On the morning of 27 March 2026, Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel sat in the Undersecretary’s chair at South Sudan’s Ministry of Petroleum in Juba for what would prove to be his last hours in office.
A presidential decree signed by Minister of Presidential Affairs Africano Mande Gedima was already in motion, naming Dr. Santino Ayuel Longar as his replacement under Republican Decree No. 108/2026.
Before clearing his desk, Dr. Chol signed two of the most consequential letters of his turbulent tenure: allocation awards granting South Sudan’s sovereign crude oil to Chiang Wei LLC FZ and Euro American International Energy, the two trading companies that have quietly dominated Juba’s oil corridor for years.
What happened next, across a span of eight days and three conflicting allocation letters for the very same cargo, is one of the most brazen acts of resource capture ever documented against an African state.
Kenya Insights has reviewed internal South Sudanese Ministry of Petroleum documents, official allocation award letters, compliance reports, shipping schedules, United States Department of Justice civil forfeiture complaints and United Kingdom High Court judgments to piece together a story that goes far beyond oil trading corruption.
It reaches into the financial architecture of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, touches a sanctioned network dismantled by American prosecutors and implicates officials who have been recycled through the petroleum ministry with the regularity of a cargo loading window.
Within eight days, the same 600,000-barrel cargo was allocated three times to two different companies. South Sudan was paid at $70 a barrel while the oil was worth $100 on the open market.
THE LAST-MINUTE LETTERS
Reference number RSS/MoP/J/O/U/3/26/262, dated 27 March 2026, bears the official seal of the Republic of South Sudan and the signature of Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel.
The letter is addressed to Mr. Choul Laam, Managing Director of Chiang Wei LLC FZ. Its subject line reads: Nile Blend Final Award Letter for April 2026 Cargo to Chiang Wei LLC FZ. The cargo: 600,000 barrels of Nile Blend crude, loading window 30 April to 2 May 2026.
The stated pricing basis: dated Brent average of the month of loading at a discount, described as the tender discount average of first two bids.
Buried in the body of the letter is the sentence that makes the allocation extraordinary: Chiang Wei LLC FZ has already advanced $60,000,000 (Sixty Million United States Dollars) against the estimated value of this April 2026 cargo.
On the same date, reference number RSS/MOP/J/O/U/3/26/251, Dr. Chol signed an equivalent award letter addressed to Mr. Taha, Managing Director of Euro American International Energy, Dubai, UAE.
Its subject: Dar Blend Final Award Letter for April 2026 Cargo to Euro American International Energy DMCC. Another 600,000 barrels, loading window 29 to 30 April 2026.
Two cargoes worth a combined $120 million at then-prevailing market prices, committed in the final hours of an outgoing official’s mandate to two companies that have been at the center of South Sudan’s most contested oil dealings for years.
This was not an isolated exercise of last-minute authority.
Internal shipping schedules reviewed by Kenya Insights show a pattern stretching back through 2025 in which RSS-designated cargoes consistently flowed to Cathay Petroleum, BGN, Wellbred and the Chiang Wei and Euro American network on dates that correspond to administrative transitions.
Officials cycle through the Petroleum Ministry’s undersecretary role with bewildering frequency: Dr. Chol himself has been appointed, dismissed, reassigned and reinstated more than ten times in twelve years, a churning that governance analysts in Juba describe as a system deliberately designed to prevent institutional memory while allowing connected intermediaries to operate continuously across every change of personnel.
THE CARGO THAT CHANGED HANDS THREE TIMES
The Dar Blend April 2026 cargo allocated to Euro American International Energy on 27 March became the site of an administrative collision that reveals the entire mechanism of capture.
Four days after Dr. Chol signed his award to Euro American’s managing director Idris Taha, his successor Dr. Santino Ayuel Longar issued his own letter. Reference RSS/MOP/J/O/U/31/03/101, dated 31 March 2026, is addressed to Mr. Ken Mugambi, Group CEO of Trinity Energy Limited, Juba, and copies in the African Export Import Bank, Afreximbank. Its subject: Dar Blend Final Award Letter for April 2026 Cargo to Trinity Energy Limited.
The cargo awarded to Trinity was identical: 600,000 barrels of Dar Blend, loading 29 to 30 April 2026.
The incoming Undersecretary directed that all proceeds from the cargo’s sale be retained by Afreximbank and applied to the Government of South Sudan’s financing obligations.
The legal basis for the reassignment was a Ministry of Finance and Planning letter, reference RSS/MOFP/J/VSF/03/2026-27 dated 31 March 2026, and an existing Petroleum Allocation letter reference RSS/MOP/J/U/O/12/25/086 dated 23 December 2025, suggesting the Trinity arrangement was rooted in a pre-existing commitment that pre-dated Dr. Chol’s tenure entirely.
Then, on 3 April 2026, a third document surfaced.
A further allocation letter, attributed the same 600,000-barrel loading window once more to Euro American International Energy DMCC, this time with authority for Euro American to retain the proceeds for application to government financing obligations.
Idris Taha’s company had vanished and reappeared across three documents in eight days, each claiming legal authority over the identical cargo.
Whether one cargo or multiple overlapping claims, the result was the same: competing entitlements, legal uncertainty and the opening for a connected intermediary to assert control regardless of which document a shipper chose to honour.
Idris Taha’s Euro American International Energy vanished and reappeared across three documents in eight days, each claiming legal authority over the identical cargo.
THE PRICE THAT ROBBED SOUTH SUDAN OF $24 MILLION
The allocation letters are silent on the most devastating detail.
Internal documents reviewed by Kenya Insights indicate that at least one cargo lifted in March 2026 was priced against February benchmark levels, when dated Brent crude traded in the range of $70 to $72 per barrel.
The timing was catastrophic for South Sudan’s treasury and enormously profitable for the intermediary that held the pricing option.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme.
The geopolitical shock that followed sent global oil prices into the sharpest single-month surge in recorded history, according to the International Energy Agency’s April 2026 Oil Market Report.
With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed and more than 20 million barrels per day of regional crude disrupted, benchmark prices soared to between $100 and $110 per barrel through March and into April.
The IEA described the March price movement as oil’s largest-ever monthly gain.
For South Sudan, the arithmetic is brutal.
A cargo of 600,000 barrels priced at February’s $70 benchmark generates approximately $42 million in gross revenue.
The same cargo lifted in late March or April, priced at market, would have been worth between $60 million and $66 million.
The differential: $18 million at the low end, $24 million at the top.
That is the sum that did not reach South Sudan’s government on a single shipment, captured instead by whichever intermediary held the contractual right to apply the earlier, lower pricing formula.
On a state whose oil revenues represent 85 to 90 percent of government income, and whose civil servants face persistent delays in salary payments, $24 million is not an accounting rounding error. It is the monthly wages of tens of thousands of public workers.
CHIANG WEI, WELLBRED AND THE TEHRAN CONNECTION
The Chiang Wei LLC FZ that received the Nile Blend allocation letter on 27 March 2026 is not simply an obscure Dubai-registered free zone company.
A compliance report dated 9 March 2026, reviewed by Kenya Insights, identifies WellBred Trading DMCC as the financial backer of Chiang Wei LLC FZ’s oil cargo operations in South Sudan.
The report flags RMB-denominated transactions between Chiang Wei and Shandong Hi-Speed Group in connection with oil lifting operations, and identifies potential financial links to networks associated with sanctioned Iranian oil.
WellBred Trading DMCC is, at this moment, the subject of United States Department of Justice civil forfeiture proceedings.
Case number 1:26-cv-00802, filed in March 2026, seeks to seize $12,973,529 that US prosecutors allege was intended for WellBred Capital Pte Ltd and its subsidiary WellBred Trading DMCC.
The complaint names Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, as the operator of what investigators describe as the Shamkhani Network: a sprawling apparatus of front companies, shell entities and shipping firms designed to move sanctioned Iranian crude onto world markets in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Shamkhani was killed in the American-Israeli strikes on Tehran on 28 February 2026.
According to the DOJ complaint, Shamkhani maintained internal organisational charts showing WellBred’s precise position within the Shamkhani Network.
The companies’ nominal leadership served as a front while actual operational control rested with Shamkhani and his associates.
The Shamkhani Network, investigators allege, laundered billions of dollars from Iranian and Russian oil sales, primarily routing barrels to buyers in China.
The FBI, Homeland Security Investigations and the IRS Criminal Investigation Global Illicit Finance Team are pursuing the case.
The compliance report reviewed by Kenya Insights recommends suspending all commercial relations with Chiang Wei LLC FZ pending a financial investigation into the company’s relationship with WellBred and any consequential exposure to Iranian oil networks under sanctions.
The report had been circulated internally within South Sudan’s Petroleum Ministry. On 27 March 2026, the day it was issued into wider circulation, Dr. Chol signed the allocation letter granting Chiang Wei a $60 million cargo.
The compliance report had been circulated within South Sudan’s Petroleum Ministry. On the very same day, Dr. Chol signed an allocation letter granting Chiang Wei a $60 million cargo.
THE ALLOCATION LEDGER: WHAT THE SHIPPING SCHEDULES REVEAL
Internal cargo scheduling tables covering South Sudan’s crude exports from January 2025 through May 2026, reviewed by Kenya Insights, show RSS-allocated cargoes flowing with remarkable consistency to the same cluster of offtakers: Cathay Petroleum International, BGN, WellBred and the chain of entities connected to Euro American International Energy.
The pattern is not incidental. Cargoes designated as RSS, the notation indicating government-discretionary allocation as distinct from commercial partner entitlements, appear in the schedules at regular monthly intervals and are consistently assigned to this network.
In January 2026, BGN received a DAR-RSS cargo loading 7 to 8 January. In December 2025, WellBred received a DAR-RSS allocation loading 27 to 28 December. BGN reappeared for an October 2025 allocation. Cathay Petroleum received RSS cargoes loading in September, July, May, March and February 2025.
The schedule reveals not a competitive tender system but a revolving allocation among a handful of entities that appear to have secured near-permanent access to South Sudan’s sovereign crude sales through mechanisms that are neither published nor subject to independent scrutiny.
THE CAPTURE THAT LEADERSHIP CHANGES CANNOT BREAK
The South Sudanese government has periodically attempted, or at least performed, accountability within the Petroleum Ministry.
The arrests of senior energy officials in February 2026 were presented as a response to financial malpractice.
The dismissal of Dr. Chol on 27 March 2026 and his replacement by Dr. Santino Ayuel Longar was framed as a further corrective step. Neither action changed the underlying allocation architecture.
Euro American International Energy, owned by Dubai-based Sudanese businessman Idris Taha, continued to appear across allocation records through the transition.
London’s High Court had already heard, in November 2025, that Euro American and Meridian Energy Pte Ltd had purchased a disputed Nile Blend cargo that BB Energy was attempting to recover against a $100 million pre-payment debt.
A UK High Court judge, Justice Christopher Butcher, noted in his November 2025 judgment that there were good grounds to believe South Sudan itself lacked the funds to satisfy any damages award, citing Transparency International’s classification of South Sudan as the world’s most corrupt country.
The court issued an injunction against the cargo’s transfer before the parties reached a settlement that allowed lifting to proceed.
The structure documented across the allocation letters is specifically designed to survive personnel changes. Incoming officials inherit commitments made in the final hours of their predecessors’ mandates.
Allocation letters create competing claims that require weeks or months to unwind, and in that window the connected intermediary has already lifted and sold the cargo.
The incoming Undersecretary Santino signed a reassignment to Trinity Energy on 31 March.
Before that letter could be operationalised, a further document on 3 April restored Euro American’s position.
The formal administrative chain was overridden by the practical reality of who controlled the contractual instruments.
WHAT STRUCTURAL REFORM WOULD ACTUALLY REQUIRE
Oil governance experts and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, whose September 2025 report titled Plundering a Nation documented the systematic looting of petroleum revenues by political elites, have identified specific reforms that would begin to break the capture cycle.
Publication of all allocation decisions in advance, with identified ultimate beneficiaries, would eliminate the opacity that enables last-minute awards to persist unchallenged.
Competitive tendering with independent oversight would prevent the revolving allocation to a closed network.
Escrow accounts holding proceeds until independently verified delivery of revenue to government accounts would end the practice of proceeds being recycled into subsequent transactions before reaching the treasury.
Market-based pricing with no contractual option to apply earlier benchmarks would have placed an additional $18 million to $24 million in South Sudan’s government accounts from the single March 2026 cargo alone.
Alignment of pricing to the date of lifting rather than any prior period would remove the mechanism through which intermediaries capture the upside of rising markets at the state’s expense.
Independent auditing of every allocation decision, every pricing formula and every payment flow would create a paper trail that could survive the personnel churn that currently resets accountability with every reshuffle.
South Sudan formally owns its oil. But the same companies capture its value, through mechanisms so embedded in the administrative structure that no single dismissal can dislodge them.
THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE SILENCE
South Sudan produces approximately 150,000 barrels of crude per day, split between Nile Blend and Dar Blend grades, piped north through Sudan to the terminal at Port Sudan’s Bashayer facility.
At $100 per barrel, that daily output represents $15 million in gross revenue.
Over a month, $450 million. Of that, oil-backed debt repayments to Afreximbank, QNB, Nasdec General Trading and other creditors consume a substantial share. The UN estimated South Sudan’s total outstanding oil-backed debt at approximately $2.3 billion as of mid-2025.
Against that backdrop, the pricing differential captured by intermediaries on government-allocated cargoes is not a marginal rounding error.
The compliance report reviewed by Kenya Insights describes a model in which Chiang Wei secures allocations, arranges lifting and resale, and retains part of the proceeds rather than transferring them fully to South Sudan.
The report characterises this as a closed-loop financing structure, in which oil value is recycled into subsequent transactions, limiting the proportion of revenue that reaches the state.
The WellBred connection, if confirmed, would add sanctions exposure to a system already burdened with debt, governance failure and institutional capture.
RIGHT OF RESPONSE
Kenya Insights sought comment from Euro American International Energy, Chiang Wei LLC FZ, the Republic of South Sudan’s Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Presidential Affairs prior to publication.
No responses were received.
Idris Taha, managing director of Euro American International Energy, did not respond to questions submitted regarding his company’s role in the April 2026 cargo allocation sequence, the pricing mechanisms applied to March 2026 cargoes and the company’s relationship with other entities in the allocation network.
Choul Laam of Chiang Wei LLC FZ did not respond to questions regarding the $60 million advance payment, the compliance report recommending suspension of commercial relations and any relationship between Chiang Wei and WellBred Trading DMCC.
DOCUMENTS: This investigation is based on South Sudan Ministry of Petroleum allocation award letters RSS/MoP/J/O/U/3/26/262 and RSS/MOP/J/O/U/3/26/251 (both 27 March 2026); Dar Blend Award Letter RSS/MOP/J/O/U/31/03/101 to Trinity Energy Limited (31 March 2026); internal South Sudan crude cargo scheduling tables (January 2025 to May 2026); a compliance report dated 9 March 2026; US DOJ civil forfeiture complaints 1:26-cv-00802 and 1:26-cv-00807; UK High Court proceedings in November 2025 (Justice Christopher Butcher); IEA Oil Market Reports for March and April 2026; and reporting by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Radio Tamazuj and Global Trade Review.
