Category: News

  • High Court Blocks NTSA Instant Traffic Fines

    High Court Blocks NTSA Instant Traffic Fines

    NAIROBI, Kenya, Mar 12 – The High Court of Kenya has temporarily stopped the enforcement of the recently launched instant traffic fines system introduced by the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA).

    Justice Bahati Mwamuye issued conservatory orders suspending the implementation of the system following a petition filed by lawyer Shadrack Wambui, who is challenging its legality.

    In the case, Wambui argues that the instant fines framework may violate due process and motorists’ constitutional rights by allowing penalties to be issued and enforced without adequate legal safeguards.

    The orders mean that NTSA and other enforcement agencies cannot implement or enforce the instant fines system until the court hears and determines the petition.

    The instant fines system had been introduced as part of efforts by NTSA to strengthen road safety enforcement and improve compliance with traffic regulations by allowing motorists who commit offences to pay fines immediately rather than undergoing lengthy court processes.

    However, critics have raised concerns over transparency, accountability and the potential for abuse if the system is implemented without clear legal frameworks and oversight.

    The High Court will now consider the arguments presented in the petition before determining whether the instant fines system can proceed or requires further legal and regulatory review.

  • Two MMUST Students Found Dead In Suspected Murder-Suicide

    Two MMUST Students Found Dead In Suspected Murder-Suicide

    Detectives in Kakamega are investigating a shocking suspected murder–suicide after two university students were found dead inside a house in Maraba, Kakamega Central.

    Police said the two victims were students at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). Their bodies were discovered in the same house, sending shockwaves through the local community.

    Preliminary investigations indicate that one of the victims may have fatally stabbed the other before taking their own life. However, police say the motive behind the incident remains unclear.

    Relatives of one of the deceased, a 21-year-old third-year student identified as Dariel Jedidah Luvunga, said they last spoke to him on the evening of March 8, 2026.

    Their concern grew after repeated attempts to reach him the following day failed. On March 10, family members visited the house where he lived, only to find the door locked from the inside.

    According to police, the relatives peeped through a small opening and spotted someone lying motionless on the floor, prompting them to alert authorities.

    Officers arrived at the scene and forced their way into the house, where they discovered two bodies. One man was lying on the floor with multiple stab wounds to the head and stomach, while the other was found hanging in the bathroom.

    Police confirmed that the body found hanging was that of Dariel. A blood-stained kitchen knife believed to have been used in the attack was recovered at the scene. Investigators also said no suicide note was found.

    The bodies were moved to the Kakamega General Hospital mortuary for postmortem examination as investigations continue.

    The incident drew a large crowd of residents who gathered at the scene as police removed the bodies.

    Authorities have urged residents to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activities as detectives work to establish the circumstances surrounding the tragedy.

    In a separate incident in Vihiga County, police are searching for a 43-year-old woman accused of fatally stabbing her 79-year-old father in Chamasilihi village in Mbale Sub-location.

    Police said the victim, identified as Mundanya Hezron Madaga, died after being stabbed in the neck during the attack. The suspect reportedly fled the scene immediately after the incident.

    The body was taken to Vihiga Teaching and Referral Hospital mortuary as police launched a manhunt for the suspect.

    According to police statistics, murder cases have been rising in the country, with authorities reporting up to eight incidents daily, many of which remain under investigation.

  • Nyakera Accuses Interior PS Omollo of Orchestrating Predawn Raid on His Kisumu Hotel in Bid to Seize Sh235m Property

    Nyakera Accuses Interior PS Omollo of Orchestrating Predawn Raid on His Kisumu Hotel in Bid to Seize Sh235m Property

    A PREDAWN raid on a lakeside hotel in Kisumu has ignited a high-voltage political and business dispute, with former Principal Secretary and Democracy for Citizens Party (DCP) patron Irungu Nyakera squarely accusing Interior PS Dr Raymond Omollo of masterminding what he calls a hostile takeover of his Sh235 million investment.

    Nyakera, who built a reputation as a no-nonsense technocrat before aligning himself with former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua and the opposition, says that at around 5am on Tuesday, more than 100 men stormed his hotel, damaging property and assaulting members of staff, including tying up a female security guard who was on duty at the time.

    Nyakera says he rushed to the scene and fired two warning shots into the air before the attackers fled.

    “I called the OCS and asked for backup, but an hour later, when no backup was forthcoming, I sent him a message that I intend to shoot anyone stepping into my property,” Nyakera said in a statement published on his social media accounts, adding that he hoped the OCS had shared the warning through the relevant security communication channels.

    Nyakera Irungu.
    Nyakera Irungu.

    The incident is not the first of its kind. Nyakera says that three weeks prior, goons working alongside the Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA) arrived at the premises, carted away merchandise belonging to his business and locked him out. He says he subsequently reported the matter to Kisumu security agencies, where officials told him something that now forms the centrepiece of his allegations against the Interior PS.

    “Upon reporting the matter to the security agencies in Kisumu, I was informed that PS Raymond Omollo had directed that I cannot continue being a tenant in a government building because I am in DCP,” Nyakera said.

    He went further, claiming that the Nyanza Region DCI boss told him that PS Omollo has personal interests in the property, a claim that Nyakera said made perfect sense given that Omollo is a former Chief Executive of LBDA, the state agency that owns the premises, and that Omollo’s cousin currently serves as LBDA’s chief executive.

    Screenshot

    LBDA is a regional development authority established by Parliament in 1979 under Cap 442 to coordinate and implement development programmes across 18 counties in the Lake Victoria basin region, with its headquarters in Kisumu.

    Dr Omollo served as its Managing Director from 2019 before being appointed Principal Secretary for Internal Security and National Administration in December 2022 by President William Ruto, making him one of the most powerful civil servants in the country and the youngest person ever to hold that office.

    A Nation investigation published in February 2023 had earlier linked Omollo, while at LBDA, to an alleged scheme in which retrenched employees were denied benefits worth at least Sh100 million through fictitious court processes involving a string of lawyers. Omollo denied any knowledge of or involvement in the alleged fraudulent arrangement at the time.

    Nyakera, who has invested in the LBDA-owned premises since 2019, says he holds a 50-year lease on the property and that court records confirm he has sunk more than Sh235 million into developing what was a shell when he took it over. He was blunt in his message to the PS.

    “If he indeed wants to take over the property, let him come and we do a valuation and I sell it to him. Sending goons here, chanting ‘hatutaki Mkikuyu,’ will not drive me away. I am an investor, but I am not stupid,” Nyakera said, using language that raises the spectre of ethnic targeting in what he frames as a politically motivated campaign of intimidation.

    The ethnic dimension of the alleged chants adds a volatile layer to an already combustible standoff. Nyakera, who hails from Murang’a in Central Kenya, is a prominent critic of the Ruto administration and a key organiser for Gachagua’s DCP in Nairobi, where he is the party’s patron and an aspirant for the Nairobi governorship in the 2027 elections. He had previously served on state boards, including as chairman of KEMSA and KICC, before President Ruto revoked both appointments, moves Nyakera has attributed to his refusal to dissolve his political affiliations.

    Kenya Insights sought a response from Dr Omollo’s office and the Interior Ministry regarding the allegations but had not received a statement by the time of going to press.

    The LBDA communications office also did not respond to queries on whether it had authorised any action against Nyakera’s tenancy or whether any formal eviction proceedings had been initiated.

    If Nyakera’s account is accurate, it raises serious governance questions.

    The Interior PS not only oversees national security and law enforcement coordination across Kenya, but also sits on the board of the Communications Authority of Kenya.

    An allegation that a serving PS is directing a parastatal over which he previously held executive authority to act against a political opponent, and that security agencies are declining to respond to distress calls from that opponent, strikes at the heart of Kenya’s constitutional guarantees of equality before the law and protection of property rights.

    Political observers will note that the timing is not incidental. Nyakera has become one of the more vocal and visible faces of the DCP opposition project, lending financial credibility and policy weight to Gachagua’s platform. His public profile has grown sharply since his sacking from the KICC board in April 2025, which he described at the time as a badge of honour. That trajectory, from government insider to opposition irritant, appears to have attracted consequences that now extend beyond the political arena and into his business affairs.

    For now, Nyakera says he is not going anywhere. His message to those behind the raids was unambiguous: come with a valuation, not with goons.

    In a second statement published hours after the attack, Nyakera appeared to validate a recent Standard Media Group investigation into the security situation in Kisumu under PS Omollo’s watch, and issued a stark warning to the investor community.

    “Standard Media was right. PS Raymond Omollo has turned Kisumu into goons territory. The chants of ‘Hatutaki wakikuyu’ cut deep for me after all the investments I have made. Anyone from outside Nyanza planning to invest in Kisumu, hold off till the security situation here improves. It’s 2007 all over again.”

    The 2007 reference will send a chill through anyone who lived through Kenya’s post-election violence, which claimed over 1,300 lives and displaced more than 600,000 people, with Kisumu and the Lake Region among the worst-affected areas.

    Nyakera is not alleging that organised political violence of that scale is imminent, but his invocation of that period as a frame for the current security climate in Kisumu is a measure of how seriously he regards the threat he says he and his staff now face.

    His investor warning carries its own economic weight. Kisumu is the third-largest city in Kenya and has in recent years positioned itself as a regional hub for trade with Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo through the Northern Corridor and the LAPSSET development framework.

    An allegation by a prominent businessman that the county has become unsafe for non-Nyanza investors, made in the context of ethnically charged attacks and alleged state complicity, will not be ignored by the business community or by development finance institutions with exposure in the region.

    PS Omollo’s office, the Interior Ministry, LBDA and the Kisumu County Commissioner had not responded to media requests for comment by the time of publication.

  • THE DIRT: Dissecting Five Firms Requesting Mining Licenses in Kenya

    THE DIRT: Dissecting Five Firms Requesting Mining Licenses in Kenya

    The Ministry of Mining and Blue Economy recently published notice that Halal Mining Company Limited, Shanta Gold Kenya Limited, Royal DFC Limited, Rotor Systems Limited and Altona Mining Ltd have submitted formal applications for mining licenses. Cabinet Secretary Hassan Joho has granted the public 42 days to file objections.

    Kenya Insights’s investigations desk spent time dissecting each applicant. What we found should give the Cabinet Secretary serious pause.

    Kenya’s mining sector has historically been a stage for spectacular wealth extraction and equally spectacular betrayals of communities and the public purse.

    From the Goldenberg scandal of the 1990s, which bled the state of the equivalent of ten percent of GDP through fictitious gold exports, to the phantom Mrima Hill licensing scandal of 2013, which was so riddled with irregularities that the incoming Kenyatta administration cancelled every license issued in the transition period, this country has been here before.

    The five firms now standing at the gate are not all equal in their problems.

    But none of them arrives without questions that demand answers before a single license is signed.

    “Kenya has been here before. The five firms now standing at the gate are not all equal in their problems. But none arrives without questions that demand answers.”

    I. SHANTA GOLD KENYA LIMITED — BLOOD ON THE GROUND IN KAKAMEGA

    Of the five applicants, Shanta Gold Kenya Limited carries the most immediate and viscerally documented record.

    The British-owned firm, incorporated locally as Shanta Gold Kenya Limited in 2010 and listed on the London Stock Exchange’s AIM market as the parent Shanta Gold, has become the most politically explosive name in Kenya’s extractive sector. Its application concerns gold mining rights in Kakamega County, a county the company has already turned into a war zone.

    The facts are on the record.

    On December 4, 2025, a National Environment Management Authority public participation forum in Ikolomani’s Emusali Primary School disintegrated into deadly violence.

    At least four people were killed when police opened fire on artisanal miners and residents opposing the company’s bid to acquire 337 acres of ancestral land to establish what it describes as an underground mining operation at the Isulu-Bushiangala site. Six others were hospitalised, including two police officers. Scores were arrested. Journalists covering the forum were assaulted and had their equipment seized.

    Two days after the December 4 killings, a mine shaft in the same district collapsed at Wangoto village, killing three more artisanal miners who had been scrambling for survival since Shanta’s arrival began displacing their livelihoods. These deaths did not occur in a vacuum.

    The artisanal mining community of Kakamega has consistently levelled a damning accusation against Shanta Gold: that the company has been conducting mining operations in Ikolomani under the legal pretence of conducting mere exploration. Artisanal miners who have worked the Isulu and Bushiangala sites for generations accused the firm of exploiting local resources for years while its exploration license technically barred it from commercial extraction. The accusation is not new. Similar allegations preceded Shanta’s operations in Siaya County, where the government issued a mining license in late 2025 over the objections of residents in seven villages. No member of affected communities attended the stakeholders’ workshop in Kisumu at which the government proclaimed the project would benefit locals.

    Shanta Gold’s own Environmental Impact Assessment, submitted to NEMA and prepared in partnership with South Africa’s Digby Wells Environmental, confirmed 1.27 million ounces of gold at the Isulu-Bushiangala site, placing its total value at an estimated Ksh 683 billion. The arithmetic of extraction that follows from these figures has detonated public fury. The national government stands to collect between Ksh 555 million and Ksh 607 million in annual royalties, plus Ksh 193.8 million through the Mineral Development Levy. Kakamega County would receive approximately Ksh 111 million from its 20 percent share. The 800 households being displaced from their ancestral land would collectively receive a community share of approximately Ksh 55 million per year, which breaks down to less than Ksh 7,000 per household annually from a Ksh 683 billion operation built on their land.

    Trans-Nzoia Governor George Natembeya and Kakamega Senator Dr. Boni Khalwale, speaking on behalf of leaders from five Western counties, were categorical: the proposed Ksh 3 billion compensation package for relocation is a grotesque insult when the gold beneath these villages is worth more than Ksh 680 billion. They accused the national government of enabling a foreign-driven land grab disguised as development. Their demands included the immediate suspension of Shanta’s operations and full accountability for the deaths on December 4.

    The Kenya Human Rights Commission added its institutional voice to the chorus of condemnation. In a formal press release on December 8, 2025, KHRC registered outrage at the killings, arbitrary arrests and procedural chaos at the December 4 forum, noting that what should have been a lawful civic process had degenerated into intimidation and impunity. The Commission found that artisanal miners had been systematically excluded from the consultations required by law under the Mining Act 2016, that no transition or inclusion plan had been presented to thousands of families whose sole livelihood depended on small-scale mining, and that the approval process itself was riddled with what it called flawed NEMA approvals and violations of the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent.

    Environmental research compounds the human rights indictment. Soil, sediment and water analysis from 19 artisanal and small-scale gold mining villages in Kakamega and Vihiga counties found arsenic concentrations at mining and ore processing sites reaching up to 7,937 times the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s safety standards for residential soils. Chromium, mercury and nickel concentrations in a majority of samples exceeded applicable safety thresholds. These are the villages into which Shanta Gold proposes to sink its billion-shilling operation.

    The governance pattern visible in Shanta’s Kenyan trajectory raises a legal question that the Mineral Rights Board must answer before any further license is granted: can a company whose exploration activities in Siaya have been formally challenged by community groups for procedural flaws, and whose December 2025 public participation forum in Kakamega produced four civilian deaths, lawfully be granted an additional mining license in the same political and social environment before those deaths have been accounted for?

    “800 households face displacement from Ksh 683 billion of gold. Their annual community share works out to less than Ksh 7,000 per family.”

    II. HALAL MINING COMPANY LIMITED — A NAME THAT DEMANDS SCRUTINY

    Halal Mining Company Limited presents a different category of concern. The company is seeking a mining license in Kilifi County to extract lead, zinc and barytes. On its surface, it is an application for a relatively conventional industrial mining operation. But the name itself, in the context of Kenya’s extractive history and the documented trajectory of similarly-named entities in the Horn of Africa, demands a level of due diligence that goes beyond routine bureaucratic processing.

    Nairobi Law Monthly’s research found no publicly available records establishing the ownership structure, directorship or corporate history of Halal Mining Company Limited in Kenya’s official registries or in the mining ministry’s publicly accessible license database. This opacity is in itself a compliance issue. The Mining Act 2016 requires prospective license holders to demonstrate technical and financial capacity, and the ministry’s due diligence framework is premised on the assumption that it knows who it is dealing with.

    The naming concern is not merely semantic. In March 2024, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed sanctions on a network of entities across the Horn of Africa that raised and laundered funds for al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated terror organisation responsible for some of the worst attacks in East African history. Among the sanctioned Kenya-based entities was Haleel Commodities Limited, a business identified as a key node in al-Shabaab’s financial facilitation network. Though Haleel and Halal are distinct names and distinct entities, the pattern of naming in the region’s informal financial networks frequently involves deliberate proximity to established, credible-sounding names. The ministry owes the public a transparent disclosure of the full ownership and directorship of Halal Mining Company Limited, its source of capital and its previous commercial activities.

    Beyond the naming question, the mineral combination that Halal Mining proposes to extract in Kilifi requires careful environmental scrutiny. Lead and zinc mining carries significant contamination risks to groundwater and coastal ecosystems, particularly in Kilifi’s topography where rivers flow toward the Indian Ocean and where communities depend heavily on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Barytes extraction, while commercially low-risk from a toxicity standpoint, is frequently used in the oil and gas drilling sector as a weighting agent, raising the question of who the end buyer for Kilifi barytes would be and whether Kenya’s royalty calculations reflect the market value of what is being exported.

    The Kilifi region has already experienced the political fallout of mining ambitions that went badly for local communities. Marula Mining’s acquisition of the Kilifi manganese processing plant through its subsidiary Muchai Mining Kenya has proceeded under conditions of limited public transparency, while community expectations around employment and environmental management have frequently outpaced the delivery. Halal Mining Company Limited must demonstrate, before any license is granted, that its Kilifi application is not another instance of extractive opportunism cloaked in a thin corporate structure.

    III. ALTONA MINING LTD — A DELISTED SHELL CHASING COASTAL SAND

    Of all five applicants, Altona Mining Ltd presents perhaps the most structurally ambiguous profile. The company has submitted two applications seeking rights to mine heavy mineral sands in Kwale County. Kwale is a county whose extractive history is deeply instructive, and the timing of Altona’s applications, coming as the county’s residents continue to await royalty payments owed to them from a decade of titanium extraction under Base Titanium, makes it among the most sensitive license decisions the ministry will face.

    The Altona Mining referenced in Australian Securities Exchange records was an ASX-listed copper company, ticker code AOH, which focused its operations on a copper-gold project in Queensland, Australia. That company was acquired by Canadian copper producer Copper Mountain Mining Corporation in 2018, through a scheme of arrangement approved by courts on both the ASX and Toronto Stock Exchange. Following the acquisition, the Altona Mining entity on the ASX was delisted. The company that acquired Altona’s Cloncurry Project was subsequently itself absorbed, creating a chain of corporate succession that makes the lineage of any entity currently trading under the Altona Mining name in Kenya deserving of the most rigorous verification.

    Nairobi Law Monthly’s research could not confirm that the Altona Mining Ltd applying for Kwale heavy mineral sand mining licenses has any verified structural or operational connection to the Australian entity that was previously publicly traded. The ministry must establish and publicly disclose whether the Altona Mining Ltd appearing in the Gazette notice is a genuine mining enterprise with documented technical capacity and capital resources sufficient for heavy mineral extraction, or a shell incorporation.

    The Kwale heavy mineral context raises the stakes considerably. Base Titanium, which operated the Kwale Mineral Sands Project as Kenya’s largest mining project from 2013 until depletion of its ore reserve in December 2024, was absorbed by Arizona-based Energy Fuels Inc in October 2024. In 2023, its final substantial year of production, Base Titanium paid Ksh 2.9 billion in royalties, of which Kwale County was entitled to Ksh 1.2 billion under the 20 percent county allocation stipulated in the Mining Act. As of early 2026, Kwale County Governor Fatuma Achani has publicly stated that not a single shilling of those royalties has reached the county. The community’s 10 percent share, mandated by law, has similarly vanished into the national government’s account without disbursement.

    Governor Achani’s response to new mining applications in Kwale has been unambiguous. Speaking in the context of prospecting interest in Mrima Hill, she stated that she would not allow any new mining until the government could demonstrate that Kwale residents would actually benefit, referencing the billions in unpaid royalties as proof that formal legal frameworks are routinely ignored when it comes to revenue sharing. Altona Mining Ltd’s two applications land directly in this political environment. For the Ministry of Mining to grant Kwale heavy mineral sand licenses to an entity of uncertain provenance while the county waits for Ksh 1.2 billion in lawfully owed royalties from the previous operation would be an act of institutional contempt toward both the county government and the communities it serves.

    The Kwale coastal ecosystem adds a further dimension. Heavy mineral sand extraction involves hydraulic mining and wet concentrator processing that historically creates significant pressure on water sources, coastal vegetation and marine environments. Kwale’s communities have already lost agricultural land, fishing resources and cultural assets in the course of Base Titanium’s operations. Any entity proposing to commence a new extraction cycle in this environment must face the highest level of technical, financial and corporate scrutiny the ministry can apply.

    “Kwale County is still waiting for Ksh 1.2 billion in royalties from the last mining operator. Granting Altona a license before that debt is settled would be institutional contempt.”

    IV. ROTOR SYSTEMS LIMITED — GOLD IN SAMBURU, QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS

    Rotor Systems Limited is seeking gold mining rights in Samburu County. Of the five applicants, it is perhaps the most opaque. Nairobi Law Monthly’s exhaustive search of public records, corporate registries, mining databases and media archives produced no substantive information about the company’s ownership, directors, financial standing, technical capacity or previous mining or commercial activities. It does not appear in any publicly accessible list of licensed mining operations in Kenya. It does not appear in media coverage of Kenya’s extractive sector. It is, for practical purposes, invisible.

    This invisibility is itself a serious red flag. Any company seeking a gold mining license in Kenya is expected to demonstrate, under the Mining Act 2016, that it possesses the technical expertise, financial resources and institutional capacity to conduct mining operations responsibly, manage environmental impact and fulfil its royalty and reporting obligations. A company with no verifiable public footprint cannot satisfy that standard on the available evidence.

    The Samburu context sharpens the concern. Samburu County is home to one of Kenya’s most historically marginalised pastoralist communities, the Samburu people, who have experienced repeated cycles of state-facilitated displacement from their ancestral grazing lands. The Samburu have been subjected to what Cultural Survival and other international human rights organisations have documented as systematic land dispossession, often justified through development framings. The history of Laikipia, which borders Samburu and hosts overlapping Samburu pastoralist land claims, is a chronicle of eviction, violence and legal subordination of indigenous land rights to commercial and political interests.

    Kenya’s record on mineral rights in pastoralist and indigenous counties is troubling. Gold deposits have been identified in Samburu’s Nachola area. Copper, chromite and other minerals are documented across northern Kenya’s geological belt. The Ministry of Mining’s own critical minerals catalogue acknowledges that most of these areas remain at reconnaissance or early exploration stages, with limited systematic evaluation of economic viability. The rush to license before adequate assessment exposes communities to speculative operations that will extract and depart without adequate accountability.

    Rotor Systems Limited must, before any license decision is made, publicly disclose its directors, shareholders, source of capital, technical team, previous corporate activities in Kenya and elsewhere, and evidence of its capacity to meet the financial assurance requirements for environmental rehabilitation mandated by the Mining Act 2016. In the absence of that disclosure, the Ministry should decline the application on grounds of insufficient documentation.

    V. ROYAL DFC LIMITED — KITUI’S RARE METALS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

    Royal DFC Limited is seeking a mining license in Kitui County to extract minerals classified under Group E: Base and Rare Metals. This is a broad and commercially significant category that includes niobium, tantalum, cobalt, lithium, manganese and related strategic minerals that have become the focus of intense global competition as demand for battery technology and defence manufacturing accelerates. Kitui County is known to host deposits of iron ore, coal, copper, amethyst and sapphire, and its geological profile makes it a legitimate target for base and rare metal exploration.

    Like Rotor Systems Limited, Royal DFC Limited has left no visible trace in the public record. Nairobi Law Monthly found no company by that name in publicly accessible Kenyan corporate or mining license databases, no media coverage, no industry association membership and no prior licensing history. Its application for what is potentially a strategically important category of minerals in a politically sensitive county arrives without a public identity.

    The rare metals dimension places Royal DFC’s application in a geopolitical context the Ministry of Mining cannot afford to treat lightly. Kenya’s Critical Minerals Catalogue, released in August 2024, explicitly identifies Kitui as among the counties with the highest mineral wealth prospects. The global scramble for rare earth elements and critical minerals has seen Kenya targeted by interests from the United States, China, Europe and the Gulf states, all seeking to secure supply chains for the energy transition and advanced manufacturing. In this environment, opaque license applications for rare metal extraction in high-value counties represent a potential national security concern, not merely a regulatory compliance issue.

    The Ministry of Mining must conduct a full beneficial ownership disclosure process for Royal DFC Limited before this application is processed. The source of the company’s capital, the nationality of its ultimate beneficial owners and the identity of any foreign partners or investors must be placed on the public record. Kenya has no sovereign wealth fund stake, no mandatory state equity participation requirement and no publicly disclosed critical minerals strategy that would ensure the national interest is protected in any licensing arrangement. Until those gaps are addressed, granting a rare metals license to an entity with no public profile is a gamble with Kenya’s long-term strategic mineral wealth.

    VI. THE SYSTEMIC ROT: WHAT THESE FIVE APPLICATIONS REVEAL

    Taken individually, each of these five applications presents specific concerns that the Ministry of Mining and the 42-day public objection window should be used to address. Taken together, they reveal something more troubling: a licensing system that consistently serves the interests of capital over community, obscures corporate identity behind bureaucratic form-filling and deploys the language of development to justify extraction that leaves counties poorer and communities displaced.

    The figures are stark. Kenya’s total mineral production value stood at Ksh 25.5 billion in the most recent official reporting period. Gold accounted for Ksh 3 billion. Base minerals added Ksh 801 million. Against the Ksh 683 billion sitting beneath Ikolomani’s fields alone, the scale of what Kenya is giving away is extraordinary. The Goldenberg scandal of the 1990s, which cost the state between Ksh 158 billion and the equivalent of Ksh 3.4 trillion in today’s money depending on the estimate used, was a lesson about what happens when licensing is captured by political and commercial interests that have no accountability to the communities above whose land extraction occurs.

    The pattern has not broken. Kwale County is still owed Ksh 1.2 billion in royalties from an operation that closed more than a year ago. Affected residents of Tiomin’s original titanium operations in Kwale were displaced from their land in 2007 and have spent seventeen years seeking adequate compensation. The Ramula and Mwibona communities in Siaya, where Shanta Gold has already been granted a license, conducted a community survey showing that most households had not reviewed the Environmental Impact Assessment document they were supposedly consulted on. The EIA for Kakamega was prepared in Kiswahili, which a significant proportion of the affected Luhya-speaking community could not read.

    Mining Cabinet Secretary Hassan Joho is not without options. The 42-day objection window is not a formality designed to absorb public comment before a predetermined outcome. It is, in law and in constitutional principle, a genuine accountability mechanism. The Kenya Human Rights Commission has already placed its formal objection to Shanta Gold’s Kakamega application on the public record. Civil society organisations, county governments, artisanal mining associations and individual residents in all five affected counties have both the right and the legal standing to submit objections that the ministry is constitutionally obligated to consider.

    What is required, before any of these five licenses is granted, is a transparent public hearing process that discloses the full beneficial ownership of every applicant, publishes their financial and technical capacity documentation, mandates community impact assessments in accessible languages, establishes binding royalty disbursement mechanisms with independent oversight, and holds any company with a documented record of community harm to the highest possible standard of justification.

    “The 42-day objection window is not a formality. It is a constitutional accountability mechanism. Communities, counties and civil society have every right to use it.”

    Five firms. Five counties. Five applications that between them could reshape Kenya’s mineral landscape for decades. The question is not whether mining should happen. The question is whether it can happen in a Kenya where the law means what it says, where communities own what the Constitution says they own, and where no company gets to build its profits on the graves of the Kenyans who had the misfortune to live above what their country calls wealth.

    NOTE

    This investigation relied on government gazette notices, court records, parliamentary transcripts, environmental impact assessments, official corporate registries, US Treasury OFAC records, documented media reporting from accredited outlets, and statements by county governments, civil society organisations and human rights bodies. All claims attributed to named parties are drawn from publicly available documents and verified statements. Readers, affected communities, county governments and members of civil society are encouraged to utilise the 42-day objection mechanism by submitting formal objections to: The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Mining, Blue Economy and Maritime Affairs, Works Building, Ngong Road, P.O. Box 30009-00100 Nairobi, or by email to [email protected]. You can also write a confidential report to us.

  • Caught On Camera: Everything You Need To Know About NTSA’S Instant Fines System

    Caught On Camera: Everything You Need To Know About NTSA’S Instant Fines System

    Kenya’s roads entered a new era on Monday when the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) activated its Instant Fines Traffic Management System, a fully automated enforcement platform that silently watches every vehicle on Nairobi’s busiest corridors and dispatches SMS penalty notices to offenders within minutes of a detected violation.

    By mid-morning on the system’s first day of operation, motorists across the city were already reporting fine alerts on their phones. One driver shared an Sh10,000 penalty notice he had received after travelling at 128 km/h on Thika Road, a stretch where the posted speed limit is 110 km/h. Others took to social media to complain that they had been fined before they had any idea the system was live, let alone what the rules were.

    “This is extortion at this point,” the Thika Road motorist wrote on X. His frustration reflects a sentiment shared widely among Nairobi’s driving public: a technology-driven enforcement regime has arrived swiftly, with limited public education and lingering legal questions about its constitutionality.

    NTSA insists the rollout is lawful, necessary and overdue. Road crashes killed more than 5,100 people in Kenya in 2025, imposing an estimated Sh450 billion in economic costs through medical expenses, lost productivity and property damage.

    The authority attributes a large share of those deaths to weak enforcement driven by a shortage of cameras, corrupt roadside policing and low enrolment in the smart driving licence programme. The instant fines system, NTSA says, is the antidote.

    THE CAMERAS: WHERE THEY ARE AND HOW THEY WORK

    One of the speed enforcement cameras installed by NTSA between Ruiru and Thika along the Thika Superhighway. The device is part of a nationwide rollout of about 700 stationary speed cameras on major highways and high-risk road sections, alongside 300 mobile speed cameras for targeted operations and spot enforcement. The camera network is linked to a National Command and Control Centre, enabling real-time monitoring of traffic violations, automated detection of offences, and the immediate issuance of penalties.

    The enforcement infrastructure consists of more than 1,000 high-definition smart cameras deployed under a Sh42 billion public-private partnership between NTSA, KCB Bank Kenya and technology firm Pesa Print. The project, approved by Cabinet in December 2025, will run for 21 years, with the camera network ultimately transferred to state ownership at the end of the contract.

    Of the 1,000 units, 700 are fixed cameras mounted at permanent positions along major highways and what NTSA describes as high-risk corridors. The remaining 300 are mobile units that enforcement teams will deploy at speeding hotspots and accident-prone zones on a rotating basis.

    The cameras are linked to a National Command and Control Centre that monitors traffic in real time, detecting violations and automatically triggering the fine notification system without human intervention.

    The system connects to NTSA’s smart driving licence database, which means every fine is tied directly to the individual driver’s profile rather than to the vehicle’s registered owner.

    Once a violation is logged, the motorist receives an SMS notification containing the alleged offence, the location, and an image of the vehicle at the time of capture.

    In practice, the cameras are concentrated along the roads that carry the highest volumes of traffic in Nairobi, routes where speeding and lane indiscipline have historically caused the greatest harm.

    Thika Road, Mombasa Road, the Southern Bypass, the Northern Bypass, the Nairobi Expressway and Waiyaki Way are all under camera surveillance, with speed limits varying significantly from one section to another.

    What has frustrated many motorists is that the camera positions are not publicly disclosed and, on many stretches, are not prominently signed.

    Critics, including technology commentators and transport operators, argue this approach prioritises revenue collection over behavioural change.

    Rwanda’s equivalent system, widely cited as a regional benchmark, marks every enforcement camera clearly so that drivers are warned in advance and have the opportunity to slow down. In Nairobi, the cameras are, for now, invisible.

    SPEED LIMITS BY ROAD AND SECTION

    Speed limits on Nairobi’s major roads are not uniform. They vary not only between roads but between sections of the same road, depending on the infrastructure, surrounding land use and historical accident data. The table below sets out the applicable limits on each major corridor currently under camera surveillance.

    ROAD / SECTION

    LIMIT

    Thika Road — Safari Park to Thika Road

    110 km/h

    Thika Road — Roysambu / TRM

    80–100 km/h

    Thika Road — Jomoko to Thika Turnoff

    80 km/h

    Thika Road — Allsops / GSU HQ

    80 km/h

    Thika Road — Pangani / Muthaiga Interchange

    80 km/h

    Nairobi Expressway — Museum Hill to Westlands

    80 km/h

    Nairobi Expressway — After Nyayo Stadium

    80 km/h

    Mombasa Road — Mombasa Road to Nyayo Stadium

    80 km/h

    Mombasa Road — Sameer Business Park / GM

    80 km/h

    Southern Bypass — to Virtual Weighbridge

    80 km/h

    Southern Bypass — Ngong Road Interchange

    80 km/h

    Northern Bypass — After Gitaru

    80 km/h

    Northern Bypass — Ruaka / Wangige

    80 km/h

    Waiyaki Way — Kangemi / Uthiru

    60–80 km/h

    The most important figure for most Nairobi commuters is the 110 km/h limit on the section of Thika Road between Safari Park and the Thika Road exit. This is the highest posted speed limit on any Nairobi urban road and is the stretch where the first widely reported fine under the new system was issued. Below Safari Park, limits drop to 80 km/h or a variable 80 to 100 km/h range depending on the specific interchange.

    The Nairobi Expressway, which carries significant cross-city traffic between Mlolongo and Westlands, is capped at 80 km/h throughout, including from Museum Hill to Westlands and after Nyayo Stadium. The Southern and Northern bypasses similarly sit at a flat 80 km/h limit. Waiyaki Way, which runs through heavier residential and commercial zones, applies the most conservative limits of 60 to 80 km/h depending on the section.

    THE SPEEDING PENALTY SCALE

    Speeding forms the backbone of NTSA’s enforcement model. The system applies a graduated penalty structure that becomes sharply more expensive as the excess speed increases. Crucially, the same scale applies regardless of the posted speed limit on the particular road: whether you exceed an 80 km/h or a 110 km/h limit, the bands and amounts are identical.

    EXCESS SPEED BAND

    PENALTY

    1–5 km/h above limit

    Warning only

    6–10 km/h above limit

    Ksh 500

    11–15 km/h above limit

    Ksh 3,000

    16–20 km/h above limit

    Ksh 10,000

    The graduated structure means that a motorist travelling at 91 km/h on a road posted at 80 km/h will face a Sh3,000 fine for exceeding the limit by 11 km/h. If the same motorist had been travelling at 101 km/h on the same stretch, the fine would jump fourfold to Sh10,000.

    Legal experts note that the sudden escalation from Sh3,000 to Sh10,000 for just five additional kilometres per hour creates what amounts to a cliff-edge penalty with no intermediate step.

    THE FULL FINES SCHEDULE: ALL 37 OFFENCES

    Beyond speeding, the system is designed to detect and penalise a broad range of traffic violations. NTSA has published a schedule of 37 offences that fall within the instant fines framework. The complete schedule is reproduced below.

    OFFENCE

    PENALTY

    No identification plates / improperly fixed plates

    Ksh 10,000

    No valid vehicle inspection certificate

    Ksh 10,000

    No licence endorsement for vehicle class

    Ksh 3,000

    Failure to renew driving licence

    Ksh 1,000

    Failure to produce driving licence

    Ksh 1,000

    Unqualified PSV driver

    Ksh 5,000

    Driving on pavement / pedestrian walkway

    Ksh 5,000

    Ignoring police officer direction

    Ksh 3,000

    Ignoring traffic sign

    Ksh 3,000

    Failure to stop for police

    Ksh 5,000

    Causing road obstruction

    Ksh 10,000

    No reflective triangles / lifesavers

    Ksh 3,000

    Driving on footpath

    Ksh 5,000

    Driver using phone while driving

    Ksh 2,000

    Body part outside moving vehicle

    Ksh 1,000

    Unlicensed PSV driver or conductor

    Ksh 5,000

    Employer hiring unlicensed PSV staff

    Ksh 10,000

    Failure to refund fare (incomplete trip)

    Ksh 3,000

    Touting

    Ksh 3,000

    PSV driver / conductor without badge or uniform

    Ksh 2,000

    Undesignated person driving PSV

    Ksh 3,000

    PSV driver allowing unauthorised driver

    Ksh 3,000

    PSV with tinted windows / windscreen

    Ksh 3,000

    PSV without fire extinguisher / fire kit

    Ksh 2,000

    PSV picking / dropping at unauthorised stop

    Ksh 3,000

    No speed governor in PSV / commercial vehicle

    Ksh 10,000

    PSV seat belts not maintained

    Ksh 500

    Vehicle without seat belts

    Ksh 1,000 per seat

    Not wearing seat belt

    Ksh 500

    Vehicle without reflective warning signs

    Ksh 2,000

    Motorcycle rider without protective gear

    Ksh 1,000

    Motorcycle with more than one pillion passenger

    Ksh 1,000

    Learner without ‘L’ plates

    Ksh 1,000

    Pedestrian obstructing vehicles

    Ksh 500

    Passenger boarding / alighting at unauthorised stop

    Ksh 1,000

    Among the most significant fines is the Sh10,000 penalty for causing a road obstruction, a common issue in Nairobi where matatus stop mid-road to pick up or drop off passengers. Operating a public service vehicle without a speed governor will also attract Sh10,000, as will employing an unlicensed PSV driver or conductor.

    The Sh1,000-per-seat penalty for vehicles without seat belts is notable for its potential cumulative impact: a matatu found to be missing seat belts across its full complement of seats could face a fine of Ksh14,000 or more from a single stop. Drivers using their mobile phones while driving face a Sh2,000 penalty, while those who fail to wear their own seat belt will be charged Sh500.

    HOW TO PAY AND WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU DON’T

    All fines issued through the automated system must be paid through the branch network of KCB Group within seven days of the SMS notification.

    The seven-day window is strict: failure to pay within the deadline will result in interest accruing on the outstanding amount, and the vehicle or driver record will be blocked from conducting any transaction on NTSA’s service platforms.

    That includes licence renewals, vehicle inspections, transfers of ownership and any other government transport service.

    Critics, have pointed out the awkward contradiction in this arrangement: NTSA is marketing a digital enforcement revolution yet directing motorists to a bank branch to settle fines, a manual bottleneck that sits at odds with the system’s stated ambitions.

    NTSA has said a Mobile Driving Licence wallet is in development that will allow motorists to carry digital copies of their licences, access offence records and pay fines through mobile and USSD channels.

    NTSA has not disclosed whether repeat offenders will face escalating penalties beyond the standard fine amounts, nor has it clarified how the system treats special-category vehicles such as those transporting perishable goods, whose operators have raised concerns about the practical implications of being held up by fine-related transaction freezes.

    THE LEGAL CHALLENGE

    The system’s most consequential question is not how much it will cost motorists but whether it is lawful. Advocate Marvin Onyango has argued publicly that NTSA may have overstepped its mandate by treating automated camera captures as proof of guilt.

    “Traffic offences are criminal in nature,” Onyango said. “Automated enforcement raises questions because it presumes guilt without considering the right to a fair hearing under Article 50. They cannot simply declare someone guilty and impose a fine without a hearing and proper evaluation of evidence.”

    Article 50 of the Constitution of Kenya guarantees the right to a fair hearing. In the criminal law context, that right includes the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard and the right to challenge evidence presented against you. An automated system that issues a fine on the basis of a camera image and sends payment demands with a seven-day deadline provides none of those procedural safeguards.

    Onyango’s position echoes a concern raised by the Federation of Public Transport Sector (FPTS), which, while broadly welcoming the system, has called for clear guidelines on who bears liability when a commercial vehicle is fined: the registered owner, the SACCO managing the route, or the individual driver behind the wheel at the time of the violation. The federation has also called for a consultative meeting with NTSA, the Judiciary and the National Police Service to address these gaps before the system’s enforcement bites more deeply into the sector.

    NTSA had not responded to requests for clarification on the outstanding legal questions as of the time of going to press.

    THE POLITICAL PRESSURE THAT DROVE THE LAUNCH

    The speed with which NTSA activated the system has raised eyebrows in transport circles. The instant fines programme had been in the pipeline for years before President William Ruto’s intervention on March 2, 2026, when he used a road safety meeting convened by the National Council on the Administration of Justice at State House to publicly rebuke the authority for its inaction.

    “I have always wondered why we have taken forever. Why don’t we enforce the instant fines programme? Why haven’t we rolled out the cameras on our roads? Rolling out cameras is not rocket science. Let us roll out the cameras in the five or six major towns within one month,” the President said, directing Transport Cabinet Secretary Davis Chirchir to begin implementation immediately.

    Within a week, NTSA had announced the system was live.

    What the authority has not explained publicly is how 1,000 cameras were procured, installed, calibrated and connected to a functional enforcement back-end in that timeframe, unless the infrastructure was already substantially in place before the presidential directive was issued.

    The Sh42 billion public-private partnership with KCB and Pesa Print had been approved by Cabinet in December 2025, suggesting months of preparation had already occurred.

    What is clear is that political will has finally translated into operational deployment, and Nairobi’s motorists are now navigating a transformed enforcement landscape whether they were ready for it or not.

    WHAT THIS MEANS FOR NAIROBI DRIVERS

    For the average Nairobi motorist, the practical implications of the new system are significant. The most immediate risk is speeding on Thika Road, the single corridor where the first fine was already reported on day one of operations. The 110 km/h stretch between Safari Park and the Thika Road exit is where the risk of an Sh10,000 fine materialises fastest, particularly given Nairobi’s tendency for variable traffic flow that can tempt drivers to accelerate on open sections.

    Matatu operators and their SACCOs face the broadest exposure across the full range of offences, from tinted windows and missing fire extinguishers to touting and fare refund failures. The industry has been warned. Commercial truck operators face particular risk from the speed governor requirement, a penalty of Sh10,000 that could land on fleets where vehicles have had governors tampered with or disabled.

    For all motorists, the most important practical step is to verify their mobile number is correctly registered with NTSA, since the fine notification system operates entirely via SMS. A number that is outdated or unregistered will mean fines accrue unnoticed until a transaction block triggers an unpleasant discovery at a licensing office.

    The National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), in collaboration with the National Police on December 4, 2025 conduct crackdown on traffic violators at Salgaa, along Nakuru-Eldore Highway as part of a renewed effort to curb road accidents, particularly during the festive season.
  • ‪CS Wandayi Convenes An Emergency Meeting With Oil Marketers Amid Fears Of Fuel Shortages in Kenya‬

    ‪CS Wandayi Convenes An Emergency Meeting With Oil Marketers Amid Fears Of Fuel Shortages in Kenya‬

    Nairobi, March 10 — Energy Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi has summoned oil marketers for an emergency meeting as the government races to contain fears of a potential fuel shortage triggered by escalating disruptions in global petroleum supply chains.

    The urgent consultations come just hours after Wandayi held discussions with companies supplying fuel to Kenya under the government-to-government (G-2-G) petroleum import arrangement, which anchors the country’s fuel procurement system.

    Speaking in Nairobi on Tuesday during the official listing of shares for Kenya Pipeline Company at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, the CS sought to calm mounting anxiety among consumers and transport operators who fear that the turmoil in global energy markets could spill over into local pump prices or supply disruptions.

    Wandayi said Kenya remains in close contact with its key suppliers under the G-2-G framework, including Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Emirates National Oil Company, as part of contingency planning aimed at protecting the country’s fuel supply.

    “We continue to engage very closely with our government-to-government suppliers in terms of contingency planning,” Wandayi said, adding that current stock levels remain stable.

    “For that reason, there is really no cause for alarm. In the short to medium term we have security of supply and we continue to monitor the situation very closely,” he said.

    The emergency meeting with oil marketing companies, scheduled for later Tuesday, is expected to review supply flows, stock levels and potential response measures should the international crisis deepen.

    “From here I am going to a meeting with oil marketers to continue close review and monitoring of the situation,” Wandayi said.

    The government on Monday had already moved to reassure Kenyans that the country holds sufficient petroleum stocks to cushion it against immediate supply disruptions linked to the unfolding crisis in the Middle East.

    According to Wandayi, Kenya has secured scheduled petroleum imports through to the end of April 2026, a move designed to guarantee stable supply even as geopolitical tensions rattle global oil markets.

    “Kenya has sufficient petroleum products to cover both the country and the region in the wake of the crisis in the Middle East,” he said.

    Kenya relies almost entirely on imported refined petroleum products, leaving the economy exposed to external shocks whenever geopolitical conflicts disrupt supply chains or trigger price spikes.

    The current turmoil follows a wave of military escalation in the Gulf region, where coordinated airstrikes by the United States and Israel on Iran — and Tehran’s retaliatory missile attacks — have shaken energy markets and threatened exports from one of the world’s most critical oil-producing corridors.

    Energy analysts warn that prolonged disruption could tighten global supply and drive up prices, a scenario that would quickly filter through to import-dependent economies such as Kenya.

    For now, officials insist the country’s forward-contracting strategy and the G-2-G supply arrangement are providing a buffer against immediate shortages, even as authorities intensify monitoring of the volatile global oil market.

  • ‪TikToker ‘Billionaire Son’ Arrested After Filming Himself Tearing Sh100 Bank Notes

    ‪TikToker ‘Billionaire Son’ Arrested After Filming Himself Tearing Sh100 Bank Notes

    Nairobi, March 10, 2026 — Kenyan authorities have arrested TikTok creator Maximilian Motara, popularly known as “Billionaire Son,” after he filmed himself tearing Sh100 banknotes and posted the video online.

    The Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) confirmed that Motara is in custody and awaiting arraignment on charges related to the defacement of Kenyan currency.

    The arrest follows a video circulated on TikTok showing Motara seated in a white sleeveless shirt as he tears several pink Sh100 notes while looking directly at the camera. In the clip, he rips the banknotes into pieces and discards them.

    According to the DCI’s Banking Fraud Investigations Unit, Motara was wanted for allegedly mutilating Kenyan currency notes and flaunting the act on TikTok.

    Kenyan law prohibits the deliberate destruction or defacement of currency. Section 367A of the Penal Code states that any person who wilfully and without lawful authority defaces, tears, cuts or otherwise mutilates a currency note commits an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to three months, a fine of up to Sh2,000, or both.

    The video triggered debate online, with some Kenyans condemning the act as irresponsible, while others questioned why authorities were pursuing what they described as a minor offence.

    Authorities have not yet disclosed when Motara will appear in court.

  • Drama As Govt Officials Skip Opening Of County Commissioner’s Office Presided By Ndindi Nyoro

    Drama As Govt Officials Skip Opening Of County Commissioner’s Office Presided By Ndindi Nyoro

    NAIROBI, Kenya Mar 9 – Residents of Kahuro in Kiharu Constituency witnessed an unusual standoff on Monday after government administrators failed to attend the official opening of a newly built Assistant County Commissioner’s office presided over by area MP Ndindi Nyoro.

    The new Kahuro Assistant County Commissioner (ACC) offices were launched in a ceremony attended by local residents, but the absence of the administrators expected to work from the facility cast a shadow over the event.

    Sources indicated that the officials who had initially been scheduled to attend the launch reportedly stayed away after receiving instructions from senior authorities not to participate in the ceremony.

    According to the sources, the administrators cited receiving “orders from above” directing them not to attend the event or formally take up the office.

    Despite the absence of the officials, Nyoro went ahead with the opening ceremony, saying the facility was ready to serve residents of the area.

    The event briefly turned dramatic when police officers arrived at the venue and attempted to stop the proceedings, prompting protests from residents who had gathered for the launch.

    Nyoro criticised what he described as attempts to frustrate development efforts in the constituency.

    “This office is ready to serve the residents. There were issues here and there. I want to tell those people, they are seeing us quiet but they should not forget who we are. Those who had sent the officers, next time don’t send them  come face me one on one,” he said.

    Residents confronted the officers, forcing them to withdraw from the venue before the ceremony continued.

    The boycott by administrators mirrors a similar incident last year in Murang’a County, when several chiefs and police officers failed to attend another handover ceremony organised by Nyoro in the Mjini area of Kiharu.

    That project involved the opening of another administration block funded through the National Government Constituencies Development Fund.

    Following the latest incident, Nyoro dismissed the absence of the officials as an attempt to undermine his work, insisting he would continue pursuing development initiatives for his constituents.

    In recent months, the Kiharu legislator has appeared to distance himself from the agenda of the ruling Kenya Kwanza Alliance, instead highlighting programmes aimed at improving education and social support in the constituency.

    Among the initiatives he has announced is a plan to provide free primary education for learners in Kiharu. Secondary school students are also required to pay only Sh500 in school fees, while all learners benefit from a free lunch programme supported by the constituency leadership.

  • How NTSA Will Detect Traffic Offenders and the Instant Fines Motorists Will Pay

    How NTSA Will Detect Traffic Offenders and the Instant Fines Motorists Will Pay

    The National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) is preparing to fundamentally change how traffic laws are enforced in Kenya, rolling out an automated system designed to detect violations, instantly notify offenders, and impose fines without the need for roadside cash transactions.

    The new regime introduces instant penalties ranging from KSh500 to KSh10,000, targeting dozens of common offences committed by motorists, motorcycle riders, PSV operators and even pedestrians.

    At the centre of the new enforcement system is a nationwide network of surveillance technology. Authorities plan to deploy 700 fixed traffic cameras and 300 mobile camera units along highways, urban roads and accident-prone corridors.  

    These devices will automatically detect violations such as speeding, driving on pedestrian paths, or ignoring traffic signs. Once a violation is captured, the footage will be transmitted to a National Command and Control Centre, where it will be processed in real time.

    The system will then generate a digital offence record linked to the driver’s second-generation Smart Driving Licence (e-DL). From there, the registered vehicle owner or driver will receive a notification of the violation and the fine due.  

    Motorists will be able to pay the penalties electronically through mobile money platforms, banking channels, USSD codes, or a digital driving licence wallet. The move is meant to eliminate roadside cash payments and reduce bribery, which anti-corruption investigators have long identified as a major problem in traffic enforcement.  

    Kenya’s road safety record has deteriorated sharply in recent years, with fatalities rising from 3,875 deaths in 2019 to more than 5,100 by 2024, according to road safety data. Authorities say weak enforcement, corruption and limited surveillance tools have allowed dangerous driving habits to flourish.  

    The automated system is part of a long-term project expected to run for 21 years under a public-private partnership valued at roughly KSh42 billion, aimed at restoring discipline on Kenyan roads.  

    Highest Instant Fines — Up to KSh10,000

    The most serious traffic offences attract the highest penalties.

    Drivers will face KSh10,000 fines for offences including:

    Driving without identification number plates.

    Operating a vehicle without a valid inspection certificate.

    Exceeding speed limits by 16–20 km/h or more.

    Causing obstruction by leaving a vehicle blocking traffic.

    PSV operators employing unlicensed drivers or conductors.

    Common Traffic Offences and Penalties

    The NTSA schedule lists 37 minor traffic offences and their corresponding fines.

    Some of the most common include:

    Speeding

    Exceeding limit by 1–5 km/h: Warning.

    6–10 km/h: KSh500.

    11–15 km/h: KSh3,000.

    16–20 km/h or more: KSh10,000.  

    Driving and Road Conduct

    Driving on a pedestrian walkway: KSh5,000.

    Failure to obey traffic signs: KSh3,000.

    Failure to obey police directions: KSh3,000.

    Failure to stop when ordered by police: KSh5,000.

    Using a mobile phone while driving: KSh2,000.

    Vehicle Compliance

    Failure to carry a driving licence: KSh1,000.

    Failure to renew a driving licence: KSh1,000.

    Failure to wear a seat belt: KSh500.

    Failure to install seat belts in a vehicle: KSh1,000 per seat.

    Failure to carry reflective warning triangles: KSh2,000.

    PSV and Matatu-Specific Offences

    Public Service Vehicle operators face additional penalties aimed at tightening discipline in the sector.

    Some of the key offences include:

    Driving a PSV while unqualified: KSh5,000.

    Employing an unlicensed driver or conductor: KSh10,000.

    Driver or conductor failing to wear badge or uniform: KSh2,000.

    Operating a PSV with tinted windows: KSh3,000.

    Failure to install a speed governor: KSh10,000.

    Picking or dropping passengers at unauthorized locations: KSh3,000.

    Motorcycle riders will also face penalties, including KSh1,000 fines for riding without protective gear or carrying more than one passenger.  

    Pedestrians Not Spared

    Even pedestrians fall under the new enforcement regime. Anyone found wilfully obstructing vehicles on the road can be fined KSh500, while passengers boarding or alighting vehicles at unauthorized points may face KSh1,000 penalties.  

    Officials say the automated system is intended to remove discretion from roadside enforcement and replace it with data-driven policing.

    By linking violations directly to digital driver records and automated fines, authorities hope to close loopholes that have long enabled bribery, ignored offences and inconsistent enforcement.

    For motorists across Kenya, the message is clear: once the cameras go live, every lane change, speed surge or illegal stop could be recorded — and the fine may arrive before the driver even reaches home.

     

  • Motorists To Receive Instant Fines Via SMS As NTSA Rolls Out New System

    Motorists To Receive Instant Fines Via SMS As NTSA Rolls Out New System

    NAIROBI, Kenya, Mar 9 — The National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) has launched a new Instant Fines Traffic Management System that will automatically issue traffic violation notifications to motorists via SMS.

    In a public notice issued Monday, NTSA said the system is now live and is designed to enhance transparency, efficiency, and accountability in traffic enforcement by eliminating human intervention in the issuance of fines.

    Under the system, motorists who violate traffic regulations will receive automated notifications indicating the offence and the fine payable.

    NTSA said all fines issued through the platform must be paid through the KCB Group branch network within seven days.

    Motorists who fail to settle the fines within the stipulated period will have the amount accrue interest.

    In addition, vehicles or drivers with outstanding penalties will be unable to access NTSA service platforms until the fines are cleared.

    The authority urged motorists to strictly observe traffic regulations and respond promptly to official notifications sent through the system.

    NTSA said additional details about the system will be communicated through official government channels.

  • Mojtaba Khamenei: The Shadow Prince Who Rose To Became Iran’s Supreme Leader

    Mojtaba Khamenei: The Shadow Prince Who Rose To Became Iran’s Supreme Leader

    Mojtaba Khamenei, long known as the discreet and powerful son of slain Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was announced early Monday as Iran’s new Supreme Leader at a time when the country is at war and Israel has openly vowed to target any successor to his father.

    Iran’s Assembly of Experts in a statement introduced Mojtaba Khamenei as the new leader of the Islamic Republic, five days after Iran International first reported that the body had selected him under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards.

    For decades Mojtaba operated largely out of public view while building deep ties across the Islamic Republic’s political and security apparatus. His rise marks the formal emergence of a figure who had already been widely regarded as one of the most influential actors behind the scenes of Iran’s ruling establishment.

    Mojtaba, the second son of Ali Khamenei, has long been considered the only member of his family with clear political ambitions. His younger brother, Masoud, worked only in administrative roles within their father’s office, while his other two brothers and two sisters are not known to have held political or bureaucratic positions.

    Born in 1969 in Mashhad, Mojtaba continued his education in Tehran at the prestigious Alavi High School, which produced many of the Islamic Republic’s elite, including former foreign minister Javad Zarif. The school’s dean, Kamal Kharrazi, later became one of Ali Khamenei’s senior political advisers.

    After graduating, Mojtaba began religious studies in Tehran before moving to Qom to pursue seminary education. In recent years, he has taught dars-e kharij — the highest level of jurisprudential instruction and a prerequisite for attaining the rank of mujtahid — at the Qom Seminary.

    Mojtaba married Zahra Haddad-Adel, daughter of former parliamentary speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel. Zahra and one of their children were killed in the February 28 attack on Ali Khamenei’s residence. The couple had three children.

    Because Mojtaba operated almost entirely behind the scenes under strict security, official information about him remained scarce, and unofficial reporting has often been fragmentary.

    He held no formal executive or elected position for much of his career, yet he was widely believed to wield significant influence within the Office of the Supreme Leader and to oversee parts of his father’s administrative network.

    Political orientation and policy views

    A devoted pupil of Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the ideological architect of the ultraconservative Paydari Party, Mojtaba has long been aligned with Iran’s hardline faction. Analysts describe him as an advocate of a “unified state” in which appointed institutions overshadow elected bodies.

    This model was implemented most clearly during the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi, when moderate conservatives such as Ali Larijani were marginalized and gradually pushed out of the political arena. Mojtaba has also been widely regarded as a key supporter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rise in 2005 and his continuation in power after the disputed 2009 election.

    Mesbah-Yazdi, a fierce opponent of republicanism who died in 2021, argued that the Supreme Leader should be appointed without regard for public consent. Mojtaba has embraced this worldview, supporting strong clerical authority and the exclusion of moderates from power.

    He has also been widely viewed as the principal political and financial patron of the Paydari Front, whose members see him as the guarantor of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary identity after his father.

    His foreign-policy outlook is deeply distrustful of the West, particularly the United States, and rooted in the doctrine of “resistance.” He strongly supports expanding Iran’s regional influence and strengthening the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” opposing compromise with Western governments.

    Position on protests

    Although Mojtaba has rarely spoken publicly, political reporting has consistently portrayed him as favoring a forceful, security-driven response to domestic unrest.

    During the 2009 Green Movement protests, he was widely identified as one of the key figures overseeing the crackdown. Demonstrators chanted directly against him for the first time, shouting: “Mojtaba, may you die before you see leadership.”

    During the protests of 2022, media outlets close to the regime again depicted him as central to maintaining internal stability.

    His supporters—including segments of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the paramilitary Basij, hardline clerics in Qom, institutions linked to the Supreme Leader’s Office, and state-aligned media—describe him as devout, discreet, and deeply knowledgeable about security affairs.

    Opponents, including much of the public and the political opposition, view him as a symbol of hereditary succession and criticize both his role in crackdowns and his opaque political influence.

    IRGC networks

    Mojtaba has maintained extensive ties to Iran’s intelligence and military structures. His network dates back to his youth, when he served in the IRGC’s Habib Battalion during the Iran–Iraq War—a unit that later produced many senior commanders, including Esmail Kowsari.

    He has had a particularly close relationship with Hossein Taeb, former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and has widely been believed to exert influence over its operations. Mohammad Sarafraz, the former head of state television, wrote that Mojtaba and Taeb pressured him to allocate a large share of the broadcaster’s advertising revenue to their networks.

    Many Iranian analysts believe Mojtaba has played a decisive role in shaping senior IRGC appointments and key security positions.

    Implications of his leadership

    With Mojtaba Khamenei now formally assuming the role of Supreme Leader, observers say his leadership could reinforce the dominance of Iran’s hardline institutions and deepen the role of the security establishment within the political system.

    His extensive ties to the IRGC and his long-standing influence within the Supreme Leader’s office have given him a unique power base even before holding the title. For years he operated as one of the most consequential figures in Iran’s political hierarchy without occupying a formal public position.

    Now, as Supreme Leader, the “shadow prince” of the Islamic Republic has stepped fully into the center of power.

    Iran International 

  • KUCCPS Opens TVET Course Applications for May 2026 Intake

    KUCCPS Opens TVET Course Applications for May 2026 Intake

    The Kenya Universities and Colleges Central Placement Service (KUCCPS) has opened applications for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) courses for the May 2026 intake.

    The applications target students who sat the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education in 2025 and previous years.

    In a notice to candidates, KUCCPS said students can now apply for courses offered in National Polytechnics, Technical Training Institutes, Institutes of science and technology, and other accredited technical colleges across the country.

    The placement body encouraged candidates to log in to the KUCCPS student portal and select courses of their choice, noting that students with any KCSE mean grade are eligible to apply for various TVET programmes.

    Applicants are required to access the portal through: http://students.kuccps.ac.ke.

    KUCCPS also clarified that the opportunity is not limited to the 2025 KCSE class, as Form Four leavers from previous years are also eligible to submit applications.

    The application window will remain open until March 18, 2026, after which the placement process will begin.

    TVET institutions in Kenya offer practical training in fields such as engineering, ICT, hospitality, construction, and business, equipping learners with technical skills needed in the labour market.

    The agency is a state corporation mandated to coordinate the placement of government-sponsored students to universities, colleges, and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions.

    Established under the Universities Act, KUCCPS also develops career guidance programmes, disseminates information on available courses, and ensures equitable access to higher education opportunities.

    The agency oversees application processes, sets minimum entry requirements, and allocates students to institutions based on merit, preferences, and available capacity.

    Successful applicants will now join accredited institutions in May, beginning courses designed to equip them with practical knowledge in diverse fields.

    The institution has online portals designed to help students, parents, and learning institutions conveniently access placement services and programme information.

    According to KUCCPS, the digital platforms allow users to browse available courses, apply for placement, or update institutional programme details depending on their role.

    Students seeking placement into universities, colleges, and technical institutions can access the Student’s Portal to view institutions, available programmes, and their minimum entry requirements.

    Applicants can also submit their course applications through the portal.

    The Institution’s portal is designed for university vice-chancellors, college principals, or their authorised representatives.

    Through this portal, institutions can declare or update their programme capacities and institutional details to facilitate the national student placement process. The portal also allows them to access placement-related data.

    The Principal’s Portal was previously used by secondary schools to submit course applications on behalf of their Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education candidates under the School/Centre Application system.

    However, KUCCPS said the School/Centre Application process was discontinued in 2023, and schools seeking more information have been advised to contact the placement service directly.

    KUCCPS continues to encourage students and stakeholders to use the online platforms to easily access placement services and information on academic programmes offered across institutions.

  • Does ICT CS William Kabogo Own a Private Road in Runda?

    Does ICT CS William Kabogo Own a Private Road in Runda?

    Nairobi, March 8, 2026 – A dispute over access to Kabogo Kangethe Road II in Nairobi’s upscale Runda estate has drawn Information, Communications and the Digital Economy Cabinet Secretary William Kabogo into a legal and public controversy over whether the road is private or public.

    The dispute emerged after resident Esther Muthoni filed a case at the Milimani Law Courts against the National Land Commission, the Kenya Urban Roads Authority and several other parties, claiming she was denied access to her residence through the road.

    The court issued interim orders in late February 2026 restraining any party from blocking or interfering with her access and directed the Officer Commanding Station at Runda Police Station to enforce compliance. The case will be mentioned on March 18.

    Kabogo was recently seen in a viral video during a confrontation with a motorist who had been stopped from using the road.

    In a statement, he maintained that the road is private property and not a public road. He declined to comment further, citing the ongoing court case.

    Questions have arisen over whether Kabogo personally owns the road. The name Kabogo Kangethe Road II has drawn attention because of its similarity to his family lineage named after his uncle Joseph, although no official confirmation of ownership has been made public.

    Kabogo has significant real estate interests in the wider Runda and Kiambu Road area, including the Iguta Paradise Homes residential development.

    Like many gated estates in the neighbourhood, such developments often maintain internal roads through private management arrangements.

    The dispute comes amid growing debate over access to roads within gated communities in Nairobi, where residents’ associations sometimes restrict entry to non-residents.

    Neither the National Land Commission nor the Kenya Urban Roads Authority has publicly clarified the ownership status of Kabogo Kangethe Road II.

    Former President Uhuru Kenyatta during a visit at Kabogo’s Iguta Paradise Homes in Runda

    With the matter now before the courts, the legal process is expected to determine whether the road is privately owned or forms part of the public road network.

  • Atleast 10 Dead, Scores Missing As Heavy Rains Hit Nairobi

    Atleast 10 Dead, Scores Missing As Heavy Rains Hit Nairobi

    Ten people have been confirmed dead in Nairobi following the devastating floods that struck the city on Friday.

    Nairobi Police Commander George Seda said eight of the victims were swept away by fast-rising floodwaters, with some dying while inside vehicles that were carried away by the raging currents.

    Seda added that two other victims died in separate electrocution incidents during the floods in different parts of the county.

    According to the county police boss, at least 71 vehicles were trapped or stranded across the city after major roads became impassable due to the heavy flooding.

    Speaking to Radio Citizen, Seda warned that the death toll could rise as search and rescue operations continue in several areas severely affected by the floods.

    Residents across Nairobi woke up to flooded neighbourhoods, stranded motorists and widespread disruption on Saturday morning after the heavy downpour left several parts of the city submerged and major roads impassable.

    According to the Secretary General of the Kenya Red Cross Society, Ahmed Idris, multiple residential estates and informal settlements were severely affected as floodwaters surged through low-lying areas and along river corridors.

    Among the hardest-hit areas were Pipeline and Embakasi, where sections of Kware Road were completely cut off by floodwaters. Other affected neighbourhoods include Mukuru Kwa Njenga, Reuben, Viwandani, Kibra, Mathare, Huruma, Baba Dogo and Bosnia.

    Flooding was also reported in South B and South C, Nairobi West and Lang’ata, as well as Umoja 3, Chokaa, Njiru, Ruai and Utawala. In northern and western parts of the city, Roysambu along Kamiti Road, Kahawa West, Githurai, Loresho and sections of Westlands also experienced rising waters.

    Major highways and urban roads were heavily disrupted, with some rendered impassable through the night. The Kenya Red Cross Society reported that traffic snarl-ups stretched into the early hours of Saturday morning as motorists struggled to navigate flooded sections.

    The most affected transport corridors included roads within the central business district and surrounding feeder routes such as Museum Hill, Uhuru Park and Uhuru Highway, as well as Mbagathi Way.

    Floodwaters also disrupted traffic along Mombasa Road near South C, Bellevue, the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport exit and Kyumbi junction.

    On Thika Superhighway, motorists reported difficult driving conditions around Githurai, Kahawa Sukari and Kenyatta Road.

    Other roads experiencing severe flooding included Lunga Lunga Road near the Kenya Power and Lighting Company depot, Limuru Road near the Belgian Embassy, Jogoo Road, Enterprise Road, Lang’ata Road near T-Mall, Riverside Drive, Kawangware at Amboseli, Kamukunji and Kabete.

    Emergency response teams, including the military, were deployed overnight to assist stranded residents and restore mobility in affected areas.

    The Kenya Red Cross Society said its first responders rescued at least 20 people who had been stranded along Kirinyaga Road after floodwaters overwhelmed parts of the area. The victims were safely evacuated as teams continued to monitor the situation and support affected communities.

    A military Rapid Response Unit was also mobilised to support emergency operations in the city. The unit conducted traffic control operations and facilitated the towing of five vehicles that had stalled at the Kariokor–Ring Road roundabout due to the swollen Nairobi River, helping restore traffic flow.

    Additional traffic management was set up at the Mbagathi Roundabout, which had also been affected by flooding.

    The Kenya Meteorological Department has warned that intense rainfall is expected to continue in most parts of the country, increasing the risk of flooding, swollen rivers and transport disruption.

    In response to the unfolding situation, Public Service, Human Capital Development and Special Programmes CS Geoffrey Ruku announced that an emergency coordination meeting will be held on Saturday morning bringing together key national disaster response agencies.

    The meeting will involve the State Department for Special Programmes, the National Police Service, the National Youth Service, the St. John Ambulance Kenya, as well as the National Disaster Management Unit, the National Disaster Operations Centre and the National Drought Management Authority.

    Authorities say the meeting will focus on accelerating response measures and strengthening coordination among emergency agencies as the country braces for continued rainfall.

  • Win For Bloggers As Court Strikes Down Cybercrime Act Criminalizing Publication of False Information

    Win For Bloggers As Court Strikes Down Cybercrime Act Criminalizing Publication of False Information

    The Court of Appeal in Nairobi has declared unconstitutional key provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act that criminalised the publication of false information online, dealing a major blow to sections of the controversial law.

    In a judgment delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Justices Kiage, Muchelule and Korir, the appellate court partially allowed an appeal filed by the Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE) challenging several provisions of the 2018 legislation.

    The appeal arose from a 2020 High Court decision by Justice James Makau, which had dismissed BAKE’s petition and upheld the constitutionality of the impugned provisions, finding that they did not violate fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.

    Dissatisfied with that ruling, BAKE moved to the Court of Appeal, arguing that several sections of the law were vague, overly broad and posed a threat to constitutional freedoms, particularly freedom of expression and the right to privacy.

    Central to the appeal were Sections 22 and 23 of the Act, which criminalised the publication of false or misleading information and the dissemination of false information likely to cause panic, chaos or damage to a person’s reputation.

    BAKE and supporting organisations, including Article 19 East Africa, the Kenya Union of Journalists and the Law Society of Kenya, argued that the provisions used vague terms such as “false”, “misleading”, “panic” and “chaos”, making it difficult for citizens to know what conduct amounted to a criminal offence.

    They further contended that the provisions had a chilling effect on free speech and could be abused by authorities to suppress legitimate expression, especially online commentary and criticism of government.

    In their analysis, the appellate judges examined whether the contested provisions met the constitutional test under Article 24, which allows the limitation of rights only where such restrictions are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.

    The court observed that legislation “restricting constitutional freedoms must be clear, specific and proportionate to the objective it seeks to achieve.”

    While acknowledging the government’s duty to combat cybercrime and protect citizens from harmful online conduct, the judges emphasised that such objectives must be pursued without undermining fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.

    The court therefore found that certain provisions criminalising the publication of false information online were inconsistent with constitutional protections for freedom of expression.

    However, the judges upheld other sections of the Act dealing with offences such as unauthorised access to computer systems, electronic fraud and interception of communications, finding that they were necessary tools in addressing cybercrime.

    The decision marks a significant development in Kenya’s digital rights landscape and clarifies the limits of state power in regulating online speech.

  • Kenya Has No Capacity to Save Its Over 500,000 Citizens Stuck in the Middle East Fire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Appears to Say

    Kenya Has No Capacity to Save Its Over 500,000 Citizens Stuck in the Middle East Fire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Appears to Say

    When the bombs started falling across the Middle East and the skies above the Gulf filled with smoke, more than 500,000 Kenyans — domestic workers, construction labourers, nurses, hospitality staff — were left to fend for themselves. The Kenyan government’s message, dressed in the careful language of diplomacy, amounted to this: get out if you can, and pay for it yourself.

    Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Musalia Mudavadi issued a statement on Friday telling Kenyans in the region to make their own arrangements through “available commercial airlines or licensed travel agents” if they wished to depart. There was no mention of evacuation flights. There was no mention of government-chartered aircraft. There was no mention of financial assistance for workers whose employers have, in many cases, been holding their passports.

    The advisory effectively handed the bill — and the burden — to the very people least equipped to carry it: migrant workers earning poverty wages in foreign countries, many of whom are legally and physically trapped by the kafala system that governs employment in Gulf states and strips workers of the right to leave without employer permission.

    A hotline that no one answers

    The dysfunction of Kenya’s crisis response machinery was exposed in a spot check conducted by a local publication, which placed calls and WhatsApp messages to ten official emergency contacts listed by the State Department for Diaspora Affairs and Kenyan missions across the Gulf and Middle East, including embassies in Israel, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kenyan consulates in Dubai and Jeddah.

    The results were damning. The State Department for Diaspora Affairs operates what it grandly describes as a 24-hour diaspora emergency hotline. The department’s own promotional material promises that calls will be answered within four rings or 30 seconds. When the reporter called, the line did not ring at all. Multiple attempts returned the same automated response: out of service.

    The hotline that is supposed to be the first point of contact for any Kenyan facing a crisis abroad — the number listed on government websites, circulated by embassies, and cited in official advisories — was dead.

    Of the nine embassy and consulate contacts tested, only the Kenyan mission in Tel Aviv returned a direct call. A Kenyan official there phoned back in the early morning hours after receiving a WhatsApp inquiry about evacuation plans. He said contingency plans existed and described the situation as “fluid yet manageable” — a formulation that captured perfectly the gap between official posture and the lived reality of Kenyans watching missiles light up the sky on their phones.

    The Kenyan Embassy in Qatar did not answer repeated calls placed at dawn and again later in the morning. It responded only after a WhatsApp message was sent. When a worker asked what to do if their employer refused to release their passport in the event of an emergency evacuation, the embassy replied that it would assist “when the time comes” — and then asked for the worker’s name, passport number, and next-of-kin details to be emailed to a labour desk.

    The response from Oman was to direct Kenyans to an online registration portal. The embassy in Kuwait sent a generic notice urging Kenyans in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon to register on the government’s diaspora platform. The Dubai consulate eventually responded, pointing to a registration link and noting that, in a worst-case scenario, Kenyans without passports could obtain an emergency travel document at the consulate — a useful piece of information buried under hours of silence.

    The Kenyan embassies in Saudi Arabia and the Jeddah consulate had no WhatsApp presence at all, cutting off the primary communication channel used by hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in the Kingdom. The emergency contact for the Tehran embassy appeared to have an active WhatsApp account but remained offline for the entire period of inquiry. The Abu Dhabi embassy did not respond to calls or messages at all.

    Njogu’s media disappearing act

    The Ministry’s communication problems were further illustrated by an embarrassing episode that played out in public on Wednesday. Principal Secretary for Diaspora Affairs Roseline Njogu was scheduled to appear on a KTN Prime panel discussion on the Middle East conflict alongside the ambassadors of Iran and Israel to Kenya.

    Then she vanished. A poster advertising the programme circulated widely on social media. Njogu subsequently issued a statement denying she had agreed to appear, accusing KTN of “disinformation” and declaring the network “out of order.” The Standard Group, which operates KTN, maintained that Njogu had earlier agreed to a phone interview during the 9 pm news bulletin. KTN clarified that the ambassadors were to be hosted on a separate occasion and that the poster was intended only to preview the broadcast lineup.

    The following day, Foreign Affairs PS Korir Singoei was deployed to clean up the mess. He issued a statement describing the episode as a scheduling matter, insisting there had been no intention to mislead the public. He neither confirmed nor denied that Njogu had agreed to appear. The episode left the public with the uncomfortable image of the country’s top diaspora official refusing to face the cameras at the precise moment 500,000 Kenyans needed her to.

    How other countries are doing it

    The contrast with how other governments have handled the same crisis is instructive and humiliating in equal measure.

    Dubai International Airport and Al Maktoum International Airport together operated more than 1,140 flights in a 84-hour window between March 2 and 5, offering roughly 105,000 outbound seats to travellers from more than 80 countries. Airport authorities noted that the number of flights was likely to increase as airlines expanded schedules to absorb demand from those seeking to leave the region.

    The Sultanate of Oman, coordinating with international airlines and foreign governments, organised dedicated flights enabling nationals of what it described as “brotherly and friendly countries” to return home safely. Oman’s approach was proactive, structured, and communicated clearly through official channels.

    Governments across South and Southeast Asia — countries whose migrant worker populations rival Kenya’s in scale — have emergency evacuation infrastructure that includes government-chartered aircraft, dedicated crisis funds, and consular staff trained to deal with mass departure scenarios. The Philippines maintains a permanent overseas workers welfare architecture with emergency repatriation as a core function. India has demonstrated in previous Middle East crises, including the 2015 Yemen evacuation, that it can move tens of thousands of citizens out of conflict zones in a matter of days.

    Kenya has no equivalent architecture. The State Department for Diaspora Affairs was established in 2022 under President William Ruto with much fanfare, promising a new era of responsiveness to the needs of Kenyans abroad. Its emergency hotline, which apparently cannot be reached, is the most visible measure of how far that promise remains from fulfilment.

    Workers trapped by the kafala system

    At the heart of the crisis is a structural vulnerability that the Kenyan government has consistently failed to address. The kafala system, which ties migrant workers’ legal status to a single employer and prohibits departure without employer consent, is in force across the Gulf states where the vast majority of Kenya’s diaspora works.

    Passport confiscation, while technically illegal under Kenyan and international law, is routine. Workers who attempt to leave without permission risk arrest, deportation, and blacklisting from future employment. In a conflict scenario, these are not abstract risks. They are the difference between getting on a flight and being stranded.

    When this reporter asked the Qatar embassy what a worker should do if their employer refused to release their passport as the security situation deteriorated, the response was to wait until “the time comes” and then contact the labour desk. There was no protocol. There was no urgency. There was no acknowledgment that the question described a situation already affecting workers across the region.

    Half a trillion shillings at stake

    The government’s apparent indifference is remarkable given the economic stakes. Remittances from the Gulf and broader Middle East region represent one of Kenya’s largest sources of foreign exchange, running into billions of dollars annually. Kenya’s total trade volume with Gulf countries including the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar stood at $6 billion as of 2024, with agricultural exports — fresh flowers, fruit and vegetables — flowing through the very air corridors now disrupted by conflict.

    The Central Bank of Kenya consistently ranks the Middle East among the top sources of diaspora remittances. Any prolonged disruption to the movement and employment of Kenyan workers in the region will feed directly into household incomes, school fees, and the informal credit chains that run through communities across the country.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged this in its Friday statement, noting that the conflict could disrupt trade flows and that it was working with Kenya Airways to secure special cargo permits and additional flight capacity for perishable exports. The government’s greater anxiety, it appeared, was for the flower consignments than for the workers.

    Mudavadi’s reassurances ring hollow

    Musalia Mudavadi

    Mudavadi said in his Friday statement that no Kenyan casualties had been reported since hostilities began and that the government’s “top priority” was the safety and welfare of citizens abroad. He said Kenya’s seven embassies and two consulates across the region had “activated emergency and contingency response mechanisms, including evacuation plans should the security situation deteriorate further.”

    The gap between that statement and the experience of a Kenyan worker trying to reach an embassy that does not answer its phone was left unaddressed. PS Singoei, meanwhile, said the State Department for Diaspora was playing a “frontline role” in addressing the welfare of diaspora communities. The frontline, based on a test of its emergency lines, appears to have been abandoned.

    In a crisis, preparedness is measured not by the language of official statements but by whether someone answers the phone. On that test, Kenya is failing its citizens in the Gulf — not quietly, but loudly, and in real time.

  • Israel and Iran Ambassadors Face Off in Kenya As War Escalates

    Israel and Iran Ambassadors Face Off in Kenya As War Escalates

    NAIROBI, Kenya, March 7 — They sat in separate offices across the same capital city, speaking with the quiet authority of men whose words carry the weight of war. One insisted the bombing of a girls’ primary school was enemy propaganda. The other said 185 little girls were dead, and that the number was still climbing. This is what diplomacy looks like when the world is on fire.

    As United States and Israeli warplanes pounded Iran for a seventh consecutive day on Friday, raining penetrator bombs on deeply buried missile sites and regime infrastructure in Tehran, the ambassadors of both Israel and Iran to Kenya fought a parallel battle for the African narrative, dispensing opposite and irreconcilable accounts of the most dangerous conflict the Middle East has seen in a generation.

    Israel’s Ambassador to Kenya, Gideon Behar, told Capital FM on Thursday that the joint US-Israeli military campaign — code-named Operation Epic Fury and launched on February 28 — was a pre-emptive strike against an existential threat. Iran’s Ambassador to Kenya, Dr Ali Gholampour, told the Nation that his country had no choice but to defend itself and that it alone would decide when the fighting stopped.

    The death toll in Iran from the US-Israeli bombardment had risen to at least 1,332 by Friday, according to the Iranian Red Crescent, including more than 181 children. Among the dead is Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the opening night of the assault when strikes targeted his office compound in Tehran. Iran’s parliament building, its state broadcaster headquarters, and a presidential office complex have since been reduced to rubble, as US B-2 stealth bombers drop 2,000-pound penetrator munitions on underground ballistic missile facilities and the US Central Command reports having struck nearly 2,000 targets inside Iran.

    Iran has struck back with waves of missiles and drones targeting Israel and military installations across nine countries, killing US soldiers in Kuwait, damaging an oil refinery in Bahrain, hitting an Amazon data centre in the UAE, and sending a drone into a British air base runway in Cyprus. At least six American service members have been confirmed killed in the conflict, all from a single Iranian strike on a base in Kuwait. The US embassy there has been closed indefinitely.

    On Friday, US President Donald Trump demanded Iran’s unconditional surrender and said he would not negotiate on any other terms. His defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, warned the bombardment was about to surge dramatically. Israel’s military announced a new phase of operations, targeting what it called regime infrastructure across the capital.

    * * *

    In Nairobi, the proxy battle for hearts and minds played out with equal intensity. Behar, speaking in a virtual interview with the Nation, was asked about the bombing of a girls’ primary school in the southern Iranian town of Minab on the first day of the war, a strike that killed at least 180 students and staff, a figure Iran’s own health ministry confirmed. His answer was instantaneous and categorical: fake news, he said. Iranian propaganda.

    Gholampour had a different version, one buttressed by satellite imagery, independent analysts, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Office, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala Yousafzai. By Friday, UNICEF had confirmed at least 181 children were among the more than 1,300 dead in Iran. A school in Tehran’s Niloufar Square had been struck earlier that day; Iran’s Foreign Ministry posted footage of destroyed classrooms to X. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said American forces would never deliberately target a school and that the Department of Defence was investigating whether the strike was theirs.

    On the nuclear question, Behar argued the strikes were necessary precisely because of timing. Iran, he said, had been on the verge of moving its nuclear programme into tunnels too deep to hit from the air. The Iranians had been dragging their feet through negotiations for years, buying time. The talks had collapsed in early February 2026 after the US demanded a complete halt to all uranium enrichment and Iran refused.

    “We knew that once these capabilities were buried underground it would be almost impossible to stop them from acquiring an atomic bomb,” Behar told the Nation. “Our action was a pre-emptive action to stop an existential threat against Israel.”

    The International Atomic Energy Agency had said as recently as March 2 that it had no indication any nuclear installation had been hit or damaged in the strikes, though Iran said at least one site had been targeted. The strikes follow the October 2025 triggering of snapback sanctions against Iran by the United Kingdom, Germany and France under the 2015 nuclear deal.

    Gholampour rejected the nuclear justification entirely, calling the war an illegal act of military aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter. Iran, he said, would decide when it ended. “Everything depends on when the aggression is stopped. If it is stopped, our authorities will consider the situation. But if not, then we will continue to defend ourselves — we have no other choice, because this is an imposed war against my nation and my country,” the ambassador said.

    Behar also widened the frame beyond the nuclear issue, accusing Tehran of financing militant networks across Africa, including in the Horn of Africa. Destroying Iran’s capacity to fund such networks, he argued, would reduce the operational reach of extremist groups on the continent. He described ordinary Iranians as friendly and peaceful, painting the war as one against a terrorist regime that the Iranian people themselves opposed, pointing to the nationwide protests that security forces crushed in early 2026.

    * * *

    Kenya was drawn into the diplomatic crossfire almost immediately. President William Ruto condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes on the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain, warning that the regionalisation of the conflict posed a grave threat to international peace and security. He did not mention the original US-Israeli attack on Iran. Tehran was not amused.

    Gholampour told the Nation he was surprised that Kenya had chosen to condemn Iran’s response rather than the initial aggressor. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs scrambled to clarify that Nairobi was not taking sides but was opposed to the ballooning of the conflict through attacks on countries not at war. Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’oei said Kenya was only opposed to escalating violence, not backing any belligerent. The apparent contradiction left analysts questioning whether Ruto’s statement reflected considered foreign policy or, as one Nation columnist put it, personal ties to American evangelical networks rather than Kenya’s national interests.

    The stakes for Kenya are vast. Some 500,000 Kenyans live and work in the Middle East, with roughly 300,000 in Saudi Arabia, 70,000 in Qatar and between 60,000 and 80,000 in the UAE. Iran is among Kenya’s top ten tea export destinations, purchasing 13 million kilogrammes worth Sh4.26 billion in 2024. Kenya Airways suspended flights to Dubai and Sharjah as airspace closures disrupted routes. Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi warned Parliament that a prolonged war would force Kenya to rethink its economic strategy as supply chains fracture and oil prices surge to their highest levels since September 2023.

    Interior Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen met Behar on March 3 to explore deepening Kenya-Israel cooperation, a meeting that sparked sharp reactions online. Gholampour, meanwhile, moved to reassure Kenyans that Iran’s missiles would not reach Kenyan territory, saying the country’s strikes were deliberately limited in range to US military targets and designed to signal defensive rather than expansionist intent. Kenya hosts a US military base in Manda, Lamu County.

    As the conflict entered its seventh day on Friday with no end in sight, Nairobi’s balancing act grew harder by the hour. International relations expert Professor Macharia Munene, who tracks Kenya’s foreign policy, described Ruto’s response as a survival tactic. “He wants to be in the good books of the US and Israel,” Munene said. “But the optics have complicated Kenya’s diplomatic posture in a region where it has deep labour and trade ties.”

    Behar ended his media interviews with confidence in the conflict’s outcome. He predicted a more stable Middle East once what he called the destabilising influence of the Iranian regime had been removed, and described Kenya and Israel as close partners built on mutual respect and a long history of cooperation. Gholampour ended his with defiance. Iran, he said, had been under attack in violation of international law, and the international community, Kenya included, had an obligation to direct its condemnation at the aggressors.

    Meanwhile, in Minab, the families of the dead continued to bury their children.

  • Govt Advices Over 500,000 Kenyans Stranded in Middle East Conflict To Leave At Own Cost, State Won’t Pay

    Govt Advices Over 500,000 Kenyans Stranded in Middle East Conflict To Leave At Own Cost, State Won’t Pay

    Kenya has urged its estimated 500,000 nationals across the Middle East to leave the region using available commercial or repatriation flights at their own expense, as conflict escalates. The government said no Kenyan casualties have been reported since hostilities began a week ago.

    Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Musalia Mudavadi said on Friday that the government was closely monitoring the rapidly evolving security situation while coordinating with diplomatic missions across the region to safeguard Kenyan citizens.

    “Kenyan citizens who wish to depart the region are advised, where feasible and safe, to make appropriate arrangements through available commercial airlines or licensed travel agents,” he said in a statement.

    In a statement issued on March 6, the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs said the safety and well-being of Kenyans abroad remained the government’s “top priority”, noting that most nationals in the region were continuing with their daily activities depending on local security conditions.

    The advisory effectively places the cost and responsibility for immediate departures on individual travellers, although the government said it was coordinating broader evacuation efforts through diplomatic channels and commercial aviation.

    Kenya Airways, the national carrier, has begun using negotiated safe air corridors to help repatriate Kenyans stranded in the region as tensions disrupt regular travel routes.

    Mr Mudavadi said the ministry remained in constant communication with Kenya’s diplomatic network across the Middle East, which includes seven embassies and two consulates-general.

    “These missions continue to provide regular updates on the welfare of Kenyan nationals and the security of our diplomatic personnel and facilities,” the statement added.

    Kenyan embassies across the region have activated emergency and contingency response mechanisms, including evacuation plans should the security situation deteriorate further.

    Diaspora support

    And Kenyans were urged to register with the nearest Kenyan embassy or consulate and maintain regular communication with diplomatic staff through emergency helplines established across the missions.

    The State Department for Diaspora Affairs also activated a 24-hour diaspora support centre accessible via telephone and WhatsApp to assist Kenyans seeking guidance.

    Officials said the centre is intended to coordinate information, assist distressed nationals and connect Kenyans with diplomatic missions across the region.

    The advisory comes as several Gulf countries intensify efforts to assist foreign nationals seeking to return home as the conflict widens and aviation routes face intermittent disruption.

    Authorities in Dubai said aviation teams had operated more than 1,140 flights within the past 84 hours through Dubai International Airport and Dubai World Central – Al Maktoum International Airport, facilitating the departure of thousands of travellers heading back to their home countries.

    Between 2 and 5 March, more than 500 flights departed the two airports, offering roughly 105,000 outbound seats to more than 80 countries, according to airport authorities.

    Officials said the number of flights could rise as airlines expand schedules to accommodate growing demand from travellers seeking to leave the region.

    Airports and airlines have urged passengers to monitor flight updates closely and confirm travel arrangements directly with their carriers as schedules continue to change in response to the evolving security environment.

    Elsewhere in the Gulf, the Sultanate of Oman stepped in to facilitate the safe departure of foreign nationals.

    In a statement reported, the local Ministry of Information said Oman was coordinating with international airlines and foreign governments to organise flights enabling travellers from “brotherly and friendly countries” to return home safely.

    The Middle East remains one of the largest destinations for Kenyan migrant workers, particularly in domestic service, construction, hospitality and healthcare.

    Remittances from the region form a significant portion of Kenya’s diaspora earnings, which have become one of the country’s largest sources of foreign exchange.

    Beyond labour migration, the region is also a major market for Kenyan exports, particularly agricultural produce such as fresh flowers, fruit and vegetables. As of 2024, Kenya had a trade volume of $6 billion with Gulf countries including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the ongoing conflict could disrupt trade flows, particularly shipments of perishable goods that rely heavily on regular air cargo services to Gulf markets.

    Officials said the government was working with Kenya Airways and other carriers to secure special cargo permits and additional flight capacity to ensure exports continue despite aviation disruptions.

    “We urge affected members of the Kenyan business community to remain patient as these efforts continue,” the ministry said.

  • How Kenya Airways Repatriation Flights Ensure Safe Return of Stranded Kenyans in Middle East

    How Kenya Airways Repatriation Flights Ensure Safe Return of Stranded Kenyans in Middle East

    When crises disrupt global travel, governments often turn to a little-known aviation tool to protect citizens abroad: repatriation flights. Recent tensions in the Middle East have highlighted how essential these flights are and why a national carrier plays a critical role in safeguarding its citizens.

    On March 4, Kenya Airways announced special flights between Nairobi and Dubai to assist Kenyans affected by regional disruptions. The airline flew from Nairobi to Dubai on March 4 and returned on March 5, after securing limited approval from Dubai airport authorities for humanitarian operations.

    Being Kenya’s national carrier gives Kenya Airways unique advantages. The airline can rapidly deploy aircraft and crew while coordinating with diplomats to obtain landing rights, airspace clearance, and other approvals. Without a national carrier, repatriation efforts would face significant delays, regulatory hurdles, and potential financial constraints, making emergency evacuation far more complex.

    How Kenya Airways Repatriation Flights Ensure Safe Return of Stranded Kenyans in Middle East
    Kenya Airways repatriation flights prove that a strong national carrier safeguards citizens, strengthens the economy, and elevates Kenya’s global presence, showing why strategic aviation capacity is vital in emergencies. [Photo: Courtesy]

    Understanding Kenya Airways Repatriation Flights

    Repatriation flights differ from regular commercial services. Airlines typically operate these missions in coordination with governments and immigration authorities, often requiring passengers to cover minimal costs or none at all.

    The process starts with embassies and foreign missions identifying citizens stranded abroad. Governments then work with national carriers like Kenya Airways to deploy aircraft and crew, while diplomats secure flight slots, landing rights, and airspace clearance from host countries.

    These flights often operate under unusual conditions. Passengers are prioritized based on vulnerability, including families, students, and those with medical needs. Unlike standard commercial operations, repatriation flights can be arranged on very short notice and may operate even when airports are partially closed or most airlines have suspended services.

    The recent Middle East crisis is a prime example. Commercial flights were widely suspended, forcing countries across Europe and Asia to organize evacuation flights. France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all coordinated emergency operations for their citizens. In Dubai, authorities allowed only limited flights for repatriation, and Kenya Airways was among the few airlines granted permission, demonstrating its critical role as Kenya’s national carrier.

    National Carrier Advantage in Emergencies

    A national carrier provides unparalleled agility in crises. Kenya Airways can deploy staff, aircraft, and logistical support faster than private operators while also coordinating with Kenyan diplomatic missions abroad. This ensures that citizens are evacuated efficiently and safely.

    During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kenya Airways demonstrated this capability by repatriating stranded citizens, transporting medical supplies, and maintaining cargo services for farmers exporting produce. Without a national airline, Kenya would have depended on private carriers facing regulatory delays and coordination challenges, which could have slowed crucial operations.

    Economic and Strategic Importance

    National carriers serve more than just emergency purposes. Airlines like Kenya Airways are economic engines that attract investors, tourists, and global trade opportunities. Efficient operations by a national airline signal reliability and connectivity, reinforcing confidence in the country’s infrastructure.

    Globally, carriers such as Emirates, Singapore Airlines, and Turkish Airlines have become symbols of national prestige. Emirates projects Dubai’s modernity, Singapore Airlines reflects precision and quality, and Turkish Airlines demonstrates Turkey’s global reach. Similarly, Kenya Airways represents Kenya on the international stage, reinforcing national identity while connecting the country to key global markets.

    Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga highlighted Kenya’s potential as a continental hub due to its strategic location. He emphasized that a national carrier could operate at a loss if necessary, provided it brought investors, tourists, and shoppers into the country. Kenya Airways, therefore, is more than a business—it is a strategic tool for national growth.

    Operational Challenges and Coordination

    Running repatriation flights is complex. Airlines must navigate emergency clearances, shifting airport schedules, and logistical hurdles while prioritizing passenger safety. Diplomats play a key role, negotiating landing rights and coordinating with host countries to ensure smooth operations.

    Financially, repatriation missions are rarely profitable. Governments often subsidize these flights to ensure citizens’ welfare. For Kenya Airways, this is an opportunity to showcase its operational capability, enhance brand reputation, and reinforce its role as a cornerstone of national resilience.

    Conclusion

    Kenya Airways repatriation flights highlight the indispensable role of a national carrier in global crises. Beyond emergencies, the airline strengthens Kenya’s economic positioning, national identity, and diplomatic reach. In situations like the recent Middle East disruptions, the airline’s ability to operate humanitarian flights demonstrates why strategic investment in a robust national carrier is not optional but essential.

    Through timely intervention, Kenya Airways not only ensures the safety of stranded Kenyans but also underscores the broader strategic, economic, and symbolic significance of a national airline capable of responding in moments of urgent need.

  • ‪Sossion Gears Up For Return To KNUT‬

    ‪Sossion Gears Up For Return To KNUT‬

    Former Kenya National Union of Teachers Secretary-General Wilson Sossion has hinted at a possible return to the helm of the teachers’ union in the upcoming April elections.

    Speaking during an interview with TV47, Sossion said he had already met the necessary eligibility requirements and was weighing the appropriate time to formally declare his bid.

    “Maybe what is remaining for me is to make a concrete pronouncement, which I will at the right time,” he said.

    Sossion served as the Secretary-General of KNUT from December 9, 2013, to June 25, 2021, a period during which he was at the forefront of negotiations and disputes involving teachers and the government.

    His tenure was marked by intense engagements with the Teachers Service Commission over issues affecting teachers’ welfare, union membership and labour rights.

    During the interview, Sossion maintained that he remains eligible to contest for the union’s top position, noting that the KNUT constitution allows individuals who have served as union officials to run for leadership roles.

    “Those who qualify to contest for the Secretary General position in the elections are those who have been officials. I have been a KNUT official in many ranks for over 20 years,” he said.

    He further clarified that the secretary-general of a trade union is not required to be an employee in the profession represented by the union, dismissing claims that his previous exit from teaching could lock him out of the race.

    “The SG of a union also does not have to be an employee of that trade,” Sossion said.

    Sossion revealed that he has already taken steps to ensure his eligibility is not questioned, including formally notifying the current KNUT leadership of his intention to run.

    “I have ensured that all the protocols for my eligibility are in place,” he said.

    According to the former union boss, he has already written to the current Secretary-General Collins Oyuu informing him of his interest in the seat.

    He also disclosed that he had cleared his union dues to remain a fully paid member of the organisation.

    “I have written to the KNUT secretary general Collins Oyuu notifying him of my candidature, and my union dues payments are up to date,” Sossion said.

    He added that he had gone beyond the minimum requirement in maintaining his membership in the union.

    “I am actually the most loyal member of KNUT. I have not just paid up to June 2026, I have also paid supplementary dues,” he stated.

    Sossion’s possible return to the KNUT leadership comes after he secured a major legal victory against the Teachers Service Commission. The Court of Appeal of Kenya ruled that the deregistration and termination of the veteran teacher and union leader by the TSC had been carried out unlawfully.

    The appellate court found that the disciplinary processes leading to Sossion’s dismissal did not follow mandatory legal procedures, thereby violating employment laws and protections afforded to teachers under Kenya’s labour framework.

    The ruling effectively cleared a major legal hurdle that could have hindered Sossion’s eligibility to contest for the union’s top seat.