value.

    The High Court has since extended those orders, with the matter now scheduled for further directions on April 27, 2026.

    The petition also raises concerns about the Sh350 million bank guarantee submitted by Zoomlion as part of the tender process, which Emilio argues is disproportionately low relative to the scale and projected value of a contract that, across its twenty-five year tenure, is expected to run to billions of shillings.

    That figure is consistent with a tender document that, as advertised, specified no price at all: a blank financial cheque drawn on the residents of Nairobi and endorsed by an administration that appears to have decided on the contractor before the advertisement was written.

    The petition further argues that at least two local companies are currently executing waste management contracts in Nairobi under earlier tenders: one for the supply of heavy equipment at Dandora, another for solid waste collection in Kibra constituency.

    Some of those contractors had already encountered delays in receiving county payments at the time the Zoomlion concession was awarded, an irony that captures something essential about how Nairobi’s governance actually works: local firms, including those with political backing, were left chasing county invoices while the county assembled a quarter-century monopoly for a foreign company its own technical team had not yet verified could do the job.

    Adding yet another layer to what has already become a juridical and reputational catastrophe for Governor Sakaja, the Environment and Land Court separately ordered Nairobi County to clear all illegally dumped trash at Umoja residential estate and enforce waste segregation compliance within 135 days, a judicial rebuke of a county government that awarded a generation-long garbage contract to a single foreign bidder while failing to collect the rubbish from its own residential estates.

    DANDORA: THE PRIZE BENEATH THE RUBBISH

    Understanding what Zoomlion has been handed requires understanding what Dandora actually is.

    The 76-acre site at the eastern edge of Nairobi has operated as the capital’s primary waste disposal facility for decades, absorbing the refuse of one of the fastest-growing urban populations in Africa in conditions that courts have now twice found to constitute a violation of constitutional rights.

    In February 2026, the Environment and Land Court awarded Sh25.8 million in damages to 1,032 waste pickers who suffered health violations through prolonged exposure to pollution at the site, holding Nairobi County and the National Environment Management Authority jointly responsible.

    The court’s findings established Dandora not merely as an environmental nuisance but as a site of systematic constitutional failure whose remediation carries an enormous financial and infrastructural obligation.

    It is control of that site, along with the revenue streams associated with waste collection across a metropolis of six million people, recycling operations, composting, and ultimately the generation of electricity from solid waste, that Zoomlion has secured through a contract structured, in the assessment of City Hall’s own technical reviewers, without any of the financial safeguards that would normally be required before a public authority surrenders control of a strategic infrastructure asset for a quarter century.

    The waste-to-energy component alone, if it performs as projected, would give Zoomlion effective control of a private power generation facility in Nairobi built on a site owned by the public and operated at public expense, for twenty-five years, with no guaranteed return mechanism to the county government identified anywhere in the contract.

    The conservatory order obtained by Emilio means that none of this can proceed while the courts examine whether any of it was legally possible in the first place.

    But the order has not resolved the deeper questions raised by the scandal: how a company was incorporated in Kenya four months before the tender it was going to win was advertised, why the official who objected to the procurement terms died at the airport on the day his colleagues left to validate those same terms, what role a Mombasa advocate with no disclosed financial stake in the arrangement has been playing in a deal that spans two county governments, two anti-corruption investigations and a conservatory order from the Commercial Court, and what President Ruto and Governor Sakaja knew, and when they knew it.

    Ghana spent years discovering what a Zoomlion contract with insufficient safeguards actually costs. Kenya appears determined to learn the same lesson the expensive way. The next court date is April 27. The accounting, when it comes, may take considerably longer.

  • THE BANK THAT BROKE THE TRUCKER: How NCBA’s Asset Financing Empire Is on Trial Before London’s Most Feared Arbitral Tribunal

    THE BANK THAT BROKE THE TRUCKER: How NCBA’s Asset Financing Empire Is on Trial Before London’s Most Feared Arbitral Tribunal

    There is a script that Kenya’s top-tier lenders have rehearsed for decades. Extend credit. Secure it with assets, debentures, and personal guarantees.

    Wait.

    And when the borrower stumbles, invoke the Insolvency Act with all the force of a sledgehammer. The script, however, appears to have hit a wall in the most expensive and embarrassing fashion possible for NCBA Bank Kenya PLC.

    The wall is a Sh88 billion arbitration claim filed before the London Court of International Arbitration, brought by the shareholders of Multiple Hauliers (EA) Limited, a logistics company that NCBA and its co-financier helped fund in 2017 and, the shareholders now allege, helped destroy.

    This is not a dispute about a rogue borrower who disappeared into the night with loan proceeds. It is, according to court papers, a claim that the bank and its co-lender Barak Fund SPC Limited, a Mauritius-registered offshore private credit vehicle, agreed to a syndicated facility to fund Multiple Hauliers’ fleet expansion and then failed to disburse the full agreed amount.

    That alleged shortfall, the claimants say, set off a liquidity cascade that pushed one of Kenya’s most storied road freight companies into financial ruin and eventual administration. The Sh88 billion claim, which dwarfs the Sh12.7 billion that NCBA says is owed to it, covers alleged lost business, disrupted contracts, and commercial damages stretching across nearly a decade of financial attrition.

    If the numbers alone do not concentrate the mind, the timing should. NCBA Group is on the cusp of the most consequential ownership transition in its history. South Africa’s Nedbank has made a formal offer to acquire approximately 66 percent of NCBA for roughly Sh113.7 billion, structured as 20 percent cash and 80 percent newly issued Nedbank shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Kenya’s Capital Markets Authority cleared the deal’s regulatory path in February 2026, granting Nedbank an exemption from mandatory full-offer obligations. Shareholders holding 77.54 percent of NCBA’s equity have committed irrevocable undertakings in support of the transaction, which is expected to close in the third quarter of 2026. The deal, in other words, is all but done. Against that backdrop, an Sh88 billion liability at the London Court of International Arbitration, scheduled for hearing in March 2027, is precisely the kind of disclosure that investors, both existing and incoming, may wish they had seen on the front page of every financial publication in East Africa.

    The Anatomy of a Collapsed Financing Deal

    The genesis of the dispute lies in a 2017 syndicated financing package that court papers describe as a combination of term loans and working capital lines from NIC Bank (which would later merge with CBA to become NCBA in 2019) and Barak Fund SPC Limited. The facility was secured by debentures over Multiple Hauliers’ assets and by personal and corporate guarantees from the company’s shareholders, principally MG Holdings Limited and individuals including Rajinder Singh Baryan, the Estate of Tarlochan Singh Heer, and Manvir Singh Baryan. The purpose was straightforward: fleet expansion and operational financing for one of Kenya’s oldest and largest road freight operators.

    Court papers indicate that Multiple Hauliers attempted to borrow Sh10.8 billion from a consortium of banks in 2017, including NIC Bank. The original consortium also included South Africa’s Standard Bank and its Kenyan subsidiary Stanbic Bank, a detail with a certain irony given that Stanbic is now the vehicle through which Standard Bank had earlier been eyeing NCBA itself. The web of institutional relationships in this case is not incidental. It is constitutive of the problem.

    The shareholders allege that the agreed facilities were never fully disbursed. Their claim, filed in London arbitration in 2024, asserts a breach of the financing commitments by both NCBA and Barak Fund. They say the funding shortfall did not merely inconvenience Multiple Hauliers. It strangled it. A logistics company that relies on fleet expansion financing must either expand or contract. The alleged failure to release agreed credit at the critical moment, they say, triggered the liquidity crisis that began the company’s long, painful descent. That descent lasted years. NCBA demanded immediate payment on March 19, 2021, upon the expiry of a standstill agreement that the bank and other participating lenders had signed in March 2020, agreeing to suspend enforcement action for a period of six months.

    The timing is worth examining. The standstill agreement, signed in March 2020, coincided with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple Hauliers was already in financial distress, having seen its business eroded in part by the Kenya government’s decision to shift cargo onto the Standard Gauge Railway’s commercial freight service. Logistics firms like Multiple Hauliers had registered significantly lower revenues since 2019 when the government launched the cargo wing of its Standard Gauge Railway business. The combination of a credit shortfall allegedly caused by the lenders, pandemic-era revenue collapse, and SGR competition created a perfect storm in which, the shareholders argue, the bank’s conduct was not merely a contributing factor but the precipitating cause of the company’s ruin.

    The firm’s failed bid to borrow Sh14.8 billion in 2017 left it unable to pay many of its debts, which spiralled into two insolvency petitions. By the time the dust settled on the immediate legal skirmishing, Multiple Hauliers was in administration, its fleet depreciating, its employees facing NSSF arrears, and its creditors, which numbered over fifteen institutions, jostling for position in an increasingly chaotic insolvency queue.

    The Administration Gambit: Enforcement as Strategy

    NCBA

    What makes the Multiple Hauliers case particularly illuminating as a study of NCBA’s enforcement playbook is the sequence of moves the bank made after the standstill agreement expired. Within months of the standstill lapsing, NCBA Bank placed Multiple Hauliers under administration on June 7, 2021, appointing Ernst & Young managers Anthony Makenzi Muthusi and Julius Mumo Ngonga to take over Multiple Hauliers’ affairs. The company fought back immediately. Two days later, Multiple Hauliers opposed the administrators and obtained court orders suspending the administration bid, filing an application seeking the revocation of the appointment of the administrators and a permanent injunction restraining them from advertising their appointment.

    The bank’s use of administration as an enforcement tool, rather than as a genuine rescue mechanism, is the core accusation that runs through the years of litigation that followed. The shareholders have consistently argued that NCBA’s objective was never the rehabilitation of Multiple Hauliers but the seizure of its assets at a moment when the company was most vulnerable. The bank’s own court papers lend some texture to this reading. In an affidavit sworn on behalf of NCBA, the bank stated that the proposed investor deal was a ruse that had been used by the company to continue delaying the completion of the administration of the company, and it set out a litany of extensions sought by the company to negotiate from October 2021 to June 2024. The bank, in other words, had grown impatient with a restructuring process that had dragged on for years while its security eroded.

    This is precisely the argument that borrowers in distress most fear from lenders of NCBA’s scale and legal resources. The bank’s position, reduced to its essentials, was: we are a secured creditor, our security is deteriorating, and we will use every statutory tool available to protect our exposure. There is nothing unlawful about that position on its face. The problem is what happens when a lender invokes those tools while simultaneously being the subject of an arbitration claim alleging that it caused the distress it is now seeking to resolve through enforcement.

    The High Court in October 2025 found that NCBA’s enforcement actions during the pendency of the London arbitration constituted a sufficient risk to the arbitral process to warrant a restraining order. The court barred the bank from appointing administrators or enforcing personal guarantees, warning that such steps could undermine the arbitral process and potentially destroy the company before liability was determined. The Court of Appeal subsequently suspended that restraint on the grounds that the bank’s assets were at risk of dissipation under the company’s current management, but the appellate court was careful to note that it was not resolving the underlying dispute. It directed that the appeal be heard on a priority basis and acknowledged that the substantive legal questions, including the critical question of whether a secured lender can use insolvency tools to override arbitration protections, remain fully live.

    NCBA’s Asset Finance Footprint: Power Built on Enforcement

    To understand why the Multiple Hauliers case is so significant, one must understand the scale and structure of NCBA’s asset financing operation. The bank has built one of Kenya’s largest asset-backed lending portfolios and markets its corporate asset financing as a defining competitive strength. Its own promotional materials describe the product as providing fleet financing, machinery and equipment loans, and operating leases with approval processes that can be completed in a single day. NCBA held vehicles valued at Sh56 billion as collateral from borrowers, while it held broader property security of Sh334 billion, representing 67 percent of its total Sh498 billion in security.

    The numbers make clear that asset enforcement is not a peripheral activity for this bank. It is a central pillar of its credit risk management. When a borrower defaults, the bank’s ability to repossess vehicles, machinery, and property and sell them under the statutory power of sale is the mechanism through which its capital ratios are protected. Kenya’s courts have generally been sympathetic to this position. In case after case, judges have upheld the bank’s right to repossess assets and exercise the statutory power of sale, even when borrowers raised questions about the accuracy of outstanding balances.

    In Aggarwal v NCBA Bank Kenya PLC, a case decided by the High Court in April 2024, a borrower who had paid over Sh87 million toward settlement of an outstanding facility and offered two properties in full and final settlement found himself facing auction proceedings when the bank resumed enforcement. The court noted that the loan had stood at Sh195,023,495 plus a dollar-denominated portion as at October 2023, and that NCBA had argued that the statutory notices had been properly served, satisfying the requirements for the exercise of the power of sale. The borrower lost.

    In Ndungu v NCBA Bank Kenya PLC, decided in March 2025, a borrower complained that the bank had unilaterally changed the conversion rate on a dollar-denominated loan when her salary currency changed, resulting in a higher outstanding balance than she expected. The bank proceeded to recover Sh759,461.95 directly from the plaintiff’s bank account in January and February 2024, which caused her to move her salary account to another bank to stop what she described as the bank raiding her finances, and the bank then threatened to report her to the Credit Reference Bureau. The court declined to grant an injunction, ruling that the value of the mortgaged property could be quantified and that any improper exercise of the power of sale could be compensated in damages. The borrower’s house remained at risk of auction.

    In NCBA Bank v Nyaata, a 2024 case at the High Court, a borrower raised the argument that NCBA had repossessed an asset during the pendency of a consent agreement on loan restructuring. The borrower stated that the bank’s action of instructing a repossession agent to repossess the subject motor vehicle during the pendency of the parties’ consent agreement on restructuring of the loan was ill-intended, and the borrower further alleged that an overpayment had been made on the loan facility. The pattern across these cases is remarkably consistent: a distressed borrower challenges the bank’s enforcement, raises questions about the accuracy of its accounts or the terms of its agreements, and finds the courts largely unmoved.

    The Multiple Hauliers case represents the mirror image of this pattern. For once, the borrower’s shareholders did not wait for NCBA to foreclose and then challenge in a Kenyan court where the institutional weight of a Tier One lender looms large. They took the fight to London, before an international tribunal where the playing field is genuinely level and where a Sh88 billion damages claim demands the same forensic scrutiny as any other commercial dispute, regardless of which party holds the debentures.

    The Ownership Transition: What Nedbank Is Buying Into

    The Multiple Hauliers arbitration does not exist in isolation from NCBA’s ownership story. That story has grown considerably more complicated in recent years. NCBA Group is primarily owned by the family of former Central Bank of Kenya Governor Philip Ndegwa, which, as of December 2024, had overtaken the Kenyatta family to become the largest shareholder. Through First Chartered Securities, the Ndegwa family holds a 14.44 percent stake in NCBA Group, amounting to Sh8 billion, after acquiring an additional 31.6 million shares. The Kenyatta family, through Enke Investments, retains a 13.2 percent stake, while D&M Management Services holds 11.54 percent. In December 2025, Muhoho Kenyatta, the son of the late President Jomo Kenyatta and brother of former President Uhuru Kenyatta, was appointed a Non-Executive Director, formalising the family’s renewed board presence at a bank they have been associated with since CBA’s era.

    The Nedbank transaction adds a further layer. Nedbank Group has secured a Kenyan regulatory waiver from the Capital Markets Authority that clears the way for its plan to acquire about 66 percent of NCBA Group, with the exemption granted on February 19, 2026, relieving the South African lender from the requirement to make a mandatory offer for 100 percent of NCBA shares. The transaction, expected to close in the third quarter of 2026, would make NCBA a subsidiary of the South African lender while the remaining 34 percent of its shares continue to trade on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Shareholders holding 77.54 percent of NCBA’s equity have committed irrevocable undertakings in support of the offer.

    Nedbank is not acquiring a blank slate. It is acquiring a bank that is the principal defendant in an Sh88 billion international arbitration, a bank with Sh56 billion in vehicle collateral and Sh334 billion in property security that it has shown itself willing and able to enforce with speed and aggression, and a bank whose asset financing portfolio has generated a paper trail of borrower grievances stretching from individual vehicle repossessions to the near-liquidation of one of Kenya’s oldest transport companies. Whether the South African lender has conducted due diligence on the full scope of that liability, and whether the arbitration claim is disclosed in the transaction documents with the prominence it deserves, are questions that minority shareholders left behind on the Nairobi Securities Exchange may wish to press at the next annual general meeting.

    What Every Borrower Should Know

    The Multiple Hauliers case offers lessons that extend far beyond the transport sector. They speak directly to any business that has entered, or is considering entering, a large asset-backed or syndicated financing arrangement with NCBA or any comparably aggressive lender.

    The first lesson is that a standstill agreement is not a ceasefire. NCBA and the other participating lenders signed a standstill deal in March 2020 agreeing to suspend enforcement action for six months, and then NCBA demanded immediate payment in March 2021 upon its expiry, and moved to appoint administrators within months. A standstill buys time. It does not change the fundamental dynamic of power between a secured lender and a distressed borrower.

    The second lesson is that the bank’s internal documentation and account statements should be subject to independent verification at every stage of a large loan relationship. The Ndungu case, the Aggarwal case, and the Nyaata case all share a common feature: borrowers who disputed the accuracy of the bank’s outstanding balance calculations and found those disputes treated as legally insufficient to restrain enforcement. In the Multiple Hauliers dispute, the shareholders take that grievance to its logical extreme: they allege not just that the bank miscalculated what was owed, but that the bank never disbursed what was agreed, and that the entire subsequent debt edifice rests on a foundation of alleged breach.

    The third lesson is structural. NCBA’s general terms and conditions, as revealed in Mbogo v NCBA Bank Kenya, contain a clause permitting the bank to terminate or vary its business relationship with the customer at any time upon notice, and to freeze any account without prior notice in a wide range of circumstances including, remarkably, circumstances where the bank has doubt for any reason, whether or not well founded, as to the person or persons entitled to operate the account. The General Terms and Conditions of NCBA Bank provide that the bank may at any time, upon notice to the customer, cancel credits which it has granted and require the repayment of outstanding debts resulting therefrom within such time as the bank may determine. That contractual asymmetry, standard across Kenyan banking but rarely examined in isolation, means that the bank retains near-unlimited discretion to alter the terms of engagement in its favour, subject only to the limits imposed by statute and case law.

    The fourth lesson is jurisdictional. The Multiple Hauliers shareholders’ decision to file their claim in London rather than Nairobi was not merely a tactical choice. It was a recognition that Kenyan courts, while increasingly sophisticated in commercial matters, operate within a context where institutional lenders carry structural advantages: deeper legal resources, greater familiarity with insolvency procedures, and an implicit presumption, visible in judgment after judgment, that secured creditors have rights that borrowers in default cannot easily override. The London Court of International Arbitration does not carry those assumptions. Before it, NCBA must answer the shareholders’ claim on its merits, with no home advantage.

    Conclusion: The Trial of a Business Model

    NCBA is not a rogue institution. It is a properly regulated, NSE-listed bank that has generated consistent profits for its shareholders, including two of Kenya’s most powerful business dynasties, and that is about to become a subsidiary of one of Southern Africa’s largest lenders. But the Multiple Hauliers case is a stress test of whether the bank’s asset financing model, built on aggressive security enforcement and the liberal use of insolvency tools, can withstand scrutiny before a forum that it cannot home-court.

    The arbitration hearing is fourteen months away. The Sh88 billion claim is not going anywhere. If the shareholders’ version of events withstands the scrutiny of an international tribunal, the implications for NCBA’s commercial reputation in the transport and logistics sector, and for the confidence of large syndicated borrowers more generally, will be severe. Every corporate borrower who has signed a syndicated loan agreement with NCBA, every business that has pledged its assets as security for a working capital facility, and every investor who is considering buying into the bank through the Nedbank transaction should read the particulars of this case with the attention it demands.

    The London arbitration is, in essence, the bill coming due for a model of lending that extracts maximum security, enforces it at maximum speed, and bets that the Kenyan courts will always see the matter from the lender’s side. The bet may be about to be tested before judges who have no interest in that outcome.

    The London Court of International Arbitration hearing in the Multiple Hauliers matter is scheduled for March 2027. Kenya Insights will continue to report on developments in this matter.

  • Raila Aide Drops Bombshell: Babu Owino Was Never Part Of ‘Jeshi Ya Baba’ Exit Plan

    Raila Aide Drops Bombshell: Babu Owino Was Never Part Of ‘Jeshi Ya Baba’ Exit Plan

    Dennis Onyango, the man who served as Raila Odinga’s press secretary and personal spokesman for decades, has fired a political grenade into the heart of the post-Raila succession battle, revealing in explosive detail that Embakasi East MP Babu Owino was never part of the late opposition chief’s carefully constructed exit strategy from the broad-based government arrangement with President William Ruto.

    Speaking on Citizen TV’s Monday Report on March 30, Onyango did not mince words.

    While confirming that Senate Minority Leader James Orengo and ODM Secretary-General Edwin Sifuna were deliberate fixtures in Raila’s contingency architecture, he drew a sharp, categorical line at the politician who has been loudest in claiming Baba’s mantle.

    “He never had Babu anywhere in his thinking. He thought he was going to be a trouble,” Onyango said of the Nairobi lawmaker who has publicly declared, “baada ya Baba ni Babu.”

    The disclosure strips Owino of an aura he has been cultivating since Raila’s death, one that positioned him alongside Sifuna and Orengo as the vanguard of the “Jeshi ya Baba” militant resistance.

    Onyango had earlier, in February, affirmed that Raila never named a preferred successor, trusting party institutions to determine who would emerge.  Monday’s interview went further, explicitly separating the wheat from the chaff.

    Onyango’s revelations build directly on disclosures made days earlier by Raila’s former legal advisor Paul Mwangi.

    Mwangi, speaking in an exclusive interview on Saturday, March 28, claimed that Raila deliberately positioned Nairobi Senator Edwin Sifuna as an “exit plan” while cooperating with President William Ruto, carefully structuring his political moves to ensure he was never boxed into a single corner. 

    Mwangi described the current ODM internal turmoil as a clash between two factions that have long coexisted within Raila’s orbit: a “political-diplomatic” wing and a “militant” wing, arguing that both sides legitimately reflect different aspects of his leadership style. 

    Raila, Mwangi insisted, would never engage in anything without an exit strategy. If things did not work out, or if there was a clash on the cooperative side, he would turn to the militant faction and rally them as a fallback. 

    Onyango on Monday confirmed that logic, then added the crucial asterisk that Mwangi had left hanging. Yes, Sifuna and Orengo were part of the plan. Babu was not. He was a liability calculation, not a strategic asset.

    The timing is devastating for Owino.

    In February, he had told a local TV station that Raila’s final message was that ODM must produce a presidential candidate and should not be fully in the broad-based government, presenting himself as the faithful interpreter of Baba’s vision.  He has also publicly declared his interest in the ODM party leadership.

    Onyango’s assessment now positions Owino as a man freelancing on a brand that its owner apparently never fully endorsed for him.

    The broader context in which these disclosures land is one of acute ODM crisis.

    Dr Oburu Oginga, who ascended to the party leadership following Raila’s death, has staked his authority on institutional consolidation, signalling he will not seek elective office in 2027 but will instead serve as a custodian of the movement. 

    That transition, however, has been anything but smooth. At the Linda Mwananchi faction’s parallel “People’s NDC” at Ufungamano House on March 27, Sifuna openly rejected serving under the new leadership structure, declaring he would not be “the SG of mediocrity” and telling Oburu to find his own Secretary-General. 

    Sifuna, who appeared to have accepted his fate after his ouster, drew a firm line against serving under what he called a new leadership lacking credibility, while honoring his tenure under Raila as the greatest privilege of his political life. 

    The Ufungamano meeting was briefly disrupted when police officers attempted to gain access to the venue, prompting Sifuna to appeal for calm and challenge the officers directly from the podium. 

    The layered disclosures illuminate, perhaps more vividly than any previous account, the architecture of Raila’s political genius.

    He maintained parallel power centres, ensured no single alliance left him without leverage, and ran a diplomatic track alongside a militant one.

    Both the pro-Ruto and anti-Ruto camps within ODM have claimed to represent Raila’s wishes, with outcomes likely to have far-reaching ramifications on the political landscape heading to 2027. 

    What Onyango has now clarified is that not everyone who claimed a seat at that table was actually invited.

    For Babu Owino, the revelation is more than a bruised ego moment.

    It lands as he positions himself as a credible Nairobi gubernatorial aspirant and potential ODM party leader, ambitions that depend substantially on the legitimacy that Raila’s posthumous endorsement, real or implied, confers.

    That endorsement, according to the man who knew Raila best, was never there.

    The question now roiling ODM’s corridors is who will inherit the militant faction’s street firepower, and whether Sifuna and Orengo, the two figures Raila actually trusted with his escape hatch, can harness that energy without the maestro who designed the trap.

  • The Invisible Hand in Your M-Pesa: How Safaricom Has Been Taking Money Kenyans Say They Never Owed

    The Invisible Hand in Your M-Pesa: How Safaricom Has Been Taking Money Kenyans Say They Never Owed

    Kenyans woke up last weekend poorer. Not because of a robbery, a failed business, or an economic shock. Poorer because their telecommunications provider, Safaricom PLC, had quietly reached into their M-Pesa wallets and extracted money for alleged Fuliza debts, some of which the affected customers insist they never incurred. By Monday morning, a single lawyer’s post on X had torn open a wound that goes far deeper than a billing glitch.

    Eric Muriuki, founding partner of MKA Law, is not easily rattled. But he was rattled. He published a screenshot of his exchange with Safaricom Care in which the company admitted it had, as a result of what it described as a “system issue,” failed to bill him accurately for Fuliza taken between February 26, 2026, and March 20, 2026. The “correction” came in the form of a KSh 60 deduction from his account without forewarning, without an itemised statement, and without consent. Muriuki’s response was blunt: “I don’t believe you. This is theft.” He declared, with a finality that resonated across the platform, that Kenyan money was not safe with Safaricom, calling out what he described as the company’s “klepto ways.”

    It should have ended there, as a single angry post from a lawyer. It did not. It became a flood.

    Writer and commentator Beatrice Wanjiru, known on X as @Wordslinger__, captured the broader alarm when she described the situation as “actually a huge scandal,” noting that Safaricom appeared to be arbitrarily deducting money from M-Pesa accounts in the name of unexplained Fuliza debts, with some customers claiming to have never activated Fuliza in the first place and others insisting they had long repaid any balances. Dozens of users replied with their own screenshots. The deductions ranged from KSh 27 to over KSh 1,300. The justification in each case was virtually identical: the same vague three-week window, the same absence of exact dates, the same take-it-or-leave-it tone.

    Screenshot

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    Screenshot

    One user reported being charged KSh 78 despite swearing they had not activated Fuliza. Another lost KSh 213. A third was hit twice in consecutive days. Several customers noted they received no SMS notification before the deduction, only a puzzling message after the fact that referenced a date range too broad to verify against any specific transaction. “They can’t even pinpoint the exact date,” one post read, capturing a frustration shared by hundreds.

    Safaricom’s official explanation, offered through customer care channels and later amplified by local media, is that a technical fault prevented the system from billing daily Fuliza fees between February 26 and March 20, 2026. A one-time catch-up adjustment was applied across all affected accounts simultaneously, and the company insisted that no further deductions would follow. “This one adjustment has been made to cover all, and there won’t be any further adjustments,” the company told at least one customer.

    But the explanation invites more questions than it answers. Why was the adjustment applied without notice? Why were no itemised statements provided? If the fault was purely in the billing cycle, how do customers who claim never to have activated Fuliza appear in the affected pool? And perhaps most damning: who audits the audit? Safaricom has not offered to publish aggregate figures on the total amount recovered through this exercise, the number of accounts touched, or the basis on which individual deduction amounts were calculated. For a company handling billions of shillings in daily transactions on behalf of over 30 million subscribers, this silence is its own indictment.

    This is not the first time. It will not be the last.

    The Fuliza scandal of March 2026 does not exist in isolation. It is the latest episode in a long-running pattern of Safaricom controversies touching on money, data, and the accountability deficit of a monopoly that has grown too large and too politically connected for ordinary Kenyans to effectively challenge.

    In February 2026, weeks before the latest deductions surfaced, Nairobi businesswoman Eunice Nganga filed a constitutional petition challenging Safaricom’s policy of automatically applying erroneous M-Pesa transfers to settle recipients’ Fuliza debts. Nganga had accidentally sent KSh 2,700 to the wrong mobile number in September 2024 and immediately initiated Safaricom’s standard reversal procedure. Safaricom refused, citing the unintended recipient’s outstanding Fuliza overdraft. The funds were automatically redirected to clear that debt without Nganga’s consent and without the recipient ever accessing or withdrawing the money. 

    Nganga’s central legal argument is that her contract with Safaricom does not extend to settling another customer’s debts using her funds, particularly where no valid transaction existed between her and the Fuliza debtor.  The case, assigned to Justice Lawrence Mugambi, was scheduled for mention on March 25, 2026. She is seeking a declaration that the policy is unconstitutional and unlawful, a refund of the KSh 2,700, broader restitution for other affected customers, and KSh 50 million in general and punitive damages.  It is a case of profound public interest. Many Kenyans have never heard of it.

    Before Nganga, there was a class-action suit that shook Safaricom’s boardroom in 2023. Three M-Pesa users, Gichuki Waigwa, Lucy Nzola, and Godfrey Okutoyi, sued Safaricom, Vodafone Group, the Central Bank of Kenya, and the Communications Authority of Kenya, alleging that the Fuliza overdraft facility illegally used money belonging to non-borrowing M-Pesa users and that Safaricom was effectively engaged in banking business without being licensed as a bank under the Banking Act.  They further claimed that the trust account into which M-Pesa funds were collected was a “sham trust,” and that Safaricom and M-Pesa Holding had commingled funds, resulting in Vodafone Group owing M-Pesa account holders KSh 305 billion.  The case, still winding through the courts, represents perhaps the most sweeping legal challenge to M-Pesa’s financial architecture.

    In September 2025, Safaricom was forced to temporarily suspend Fuliza following a technical disruption that halted repayment transactions. Customers were left uncertain about their loan status, with some worried that fees would accumulate unnoticed before normal billing resumed.  That fear, it turns out, was not unfounded. Five months later, Safaricom was telling customers that fees had indeed been accruing unseen in the background, and was now reclaiming them in bulk.

    Even Fuliza’s criminal underbelly has been documented. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations alleged that a syndicate of eight young men in Nakuru and Trans-Nzoia defrauded Safaricom of close to KSh 500 million by using fraudulently registered SIM cards to take Fuliza loans with no intention of repayment.  Over 123,000 new mobile numbers opted into Fuliza in a single month before being switched off or vacated, leaving no trace of the borrowers.  The scale of that fraud raises its own disturbing question: if the Fuliza system was penetrated so comprehensively by outside actors, what assurance do ordinary subscribers have that the billing infrastructure tracking their personal balances is accurate?

    Bonga Points, Vanishing in the Night

    As if the Fuliza scandal were not enough, the very same weekend it erupted, a second alarm was going off inside Safaricom’s ecosystem. On March 29, reports surfaced of Bonga Points being transferred to unknown recipients in a series of early-morning transactions, with message logs showing multiple redemptions occurring between 2 a.m. and 7 a.m., draining account balances without user authorisation. 

    Safaricom confirmed on Sunday, March 29, that it had detected irregularities involving unauthorised redemption of Bonga Points, indicating that some users may have had their points accessed without consent.  The timing of the Bonga fraud, arriving in the same news cycle as the Fuliza deductions scandal, is devastating for a company already under intense public scrutiny. Two separate incidents, both involving Safaricom customer value being removed from accounts without consent, surfacing within 48 hours.

    The Bonga Points story also carries its own deeper history of bad faith. In 2022, Safaricom attempted to expire Bonga Points accumulated before December 31, 2019, citing liabilities of KSh 4.5 billion sitting on its books. A High Court judge later quashed the move, ruling that Bonga Points, once awarded, become the customer’s property and Safaricom ceases to have any right over them.  The court’s declaration was unambiguous. That Safaricom attempted such a seizure in the first place, targeting KSh 4.5 billion in customer-owned value through a clause change, speaks to a corporate culture comfortable with taking from subscribers when the legal landscape appears permissive.

    A Company That Ignores Parliament

    What makes Safaricom’s accountability crisis truly remarkable is its apparent contempt for the oversight institutions meant to hold it in check. The Senate Standing Committee on Information, Communication and Technology had convened a meeting on March 17, 2026, specifically to hear from Safaricom’s Chief Executive Officer on matters of service delivery and data protection. Safaricom did not appear. 

    The committee had also sought to deliberate on a statement from Migori Senator Eddy Oketch regarding alleged breaches of confidential subscriber information by Safaricom. Senators warned that continued failure to honour parliamentary invitations may attract further action and expressed concern that the company’s absence undermines the oversight mandate on matters directly affecting millions of subscribers. 

    That snub sits within a broader pattern of parliamentary frustration. Senators have been trying for over a year to extract answers from Safaricom on data privacy. The central question is whether Safaricom shares subscriber data, including location information, with government agencies without customer consent.  Safaricom has denied doing so without court orders. But two former senior managers at the company were accused of harvesting personal data on 11.5 million subscribers, including names, ID numbers, phone contacts, betting histories, and geolocation data, and attempting to sell the trove to a sports betting firm.  At the time the court case was filed, Safaricom admitted it had been unable to access or delete the compromised data from the Google Drive where it had been stored. 

    In other words: the private information of nearly a quarter of Safaricom’s entire customer base was floating somewhere on the internet, and the company that collected it could not even reach it to delete it.

    The Economics of Micro-Theft

    Commentators on X this week raised the darkest arithmetic of the Fuliza billing scandal. If Safaricom deducted an average of KSh 100 from each of even one million accounts through this “adjustment,” that is KSh 100 million recovered without court order, without notice, and without the possibility of meaningful individual challenge. Few Kenyans will file a consumer complaint over KSh 60. Fewer still will sue. This is precisely why the amounts are small. The aggregate sum, however, is not.

    Safaricom’s Fuliza book is enormous. It disburses the equivalent of tens of millions of US dollars daily. Even fractional billing irregularities, applied across that base, generate material sums. The company has offered no aggregate disclosure of the total recovered through the March correction, no explanation of why the system failed to bill for three full weeks, and no independent audit. It has, instead, offered apologies.

    For millions of Kenyans, M-Pesa is not a convenience. It is the only financial infrastructure they have. Their rent, their children’s school fees, their hospital payments, their small business cash flows, all of it moves through Safaricom’s pipes. The question being asked on the streets of Nairobi and in the replies of thousands of X posts is the same one lawyers are now beginning to formalise into court papers: who gave Safaricom the right to help itself?

    What Must Happen

    The Communications Authority of Kenya has a mandate. The Office of the Data Protection Commissioner has teeth. The courts have, when pushed, sided with consumers. What is missing is the political will to push. Safaricom is part-owned by Telkom South Africa through Vodacom, is listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange, and its M-Pesa operations are so deeply embedded in Kenya’s financial architecture that destabilising the company is not an option anyone in authority wants to pursue. That very indispensability has become its greatest protection against accountability.

    But indispensability is not impunity. The Senate ICT Committee must compel Safaricom’s CEO to appear and answer, under oath if necessary, for the Fuliza billing collapse, the Bonga Points fraud, and the data protection failures. The Communications Authority must formally investigate whether the mass deductions of March 2026 comply with Section 83C of the Kenya Information and Communications Act. The Central Bank of Kenya, whose M-Pesa oversight role was explicitly criticised in the KSh 305 billion class-action suit, must explain what safeguards exist to prevent Safaricom from conducting bulk account adjustments outside the normal consumer consent framework.

    And every affected Kenyan, whether they lost KSh 27 or KSh 1,300, should file a formal complaint with the Communications Authority. The CA’s complaint registry is a public record. Volume is evidence. Evidence is leverage.

    For now, the most honest thing that can be said about Kenya’s relationship with Safaricom is this: millions of Kenyans trust it with their money, their identity, their location, and their communication. Safaricom, on the evidence accumulated across years of litigation, regulatory evasion, and parliamentary no-shows, has not earned that trust. It has merely inherited it, in the absence of any viable alternative.

    That is not a business model. That is a hostage situation.

    Kenya Insights will continue tracking the Fuliza deductions case, the Eunice Nganga constitutional petition, and the Senate ICT Committee proceedings. Affected subscribers are encouraged to document their deductions and file formal complaints with the Communications Authority of Kenya via their website or by calling 0800 221 772.

  • MONEY BAGS: How ODM Spent Sh40 Million on 3,000 Delegates in Nairobi’s NDC

    MONEY BAGS: How ODM Spent Sh40 Million on 3,000 Delegates in Nairobi’s NDC

    The Orange Democratic Movement has never been accused of doing things quietly. But the scale of extravagance at its Special National Delegates Convention at the ASK Jamhuri Grounds last Friday made even hardened political observers raise an eyebrow. A party currently locked in a bitter and public feud over money, legitimacy and leadership reportedly spent at least Sh40 million in a single day to put on the most ostentatious show of political force seen in Nairobi since the last general election.

    Three thousand delegates. Branded merchandise. Chartered buses. Catered meals served in shifts. Mobile money disbursements handled by a contracted firm. Security so tight that journalists were shepherded in and out of the venue on party buses. It was not a political convention so much as a carefully produced political spectacle, and every shilling of it was designed to send one message: ODM is still here, still powerful and, above all, still very much open for business.

    “The entire process is estimated to cost about Sh40 million,” a senior party official on the organising committee told The Star, speaking in confidence. “Posters, merchandise, food, transport, accommodation, everything that has gone into making the event a success is around that figure.”

    The money, according to party officials, was drawn from ODM’s accounts and disbursed through a structured system, with delegates receiving transport and sitting allowances via mobile money from a third-party firm. Delegates from within Nairobi collected approximately Sh5,000 each, while those making the journey from far-flung regions pocketed upwards of Sh20,000. Delegates from Kisumu, a four-hour drive away, received Sh9,000 per head. Across 3,000 delegates, that delegate facilitation alone runs into the tens of millions before a single crate of water is factored in.

    Nairobi County branch chairman George Aladwa confirmed that capital-based delegates received their dues without incident, a rare and notable achievement at large-scale political gatherings, where delayed payments have historically sparked chaos and stampedes. That the money flowed on time, through a single contracted firm, points to a level of financial management that ODM has not always been able to demonstrate. It also raises pointed questions about where, exactly, the money came from.

    The question of funding has become the most combustible issue in ODM’s savage internal war. Secretary General Edwin Sifuna, now removed from his position by a NEC resolution but still fighting through the courts, has repeatedly alleged that the Linda Ground faction’s rallies and gatherings have been bankrolled by “outsiders,” with some in his camp pointing directly at State House. Sifuna claimed in February that he, as a signatory to ODM’s accounts alongside National Treasurer Timothy Bosire, had not authorised any withdrawal sufficient to fund the string of Linda Ground rallies held across Kisumu, Kakamega, Busia and Kisii. “The money you see being spent in ODM rallies is not coming from ODM headquarters,” he said at the time. “There is parallel funding for activities clothed in ODM colours.”

    The allegations stung. ODM National Chairperson and Homa Bay Governor Gladys Wanga moved swiftly to douse the flames. She explained that the national treasurer’s signature is the only mandatory one required to release party funds and that six other signatories can co-authorise expenditure. “There is political party funding in this country, and ODM is entitled to the second largest share. We have money as a party,” she said. Oburu Oginga, now the ratified party leader following the death of his brother Raila Odinga in October 2025, denied that State House had any hand in ODM’s activities.

    But the questions have not gone away. The Political Parties Fund, administered by the National Treasury, is at the centre of a long-running legal dispute between ODM and the government. ODM claims it is owed Sh12.6 billion in accumulated, unpaid statutory party funding. That dispute has escalated to the point where the party’s Central Committee resolved last year to pursue execution proceedings against the Treasury. Yet on Friday, Sh40 million appeared to flow with seamless efficiency.

    “We haven’t received about Sh12 billion from the exchequer, but we get our quarterly shares, so we were able to fund the programme,” a senior official involved in organising Friday’s convention told The Star. The quarterly disbursements, officials insist, are sufficient to bankroll a convention of this magnitude. Independent analysts are less certain. Sh40 million is a substantial sum for a party that simultaneously claims financial persecution at the hands of the Treasury and faces the additional complication of a sitting secretary general who refuses to recognise the legitimacy of the NDC that authorised the expenditure.

    The convention itself unfolded against the backdrop of the most serious internal rupture in ODM’s 20-year history. While Oburu and his Linda Ground faction occupied the ASK Dome at Jamhuri Grounds, Sifuna led a parallel “People’s Convention” eight kilometres away at Ufungamano House, forcing his way through a police blockade with allies including Siaya Governor James Orengo, Vihiga Senator Godfrey Osotsi and Embakasi East MP Babu Owino. Anti-riot police had sealed off Ufungamano House early in the morning, turning away delegates and journalists before Sifuna’s contingent breached the cordon. The symbolism was hard to miss: two events, one party, and a police force whose deployment favoured one side over the other.

    Sifuna’s faction dismissed the Jamhuri convention as constitutionally illegitimate. He argued that only the secretary general, under the ODM constitution, can legally convene a National Delegates Conference and that the 21-day notice issued by his rival Catherine Omanyo, whom he does not recognise as acting secretary general, was therefore void. “Convention bandia,” was his verdict. His allies were more blunt. “Who said Oburu should be ODM’s party leader? Did you elect him?” Sifuna demanded, in a remark that landed heavily given that Oburu was installed, in Sifuna’s telling, even before Raila’s body had arrived back in Kenya from India.

    The Political Parties Disputes Tribunal declined to stop the convention. In its ruling on March 26, the tribunal struck out Sifuna’s petition on the procedural ground that he had not exhausted ODM’s internal dispute resolution mechanisms before approaching the tribunal. The ruling cleared the runway for Jamhuri. It did not resolve the underlying constitutional questions, which remain live and may yet find their way back to a higher forum.

    At Jamhuri, in the meantime, the theatre was spectacular. The convention ratified Oburu Oginga as substantive party leader, installed Kisii Governor Simba Arati and Mombasa Governor Abdulswamad Nassir as deputy party leaders, and removed Osotsi from his position as deputy leader. The delegates also ratified a National Executive Committee resolution under Article 87 of the ODM constitution, formally authorising the party to open coalition talks with President William Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance, a decision that represents ODM’s most dramatic strategic pivot since its founding.

    Junet Mohamed, the Suna East MP and Minority Leader in the National Assembly, struck a combative tone that drew roars from the crowd. “Anyone in this country who wants to negotiate with ODM, we will not negotiate on our parliamentary strength,” he declared, hinting heavily at a zoning arrangement for the 2027 elections. “Anywhere we have an MCA, MP, Senator, Governor, Woman Rep, it will remain with ODM. Don’t joke with ODM because if they are angered, they can cause problems.” The implicit threat was aimed at UDA, but it was loud enough to reach Sifuna at Ufungamano as well.

    Winnie Odinga, daughter of the late Raila and until recently an ally of Sifuna’s faction, chose to appear at Jamhuri, delivering a carefully worded speech that congratulated Oburu while pressing for youth inclusion and a more open party culture. Her presence was read as a significant political signal, a cautious swing toward the mainstream Oburu structure even as she continued to advocate for reforms from within. “When we talk about the new ODM, we want a party that opens doors, not closes them,” she said. Oburu responded with a conciliatory promise not to expel rebels, though he stopped well short of inviting Sifuna back to the table.

    Wanga, ratified as national chairperson, described the event as “inspiring, engaging, productive and historic,” a characterisation that her rivals at Ufungamano would contest every word of. The party’s organisational prowess on the day was genuine and, for ODM’s purposes, politically valuable. The buses ran on time. The mobile money transferred without drama. The delegates ate. The leadership was installed. The coalition mandate was secured. The event was, by any operational measure, a success.

    The harder test comes next. ODM now enters coalition talks with UDA carrying a fractured internal structure, a disputed secretary general, a Sh12.6 billion funding grievance against the government it is proposing to partner with, and questions about the provenance of the very money it spent to get here. Forty million shillings can buy a spectacular day. What it cannot buy, as ODM is about to discover, is a united party.

  • The Debt They Would Not Pay: How Standard Group Ducked Sh50 Million In Regulatory Fee For Years, Then Called It A Witch-Hunt

    The Debt They Would Not Pay: How Standard Group Ducked Sh50 Million In Regulatory Fee For Years, Then Called It A Witch-Hunt

    The Communications and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal delivered its ruling on Friday with the quiet efficiency of a court that had heard enough. It dismissed the appeal by Standard Group PLC without sentiment and without ambiguity, clearing the way for the Communications Authority of Kenya to revoke six broadcasting licences belonging to one of the country’s oldest media organisations. The affected properties are Radio Maisha, Spice FM, Vybez Radio, Berur FM, KTN Burudani and KTN News.

    The debt at the centre of this crisis is not a secret, nor is it disputed. Standard Group itself does not dispute it. What it disputes is the consequence, and it is that peculiar stance, paying nothing while contesting everything, that has brought the company to the edge of broadcasting oblivion.

    The outstanding amount as confirmed by the Communications Authority stands at Sh48,874,524.10, comprising Sh13,880,334.37 in licence fees and Sh34,994,189.73 in Universal Service Fund levies. These are not penalties, not fines, not punitive extractions. They are the basic regulatory cost of holding a broadcasting licence in Kenya, fees that every other station in the country is expected to remit annually as a condition of operating on the public airwaves.

    Standard Group has not paid them. Not for one year, not for two, but across multiple consecutive years. The CA began formal engagement with the media house as far back as June 2023. It held meetings in December 2023 and again in February 2024. It issued a Notice of Contravention on December 4, 2023, giving Standard 45 days to regularise its position. That notice lapsed on January 17, 2024, without payment. The Authority then issued formal Notices of Revocation in September 2024. Those too lapsed, on March 24, 2025, without the debt being cleared.

    At no point in this timeline spanning nearly three years did Standard Group settle the outstanding amount. At no point did it make a single regulatory payment toward the accumulated arrears. It is that stark, uncontested fact that the Tribunal found determinative.

    In its appeal, Standard Group leaned heavily on one argument: that it had entered into a settlement agreement with the Communications Authority on December 24, 2024, and that the Authority’s revocation notices therefore constituted a breach of that agreement.

    On its face, the claim has a surface plausibility. The media house says it made an initial payment of Sh10 million on December 27, 2024, with further payments contingent on the completion of a rights issue. It described this as honouring the terms of a negotiated plan.

    The Tribunal rejected this framing entirely. The revocation notices had been formally issued in September 2024, three full months before the claimed December agreement. The Tribunal held that regulatory obligations under the Kenya Information and Communications Act cannot be extinguished or overridden by a private arrangement arrived at after the enforcement process has already been formally commenced. Legitimate expectations, the Tribunal stated in terms, cannot override statutory duties.

    More damaging still is the CA’s account, which flatly contradicts Standard Group’s version of events. The Authority has consistently maintained that Standard Group never formally submitted a payment plan, despite being asked to do so. In its own statement released alongside the Tribunal’s ruling, Standard Group conceded this point with a candour that undermined its broader victim narrative.

    ‘We make no secret of the fact that no payments have been made to the CA toward the outstanding fees,’ the statement read. ‘The Authority has repeatedly asserted that we entered into a payment plan. We did not.’

    Read that again. The company spent months arguing before the Tribunal that the CA had breached an agreement. In the same breath, it acknowledged publicly that no payment plan was ever formalised. If there was no payment plan, there was nothing for the CA to breach. The Tribunal saw through this contradiction. So should the public.

    Standard Group’s central defence in the court of public opinion is that it cannot pay the CA because the government has not paid it. The media house claims the state owes it Sh1.2 billion in unpaid advertising fees, and that it is unconscionable to demand regulatory compliance from a creditor while withholding payment.

    This argument has emotional resonance. The relationship between Kenyan government advertising and media editorial independence is genuinely corrosive, and the practice of using advertising as a tool of political leverage has been documented across multiple media houses. The government does owe the media industry substantial sums.

    But the argument, however resonant emotionally, fails legally and practically. Regulatory fees and advertising receivables are entirely separate legal obligations. The CA does not owe Standard Group advertising money; the state does. The CA’s mandate is the enforcement of the Kenya Information and Communications Act, not the management of inter-governmental payment schedules. Telling the regulator to wait until the Treasury pays is like telling a landlord that rent will come when a different tenant pays a different bill. The Tribunal made this separation explicit.

    What Standard Group’s leadership has been less eager to discuss is the full picture of the company’s financial condition, which extends well beyond government advertising delays. The group’s audited results for the year ended December 31, 2024, make grim reading. Revenue collapsed by 23 percent to Sh1.8 billion, down from Sh2.4 billion the previous year. The loss before tax ballooned to Sh1.1 billion, up from Sh723 million in 2023. Total assets shrank to Sh3.84 billion while the company’s equity position turned deeply negative, standing at negative Sh2.22 billion.

    The company has been loss-making every year since 2019, when it posted a Sh484 million loss after launching Spice FM, Vybez Radio and KTN Burudani, the very stations now facing revocation. It recorded losses through the pandemic years, losses through the economic recovery, and ever-deepening losses in 2023 and 2024. A Sh1.5 billion rights issue has been mooted to rescue the balance sheet, but as of this writing it remains unrealised, its proceeds still theoretical.

    In this context, the non-payment of Sh48.9 million in regulatory fees is not a political choice or an act of resistance. It is the consequence of a company that is structurally insolvent, spending Sh2.9 billion while earning Sh1.8 billion, and unable to meet obligations to creditors, employees and regulators simultaneously.

    Standard Group is not a neutral corporate entity. It is a media house with a controlling ownership structure deeply embedded in Kenyan political dynasties. S.N.G Holdings Limited, believed to be associated with the Moi family and their associates, holds approximately 69 percent of the company. Trade World Kenya Limited holds a further 10.9 percent and Miller Trustees Limited holds 10.53 percent, both widely understood to be connected to the same network.

    The late President Daniel arap Moi’s family, now led by former Senator Gideon Moi, has been the dominant force in Standard Group since the Moi-era buyout of the newspaper from Lonrho in 1995. When President Uhuru Kenyatta’s associates attempted to acquire Standard Group in the years before 2020, negotiations reportedly collapsed after Gideon Moi demanded a premium price and declined to relinquish editorial control. He reportedly told associates that the Standard was not a business asset but a political one.

    Gideon Moi backed Raila Odinga’s presidential bid against William Ruto in the 2022 election. Ruto won. The political arithmetic of the present confrontation is therefore not invisible. A media house controlled by the Moi family, which supported the losing candidate, is now facing regulatory action from an authority operating under a government led by the man who beat that candidate.

    None of this context excuses the non-payment of regulatory fees. But it is the context within which Standard Group’s political vendetta claim must be assessed. There is a legitimate concern that enforcement actions in Kenya’s media sector are selectively applied and politically timed. There is also a documented pattern of the CA revoking licences across the industry, having moved against 75 broadcasters in 2024 and more than 42 television stations in 2025 for various compliance failures. The regulator’s actions against Standard Group sit within that broader enforcement pattern, though the political backdrop cannot be entirely dismissed.

    Standard Group has presented itself throughout this crisis as a fearless truth-teller being punished for exposing government wrongdoing. Acting Chief Executive Editor Chaacha Mwita has spoken of the company’s commitment to journalism and its refusal to be silenced. These are noble words, and the protection of press freedom in Kenya is a cause that deserves vigorous defence.

    The difficulty is that Standard Group’s editorial record in the period leading up to this crisis does not entirely support the self-portrait of a rigorous, independent watchdog operating to unimpeachable professional standards.

    The Media Council of Kenya raised documented concerns about the Abducted headline the publication ran concerning Cabinet Secretary Raphael Tuju during the coverage of his property dispute. The headline was later challenged as factually inaccurate, a significant editorial failing for a media house claiming the mantle of truth-telling. Tuju himself was a former news anchor at KTN, the very station whose licence now faces cancellation, an irony that has been little remarked upon in Standard’s own coverage of its predicament.

    The Media Council also raised concerns about systemic sensationalism prioritised over factual verification and about the media house’s alleged refusal to extend the right of reply in certain stories. These are not trivial editorial complaints. They go to the heart of whether a media organisation deserves the public trust it is now mobilising in its defence.

    Standard Group has announced its intention to pursue the matter in the High Court, citing Section 102G of the Kenya Information and Communications Act, which it argues requires automatic preservation of the status quo upon the filing of an appeal. The media house has warned the CA that any gazettement of the revocation notices will be met with immediate contempt proceedings.

    Whether the High Court will grant emergency relief remains to be seen. The Tribunal’s ruling was unambiguous: the revocation was lawful, valid and procedurally fair. The CA followed due process at every step, issuing contravention notices, holding multiple meetings, granting extensions and concessions, and issuing formal revocation notices only after all those steps had been exhausted. The Tribunal awarded costs to the CA, a further signal of how comprehensively Standard Group’s appeal failed on the merits.

    A High Court appeal would need to identify a constitutional question, a question of law or a specific procedural error in the Tribunal’s process. Relitigating the factual findings, including the undisputed existence of the debt and the undisputed history of non-payment, is not an available ground. Standard Group’s legal team will need to construct a narrower and more technically precise argument than the politically charged narrative the company has deployed in its public communications.

    The stakes of this case extend beyond Standard Group. Kenya’s broadcasting landscape is already thin. The potential shutdown of KTN News, Radio Maisha and Spice FM would represent a significant contraction in media plurality at a moment when the country needs more independent voices, not fewer. Hundreds of journalists employed across these platforms face unemployment if the licences are formally revoked.

    These are real human consequences, and they deserve to be named. But they are consequences that flow from years of financial mismanagement, structural losses and the repeated failure to meet basic regulatory obligations. The CA did not create this crisis. It gave Standard Group nearly three years of notices, meetings, extensions and opportunities to regularise its position. The media house used that time to accumulate more losses, launch a rights issue it has not completed and pay itself a legal defence.

    The remedy, as Mwita himself articulated, is theoretically simple. The government should pay Standard Group what it owes. Standard Group should pay the CA what it owes. But Standard Group has had since at least 2023 to begin partial payments, to demonstrate good faith, to submit a formalised repayment schedule with guaranteed tranches. It did none of these things with sufficient rigour to satisfy the regulator or the Tribunal.

    Crying political vendetta is the oldest play in the Kenyan media governance book. Sometimes it is entirely warranted. Sometimes it is a shield behind which genuine institutional failure seeks cover. In Standard Group’s case, it appears to be both things at once, which is precisely what makes this story so difficult and so important to tell honestly.

    The media house may yet win in the High Court. It may yet secure the injunction and the breathing room to restructure its finances and resume payments. But it will not be able to claim, not with the tribunal’s ruling on the record, that it was brought to this point by anything other than its own choices.