Category: Investigations

  • How A Meru University Dropout Hacked Into Afrisend Money Transfer Siphoning Sh11 Million Exposing Its System Vulnerability After Walking Free From Betting Firm Heist

    How A Meru University Dropout Hacked Into Afrisend Money Transfer Siphoning Sh11 Million Exposing Its System Vulnerability After Walking Free From Betting Firm Heist

    In a stunning twist that has left cybersecurity experts and law enforcement agencies reeling, 27-year-old Seth Mwabe Okwanyo, the Meru University dropout who brazenly walked out of Milimani Law Courts a free man after his case was thrown out, found himself back in handcuffs within minutes, arrested for orchestrating yet another multimillion-shilling cyberheist that has exposed catastrophic flaws in Kenya’s financial technology infrastructure.

    The dramatic rearrest of the self-styled cybersecurity consultant on Tuesday, February 10, 2026, came just moments after Senior Resident Magistrate Irene Thamana dismissed his case and ordered the return of his seized electronic gadgets, including an iPhone 16 Pro, Samsung S22, Starlink router, MacBook M2 laptop and HP Omen laptop.

    As Mwabe stepped into the Nairobi sunshine, probably believing he had beaten the system, detectives from the Banking Fraud Investigation Unit were lying in wait, armed with fresh charges that paint an even more disturbing picture of a serial cyber fraudster who has been playing a dangerous cat-and-mouse game with Kenyan authorities.

    This time, prosecutors allege, Mwabe penetrated the defenses of Afrisend Money Transfer Limited, siphoning a staggering Sh11.4 million through 38 fraudulent transactions that vanished without a trace from the company’s records.

    The July 16, 2025 heist, which investigators say involved the unauthorized installation of a malicious Java application, has thrust Kenya’s fintech sector into crisis mode and raised uncomfortable questions about whether digital financial platforms are nothing more than elaborate houses of cards waiting to be toppled by anyone with enough coding knowledge and criminal intent.

    But this is not Mwabe’s first dance with cybercrime accusations.

    His latest arrest marks the second time in six months that the young man from Wasimbete ward in Migori County has been hauled before the courts on allegations of masterminding sophisticated digital heists worth millions of shillings, suggesting a pattern of brazen criminality that has seen him allegedly target Kenya’s most lucrative digital sectors with surgical precision.

    The genesis of Mwabe’s troubles began on August 30, 2025, when DCI officers stormed his two-bedroom apartment in the upscale Tatu City estate in Kiambu County.

    What they discovered inside read like something out of a cybercrime thriller.

    The apartment had been transformed into what investigators described as a fully equipped computer laboratory, complete with advanced servers, multiple high-end laptops, routers, data storage devices, a safe stuffed with cash, a money-counting machine, and an arsenal of SIM cards and mobile devices designed to bypass verification systems.

    The raid came after Afrisend Money Transfer Limited filed a formal complaint detailing how their payment systems had been compromised in what prosecutors now describe as one of the most sophisticated cyber frauds ever witnessed in Kenya.

    On that fateful day in July, 38 unauthorized transactions drained Sh11,410,165 from the company’s Diamond Trust Bank account via the PesaLink platform, yet bizarrely, these transactions never appeared in Afrisend’s internal records even though recipients confirmed receiving the money.

    Investigating officer Chief Inspector Julius Cheruiyot revealed to the court that Mwabe had allegedly shared a fraudulent application link via a Telegram bot, which was then used to siphon the funds while simultaneously erasing system and database logs to cover his digital tracks.

    The scheme’s sophistication suggested not just technical prowess but an intimate understanding of how to exploit the vulnerabilities in Kenya’s interconnected financial systems.

    But what makes Mwabe’s case truly extraordinary is that this was not his first encounter with cybercrime allegations.

    Just months before the Afrisend heist, reports had surfaced linking him to suspicious activities targeting betting platforms, with some media outlets initially reporting connections to major betting firms before corrections were issued.

    The confusion surrounding these earlier allegations only added to the mystique of a young man who seemed to be everywhere and nowhere in Kenya’s murky cybercrime underworld.

    When he was first arrested in August 2025, Mwabe put up a spirited defense that left many Kenyans torn between admiration and condemnation.

    Standing in his Tatu City apartment as detectives broke down his door, he reportedly proclaimed with startling confidence that he was merely testing software he had developed and the money had unexpectedly appeared in his account.

    It was a defense so audacious that it sparked a national conversation about the fine line between ethical hacking and outright theft.

    The DCI initially sought to detain Mwabe for 20 days to complete their investigations, citing the need to gather forensic evidence from his seized devices and obtain records from Telegram, Starlink, local banks, mobile service providers and the Kenya Bankers Association.

    Prosecutors argued that he posed a flight risk and might interfere with witnesses if released.

    However, on September 3, 2025, Milimani Senior Principal Magistrate Benmark Ekhubi rejected the prosecution’s application, ruling that the request to hold Mwabe longer lacked merit.

    The magistrate granted him release on Sh500,000 cash bail or a Sh1 million bond, noting that the suspect had no control over the forensic investigations and that electronic examinations could proceed without his presence.

    His release sparked jubilant celebrations back in his rural home in Suna West, Migori County, where family members welcomed him with Christian songs.

    His father, Okwanyo Mwabe, a Seventh-day Adventist church pastor, expressed shock at the allegations while his uncle, Ogwari Mwabe, described Seth as a shy, silent but intelligent boy who would never harm anyone.

    The family called on the government to harness rather than punish young tech talents, lamenting the lack of job opportunities for skilled Kenyan youth.

    What nobody knew then was that while Mwabe was celebrating his freedom and family members were singing his praises, investigators were quietly building a new case against him.

    The fresh charges relating to the Afrisend heist had been waiting in the wings, and prosecutors were determined not to let him slip through their fingers a second time.

    The story of Seth Mwabe is as much a tale of wasted potential as it is one of alleged criminality.

    His digital footprint reveals a young man who once harbored legitimate aspirations in cybersecurity.

    On his LinkedIn profile, he described himself as an information security enthusiast driven by passion and claimed to have founded a cybersecurity training community at Meru University before dropping out of his second-year IT program.

    Between 2018 and 2020, Mwabe claimed to have worked with at least three companies, sharpening his skills in digital defense and penetration testing.

    He maintained a blog where he detailed security vulnerabilities, including how poorly protected office printers could be hijacked using default passwords.

    In 2019, he even won Sh50,000 in a cybersecurity challenge organized by a leading local bank, a recognition that briefly placed him on the radar of Kenya’s budding tech security scene.

    But somewhere along the way, according to prosecutors, Mwabe’s knowledge of how to defend systems morphed into expertise on how to attack them.

    His Facebook timeline, littered with posts celebrating victories in cybersecurity competitions and a 2018 photo of him wearing a hacker’s mask with two laptops referencing PwnStorm, a notorious Russian hacking collective, now looks less like youthful enthusiasm and more like a roadmap to a criminal enterprise.

    The implications of Mwabe’s alleged activities extend far beyond the millions he is accused of stealing. His case has ripped the lid off the vulnerability of Kenya’s digital financial infrastructure at a time when the country has been positioning itself as East Africa’s fintech hub.

    If a university dropout operating out of a two-bedroom apartment can repeatedly penetrate the defenses of major financial institutions, what does that say about the billions of shillings transacted daily through mobile and online platforms?

    Cybersecurity analysts who spoke to Kenya Insights described the breaches as wake-up calls that the industry can no longer afford to ignore.

    The fact that Mwabe allegedly managed to install unauthorized software, manipulate transactions, and delete logs without detection suggests either woefully inadequate access controls, possible insider assistance, or both.

    For Afrisend Money Transfer Limited, the breach represents not just a financial catastrophe but a reputational nuclear bomb.

    In an industry built on trust, revelations that your payment system can be hijacked for an entire day with 38 fraudulent transactions going completely undetected is the kind of scandal that can destroy a company overnight.

    The firm now faces tough questions from regulators, customers and investors about how such a massive security failure could occur and why their internal monitoring systems failed to detect the hemorrhaging of millions.

    The case has also exposed uncomfortable truths about how Kenya’s rapid digital transformation has outpaced the development of robust security infrastructure.

    With betting platforms processing billions of shillings weekly and mobile money transactions reaching record highs, the country has become a lucrative target for cybercriminals who have discovered that the digital doors are often locked with flimsy padlocks rather than fortress-grade security.

    When Mwabe appeared before Senior Resident Magistrate Irene Thamana on February 11, 2026, to face charges of unauthorized access to a computer system, computer fraud and 18 counts of money laundering, he maintained his innocence, entering a plea of not guilty to all 20 charges.

    The court granted him bail of Sh500,000 cash or a bond of Sh1.5 million plus two contact persons, with the case set for mention on March 3, 2026.

    But this time, prosecutors are determined to build an airtight case.

    They have evidence of the unauthorized Java application allegedly installed in Afrisend’s system, forensic trails of the 38 transactions, and a web of money laundering activities involving multiple accomplices who allegedly helped Mwabe disguise the source of the stolen funds.

    The prosecution’s case hinges on proving that Mwabe deliberately breached security measures, installed malicious software, manipulated the payment system, deleted logs to cover his tracks, and then laundered the proceeds through a network of accomplices.

    If convicted on all counts, Mwabe faces up to 20 years in prison under Kenya’s Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act of 2018.

    As the case winds its way through the courts, it has sparked a national debate about how Kenya should handle young tech prodigies who use their skills for crime. Some Kenyans have expressed sympathy, arguing that unemployment and lack of opportunities drive talented youth toward illicit activities.

    Social media has been flooded with comments lamenting that arresting such talents while ignoring bigger corruption is backwards, with calls for Mwabe’s skills to be harnessed for national cybersecurity rather than letting them rot in jail.

    Critics, however, decry the romanticization of cybercrime, pointing out that Mwabe’s alleged victims are ordinary Kenyans whose data and money are now vulnerable.

    They argue that no amount of talent justifies theft and that giving cybercriminals a pass sends a dangerous message that crime pays as long as you’re smart enough.

    The Seth Mwabe saga also highlights the growing challenge of cybercrime in Kenya. According to the Communications Authority of Kenya, cyber incidents targeting financial services rose by 40 percent in 2025, with weak APIs in digital platforms being the primary vulnerability exploited by hackers.

    The DCI has arrested several suspects this year alone for various cybercrimes, but Mwabe’s case stands out for its audacity and the sheer amount allegedly stolen.

    Abraham Mugambi, DCI’s Regional Criminal Investigations Officer, has reiterated the agency’s commitment to tackling what he calls white-collar crime, particularly computer crimes.

    But the reality is that law enforcement is playing catch-up in a digital arms race where criminals often stay several steps ahead.

    The case raises fundamental questions about Kenya’s readiness for the digital age. As the country races to embrace technological innovation, it must grapple with the security challenges that accompany digital transformation.

    The Sh11.4 million allegedly stolen from Afrisend represents more than financial loss. It symbolizes the cost of inadequate preparation and the urgent need for comprehensive cybersecurity reform.

    Industry experts are calling for mandatory public disclosure of breaches, independent cybersecurity audits for fintech firms, user compensation frameworks, and real regulatory oversight. Without these measures, Kenya risks more scandals and more users losing trust in digital platforms.

    The broader implications extend to youth unemployment and education gaps. With 35 percent of Kenyan graduates struggling to find jobs, some are turning to illicit tech paths for survival.

    Initiatives like scholarships for IT dropouts and programs to channel tech talent into legitimate cybersecurity careers could prevent more young people from following Mwabe’s alleged path.

    As Mwabe’s trial approaches, the stakes couldn’t be higher.

    For prosecutors, it’s a chance to send a strong message that cybercrime will not be tolerated regardless of how skilled the perpetrator. For the defense, it’s an opportunity to argue that a young man’s life should not be destroyed for what they might frame as ethical hacking gone wrong.

    For Kenya’s fintech industry, it’s a moment of reckoning. The Seth Mwabe story isn’t just about one hacker and Sh11 million. It’s about a system where billions move daily, guarded by walls that may be weaker than they look.

    Betting firms, microfinance institutions, mobile money platforms and banks all owe Kenyans answers about how they’re protecting customer funds and data.

    The old adage in betting says the house always wins. But the Mwabe saga has proven that the house isn’t invincible. When even major financial platforms can be hacked by a single determined individual, who really protects the players?

    As the March 3 court date approaches, all eyes will be on whether prosecutors can finally put an end to the alleged crime spree of Kenya’s most notorious young hacker.

    But win or lose, the damage has been done. The vulnerabilities have been exposed. The questions have been asked. And Kenya’s digital revolution will never quite look the same again.

  • Epstein’s Girlfriend Ghislaine Maxwell Frequently Visited Kenya As Files Reveal Local Secret Links With The Underage Sex Trafficking Ring

    Epstein’s Girlfriend Ghislaine Maxwell Frequently Visited Kenya As Files Reveal Local Secret Links With The Underage Sex Trafficking Ring

    Nairobi, Kenya — Ghislaine Maxwell, the British socialite serving 20 years in prison for sex trafficking minors alongside billionaire paedophile Jeffrey Epstein, was a regular visitor to Kenya, newly unsealed court documents have revealed in a bombshell expose that has sent shockwaves through the country’s elite circles.

    The damning files, released following civil litigation against Maxwell, paint a disturbing picture of how Kenya became entangled in one of the world’s most notorious sex trafficking operations, with the East African nation featured prominently in Epstein’s private address book and identified as a key destination in his global network of abuse.

    Maxwell, daughter of the late Robert Maxwell who owned a 45 percent stake in the now-defunct Kenya Times newspaper through a joint venture with KANU, leveraged her family’s Kenyan connections to establish a foothold in the country that prosecutors say facilitated her criminal enterprise.

    The secret address book recovered from Epstein’s Palm Beach mansion contains multiple Kenyan contacts, including the prestigious Muthaiga Club in Nairobi and Italian-born Kenyan conservationist Kuki Gallmann.

    While appearing in the address book does not necessarily implicate individuals in criminal activity, investigators say it demonstrates the sprawling reach of Epstein’s network across continents.

    Court documents reveal that Kenya was specifically listed as a leading sex tourism destination alongside Thailand, Brazil, Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica in materials found in Epstein’s possession.

    The designation raises troubling questions about why the convicted sex offender maintained such keen interest in the country.

    In a particularly chilling example, emails presented as evidence show how Epstein in 2009 orchestrated plans to send two teenage girls to Kenya under the guise of an equestrian safari and wildlife conservation internships. The elaborate scheme involved properties at Borana, Ol Malo, Cottars, and Ol Donyo Wuas, with Epstein insisting the girls send him photographs during their stay.

    The proposed trip followed Epstein’s established pattern of grooming vulnerable minors by offering career support and exotic travel opportunities.

    When one of the intended victims showed reluctance about the Kenya excursion, Epstein sent angry emails berating her, demonstrating the psychological manipulation central to his criminal operation.

    “Hey Jeff, I am thrilled beyond belief to be going on this trip to Kenya. Please don’t think I’m not,” the frightened teenager wrote back, desperately trying to appease the billionaire predator who had promised to support her music career. Epstein’s cold response came swiftly: “So, for the future, I don’t care what you do, it’s your life, but don’t lie or bullshit me.”

    Ultimately, one girl withdrew from the trip, but Hollywood publicist Peggy Siegal and her niece travelled to Kenya in December 2009, landing at a camp in Maasai Mara where they encountered members of the Ralph Lauren family also on holiday.

    The coincidence underscores how Kenya’s luxury safari industry became unwittingly intertwined with Epstein’s web of exploitation.

    Maxwell’s frequent visits to Kenya take on sinister new meaning in light of her June 2022 conviction for grooming underage victims across multiple locations over a decade-long period.

    Prosecutors established that Maxwell and Epstein systematically targeted school students aspiring to careers in modelling or the arts, promising mentorship while delivering abuse.

    The Kenya connection runs deeper through Maxwell’s family history. Her father, British media mogul Robert Maxwell, acquired his stake in Kenya Times in 1988, the same year some sources claim he introduced his daughter to Epstein.

    Others suggest the pair met through mutual friends, but the timing of the business venture and their relationship remains striking.

    Robert Maxwell’s mysterious death in 1991, when his naked body was found in the Atlantic Ocean, triggered the collapse of his publishing empire.

    While an inquest ruled heart attack and accidental drowning, Epstein himself claimed in emails that Maxwell was killed after attempting to blackmail Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, adding another layer of intrigue to the family’s murky dealings.

    Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell
    Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell

    The newly released documents expose how international power brokers sought to exploit Epstein’s interest in Kenya for business opportunities.

    Boris Nikolic, then advisor to Bill Gates, suggested investing in mobile money platforms and offered to introduce Epstein to the inventor of M-Pesa. Ernest Unik, an events organiser who runs the Haiti-based children’s charity Edeyo, shared contacts including a State House official serving as an aide to then President Uhuru Kenyatta.

    Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, CEO of Dubai logistics giant DP World, went further, offering to connect Epstein directly with the Kenyan president.

    As proof of his access, he emailed Epstein a photograph with then Foreign Affairs Minister Amina Mohammed, writing: “With Mrs. Amina president cabinate minister of Kenya.”

    Perhaps most disturbing is the revelation that a senior United Nations official based in Nairobi cultivated a relationship with Epstein that raised serious ethical questions.

    Lisa Svensson, who served as marine chief at the United Nations Environment Programme in Nairobi, exchanged flirtatious messages with the convicted sex offender from 2012 onwards.

    In October 2016, as a lawsuit accusing Epstein and Donald Trump of abusing a minor was filed in New York, Svensson invited Epstein to visit her in Kenya. “Gave up on Swedish men, moved to Kenya. Wish me good luck. Come and visit,” she wrote.

    Days later, with the US presidential election approaching, she advised the registered sex offender: “If any president candidates win, you need to evacuate.”

    Internal UN correspondence shows Svensson disappeared from her Nairobi workstation under unclear circumstances around this time, working remotely from Europe instead.

    A 2018 complaint to UNEP Executive Director Erik Solheim read: “You, Sir, have approved that your friend, Lisa Svensson can work from Europe, because for personal reasons she does not wish to work in Nairobi. Her big office in Nairobi remains vacant.”

    Solheim himself was forced to resign later that year for breaking internal rules.

    When Epstein was arrested in July 2019 for sex trafficking of minors, Svensson quietly left her UNEP position, raising questions about whether her departure was connected to her association with the disgraced financier. Epstein died by suicide in his prison cell one month after his arrest.

    The revelations confirm Kenya’s troubling status as what investigators describe as a playground for international wheeler-dealers, a secluded hideout for billionaires and celebrities, and crucially, a transit or destination country for sex trafficking operations.

    Separate documents link Kenya and Tanzania to an alleged trafficking network, with children from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia and other parts of Eastern Africa reportedly trafficked through Mombasa port.

    The convergence of luxury tourism infrastructure, weak regulatory oversight, and powerful international connections created conditions that predators like Epstein and Maxwell exploited.

    Kenyan authorities have yet to issue an official statement addressing the damning revelations or indicating whether local investigations will be launched into the activities described in the court documents.

    Legal experts say the statute of limitations and jurisdictional complexities may complicate any potential prosecutions, but victims’ advocates are demanding accountability.

    “These files expose Kenya as more than just a picturesque safari destination in Epstein’s world. It was a deliberate choice, a place where powerful people believed they could operate with impunity,” said one international trafficking expert who requested anonymity.

    “The question now is whether Kenyan authorities will take seriously their obligation to investigate and prevent such exploitation on their soil.”

    The Maxwell family’s business interests in Kenya, combined with Ghislaine’s regular visits and Epstein’s cultivation of high-level contacts, paint a picture of systematic relationship-building that went far beyond casual tourism.

    These were calculated moves by sophisticated criminals who understood how to leverage social capital and geographic distance to further their predatory aims.

    As more documents continue to emerge from ongoing litigation, the full extent of Kenya’s entanglement in the Epstein-Maxwell trafficking network remains to be seen.

    What is already clear is that the country’s reputation as a premier destination has been irrevocably tainted by its association with two of the world’s most reviled sex offenders.

    For the young women and girls who were targeted, groomed, and in many cases abused, Kenya represents not adventure and wildlife, but rather another location where their trauma unfolded.

    The luxury lodges and exclusive clubs that dot the landscape now carry the shadow of having potentially facilitated one of history’s most extensive child exploitation operations.

    The international community watches as Kenya grapples with its unwitting role in this global scandal, wondering whether the revelations will spur meaningful reform in how the country monitors and regulates the movements of high-risk individuals, or whether the powerful connections exposed in these files will ensure that uncomfortable questions remain unanswered.

  • The Crash of Koko Networks: A Detailed Look Into How and Why It Happened, And The Potential For A “Silver Lining” For Carbon Integrity

    The Crash of Koko Networks: A Detailed Look Into How and Why It Happened, And The Potential For A “Silver Lining” For Carbon Integrity

    By Tom Price

    As the news of Koko Networks’ bankruptcy sank in over the weekend, a false narrative was created that this was somehow the fault of Government of Kenya regulators, for failing to approve the sale of Koko’s carbon credits.

    While that may have been the trigger, if anything that decision is a silver lining in this tragedy, showing that the system for ensuring high quality carbon credits is starting to work as intended.

    Regulators aren’t rubber stamps – and in the case of Koko, the Government of Kenya did their job exactly right, enabling carbon credits to exist alongside Kenya’s other high quality exports like tea and coffee. And that’s because Koko’s carbon credits were largely hot air, and the failure of Koko to sell their offsets was entirely of their own making.

    Before explaining why, first a moment of compassion for the victims here: the customers, employees, investors, lenders, and other partners who thought they were supporting a clean cooking fuel company rather than a flawed carbon credit company, and were misled by Koko’s leadership team.

    To their credit, they built Koko into a world class operation, run by some of the smartest, most capable operators available in business today; other companies will be lucky to snap them up.

    Koko was incredibly impressive, a marvel of technology and branding meeting a market ripe for disruption.

    The stoves worked well, the fuel was clean and affordable, and the fuel ATMs were convenient and modern. And the need to replace dirty, unsustainable charcoal is as pressing as ever. The fatal flaw for Koko was the heart of their operation: how they counted carbon credits.

    A business model built on carbon

    That’s because making and selling carbon credits was the entire business. As they told the Harvard Business Review, Koko subsidized their fuel by 25-40% and their stoves by up to 85% – they lost money on every customer they signed up, and every liter of fuel they sold. And if their claims are to be believed, they were selling upwards of ~20 million liters every month at the end, losing money on every single one. So the only way to break-even – let alone profit – was carbon credits.

    The problem lay in how Koko exploited the now-closing gaps in how carbon credits are generated. Koko has to date been issued almost 15 million carbon credits by Gold Standard, at least 170,000 of which have been sold to companies like Bank of America and Bristol Meyers. But those were sold into the voluntary market, which generally commands lower prices. The real money was in the compliance market, like CORSIA which covers airlines.

    According to Gold Standard and Koko’s own documents, Koko expected to earn as much as 5+ carbon credits per customer per year for ten years – far, far more than other companies in the same market. These carbon credits, generating $100 in revenue per customer per year, would be used to repay the cost of the stove and the fuel subsidy and then generate operating profit for the company.

    This carbon finance would therefore be used to provide a clean transition from cooking with dirty fuels, return a profit to investors and provide the company with healthy margins to continue expansion.

    Why was this approach doomed to fail from the start? There are three fatal flaws in Koko’s approach, lessons that must be learned for the sector to build back better. 

    1 – Overcounting their sustainability. Koko used a wildly inaccurate fNRB (the fraction of non-renewable biomass, or the modeled rate at which trees won’t grow back after cutting them down to make charcoal). Koko claimed 93%, when in fact fNRB in Kenyan cities like Nairobi is 38%. The inaccuracy of Koko’s assumption has been widely known and discussed for some time. Koko, like most other project developers, opted against using scientific studies and instead chose a figure that would maximise the amount of savings they can claim.

    That metric alone would result in overcredited Koko by 2.4X.

    2 – Overcounting their impact, with a vastly distorted and inaccurate claim of baseline fuel usage. Koko claimed all of their urban customers in cities like Nairobi were previously using only charcoal (6.8 tons of firewood equivalent, or about 1 ton of charcoal per household per year), and none used any LPG, and that they all used their Koko stoves all the time instead.

    Any credible survey shows that is simply not true. “Fuel stacking” (cooking with multiple fuels alongside one another) is the default, not exception, and LPG use is widespread among households in urban Kenya.

    At the start of their staggering growth, 52% of households in urban Kenya were already using LPG (2019 census ref, table 2.18, page 330). In Nairobi, the urban area where Koko expanded the fastest, the number was at 67.2%. The logic that all of the customers onboarded were solely non LPG customers is simply not credible. Yet Koko claimed that all ~1.3 million customers were using *only* dirty charcoal before switching to ethanol.

    That would overcredit them significantly, compounding their fNRB overcrediting.

    From Koko’s Gold Standard documents, GS 11440. Citation: GS11440_ER Sheet_MP07_VPA2_V03_20.01.2025.xlsx. Dated March 2025. Full documents available here.

    From Koko’s Gold Standard documents, GS 11440. Citation: GS11440_ER Sheet_MP07_VPA2_V03_20.01.2025.xlsx. Dated March 2025. Full documents available here.


    3 – Overcounting how much clean fuel their customers were actually using.
    This is perhaps the most egregious metric. Koko was a walled garden system – you could only fill their stoves with their tanks, which you could only top up in their fuel ATMs, and only after you punched in your personal customer ID.

    Customer ID

    They knew exactly, to the liter, how much each customer was buying every month, and there was every incentive to report that number … if it would be higher than the claimed average.

    But they didn’t.

    Instead, they used an average of 15+ liters for every customer, every month, “verified” most recently by surveying only 159 customers out of almost 900,000 households in March 2023.

    There’s a simple way to know what actually happened – they have the data, they just didn’t use it. And the most obvious reason why is also the most likely one.

    These three metrics alone account for substantial overcrediting, with some estimates suggesting as much as 10X (without actual fuel sales data, we may never know). 

    Academic experts weigh in

    The concern about what a company like Koko was doing was explicitly laid out in research by UC Berkeley in January, 2024, in ground breaking work which for the first time took a comprehensive look at the over/under crediting in the global cookstove market.

    The researchers examined every methodology and input metric in detail, including the methodology Koko chose and how Koko chose to interpret the rules. Literally every concern they raised about potential overcrediting was something Koko had chosen to do.

    The attention surrounding the research accelerated calls for reform, and pretty soon the clock for Koko was ticking. Tough new rules were coming into place, like those by Gold Standard and UNFCCC that would come into effect in January 2026 requiring the use of an accurate fNRB.

    So the race was on to get those credits sold, and that required Kenya to sign off on a Letter of Authorization.

    A changing market

    Some background may be in order. Not all carbon credits are the same. Early methodologies relied largely on insufficient sampling and estimates, which UC Berkeley pointed out was rife with overcrediting. To its credit, the cookstove sector has responded, and now projects that can prove their use and impact, such as through tracking fuel sold or stove use, are seen as more credible. The Gold Standard’s accurate new “Metered and Measured” methodology is widely seen as most reliable, and the new CLEAR methodology has helpfully incorporated approaches relying on continuously-tracked energy consumption (CTEC).

    But as the market continues to move towards quality and tougher standards, outdated methodologies are still used by legacy projects. Koko has chosen to continue using one of the worst rated methodologies (AMS-I.E), for perhaps the simple expedient that it was in their best interest.

    This is not to discount the challenges for developers as standards change, but it has now been almost three years since the pre-print of the UC Berkeley research became public, and concerns about overcrediting have been constant in the last years.

    This duality is what has created the market opportunity for the rise of ratings agencies like BeZero, which independently evaluate carbon projects on objective standards, and then rate them from AAA-D depending on quality.  

    Here’s how cookstove projects stacked up last year, by rating:

    When Koko was rated, they earned only a “B” overall grade, which means “the credit issued by the project has a low likelihood of achieving 1 tonne of CO2 removal.” And they got an even lower “D” on the sub-metric for carbon accounting.

    Since they chose not to use more credible metrics and earn a higher rating, their only hope was to find large buyers who either wouldn’t know enough, or wouldn’t ask before buying the offsets – or simply didn’t care about quality.

    For a while that market seemed like CORSIA, the program for airlines to offset their emissions. And while CORSIA had their own standards, they weren’t nearly tough enough – check out just how poorly rated all the CORSIA eligible projects are:

    Crash Out

    Which brings us back around to the Government of Kenya’s refusal to issue Koko a letter of authorization to sell into the CORSIA market. According to reporting by QCINTEL, Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) wanted Koko to amend their fNRB to be more accurate, and Koko refused. Kenya needed the carbon credits it approved to be valid, since it would impact their ability to meet their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris climate accords. Koko’s approach to over-crediting meant they requested an outsized number of authorizations from the country’s entire budget for all projects, industries and years.

    And reportedly attempts to work with Koko to use more credible approaches so that the Kenyan Government could safely authorize a smaller volume within their national budget were rebuffed by the company, unwilling to be reasonable.

    By refusing to use credible numbers, Koko chose their own fate. There can be no more damning indictment than of them being willing to let the company go out of business (and try to blame regulators in hopes of claiming an insurance settlement from MIGA) than to play by the rules and be accurate. They crashed out instead of coming clean.

    Plenty of blame to go around

    Koko is not alone in blame here. These fundamental flaws in the business model link back to larger flaws within the system.

    1. Standard bodies and verification bodies  

    Gold Standard, which issued almost 15M carbon credits to Koko, has some tough questions to answer about why they continued to let projects use significantly divergent fNRB rates at the same time in the same market, and why a company like Koko was allowed to choose an estimate of usage, even though Koko had all the data needed to prove it.

    Meanwhile, the independent verifier hired by Koko signed off on millions of credits based on ~150 surveys of customers picked by Koko out of their ~900,000 total customer population. Why was the company not challenged to provide actual fuel sales data?

    (On a more positive note, it is helpful to see Gold Standard’s recent methodological updates – including both overall as well as to its suite of cookstove methodologies – to align with the Paris Agreement, introduce greater scrutiny on data used and increase the hurdle rate on what qualifies as a GS VER.)

    1. Koko carbon and commercial leaders

    The leadership at Koko who set up, generated and sold carbon credits under false pretenses have to accept responsibility for the choices they made. All of this was being debated publicly and widely. None of these issues were a secret or a surprise. So it’s difficult to find another way to interpret the design of the carbon program they oversaw, and the data they chose to report, other than that at some point along the way they realized their mistakes and yet continued to knowingly mislead stakeholders about the veracity of their carbon claims, in hopes of a big payout. Estimates are Koko was on track to eventually issue almost $1B in carbon credits.

    1. The investor community

    Investors appear to have missed key items during their due diligence on this business. All their workings are readily accessible in the public domain. It only takes someone with a few hours on their hands to unpack what is being stated and walk outside and check those assumptions with reality. If they couldn’t check reality, they could have at least referenced the latest science, and compared it to Koko’s claims.

    For example, the MIGA due diligence report is publicly accessible. The publicly-available key documents and scope of review don’t appear to have reviewed the actual carbon programme they were insuring against.

    How the industry moves forward

    The tragedy of all of this is that while the business model of using carbon to enable broader clean cooking access is fundamentally sound, Koko’s overwhelming reliance on only that revenue while deeply subsidizing their fuel sales was fatally flawed from the start.

    In Kenya, unsubsidised ethanol cooking fuel is the most expensive method to cook any meal (link to CCT paper). The notion that a perpetual carbon subsidy should cover the negative operating margin was always going to meet reality at some point in time, no matter how much good PR they received.

    Koko was an incredibly well run operation, delivering real value and benefit to customers.  Perhaps they could have charged a higher price for the fuel, reducing risk exposure. Or maybe if they had aimed to earn fewer credits but gotten a higher price for them, they could have made it work. In recent months, there has been a very clear trend towards projects with higher ratings earning a multiple of the value of lower rated ones.

    That makes sense – to use an analogy, if carbon credit buyers are purchasing bottles of water, they don’t want the container, they want the content. A ton of emission reductions should be a provable ton of emission reductions. If you can prove it, you should be paid more. And if you can’t prove it, then you should sell at a discount, if at all. Koko tried to have it both ways – selling a water bottle labeled as “full” but with only a few drops at the bottom, trying to get premium pricing for a substandard product.

    The good news is that tools now exist for all cookstove projects to prove their impact, through logging fuel sales or incorporating stove use monitors.

    The urgency is greater than ever. Cooking with firewood and charcoal adds more CO2 emissions than the entire global aviation industry, while hundreds of millions of families suffer the health impacts of smoky kitchens.

    Ratings agencies will play a vital role in birthing this new market of integrity. There are now multiple “A” rated cookstove projects, delivering real provable impact, while lowering costs and improving health.

    Koko could have been one of those. Instead it will be remembered for two things: the company that tried to pull off another great carbon heist, and the bravery of the Government of Kenya regulators who stood up for the integrity of their market.

    Anything else is just hot air and victim blaming.

    The above images and data are all taken from publicly available information, mostly by Koko to Gold Standard; will happily update or amend if/when better information is available.

    The author has eight years’ experience in the clean cookstove sector, most recently with EcoSafi, with a focus on carbon credit integrity. The author is no longer affiliated with the company, and the views expressed are personal, offered in the public interest to support informed debate on carbon finance for cookstoves.

  • Kenya Freezes Bank Accounts Holding Hundreds of Millions in Suspected Terror Finance Operation

    Kenya Freezes Bank Accounts Holding Hundreds of Millions in Suspected Terror Finance Operation

    Kenyan authorities have frozen 31 bank accounts containing hundreds of millions of shillings linked to 13 individuals suspected of financing terrorist operations across East Africa, marking one of the most aggressive counter-terrorism financing crackdowns in the region’s recent history.

    The Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) issued an immediate asset freeze order on February 4 targeting 10 Kenyan nationals and three citizens from neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda, after months of intelligence work conducted jointly with Interpol and US financial crime enforcement agencies revealed what investigators describe as a sophisticated cross-border money laundering network supporting both al-Shabaab and Islamic State affiliates.

    According to multiple sources familiar with the investigation, some of the flagged wire transfers originated from US bank accounts and were routed through Turkey and South Africa before arriving in Nairobi as recently as November last year.

    The circuitous routing, investigators say, was designed to obscure the money’s origins and ultimate beneficiaries.

    Among those designated is Violet Kemunto Omwoyo, whom authorities linked to the 2019 Dusit D2 hotel attack that killed 21 people including one American citizen. Court documents describe her as part of a cross-border facilitation network supporting al-Shabaab operations in Somalia.

    Another individual, Juma Ambare, allegedly facilitated the procurement of military-grade equipment, communication devices, drone components and digital watches for the Somalia-based militant group.

    The designations represent a strategic pivot in Kenya’s counter-terrorism approach. While previous efforts focused primarily on military operations and border surveillance, officials now acknowledge that disrupting financial flows may prove more effective than kinetic action alone.

    “This is preventive security. You intervene before money becomes logistics, and logistics becomes violence,” one senior investigator told the Saturday Nation, speaking on condition of anonymity.

    The sanctions regime, implemented under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, requires financial institutions to freeze assets within 24 hours without prior notice to account holders. The restrictions extend beyond directly held accounts to include jointly owned funds, indirectly controlled resources, businesses under their influence and third parties acting on their behalf.

    FRC Director-General Saitoti Maika warned that any institution found facilitating sanctioned individuals through masking ownership, holding assets or providing commercial cover could face severe penalties including asset seizure. Banks that fail to comply face fines of up to Sh20 million, while individual bank officials could receive prison sentences of up to 20 years.

    The investigation into the 13 designated individuals uncovered patterns that initially appeared unremarkable but collectively raised red flags. Two of those sanctioned operate one of Nairobi’s largest mobile money transfer agencies and are business partners. Neither are prominent public figures, which officials say was precisely the strategy employed by terror financing networks.

    “They are facilitators. Their accounts, transaction patterns and associations are what raised red flags,” the FRC said in a statement. “Notably, the targets are not prominent public figures. Security officials say that is precisely the point.”

    The enforcement action comes as Kenya races to exit the Financial Action Task Force grey list, a designation the country received in February 2024 after FATF found that Nairobi could not demonstrate successful investigations or prosecutions of money laundering despite its high-risk profile. Being grey-listed signals elevated risk to investors and correspondent banks, undermining Kenya’s credibility as a regional financial hub.

    Among those designated are individuals described as facilitating Islamic State operations through cryptocurrency transactions. Mohamed Siyat Ali is identified as an IS facilitator who transfers funds through cryptocurrency from several crypto wallets, including those linked to associates of Bilal Al Sudani, the deceased Deputy Commander of ISIS’s Al-Karrar office responsible for financing Islamic State affiliates across Africa.

    The Al-Karrar office, intelligence sources indicate, has emerged as a critical coordination node for Islamic State’s African operations, channelling resources and tactical support to affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique through networks operating in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa.

    The scale of terrorist financing in the region defies conventional assumptions. Al-Shabaab alone generates over $100 million annually through extortion, taxation of local businesses, charcoal smuggling and support from affiliated businesspeople, according to assessments by US and Somali government agencies. The group’s revenues are disbursed not only to sustain its own operations but also to support al-Qaeda-linked groups worldwide.

    The Dusit D2 attack, which investigators have studied extensively, illustrates the transnational nature of modern terror financing. President William Ruto revealed in June 2025 that the attack was financed through banks in South Africa, Somalia and Kenya. Court documents show that one facilitator transferred Sh836,900 through mobile money to an al-Shabaab member who helped coordinate the assault. Two men convicted for facilitating that attack received 30-year prison sentences in June 2025.

    Kenya’s property sector has emerged as a particular concern for regulators. Cash purchases, shell companies and limited transparency around beneficial ownership have made real estate a preferred destination for laundered capital. Authorities have warned developers, brokers and lawyers that transactions linked to sanctioned individuals could trigger criminal liability.

    “The property sector is now a frontline. If we do not close loopholes there, we undermine everything else,” a senior FRC official said.

    The Counter-Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee, which brings together the Ministry of Interior, National Intelligence Service, Central Bank of Kenya, National Counter Terrorism Centre and FRC, approved the designations after reviewing financial intelligence analyses conducted over several months.

    Listed individuals may petition the committee for delisting if they can demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that they have ceased the conduct that led to their designation, though officials say this provision is designed more to preserve procedural fairness than to offer easy exit routes.

    The enforcement action extends beyond traditional banking channels. Mobile money operators, insurance companies, savings and cooperative organisations, real estate firms and law practitioners have all been warned that they face potential criminal liability if found facilitating sanctioned persons.

    Kenya’s challenges reflect broader regional vulnerabilities. The country’s proximity to Somalia makes it an attractive location for laundering piracy proceeds and serving as a financial facilitation hub for al-Shabaab. Trade goods are often used to provide counter-valuation in regional hawala networks, the informal money transfer systems that operate outside conventional banking oversight.

    The rise of cryptocurrency has added another layer of complexity. While some terrorist groups have struggled to adopt digital currencies effectively due to the limited vendor networks willing to accept them for physical goods like food, fuel and ammunition, Islamic State affiliates have shown increasing sophistication in moving funds through Bitcoin, Tether and other cryptocurrencies.

    Intelligence agencies across Africa have detected cryptocurrency flows potentially linked to terrorism financing totalling approximately $260 million during Operation Catalyst, a two-month enforcement action conducted across six African countries including Kenya between July and September 2025.

    Financial institutions holding money linked to the 13 designated individuals are expected to provide a full catalogue of their property and cash holdings within days. The curbs applied with immediate effect, triggering asset freezes and broad prohibitions intended to deny the individuals access to the formal financial system.

    The move represents what officials describe as a law enforcement breakthrough, reflecting months of financial intelligence analyses and inter-agency coordination not just within Kenya but across international borders.

    Yet challenges remain formidable. Cryptocurrency mixing services, peer-to-peer exchanges and the use of enhanced anonymity features allow criminals and terrorists to exploit regulatory gaps. Virtual asset service providers remain largely unregulated in Kenya, creating vulnerabilities that terror financiers have been quick to exploit.

    Kenya’s new Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Act, passed in June 2025, introduces stricter know-your-customer requirements, enhanced due diligence on high-risk customers and politically exposed persons, more frequent reporting of suspicious transactions, and increased criminal liability for non-compliance.

    Whether these measures prove sufficient to reverse Kenya’s grey-listing while simultaneously choking off terror financing networks will test the capacity and political will of institutions from the Financial Reporting Centre to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

    For now, Kenya’s message to terror financiers is unambiguous. As one investigator put it: “The fight is being waged in boardrooms and bank vaults. Financial disruption is now a frontline defence.”

    The 13 designated individuals are: Zakariya Kamal Sufi Abasheikh, Jamal Abdi Mohamed, Hadija Issack Ali, Abdiweli Dubat Dege, Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, Robert Karani Nyokae, Zuena Nakhumicha Machabe, Mohamed Siyat Ali, Violet Kemunto Omwoyo, Juma Ambare (all Kenyan); Abubaker Swalleh (Ugandan); and Salehe Burhani Minja and Jerumami Usama Koja (both Tanzanian).

  • How Slapping Wajir Governor Landed Alleged Pedophile Turkish Tycoon in Hot Soup As Epstein List Links Kenya’s Coastal Underage Sex Scandal With Foreigners

    How Slapping Wajir Governor Landed Alleged Pedophile Turkish Tycoon in Hot Soup As Epstein List Links Kenya’s Coastal Underage Sex Scandal With Foreigners

    When Turkish billionaire Osman Erdinc Elsek allegedly delivered two sharp slaps to the cheeks of Wajir Governor Ahmed Abdullahi on a humid Kilifi evening last month, he likely did not anticipate the cascade of consequences that would follow.

    What began as a road rage confrontation along the Mombasa-Malindi highway has metamorphosed into a legal quagmire that has resurrected long-buried allegations of child defilement, exposed disturbing patterns of judicial interference, and thrust Kenya’s coastal region into the global spotlight following explosive revelations in the Jeffrey Epstein files.

    The January 12 incident at Kanamai, Kilifi South, was dramatic by any measure. According to police reports and sworn affidavits, Elsek’s Toyota Land Cruiser V8 aggressively forced its way into a convoy of Orange Democratic Movement leaders returning from a Central Committee meeting at Vipingo.

    The vehicle struck the governor’s car from behind.

    When Governor Abdullahi’s driver alighted to assess the damage, Elsek allegedly drew a Glock pistol loaded with 15 rounds of ammunition and slapped the driver. The governor, who serves as chairperson of the Council of Governors, then stepped out himself, only to be punched by the armed foreign national.

    Witnesses, including senior Members of Parliament and another governor traveling in the convoy, watched in stunned silence as the 62-year-old Turkish refugee turned investor assaulted one of Kenya’s most senior county officials in broad daylight. The tense standoff lasted several minutes before police intervened.

    Within hours, Elsek and his associate Gokmen Sandikci were arrested at Mtwapa. But what followed their detention revealed a story far more sinister than simple road rage.

    From Traffic Accident to Terrorism Charges

    On January 14, Elsek appeared before Senior Resident Magistrate David Odhiambo at the Mombasa Law Courts, not on assault charges as might be expected, but facing accusations of membership in the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, collecting information for terrorism, possession of articles connected to terrorism, and illegal possession of a firearm.

    The prosecution, led by Hassan Sugal of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, told the court that Elsek was being investigated for terrorism financing contrary to Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012. Investigators claimed they had received credible intelligence linking the businessman to Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen, a proscribed terrorist organization.

    According to the charge sheet, Elsek allegedly possessed a Samsung Flip 7 mobile phone containing video recordings collected for use in planning or executing terrorist activities. The device was purportedly discovered on January 14 at 5:23 pm while Elsek was at the ATPU offices in Mombasa, conveniently after his arrest.

    Elsek’s legal team, led by veteran criminal defense attorney Cliff Ombeta and constitutional lawyer John Khaminwa, immediately cried foul. In a sworn affidavit, Elsek insisted the terrorism allegations were manufactured, politically instigated, and aimed at justifying unlawful detention following what was essentially a traffic dispute.

    “The matter is not about terrorism but a traffic accident involving two governors and two Members of Parliament, whose names the prosecution does not want to disclose out of embarrassment,” Ombeta argued in court.

    The magistrate granted Elsek a bond of one million shillings with similar surety, while Sandikci received a 500,000 shilling bond. For terrorism charges that typically attract stringent bail conditions or outright denial, these were remarkably lenient terms. The pretrial hearing was scheduled for February 19, 2026.

    The Ghost of 2019: Child Defilement Charges That Vanished

    The current terrorism investigation has revived uncomfortable questions about Elsek’s history with Kenya’s criminal justice system.

    In January 2019, the billionaire was arrested at his fortified Kikambala residence by a joint operation involving Interpol, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and the General Service Unit. He faced ten counts of child defilement and child prostitution.

    The allegations were horrifying in their specificity. Between February and October 2018, Elsek allegedly defiled a 15-year-old girl and forced three other minors, aged 14 to 17, to massage his private parts using olive oil at his palatial home.

    The charge sheet stated he lured the four minors to his bedroom on numerous occasions, touched their breasts, and used his influence to procure them for indecent acts.

    Police affidavits painted a picture of calculated predation.

    Investigators said Elsek took advantage of the girls’ poor backgrounds, promising to pay for their education and meet their social needs in exchange for sexual favors. The victims told police that Elsek threatened them with dire consequences, including causing them to disappear without a trace.

    These were not idle threats from an ordinary man. Elsek had by then spent more than a decade in Kenya, amassing an estimated six billion shillings in investments through his 18-company empire, the Elsek Group Conglomerate.

    His business interests spanned construction, real estate, hospitality, quarrying, transport, and mortgage banking. His crown jewel, Kilifi Pearl Beach Resort, had become a luxury destination for local and international guests.

    Then came the first indication of Elsek’s unusual relationship with Kenya’s judicial system. The case, initially filed at Shanzu court, had to be transferred to Malindi after it emerged that the accused was a personal friend of the court and the state prosecutor.

    Senior Resident Magistrate David Odhiambo, the same magistrate who would later preside over Elsek’s terrorism case, admitted in court: “The accused is well known to the court and is a friend to a prosecutor.” Elsek was also a member of the Court Users Committee at Shanzu court and had undertaken several construction projects at the station, including the very courthouse where he was being tried.

    How does a foreign national, let alone one facing child defilement charges, become so embedded in the judicial system that the case must be transferred to avoid the appearance of bias?

    Despite this damning conflict of interest, Elsek was released on a mere 700,000 shillings cash bail. The case eventually transferred to Malindi, where it began to disintegrate.

    Key witnesses recanted their statements and turned hostile. Significant gaps emerged in the investigation. Elsek’s lawyers successfully argued that the case had no Occurrence Book number, meaning the alleged offenses were never formally reported at any police station. There was no identifiable complainant.

    The High Court in Malindi ordered the case to start afresh, citing procedural irregularities, illegalities, and indications of malice. But the fresh trial was plagued by repeated adjournments. Eventually, the state failed to prove its case, and Elsek walked free.

    In a surreal twist, three of the alleged victims later appeared outside the Malindi court demanding to be reunited with Elsek. The girls, aged between 14 and 17, claimed they were being held against their will in a witness protection program and that detectives had not allowed them to give their side of the story.

    Four young girls, allegedly defiled and exploited, got no justice. Their alleged abuser returned to his businesses, his resort, his billions. The message was unmistakable: money and connections trump justice in Kenya.

    The Pattern of Impunity

    The child defilement case was not Elsek’s first brush with Kenyan law.

    In 2016, he was charged with defrauding a Somalia-based construction company of 7.6 million shillings and threatening complainants with a firearm when they demanded a refund. That case was withdrawn after the parties allegedly settled.

    In another case still pending at Mombasa court, prosecutors charged Elsek and his manager with conspiring to defeat justice by interfering with witnesses in the child defilement case.

    The state alleged they dissuaded key witnesses from testifying. Elsek told the court that internal investigations uncovered evidence that police officers coerced minors into signing false statements against him.

    A pattern emerges across these cases: serious charges filed, cases transferred or delayed, witnesses turning hostile, procedural irregularities discovered, eventual collapse of prosecution. Throughout it all, Elsek has maintained his innocence, claiming powerful individuals are targeting him because they are unhappy with his investments.

    The Epstein Files: Kenya’s Coastal Shame Exposed

    The timing of Elsek’s latest arrest could not be more significant. Just weeks before the January 12 road rage incident, the United States Department of Justice released over 3.5 million pages of documents related to convicted sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein. Among the most disturbing revelations: Kenya’s coastal region, particularly Malindi, has been a hunting ground for international pedophiles.

    The files, released under the Epstein Files Transparency Act approved by US lawmakers in 2025, explicitly name Malindi as a haven for pedophiles. They describe how Epstein and his network used NGOs, safari tours, and modeling agencies as fronts for trafficking children from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia through Mombasa.

    Jeffrey Epstein
    Jeffrey Epstein

    In chilling email exchanges from 2009, Epstein joked about bringing back a little baby or two, boys or girls, from Kenya. Another message referred to girls finally turning legal. The correspondence revealed detailed planning for trips involving young women, with Epstein pledging 13,000 dollars per girl for what he termed safari and internship.

    Epstein’s publicist Peggy Siegal joked about their 2009 Kenya trip: “If the Maasai warriors don’t eat us, the pirates from Somalia will.” The language is typical of trafficking networks that exploit vulnerable Maasai and Somali children under the guise of humanitarian work.

    The files also revealed that Epstein’s estate was opening a film studio in Somaliland, possibly to lure young actors into the millionaire sex ring. He wanted to establish a commercial bank in Somalia. Tanzania’s luxury Mnemba Island, a private archipelago in the Indian Ocean, was visited by members of Epstein’s circle with trafficked children.

    Between April and June 2009, emails show Epstein and Siegal discussed transporting two girls to Kenya. On May 28, Epstein pledged 13,000 dollars per girl for a safari and internship. He referenced his knowledge of accommodations, writing: “I am very familiar with the flexibility of some of the accommodation venues you have chosen.”

    The planning continued into 2011.

    A May email noted that a girl, whose name was redacted by authorities, is finally turning legal. Earlier that month, Siegal told Epstein the girls were enthusiastic: “The girls not only showed up for the conference call but are now totally excited about going. We are all kissing the ground you walk on and the African plains the girls are about to ride on.”

    Circulating photographs allegedly depict Epstein at a foreign tycoon’s Malindi coastal property, though the timing remains unclear and no files confirm specific dates or activities. The identity of the tycoon has not been officially disclosed, and individuals pictured deny knowledge of any crimes.

    The Epstein files paint a picture of systematic exploitation, with Malindi and Mombasa serving as operational bases for international predators who exploited weak law enforcement, poverty, and corruption to prey on the most vulnerable children.

    The Refugee Billionaire

    One of the most perplexing aspects of Elsek’s story is his official status in Kenya. Despite controlling an 18-company business empire worth over six billion shillings and living in palatial residences along the coast, Elsek is officially a refugee.

    Court documents confirm that Elsek holds a Kenyan refugee alien certificate, a status granted under the 1951 Refugee Convention. His lawyers told the court that Elsek arrived in Kenya in December 2008 as a foreign investor fleeing political persecution in Turkey after falling out with the then Turkish president.

    The irony is staggering. A man who owns luxury resorts, construction companies, real estate developments, and quarrying operations across Kenya’s coastal region claims refugee protection meant for people fleeing persecution and lacking the means to sustain themselves.

    Dr. John Khaminwa told the court that Elsek had adopted Kenya as his home and faced danger if returned to Turkey. He argued that his client had made significant investments in Kenya and posed no flight risk. The lawyer urged the court to consider the importance of foreign investment to Kenya’s economy and avoid terms that could discourage investors.

    But questions remain. How does a refugee accumulate billions in assets? Why would Kenya grant refugee status to someone with the financial means to invest in multiple companies? What danger does Elsek face in Turkey that justifies this status, and has that danger been independently verified?

    More importantly, does refugee status protect Elsek from accountability for alleged crimes committed on Kenyan soil?

    The Questions That Demand Answers

    The convergence of the Epstein files, Elsek’s resurrected legal troubles, and the shocking assault on a sitting governor has thrust Kenya’s coastal region into an uncomfortable spotlight. Several questions demand answers.

    First, how did a foreign national charged with child defilement become friends with court officials and state prosecutors? The admission by Magistrate Odhiambo that Elsek was well known to the court and a friend to a prosecutor should have triggered a comprehensive investigation into judicial impropriety. Instead, the case was quietly transferred, and eventually collapsed.

    Second, why do witnesses in cases against wealthy foreigners repeatedly turn hostile? In Elsek’s child defilement case, key witnesses recanted their statements. In other cases involving foreign nationals accused of exploiting minors along the coast, similar patterns have emerged. Are witnesses being intimidated, bribed, or both? Who is facilitating these witness turnarounds?

    Third, what really happened in the police investigation where evidence mysteriously vanished and Occurrence Book numbers could not be produced? The High Court cited procedural irregularities, illegalities, and indications of malice when ordering the case to start afresh. But no police officers were held accountable for these failures. No investigation was launched into how a case of alleged child defilement could lack basic documentation.

    Fourth, how can someone facing terrorism charges receive bail so easily? Elsek was granted one million shillings bond for allegations of Al-Shabaab membership and terrorism financing. Kenyan courts typically impose stringent conditions on terrorism suspects or deny bail altogether. What made Elsek’s case different?

    Fifth, are the terrorism charges legitimate, or are they a smokescreen? Many observers suspect the terrorism allegations are a way to justify Elsek’s arrest without addressing the real issue: a foreign billionaire with a history of alleged child abuse had just physically assaulted a governor and brandished a firearm at public officials. Rather than face straightforward assault and weapons charges, he is now embroiled in terrorism allegations that may prove difficult to substantiate.

    Most importantly, who is protecting Osman Erdinc Elsek, and why?

    The Bigger Picture: Coast as Predator Paradise

    Elsek’s story does not exist in isolation. It is part of a much larger, darker narrative about Kenya’s coast as a destination for child sex tourism. The Epstein files merely confirmed what local activists and international watchdogs have been saying for years.

    Malindi and Mombasa have become infamous for child prostitution and sex tourism. Poor families, desperate for income, sometimes allow their children to be exploited by wealthy foreigners who arrive under the guise of tourism, business, or humanitarian work. NGOs and modeling agencies, according to the Epstein files, have facilitated these crimes.

    The victims are Maasai children, Somali refugees, Ethiopian migrants, and local Kenyan girls from impoverished backgrounds. The perpetrators are international businessmen, tourists, and investors who exploit weak law enforcement, poverty, and corruption.

    When billionaire pedophile Jeffrey Epstein could joke about bringing back babies from Kenya, when his network could openly discuss trafficking routes through Mombasa, when his estate could plan film studios in Somaliland to lure child actors, it reveals a level of impunity that should horrify every Kenyan.

    The Epstein files reference Malindi as a haven for pedophiles and allege that Epstein had close links with prominent Kenyan figures, including a former president, though no evidence of criminal involvement has been presented. The files describe how children from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and other parts of Eastern Africa were trafficked through Mombasa.

    Several email exchanges with dignitaries from the Cape, referring to wealthy white South Africans, appear in the files. Qatari royals are mentioned 297 times in the Epstein documents. The files reveal that some NGOs and modeling agencies in Africa facilitated, participated in, and assisted Epstein in what can only be described as human trafficking.

    Epstein served as a go-to contact for African politicians to negotiate contracts or establish connections. The files mention trips to East African countries, safaris in Kenya, Maasai villages in Tanzania, and even Somalia.

    This is the ecosystem within which Elsek has operated for nearly two decades. Whether or not he is directly connected to the networks described in the Epstein files, his alleged pattern of behavior and the repeated failure of Kenya’s justice system to hold him accountable fits squarely within the broader problem the files expose.

    A System That Protects Predators

    The collapse of Elsek’s child defilement case reveals systemic failures that enable exploitation.

    When a magistrate admits the accused is a friend of the court and a prosecutor, when key witnesses turn hostile, when Occurrence Book numbers mysteriously do not exist, when cases collapse due to procedural irregularities without any accountability for the officers responsible, it signals a justice system that can be manipulated by those with money and connections.

    Elsek in court when he was arraigned over child defilement charges.
    Elsek in court when he was arraigned over child defilement charges.

    The victims in Elsek’s case were girls from poor backgrounds. They lacked the resources to hire lawyers, the connections to influence prosecutors, the money to ensure their case received proper attention. Their alleged abuser, by contrast, had all three.

    This is not just about one Turkish tycoon. It is about a broken justice system that fails the most vulnerable. It is about how money and connections can buy immunity from even the most heinous allegations. It is about how Kenya’s coast has become a paradise for predators and hell for their victims.

    Local activists working to combat child sex tourism along the coast have long complained about the challenges they face. Police corruption, they say, is rampant. Officers are paid to look the other way or to bungle investigations. Witnesses are intimidated or bribed. Prosecutors are influenced. Magistrates have conflicts of interest.

    The result is a culture of impunity where foreign nationals with money can operate freely, knowing that even if they are arrested and charged, the case will likely collapse before reaching a verdict.

    **The Governor Assault: When Impunity Met Politics**

    The January 12 assault on Governor Ahmed Abdullahi represents a rare moment when Elsek’s apparent impunity collided with political power. Abdullahi is not just any county official. He is the governor of Wajir, a two-term leader who previously served as Vice Chairperson of the Council of Governors before being elected Chairperson in October 2024. He holds the highest rank in accounting as a Fellowship Certified Public Accountant and has received the Elder of the Order of the Golden Heart of Kenya for his public service.

    When Elsek allegedly punched Governor Abdullahi and slapped his driver in the presence of multiple witnesses, including senior MPs and another governor, he crossed a line that even his money and connections might not be able to erase.

    The Council of Governors issued a furious statement demanding to know who authorized a foreigner to carry a gun and terrorize Kenyans. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki ordered a swift probe. The incident highlighted growing friction on Kenyan roads involving VIP convoys and the public, but the assault on a governor crossed a red line.

    Yet even here, the response has been curious. Rather than facing straightforward assault and illegal weapons charges, Elsek was hit with terrorism allegations that his lawyers claim are fabricated. The terrorism investigation has effectively overshadowed the assault charges, shifting focus from a clear-cut case of a foreign national physically attacking a sitting governor to complex allegations about Al-Shabaab membership that will be difficult to prove.

    The February 19 Reckoning

    As Elsek’s pretrial hearing approaches on February 19, 2026, Kenya faces a test of its commitment to justice. Will the terrorism charges lead to a credible prosecution based on solid evidence, or will they collapse like the child defilement case before them? Will the assault charges against Governor Abdullahi receive proper attention, or will they be buried under the weight of more sensational terrorism allegations?

    Beyond Elsek’s individual case, the Epstein files have issued Kenya an uncomfortable challenge. The world now knows that Malindi has been described as a haven for pedophiles, that Mombasa has served as a trafficking route for vulnerable children, that international networks have operated with apparent ease along Kenya’s coast.

    Kenya must confront this reality. It must dismantle the systems that enable impunity. Investigators and prosecutors must face consequences for botched cases. Courts must refuse to bend for the wealthy and connected. Witness protection must be strengthened so that intimidation and bribery cannot derail cases. Police corruption must be rooted out.

    Until these systemic changes occur, more children will be victimized, more predators will walk free, and more luxury resorts will operate while hiding dark secrets behind their pristine beaches and five-star amenities.

    The four young girls allegedly abused by Elsek in 2018 deserve answers. Governor Abdullahi deserves justice. The Kenyan public deserves to know why a man with such serious allegations against him continues to operate freely in their country.

    As the Epstein files send shockwaves across the world, exposing how Kenya’s coast has been a hunting ground for international pedophiles, the case of Osman Erdinc Elsek becomes a litmus test for Kenya’s commitment to the rule of law.

    The story of Osman Erdinc Elsek is not just about one Turkish tycoon’s alleged crimes. It is about a justice system that can be bought. It is about children whose lives matter less than investor confidence. It is about a coastal region that has become synonymous with exploitation. It is about the uncomfortable truth that in Kenya, as in many places around the world, money talks and justice walks.

    The world is watching. Kenya’s children are waiting. Justice, long delayed, demands to be served.

    Note: This investigation is based on court documents, police reports, media coverage, and the recently released Epstein files. Osman Erdinc Elsek has denied all allegations against him and maintains that the charges are politically motivated and fabricated. He is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. The pretrial hearing in his terrorism case is scheduled for February 19, 2026.

  • Somali Lawmaker Exposes How Minnesota Fraud Is Rooted in State Corruption and Is Directed From Mogadishu

    Somali Lawmaker Exposes How Minnesota Fraud Is Rooted in State Corruption and Is Directed From Mogadishu

    WASHINGTON — A Somali member of parliament has intensified the debate over a sprawling fraud scandal in Minnesota, asserting in a letter to Senator Ted Cruz that the abuse of U.S. taxpayer funds under investigation in the state is part of a far larger, state-enabled system of corruption directed from Mogadishu.

    The lawmaker, Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib, sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee of Somalia’s House of the People and has emerged as one of the most vocal internal critics of his own government. In his letter to Mr. Cruz, Dr. Abib said he possesses extensive documentary evidence showing that fraud uncovered in Minnesota represents only the downstream effects of what he described as a “state-sanctioned fraud architecture” embedded within Somali institutions and protected by senior political leaders.

    Dr. Abib urged Congress not to focus solely on Minnesota officials, including Governor Tim Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison, arguing that state and municipal authorities are not the originators of the schemes now under federal scrutiny. Minnesota, he wrote, functions primarily as a distribution point for funds that are later transferred, laundered and recycled through transnational networks tied to Somalia’s political and financial elite.

    The letter arrives as federal prosecutors and congressional committees continue to examine fraud involving pandemic-era food aid, health care and social services programs in Minnesota, cases that have already resulted in dozens of indictments and allegations involving hundreds of millions of dollars. Republican lawmakers, including Mr. Cruz, have raised concerns that proceeds from these schemes were routed abroad, including to Somalia, through informal money-transfer systems.

    Dr. Abib’s claims echo arguments he has made previously in interviews and written submissions to U.S. officials. In January, he told The Daily Caller that Somalia effectively functions as a “fraud pipeline,” siphoning U.S. taxpayer money from aid, health care and child care programs into one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries  . He said corruption exposed in Minnesota and other American states did not arise spontaneously but reflected predictable outcomes of Somalia’s governing structure, which relies heavily on foreign aid and lacks effective oversight.

    According to material Dr. Abib shared with U.S. lawmakers and journalists, international partners have allocated more than $3.5 billion in humanitarian assistance to Somalia in recent years, with roughly 90 percent coming from the United States.

    He alleges that large portions of this money are systematically diverted through inflated contracts, cash withdrawals without receipts and payments to shell advisers and family-linked businesses embedded within government agencies.

    Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib
    Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib

    In one 2023 report cited by Dr. Abib, Somali parliamentary investigators compiled hundreds of gigabytes of expenditure data that they say show illegal spending by the executive branch, including inflated travel costs and purchases from politically connected firms without competitive bidding.

    He has also accused senior officials at Somalia’s central bank and disaster management agency of facilitating or benefiting from the diversion of aid, claims that Somali authorities have not publicly addressed in detail.

    Dr. Abib’s second letter, sent earlier this year and also reviewed by U.S. officials, argued that U.S. oversight failures under the Biden administration allowed billions of dollars in aid fraud to go unaddressed for years.

    He documented what he described as a multibillion-dollar gap between donor-reported project revenues and actual deposits into Somalia’s Treasury Single Account, which receives international assistance.

    The World Bank and the United Nations World Food Program, both key channels for aid to Somalia, have rejected accusations that they knowingly facilitate fraud. A World Bank spokesman has said its Somalia projects are subject to strict fiduciary controls and monitoring procedures and that the institution has zero tolerance for corruption. The bank has encouraged whistleblowers to submit allegations through formal reporting mechanisms.

    U.S. officials have acknowledged concerns about diversion of aid and fraud but have stopped short of endorsing Dr. Abib’s most sweeping claims. Treasury Department representatives have said they are examining whether fraud proceeds from Minnesota cases were transferred abroad and have pledged to strengthen enforcement tools to combat money laundering and terror financing. No U.S. agency has publicly confirmed evidence that Somalia’s government formally authorized or directed fraud committed inside the United States.

    Within Somalia, Dr. Abib’s accusations have made him a polarizing figure. He has portrayed himself as a whistleblower acting at personal risk, saying he has received threats and faced political retaliation for exposing corruption. Supporters see him as a rare internal critic in a system long plagued by graft, while detractors accuse him of politicizing aid and damaging Somalia’s international standing.

    In his letter to Mr. Cruz, Dr. Abib said he has already submitted a detailed oversight report to congressional leaders and offered to testify publicly under oath. He argued that hearings focused solely on American state officials would generate headlines but fail to address what he called the sovereign-level decision makers who enable fraud and protect its proceeds.

    Whether Congress will take up that offer remains unclear. But Dr. Abib’s intervention adds an international and diplomatic dimension to a scandal that has already shaken confidence in U.S. safeguards for taxpayer-funded programs, raising questions about how domestic fraud, foreign aid and fragile states intersect in an increasingly interconnected financial system.

  • Audit Reveals How Sh151 Million Was Wired To A Secret City Hall Account Pointing To Fraud

    Audit Reveals How Sh151 Million Was Wired To A Secret City Hall Account Pointing To Fraud

    Nairobi City County officials are on the spot after a damning audit exposed how they secretly opened an off-the-books bank account and funneled over Sh151 million into it within months, with no documentation, no known signatories and no legitimate explanation for its existence.

    The explosive revelations by Auditor General Nancy Gathungu paint a picture of systematic fraud at City Hall, where public finance controls were brazenly bypassed to create what auditors describe as a ghost account that received massive unexplained payments yet was never reflected in official county records.

    The account, dubiously titled “NCC Imprest Operations Account,” was opened at a commercial bank in November 2024 without following any of the stringent legal procedures that govern county finances. Within weeks of its creation, the money started pouring in.

    A supplier transferred Sh98.1 million into the account on November 25, 2024. Two months later, another Sh53.5 million landed in the same account on January 22, 2025. After deducting minor bank charges, the balance stood at a staggering Sh151.7 million by June 30, 2025, money that exists in financial limbo with no trace in Nairobi County’s formal accounting system.

    What makes the scandal particularly brazen is that county officials have refused to provide even basic information about the account. They have not disclosed who authorized its opening, who the signatories are, or why an account supposedly meant for expenditure was only receiving money but never making payments.

    “The authority to open the account was not provided, and there was no justification provided for establishing an imprest operations account. Further, the signatories to the account were not disclosed, and no explanation was provided for operating an expenditure account that only received revenue,” the audit report states in scathing terms.

    The account was structured to appear as an expenditure facility, a type of account typically used to manage operational costs and make payments to suppliers and service providers. However, audit records show it functioned exclusively as a revenue channel, receiving large wire transfers with no corresponding invoices, contracts or supporting documents to explain what the payments were for.

    Auditors found no cash books, no bank reconciliation statements, no invoices from the entities making the transfers, and no documentation whatsoever linking the funds to any legitimate county business. The money simply appeared and sat there, controlled by unknown individuals operating in complete secrecy.

    The latest audit report covering the financial year ending June 2025 reveals that this secret account is just the tip of the iceberg in what appears to be endemic financial mismanagement and potential looting at City Hall under Governor Johnson Sakaja’s administration.

    Auditors also flagged Sh16.4 million in questionable overseas travel and training expenses. Of Sh798 million reviewed for foreign trips, at least Sh16.4 million lacked basic documentation such as travel approvals, boarding passes, visa stamps, attendance registers or post-trip reports.

    In the most suspicious case, county officials claimed to have spent over Sh7.2 million on a sustainability training program in Singapore scheduled for February 2025. However, auditors found no air tickets, no visas, no insurance records and no procurement documents for the trip, raising serious questions about whether the journey ever happened or whether the money was simply stolen.

    The audit found that in several cases, per diems were paid beyond approved event dates, accommodation costs were covered despite sponsor commitments to provide lodging, and unauthorized rates were applied to inflate payments. Officials made advance payments before trips occurred, prepared paperwork after events supposedly ended, and procured services that had already been contracted elsewhere, painting a disturbing picture of a system where oversight has completely collapsed.

    Auditors also identified Sh16 million in non-exchange receivables that could not be supported with ledgers, invoices or contracts, making it impossible to verify whether the debts are legitimate or will ever be recovered. County officials failed to account for bad and doubtful debts, a failure that artificially inflates both receivables and total assets on Nairobi County’s financial statements.

    On Thursday, senior officials from Governor Sakaja’s executive committee appeared before the Nairobi County Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee to answer for the audit findings. Members of the County Assembly signaled a tougher stance on accountability, with committee chairperson and Ngara MCA Chege Mwaura warning that the hearings would expose how public funds have been misused.

    “It is important for Nairobi residents to understand how their taxes are being spent,” Mwaura said, adding that the committee is working closely with officers from the Auditor General’s office and has already scheduled appearances for all implicated officials.

    The scandal comes at a time when Nairobi County is drowning in over Sh100 billion in debt, including billions owed to suppliers, Kenya Power, and law firms. Earlier audits revealed that City Hall operates 23 unauthorized commercial bank accounts instead of maintaining its funds at the Central Bank of Kenya as required by law. The county has also been accused of removing Sh39.8 billion in fake supplier bills from its books without proper documentation.

    The secret account revelations have reignited questions about financial governance under Governor Sakaja, who came into office in 2022 promising transparency and fiscal responsibility. Critics say the pattern of unauthorized accounts, missing documentation and unexplained expenditures suggests either gross incompetence or deliberate theft of public funds on a massive scale.

    As investigators probe deeper into the Sh151 million mystery account, one question looms large over City Hall: if officials won’t even say who controls this account or why it exists, what else are they hiding from the public?

    The Auditor General has demanded full disclosure and accountability, warning that the unexplained transactions expose serious weaknesses in Nairobi County’s financial controls and point to potential criminal activity that must be investigated and prosecuted.

  • How Turkish Tycoon Osman Erdinc Elsek Has Dodged Justice for Child Defilement, Governor Assault and Terror Links While Kenya’s Coast Remains Playground for Global Sex Predators

    How Turkish Tycoon Osman Erdinc Elsek Has Dodged Justice for Child Defilement, Governor Assault and Terror Links While Kenya’s Coast Remains Playground for Global Sex Predators

    The story of Osman Erdinc Elsek reads like a script from a crime thriller, except it’s real, it’s happening in Kenya, and the victims are children. For nearly two decades, this Turkish billionaire has operated with brazen impunity along Kenya’s Coast, accumulating wealth through his 18-company empire while leaving a trail of shocking allegations: child defilement, terrorism financing, illegal firearms and physical assault of a sitting governor.

    Yet somehow, despite multiple arrests and court cases that would have buried any ordinary Kenyan, Elsek walks free, his properties intact, his businesses thriving, his luxury resort still welcoming guests. The question burning in everyone’s mind: who is protecting this man?

    The Epstein Files: Kenya Named

    The release of Jeffrey Epstein’s files by the US Department of Justice has sent shockwaves across the world. Over 3.5 million pages of documents reveal what many suspected but few could prove: Kenya’s Coast, particularly Malindi, has been a hunting ground for international paedophiles.

    The files explicitly mention coastal towns like Malindi as areas frequented by individuals involved in child trafficking. They describe how Epstein and his network used NGOs, safari tours and modelling agencies as fronts for trafficking children from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia through Mombasa.

    In one chilling email exchange from 2009, Epstein jokes about bringing back “a little baby… or two… boys or girls” from Kenya. Another message refers to girls “finally turning legal.” The correspondence reveals detailed planning for trips involving young women, with Epstein pledging $13,000 per girl for what he termed “safari and internship.”

    Epstein’s publicist Peggy Siegal joked about their 2009 Kenya trip: “If the Maasai warriors don’t eat us, the pirates from Somalia will.” The language is typical of trafficking networks that exploit vulnerable Maasai and Somali children under the guise of humanitarian work.

    The files also reveal that Epstein’s estate was opening a film studio in Somaliland, possibly to lure young actors into the millionaire sex ring. He wanted to establish a commercial bank in Somalia. Tanzania’s luxury Mnemba Island, a private archipelago in the Indian Ocean, was visited by members of Epstein’s circle with trafficked children.

    Enter Osman Erdinc Elsek: The Man Who Won’t Go Down

    Against this backdrop of international child trafficking networks, Osman Erdinc Elsek’s story becomes even more disturbing. This Turkish national arrived in Kenya in December 2008 as a “foreign investor” and quickly established himself in Kikambala, Kilifi County. Today, he controls 18 companies under the Elsek Group Conglomerate, operating in construction, real estate, hospitality, quarrying, transport and mortgage banking.

    His crown jewel? Kilifi Pearl Beach Resort, a luxury destination that has hosted both local and international guests. Property worth over Sh6 billion, all built on Kenyan soil. Not bad for a man who holds refugee status in the country.

    Yes, refugee status. Despite his billions and business empire, Elsek is officially a refugee in Kenya. The irony would be laughable if it weren’t so sinister.

    The Child Defilement Case That Collapsed

    In 2019, Elsek was arrested and charged with 10 counts of defilement and child prostitution. The allegations were horrific: he allegedly defiled a 15-year-old girl and forced three other minors, aged 14 to 17, to massage his private parts using olive oil at his Kikambala residence between February and October 2018.

    The charge sheet stated he lured the four minors to his bedroom on numerous occasions, touching their breasts and using his influence to procure them for indecent acts. According to police affidavits, he took advantage of the girls’ poor backgrounds, promising to pay for their education and meet their social needs in exchange for sexual favours.

    The victims told investigators that Elsek threatened them with dire consequences, including making them “disappear without a trace.” These were not idle threats from an ordinary man. This was a billionaire with connections, resources and apparent immunity.

    Then came the first sign of Elsek’s untouchable status. The case, initially filed at Shanzu court, had to be transferred to Malindi after it emerged that the accused was a personal friend of the court and the State prosecutor. The presiding magistrate, David Odhiambo, admitted: “The accused is well known to the court and is a friend to a prosecutor.”

    Elsek was also a member of the Court Users Committee at Shanzu court and had undertaken several construction projects at the station. How does a foreign national, let alone one facing child defilement charges, become so embedded in the judicial system?

    Despite this damning conflict of interest, Elsek was released on a mere Sh700,000 cash bail. The case eventually transferred to Malindi, where it began to fall apart in spectacular fashion.

    Key witnesses recanted their statements and turned hostile. Significant gaps emerged in the investigation. Elsek’s lawyers successfully argued that the case had no Occurrence Book number, meaning the alleged offences were never formally reported at any police station. There was no identifiable complainant.

    The High Court in Malindi ordered the case to start afresh, citing “procedural irregularities, illegalities and indications of malice.” But the fresh trial was plagued by repeated adjournments. Eventually, the State failed to prove its case, and Elsek walked free.

    Four young girls, allegedly defiled and exploited, got no justice. Their alleged abuser returned to his businesses, his resort, his billions. The message was clear: money and connections trump justice in Kenya.

    The Governor Assault: When Impunity Met Politics

    If anyone thought Elsek had learned to keep a low profile after dodging child defilement charges, they were sorely mistaken. On January 12, 2026, the billionaire made headlines again, this time for allegedly assaulting a sitting governor.

    The incident occurred at Kanamai in Kilifi South when a vehicle driven by Elsek cut through a convoy of ODM leaders leaving Vipingo after a Central Committee meeting. The vehicle hit the governor’s car from behind. When the governor’s driver stepped out to inquire, Elsek allegedly drew a gun and slapped him in rage.

    When the governor himself stepped out, Elsek reportedly punched him. Witnesses included senior MPs and another governor who were in the convoy. The tense incident drew a crowd and lasted several minutes.

    This was not just road rage. This was a foreign national, already facing serious criminal allegations, brandishing a firearm and physically assaulting elected officials in broad daylight. In any functioning justice system, this would have been the end of Osman Erdinc Elsek.

    Instead, he was arrested on January 14 and charged with being a member of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, collecting information for terrorism, possession of articles connected to terrorism and illegal possession of a firearm. His co-accused, Gokmen Sandikci, faced charges of consorting with someone in illegal possession of a firearm.

    The Terrorism Charges: Too Convenient?

    The terrorism charges against Elsek raise more questions than they answer. According to the charge sheet, on an unknown date within Kenya, he was a member of Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen, a proscribed terrorist group.

    He was also charged with collecting information for terrorism after allegedly being found with a Samsung Flip 7 mobile phone containing video recordings for use in committing terrorist acts. The alleged offence occurred on January 14, 2026, at the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Mombasa, conveniently after his arrest.

    Elsek denied all charges through his lawyer Cliff Ombeta, one of Kenya’s most prominent criminal defence attorneys. He argued the matter arose from a traffic accident and confrontation involving a political convoy, not terrorism. In a sworn affidavit, he maintained the terrorism claims contradicted police Occurrence Book records, which related to a traffic accident in which he was the victim.

    The court granted him a Sh1 million bond with similar surety, while his co-accused Sandikci got Sh500,000 surety bond. For terrorism charges, these are remarkably lenient terms.

    Many observers suspect the terrorism charges are a smokescreen, a way to justify Elsek’s arrest without addressing the real issue: a foreign billionaire with a history of alleged child abuse had just physically assaulted a governor and brandished a firearm at public officials. Rather than face straightforward assault and weapons charges, he’s now embroiled in terrorism allegations that may prove difficult to substantiate.

    The Pattern of Impunity

    Elsek’s legal troubles didn’t start with child defilement. In 2016, he was charged with defrauding a Somalia-based construction company of Sh7.6 million and threatening complainants with a firearm when they demanded a refund. That case was withdrawn after the parties allegedly settled.

    In another case still pending at Mombasa court, prosecutors charged Elsek and his manager with conspiring to defeat justice by interfering with witnesses in the child defilement case. The State alleged they dissuaded key witnesses from testifying. Elsek told the court that internal investigations uncovered evidence that police officers coerced minors into signing false statements against him.

    What emerges is a pattern: serious charges filed, cases transferred or delayed, witnesses turning hostile, procedural irregularities discovered, eventual collapse of prosecution. Rinse and repeat.

    Throughout it all, Elsek has maintained his innocence, claiming powerful individuals are after him because they’re unhappy with his investments. He told the court his companies have undertaken extensive Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives, formally documented as proof of his commitment to Kenya.

    But CSR and charity work don’t erase allegations of child sexual abuse. They don’t explain why a billionaire holds refugee status. They don’t justify assaulting a governor. And they certainly don’t address why this man remains free while the Kenyan justice system has failed his alleged victims time and again.

    The Bigger Picture: Coast as Paedophile Paradise

    Elsek’s story doesn’t exist in isolation. It’s part of a much larger, darker narrative about Kenya’s Coast as a destination for child sex tourism. The Epstein files merely confirmed what local activists and international watchdogs have been saying for years.

    Malindi and Mombasa have become infamous for child prostitution and sex tourism. Poor families, desperate for income, sometimes allow their children to be exploited by wealthy foreigners who arrive under the guise of tourism, business or humanitarian work. NGOs and modelling agencies, according to the Epstein files, have facilitated these crimes.

    The victims are Maasai children, Somali refugees, Ethiopian migrants and local Kenyan girls from impoverished backgrounds. The perpetrators are international businessmen, tourists and investors who exploit weak law enforcement, poverty and corruption.

    When billionaire paedophile Jeffrey Epstein could joke about bringing back babies from Kenya, when his network could openly discuss trafficking routes through Mombasa, when his estate could plan film studios in Somaliland to lure child actors, it reveals a level of impunity that should horrify every Kenyan.

    And when a Turkish tycoon with similar allegations can operate luxury resorts, maintain billions in assets, assault elected officials and walk away from multiple serious charges, it confirms that impunity isn’t just an international problem. It’s deeply rooted in Kenya’s own systems.

    The Questions That Demand Answers

    How does a foreign national charged with child defilement become friends with court officials and state prosecutors?

    Why does a billionaire businessman hold refugee status in Kenya?

    How did four young girls allegedly defiled and exploited end up with no justice while their alleged abuser thrives?

    Why do witnesses turn hostile in cases against wealthy foreigners?

    What really happened in that police investigation where evidence mysteriously vanished and Occurrence Book numbers couldn’t be produced?

    How can someone facing terrorism charges get bail so easily?

    Most importantly: who is protecting Osman Erdinc Elsek, and why?

    The Unanswered Call for Justice

    As the Epstein files send shockwaves across the world, exposing how Kenya’s Coast has been a hunting ground for international paedophiles, the case of Osman Erdinc Elsek becomes a litmus test for Kenya’s commitment to justice.

    Will Kenyan authorities finally hold him accountable, or will he continue to dodge justice like he has for nearly two decades? Will the latest terrorism charges lead anywhere, or will they collapse like the defilement case before them?

    The four young girls allegedly abused in 2018 deserve answers. The governor assaulted in 2026 deserves justice. The Kenyan public deserves to know why a man with such serious allegations against him continues to operate freely in their country.

    Beyond Elsek, Kenya must confront the uncomfortable truth revealed by the Epstein files: the Coast has become synonymous with child sex tourism. Poor enforcement, corruption and poverty have created a perfect storm where vulnerable children are exploited by wealthy predators who know they can get away with it.

    Until Kenya dismantles the systems that enable this impunity, until investigators and prosecutors face consequences for botched cases, until courts refuse to bend for the wealthy and connected, the cycle will continue. More children will be victimized. More predators will walk free. More luxury resorts will operate while hiding dark secrets behind their pristine beaches and five-star amenities.

    The story of Osman Erdinc Elsek isn’t just about one Turkish tycoon’s alleged crimes. It’s about a broken justice system that fails the most vulnerable. It’s about how money and connections can buy immunity from even the most heinous allegations. It’s about how Kenya’s Coast has become a paradise for predators and hell for their victims.

    As Elsek’s latest case proceeds with a pretrial date set for February 19, 2026, one question looms large: will this time be different, or is this just another chapter in the long story of justice denied?

    The world is watching. Kenya’s children are waiting. Justice, long delayed, demands to be served.

  • Epstein Files: Sultan bin Sulayem Bragged on His Closeness to President Uhuru Then His Firm DP World Controversially Won Port Construction in Kenya, Tanzania

    Epstein Files: Sultan bin Sulayem Bragged on His Closeness to President Uhuru Then His Firm DP World Controversially Won Port Construction in Kenya, Tanzania

    The release of over 3.5 million pages of documents related to convicted sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein has exposed a troubling pattern linking Dubai’s logistics titan DP World to the disgraced financier through its chairman Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, raising uncomfortable questions about how the company secured lucrative port deals across East Africa just months after Sulayem boasted to Epstein about his access to African presidents.

    The documents reveal that in April 2013, Sulayem emailed Epstein to inform him he was attending the inauguration of then President Uhuru Kenyatta, writing, “I am in Nairobi for the inauguration of Uhuru Kenyatta as president of Kenya, whom I know very well.” Epstein replied three hours later asking, “Any plans for NY?” The casual exchange suggests a relationship where access to heads of state was currency worth trading.

    Just over a year later, in October 2014, Sulayem updated Epstein about a three-hour meeting he had with President Kenyatta in Mombasa.

    The discussion centred on plans to build what Sulayem described as a massive logistics hub to serve Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, the Central African Republic and Rwanda.

    Former President Uhuru Kenyatta.
    Former President Uhuru Kenyatta.

    Within months of these communications, DP World began aggressive expansion across East Africa, securing deals that critics say lacked transparency and proper public participation.

    The timing raises troubling questions.

    In March 2022, Kenya’s Finance Ministry entered into a controversial concession with DP World, giving the Dubai-based firm rights to operate berths at Mombasa, Lamu and Kisumu ports.

    The deal, which emerged after President Kenyatta’s February 2022 visit to the UAE, sparked fierce political backlash.

    Kenya Kwanza Coalition leaders accused Kenyatta of secretly auctioning national assets, with claims the agreement was sealed during what was publicly billed as opposition leader Raila Odinga’s birthday party in Mombasa.

    The letter requesting DP World’s proposal was addressed directly to Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, the same man who had spent years cultivating a relationship with one of history’s most notorious paedophiles.

    Although the Kenya deal ultimately collapsed amid election-year politics, DP World’s appetite for East African ports did not wane.

    In October 2023, DP World signed a 30-year concession to operate four berths at Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Port, committing an initial $250 million that could grow to $1 billion.

    Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem himself described the agreement as “a milestone in enhancing the supply chain infrastructure in East Africa.”

    The deal, which took effect in April 2024, grants DP World control over one of the continent’s busiest maritime gateways, handling cargo for Tanzania and landlocked neighbours including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, DRC and Zambia.

    The Epstein files paint a disturbing portrait of Sulayem’s character and his relationship with the convicted sex offender.

    Between 2007 and 2018, the two exchanged what investigators describe as “dozens, if not hundreds” of emails covering everything from business matters to deeply personal exchanges.

    Photos released by House Democrats show Epstein cooking with Sulayem, suggesting an intimacy that went far beyond professional acquaintance.

    In one particularly chilling exchange from 2017, Sulayem helped arrange for a Russian “masseuse” from Epstein’s “private spa” to train at the Rixos hotel in Antalya, Turkey, so she could “gain better experiences.”

    Epstein wrote that he wanted her to “learn as much as she can, all treatments etc.” During Ghislaine Maxwell’s 2022 trial, multiple witnesses testified that Epstein used the guise of “massages” to sexually exploit young girls at his properties.

    The masseuse’s passport details were redacted in the DoJ files, her age unknown.

    Other emails reveal Sulayem repeatedly asking Epstein if he could visit his private island, Little St. James, where victims testified they were trafficked and abused.

    “Dear Jeffery, Any update on the Christmas at your island I need to plan my travel,” Sulayem wrote in December 2014. This was years after Epstein’s 2008 conviction for soliciting prostitution from a minor.

    In August 2015, Sulayem sent Epstein a link to a pornography website during a series of text messages.

    In another 2016 exchange, Epstein wrote to Sulayem: “no girl in dubai is safe tonite.” The context remains unclear, but the casual depravity is unmistakable.

    The relationship extended to political access. In January 2017, days before Donald Trump’s first inauguration, Sulayem asked Epstein whether he should attend and “Do you think it will be possible to shake hand with trump?” Epstein advised him on the matter.

    In 2015, Sulayem asked Epstein to introduce him to Elon Musk to discuss using Tesla batteries for a Dubai hotel project. Two years later, Musk and Sulayem led a discussion in Dubai.

    Epstein also facilitated Sulayem’s attempts to recruit British politician Lord Peter Mandelson to DP World’s board in 2014.

    Mandelson, who served in Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s cabinets and later became Donald Trump’s ambassador to Washington before being sacked over his Epstein ties, initially agreed before raising concerns about DP World’s parent company, Dubai World, being “overleveraged.” Epstein reassured him it was “awash in cash flow.”

    Investigative reporting also reveals that Epstein used Sulayem’s name as a front to purchase Great St. James, an island near Little St. James in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

    Documents made it appear that Sulayem was the buyer paying roughly $22.5 million, when in reality the beneficial owner was Epstein himself.

    This arrangement allowed Epstein to mask his expanding island empire behind the credibility of a wealthy Gulf businessman.

    The Africa connection runs deeper than Kenya and Tanzania.

    DP World now operates ports and logistics centres across at least nine African countries, including Algeria, Angola, Djibouti, Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa, as well as the breakaway region of Somaliland.

    The company’s expansion has been marked by long-term concessions, often spanning 20 to 30 years, granting DP World extraordinary control over critical trade infrastructure.

    In Senegal, DP World is constructing a $1.1 billion deepwater port at Ndayane, 50 kilometres south of Dakar, which it will control for 25 years.

    In Angola, the company secured a 20-year concession for the multipurpose terminal at Luanda port.

    In the Democratic Republic of Congo, DP World is developing a $1.2 billion deep-sea port at Banana, expected to be completed by 2025. In Mozambique, DP World operates the Maputo container terminal and launched the first dedicated container train service to Zimbabwe.

    The pattern is consistent: DP World arrives in African nations promising modernisation and investment, secures decades-long concessions over strategic assets, and tightens Dubai’s grip on continental trade routes.

    The company’s expansion aligns with broader UAE geopolitical strategy, with sister firm AD Ports Group similarly expanding across Tanzania, Congo and Egypt.

    Yet DP World’s Africa ventures have been plagued by controversy.

    In Djibouti, the government nationalised the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018, terminating DP World’s 30-year concession amid accusations of unfair contract terms.

    The move escalated into a bitter legal battle, with a Hong Kong appeals court ordering Djibouti to pay DP World over $600 million in damages. The crisis deepened after the UAE signed a deal to upgrade Somaliland’s Berbera port, positioning a rival facility on Djibouti’s doorstep.

    In Tanzania, the DP World concession sparked fierce opposition from activists, religious leaders and opposition politicians who warned it threatened national sovereignty.

    “The agreement was shocking as it entailed clauses that were blatantly one-sided in favour of the Dubai government and its state-owned enterprise Dubai Port World,” activist Maria Tsehai told The Africa Report in 2023. President Samia Suluhu Hassan pushed the deal through despite the backlash.

    The Epstein files also reveal discussions between Sulayem and the sex offender about exploiting Somaliland’s economic potential.

    In April 2018, Sulayem sent Epstein a document titled “The recognition of Somaliland – a brief history.” Earlier emails from associates explored water exports from Berbera and financial services opportunities, with one sender noting the potential to profit from remittance services if Barclays halted money transfers to the region.

    Other African locations appear in the Epstein files in more sinister contexts.

    The documents reference Kenya and Somalia as locations flagged for paedophile activity, with Tanzania and Senegal identified as transit points in alleged trafficking operations.

    Coastal towns like Malindi in Kenya are described as areas frequented by individuals involved in such activity.

    Luxury destinations such as Mnemba Island in Tanzania were reportedly visited by members of Epstein’s circle.

    Newly released emails detail planning for 2009 trips to Kenya involving young women.

    In one exchange, American publicist Peggy Siegal joked to Epstein about travelling from Amsterdam: “If the Maasai warriors don’t eat us, the pirates from Somalia will.”

    Between April and June 2009, correspondence shows Epstein and Siegal discussed transporting two girls to Kenya, with Epstein pledging $13,000 per girl for “safari and internship.” He referenced his knowledge of accommodation flexibility at venues Siegal had chosen.

    In May 2011, Siegal emailed that a girl, whose name was redacted, “is finally turning legal.” Earlier that month she told Epstein the girls were “kissing the ground you walk on and the African plains the girls are about to ride on.”

    In one excerpt presented as a “joke,” a sender wrote to Epstein about “bringing a little baby back… or two… boys or girls” from Kenya.

    The documents allege that Epstein’s estate was in the process of opening a film studio in Somaliland, possibly to lure young actors into his network.

    He reportedly wanted to establish a commercial bank in Somalia.

    Files suggest some non-governmental organisations and modelling agencies in Africa facilitated or participated in activities consistent with human trafficking.

    Children from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia and other parts of Eastern Africa were reportedly trafficked through Mombasa, the very port where DP World sought control and where Sulayem met with President Kenyatta to discuss regional logistics infrastructure.

    Experts caution that mention of countries in the Epstein documents does not constitute proof of wrongdoing by government officials. No evidence directly links President Kenyatta or other African leaders to Epstein’s crimes. Being photographed with Epstein at public events or appearing in correspondence does not imply criminal involvement.

    President Kenyatta’s connection to the files stems entirely from Sulayem’s emails about attending his inauguration and discussing port development.

    Similarly, there is no public record that Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem has been charged with or formally investigated for Epstein’s crimes.

    DP World declined to comment on the revelations.

    Yet the company’s chairman maintained a close personal friendship with a convicted paedophile for over a decade, exchanged hundreds of emails with him, facilitated his masseuse’s training, sought invitations to his private island where abuse occurred, and shared pornographic content with him, all while leveraging Epstein’s network to access political power and business opportunities.

    The question now facing East African governments is whether they conducted adequate due diligence before handing control of strategic national assets to a company led by a man so deeply enmeshed with Jeffrey Epstein.

    Did Kenyan and Tanzanian officials know about Sulayem’s relationship with the convicted sex offender when they negotiated port concessions? Were background checks conducted? What safeguards exist to prevent individuals with such associations from gaining control over critical infrastructure?

    In Kenya, the DP World deal collapsed amid political opposition, though speculation persists that the company may re-emerge as a contender as the government quietly relaunches port concessions.

    In Tanzania, DP World is already operational, with the government touting reduced ship turnaround times and increased revenue while critics warn of sovereignty erosion.

    DP World now controls a vast network of African ports stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, from Djibouti and Somaliland down through Mozambique and across to Senegal and Angola.

    The company, ultimately owned by Dubai’s ruling family through Dubai World and chaired by the emirate’s ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, wields enormous influence over continental trade flows.

    Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, born into one of Dubai’s most prominent political families and positioned since birth with access to the UAE’s ruling elite, has built an empire by securing long-term concessions over strategic infrastructure in developing nations.

    His relationship with Jeffrey Epstein suggests he was willing to maintain close personal ties with a known sex offender, facilitate the training of women from Epstein’s “private spa,” and seek invitations to an island where children were abused, all while presenting himself as a legitimate businessman worthy of trust from African governments.

    The Epstein files have exposed more than a paedophile’s network.

    They have revealed the casual intermingling of wealth, political access and depravity at the highest levels of global commerce.

    They have shown how men like Sulayem leveraged relationships with criminals to enhance their own power and reach.

    And they have raised urgent questions about how such individuals were granted control over East Africa’s maritime gateways while their character remained unexamined.

    As Kenya contemplates relaunching its port concessions and Tanzania deepens its partnership with DP World, the shadow of Jeffrey Epstein looms over every contract, every promise of investment, every assurance of modernisation.

    The documents released by the US Department of Justice force a reckoning: are African nations so desperate for foreign investment that they will hand strategic assets to companies led by men who counted paedophiles among their closest friends?

    The ports of Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Lamu and others are more than economic infrastructure.

    They are gateways to the continent, arteries through which trade flows, symbols of sovereignty and development.

    The decision of whom to entrust with their operation cannot be made lightly, cannot ignore character, cannot overlook associations that speak to judgment and values.

    Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem may never be charged with a crime. DP World may deliver on its promises of efficiency and investment.

    But the Epstein files have permanently stained both, raising questions that demand answers before any government hands this company control over another inch of African soil.

  • How Rogue Kenyan Developers Scam Unsuspecting Diaspora Homebuyers Out of Millions

    How Rogue Kenyan Developers Scam Unsuspecting Diaspora Homebuyers Out of Millions

    The dream of owning a home in Kenya has turned into a living nightmare for hundreds of diaspora investors who have lost millions of shillings to ruthless property developers operating elaborate fraud schemes that would make even the most seasoned con artists blush.

    From the dusty outskirts of Malaa to the sprawling suburbs of Ruiru and the coastal paradise of Mombasa, a sinister web of deceit has trapped Kenyans living abroad, many of whom have pumped their life savings into what they believed were legitimate real estate investments, only to discover they have been sold air.

    The scale of the fraud is staggering. Josphat Ndambo, a Kenyan based in the United States, parted with a eye-watering Sh4.25 million in November 2021 after being seduced by a slick YouTube video promoting Asali Estate in Malaa.

    The video, featuring pristine artistic impressions of three-bedroom maisonettes set against the majestic backdrop of Mount Kilimambogo, was nothing more than digital wizardry designed to separate desperate homebuyers from their hard-earned cash.

    Two years later, Ndambo’s dream property remains a fantasy.

    The site in Malaa tells a heartbreaking story of abandonment and despair. There is no electricity, no infrastructure, just dilapidated foundations and the shattered hopes of investors who trusted the wrong people.

    The mastermind behind Asali Estate, George Mburu, cut his teeth at the now-collapsed Banda Homes Limited before launching Mizizi Africa Homes Limited.

    Operating from a plush office opposite Sarit Centre in Westlands, Mburu has mastered the art of living large while his clients languish in financial ruin. In a brazen interview with a popular YouTuber, the former wannabe hip-hop artist boasted about eating life with a big spoon, flaunting his Range Rover, and dismissing critics as mere detractors.

    While Mburu lives the high life, Dennis Mwangi, another victim, is fighting a legal battle to recover Sh4.537 million he paid for a phantom three-bedroom bungalow at Peacock Estate along Kenyatta Road. Despite winning an arbitration settlement in June 2024 that ordered a refund within 60 days, Mwangi has not seen a single shilling. The Peacock Estate site mirrors the desolation of Asali Estate, with only incomplete, abandoned units standing as monuments to broken promises.

    The fraud extends far beyond Mizizi Africa Homes. Across town, Willstone Homes Limited has ensnared US-based investor Mellen Bwari Okari in a Sh57 million nightmare. Okari purchased five maisonettes in an off-plan development called White Park Gardens through her company, Universal DoubleTree Hotel Limited. What she discovered during a site visit sent chills down her spine.

    Not only was the construction marred by shoddy workmanship, but a private investigator uncovered an even more sinister revelation. The property was not even located where the sales agreement claimed. Instead of being in Ruai East, Nairobi County, the land was actually in Mavoko, Machakos County. Worse still, the land registration numbers provided in the sale agreement were completely fabricated. The title Block 3/90489 referenced in all documents simply did not exist.

    The three directors of Willstone Homes Limited, Ejidio Kinyajui, Patrick Thuo Marigi, and Victor Muusya Cosmus, have already moved on to their next venture, registering Ubuni Investments from the same Park Suites office in Westlands. Like Mburu, Kinyajui enjoys broadcasting his lavish lifestyle on social media, posting videos of himself flying first class on Emirates, chartering helicopters, and driving luxury vehicles. A single first-class Emirates ticket can cost between Sh1.5 million and Sh2.5 million, yet somehow his clients cannot get their money back.

    Perhaps no one epitomizes the audacity of these scammers better than David Mureithi Kanyi, the reclusive businessman behind Kenya Projects. Kanyi perfected a diabolical strategy targeting community-based organizations and offering down payments so low they seemed too good to be true. They were.

    George Gitonga learned this lesson the hard way. Five years ago, he stumbled upon a Facebook advertisement for houses in Kamakis. He liquidated his children’s education policy, which had just matured with a Sh2 million payout, and even sold his car to raise an additional Sh900,000. The total Sh2.9 million was supposed to secure a two-bedroom maisonette. Instead, Gitonga joined 36 other victims who were eventually forced to complete construction using their own funds. Even after finishing the houses themselves, the buyers remain in limbo because Kanyi has refused to provide title deeds.

    Kanyi, who has since relocated to Mombasa and continues rebranding his operations, deployed similar tactics on the coast. Eva Mmbone Kiti, Nana Mohammed, Faud Ali Ahmed, and Nana Khadija Omar wired Sh13 million for three-bedroom maisonettes at Royal Palm Villas. They later discovered that Kanyi had taken out a Sh55 million bank loan against the same property they had purchased, effectively double-dealing on their investment.

    The modus operandi of these fraudsters follows a chillingly consistent pattern. First, they create legitimate-looking companies with professional offices in upscale Nairobi neighborhoods. Then they produce slick marketing materials, complete with doctored images and falsified land registration numbers. They target diaspora investors specifically because distance makes due diligence nearly impossible. Many victims are working multiple jobs abroad to send money home and cannot afford frequent trips to Kenya to physically inspect their investments.

    The developers exploit the off-plan model, where buyers pay for properties before construction is complete. This arrangement, poorly regulated in Kenya, has become a breeding ground for fraud. Developers collect millions in down payments, begin minimal construction to create the illusion of progress, then either abandon projects entirely or use new investor funds to partially complete old projects in a classic Ponzi scheme structure.

    To add insult to injury, many of these developers sponsor fake awards and recognition ceremonies designed to create an aura of legitimacy. They then hire social media influencers to promote their projects as critically acclaimed and trustworthy. The entire ecosystem is rotten from top to bottom.

    Some fraudsters have become even more creative. They identify prime land, approach the owners, and propose subdividing and selling parcels on their behalf. The developers convince landowners that an escrow account is unnecessary, promising to remit sale proceeds minus commission directly. After collecting money from buyers, the developers vanish without paying the landowners. The result is a double fraud where both the original landowner and the buyers are victims, and neither party can legally transfer ownership.

    Legislative attempts to address this crisis have stalled. Kirinyaga Central MP Joseph Gitari proposed a Land Amendment Bill requiring land-selling companies to deposit Sh500 million as a licensing fee before registration. The deposit would serve as insurance to refund victims when developers fail to deliver. However, the bill has languished in parliament with little hope of passage.

    Two years ago, industry players formed the Association of Real Estate Stakeholders in a supposed effort to self-regulate and discipline rogue operators. The initiative has been a spectacular failure. Many of the association’s own members have been implicated in fraudulent schemes. When contacted for comment on members embroiled in legal disputes, RESA chairman Chrispus Wachira did not respond.

    The psychological toll on victims cannot be quantified. These are not wealthy speculators gambling with disposable income. They are teachers, nurses, drivers, and security guards working grueling hours in foreign countries, denying themselves basic comforts so they can send money home to build a future. They dream of retiring in dignity, of having something to show their children, of finally coming home. Instead, they are left with worthless paperwork and crushing debt.

    The impunity with which these developers operate is shocking. Despite mounting court cases and public exposure, most continue their businesses unabated. Mburu still runs Mizizi Africa Homes. Kinyajui and his partners have simply rebranded as Ubuni Investments. Kanyi operates from Mombasa under new company names. None have faced serious criminal prosecution.

    Industry experts point to systemic failures enabling this fraud. The lack of mandatory escrow accounts means developers control all funds with zero accountability. Weak enforcement of construction regulations allows substandard work to proceed unchecked. The National Construction Authority and National Environmental Management Authority approvals are routinely bypassed. Land registry records can be easily forged or manipulated. There is no central database to track developers’ histories or warn potential buyers about problematic companies.

    Financial institutions also bear some responsibility. Banks readily provide mortgages and loans against properties with questionable documentation. They fail to conduct adequate due diligence before financing these projects, effectively legitimizing fraudulent schemes.

    For diaspora Kenyans, the home-buying process has become a minefield. Trust has evaporated. Even legitimate developers now struggle to attract clients because the market has been poisoned by serial fraudsters. The economic impact extends beyond individual losses. When billions of shillings meant for productive investment vanish into the pockets of con artists, the entire economy suffers.

    Some victims have attempted to salvage their investments by pooling resources and completing projects themselves, but this solution only works when the land title is genuine and accessible. In cases where registration numbers are fabricated or properties are encumbered by secret loans, there is no path forward.

    The courts offer little relief. Legal battles drag on for years, draining victims of additional resources for attorney fees and court costs. Even when judgments are rendered in favor of plaintiffs, enforcement remains nearly impossible. Developers simply close one company and open another, moving assets between entities to stay one step ahead of creditors.

    As more cases come to light, a disturbing picture emerges of an industry riddled with corruption at every level. From complicit officials who process fraudulent documents to real estate agents who knowingly market phantom properties, the rot runs deep. Until Kenya implements comprehensive reforms including mandatory escrow accounts, stricter licensing requirements, criminal penalties for developers who defraud buyers, and a centralized registry of industry players with transparent track records, the carnage will continue.

    For now, thousands of Kenyans abroad are left to count their losses and warn others about the treacherous landscape of Kenyan real estate. Their stories serve as cautionary tales about dreams deferred and trust betrayed. The con artists, meanwhile, continue their operations with brazen confidence, knowing that the system designed to protect citizens has instead become their accomplice.

    The question is no longer whether reform will come, but whether it will arrive in time to save the next generation of victims from the same fate.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

  • Questions As KETRACO Deletes Details of Sh24 Billion Deal To Power SGR Trains That Never Was

    Questions As KETRACO Deletes Details of Sh24 Billion Deal To Power SGR Trains That Never Was

    In what appears to be a desperate attempt to erase the evidence of yet another white elephant project, the Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited has quietly deleted key pages from its website detailing the Sh24.2 billion contract meant to electrify Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway.

    The vanished webpage, which once proudly announced the January 2018 signing of a $240 million deal with China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company Limited, promised that electric trains would be running on the Mombasa-Nairobi line by 2021.

    Screenshot of the deleted page.

    It is now 2026, and the SGR still chugs along on expensive diesel, belching fumes and burning through operational costs that were supposed to have been slashed by cleaner, cheaper electricity.

    The deletion raises uncomfortable questions about transparency and accountability at KETRACO, coming at a time when Auditor General Nancy Gathungu has exposed a staggering Sh4 billion in unpaid compensation to landowners whose properties were acquired for various transmission projects across the country.

    The SGR electrification project appears to have joined a long list of ambitious infrastructure promises that evaporated into thin air, taking billions of taxpayer shillings with them.

    THE GRAND PROMISE

    When then KETRACO Managing Director Fernandes Barasa put pen to paper on that January morning in 2018, the mood was celebratory.

    Government officials and Chinese contractors posed for photographs, marking what was hailed as a major step toward modernizing Kenya’s flagship infrastructure project.

    The contract stipulated construction of 14 substations along the 472-kilometer stretch between the port city and the capital, with completion expected within 28 months.

    Barasa, writing in a local daily at the time, painted an ambitious picture of the project’s transformative potential.

    He spoke of zero carbon emissions through geothermal-powered transmission lines, of faster trains, of economic corridors blooming along the railway line, of cheaper transport costs for the common mwananchi. The article read more like a manifesto than a sober technical assessment of the project’s viability.

    But skeptics existed even then. Kenya Railways Corporation Managing Director Atanas Maina had publicly expressed doubts about the country’s capacity to sustain an electric railway, citing unreliable power supply and lack of financing. His warnings, dismissed at the time as pessimism, would prove prescient.

    THE MAN AT THE CENTRE

    Fernandes Barasa’s tenure at KETRACO has been nothing if not controversial.

    Fernandes Barasa
    Fernandes Barasa

    The current Kakamega Governor, who resigned from the transmission company in February 2022 just before appearing before Parliament’s Public Investment Committee, left behind a trail of questionable deals and unexplained losses.

    The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has repeatedly summoned him to answer for the Sh18 billion lost to penalties in the Lake Turkana Wind Power project, where delays in completing transmission lines cost taxpayers dearly.

    He spent two marathon days at EACC headquarters in November 2022, grilled for over 12 hours each day about suspected fraudulent transactions and mismanagement during his watch.

    Then there was the Sh785 million in excess payments to Lake Turkana Wind Power that Parliament wanted explained.

    And mysterious payments to wrong accounts that nobody seemed able to trace. Barasa resigned strategically, citing constitutional requirements for public servants seeking elective office, but many saw it as a convenient escape from accountability.

    Now add to this litany the ghost of the SGR electrification project, a Sh24.2 billion contract that produced nothing except deleted web pages and unanswered questions.

    THE CURIOUS CLARIFICATION

    In what reads like an admission of deception, KETRACO issued a curious “clarification” shortly after the initial euphoria of the 2018 contract signing.

    The agency quietly revealed that what had been trumpeted as a done deal was merely a commercial contract, not a financing agreement.

    The contract would only become effective after the National Treasury signed a financing agreement with prospective lenders.

    That financing agreement, it turns out, never materialized.

    “KETRACO has not borrowed any loan for the electrification of the SGR Project,” the agency admitted in its damage control statement. This was a far cry from the triumphant tones of Barasa’s opinion piece that had celebrated the project as if trains were about to start running on electricity the next day.

    The question that nobody at KETRACO wants to answer is simple but devastating.

    Why announce a Sh24.2 billion contract with such fanfare if the money to implement it did not exist? Was this a calculated deception meant to burnish the agency’s image, or was it incompetence of breathtaking proportions?

    COMPARATIVE EMBARRASSMENT

    The failure of Kenya’s SGR electrification looks even more embarrassing when compared to regional peers. Ethiopia built a 750-kilometer electric railway line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti at a cost of $3.4 billion and completed it in 2016. Morocco’s high-speed rail, Africa’s first, connects Tangier and Casablanca at speeds of up to 320 kilometers per hour and has been operational since 2018.

    Even Tanzania, often dismissed as playing catch-up to Kenya’s economy, is planning its SGR with electrification built into the original design.

    Meanwhile, Uganda’s planned electric SGR threatens to create an operational nightmare for Kenya. As things stand, Kenya’s diesel locomotives would not be able to operate seamlessly in Ugandan territory if Kampala proceeds with its electric standard.

    The integration problems this creates could effectively lock Kenya out of the very regional connectivity that the SGR was meant to facilitate.

    Kenya spent a staggering Sh447 billion on a 472-kilometer diesel railway while Ethiopia spent Sh346 billion on a 750-kilometer electric one. The mathematics of this disparity should trouble every Kenyan taxpayer.

    WHERE DID THE MONEY GO?

    The bigger question hovering over the deleted webpage is not just about a failed electrification project.

    It is about the entire ecosystem of inflated contracts, dubious procurement processes, and vanishing funds that has characterized Kenya’s infrastructure development under Chinese financing.

    KETRACO’s own contradictory statements raise red flags. If the contract signed in 2018 was merely commercial and not backed by actual financing, what were the Sh24.2 billion meant to cover? Who conducted the due diligence before the signing ceremony? Who approved the public announcement of a deal that hinged on financing that had not been secured?

    The then transport Cabinet Secretary James Macharia effectively killed the project in 2018 when he told Parliament that Kenya lacked both the guaranteed power supply and the financial capacity to support such expensive infrastructure. “We need at least 80 percent guaranteed supply to even think of upgrading SGR to an electric rail,” he said, adding that KETRACO itself lacked the equipment and expertise for the job.

    These realities were known in January 2018 when Barasa was signing contracts and writing opinion pieces.

    Yet the charade continued, with taxpayers none the wiser about the technical and financial impossibilities standing in the way of implementation.

    THE PATTERN OF DECEIT

    The deleted KETRACO webpage is not an isolated incident.

    It fits a troubling pattern of government agencies announcing grand projects, holding expensive launch ceremonies, and then quietly shelving the initiatives when public attention wanes.

    The evidence of the initial promises is scrubbed from official records, leaving citizens with no paper trail to hold anyone accountable.

    This approach thrives on short public memory and bureaucratic opacity. By the time questions start being asked, the officials responsible have moved on to other positions, or like Barasa, have ascended to elected office where they enjoy political protection from prosecution.

    The SGR itself continues to hemorrhage money. Recent reports indicate the railway made billions in losses as it struggles to attract sufficient cargo and passenger traffic to justify its existence.

    Adding the cost of diesel fuel to already bloated operational expenses only compounds the financial disaster.

    An electric railway, powered by Kenya’s abundant geothermal energy, would have addressed at least part of this problem.

    UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

    As KETRACO’s website administrators quietly hit the delete button, hoping the embarrassing history would disappear into the digital ether, several questions cry out for answers.

    Who authorized the deletion of the webpage? Was this done with the knowledge and approval of current management, or was it a rogue decision by lower-level staff trying to cover tracks? Why delete the page now, eight years after the contract was signed, unless there are new pressures or investigations that make the existence of that evidence problematic?

    What happened to the 14 substations that were supposed to be constructed? Was any preliminary work done? Were any funds disbursed to the Chinese contractor? If so, how much, and where did that money go if no substations were built?

    Where is China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company Limited in all this? Did they attempt to hold the Kenyan government to the terms of the contract? Did they demand compensation for a contract that was signed but never implemented? Or was the entire thing understood from the beginning to be a paper exercise, a smoke-and-mirrors show to create the illusion of progress?

    THE SILENCE IS DEAFENING

    Citizen Weekly sought comment from KETRACO’s current Acting Managing Director Kipkemoi Kibias about the deleted webpage and the fate of the electrification contract.

    Eng. Kipkemoi Kibias, Acting Managing Director & Chief Executive Officer
    Eng. Kipkemoi Kibias, Acting Managing Director & Chief Executive Officer

    Our calls and emails went unanswered.

    The agency’s head of communications, Winnie Osika, who has been defending KETRACO’s record on the delayed landowner compensation, did not respond to specific questions about the SGR project.

    Fernandes Barasa, now serving as Kakamega Governor and recently confirmed as ODM county chairman, was equally unreachable for comment. His office referred us to KETRACO, saying he no longer had responsibilities for the agency’s operations.

    China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company Limited has no public presence in Kenya beyond that 2018 signing ceremony. Their local representatives could not be traced, and the company has not issued any statement about the failed project.

    This wall of silence is its own answer. When questioned about regular operational matters, government agencies are quick to issue statements and clarifications. When the questions touch on potential scandals involving missing billions, suddenly nobody is available to speak.

    The deleted KETRACO webpage is a small detail in a much larger story about governance failure and the waste of public resources.

    It represents the gap between what government tells citizens and what actually happens. It shows how easily promises can be made, contracts signed, and money allocated, all without any intention or capacity to deliver.

    For ordinary Kenyans, the message is clear and disheartening. The SGR they were told would revolutionize transport will continue running on expensive diesel.

    The cleaner, faster, cheaper electric trains will remain a pipe dream. The Sh24.2 billion that could have gone to schools, hospitals, or roads has vanished into the black hole of abandoned projects and dubious contracts.

    Meanwhile, Barasa has moved on to bigger things, wielding political power in Kakamega while dodging corruption investigators.

    The Chinese contractors have presumably found other countries with more reliable governments to do business with. KETRACO continues announcing new projects, hoping nobody notices the graveyard of previous promises.

    The deleted webpage is gone, but the questions it raises will not disappear so easily. Kenyans deserve to know what happened to their Sh24.2 billion. They deserve accountability for the grand promises that turned out to be lies.

    They deserve an honest explanation of why, eight years later, they are still watching diesel trains crawl along tracks that were supposed to be powered by clean electricity.

    Until those answers come, the digital ghost of that deleted webpage will continue to haunt KETRACO and everyone involved in this shabby affair. You can delete the evidence, but you cannot delete the truth.

    This investigation is ongoing. Kenya Insights continues to seek responses from KETRACO, the National Treasury, and other relevant parties. Updates will be published as new information becomes available.

    SIDEBAR: THE COST OF BROKEN PROMISES

    The SGR electrification debacle is estimated to have cost Kenya:

    – Sh24.2 billion in the announced contract value

    – Undisclosed amounts in preliminary studies and consultations

    – Lost savings from continued diesel operations vs. projected electric costs

    – Environmental costs from continued carbon emissions

    – Reputational damage affecting other infrastructure projects

    – The opportunity cost of Sh24.2 billion that could have been invested elsewhere

    The human cost includes:

    – Landowners still waiting for compensation from KETRACO’s various projects

    – Citizens facing higher transport costs than projected

    – Communities along the SGR corridor denied promised development opportunities

    – Loss of public trust in government infrastructure promises

    Total damage: Incalculable, but devastating to Kenya’s development aspirations

  • CNN Investigation Reveals How Russian Agents Have Been Duping African Men Into Fighting Ukraine Promising Big While Entrapping Them To Death

    CNN Investigation Reveals How Russian Agents Have Been Duping African Men Into Fighting Ukraine Promising Big While Entrapping Them To Death

    Anne Ndarua’s hands tremble as she speaks about her only son. Six months have passed since Francis Ndung’u Ndarua left for Russia on what she believed was a legitimate electrical engineering job. The 35-year-old father has not been heard from since October, and his mother is no longer certain whether he is alive or dead.

    The last time Anne saw evidence of her son was through a chilling video that went viral on social media in December. In full Russian military uniform, with a land mine strapped to his chest, Francis appeared terrified as a Russian soldier hurled racist slurs at him, declaring he would be used as a “can-opener” to breach Ukrainian army positions. The brutality of the footage was so traumatizing that Anne could not bring herself to watch it after her daughter described the horrifying scenes.

    Francis is just one face in a growing nightmare that has ensnared hundreds, possibly thousands, of desperate African men who believed they were answering the call to better-paying jobs abroad. Instead, they have found themselves thrust into the brutal meat grinder of Russia’s war against Ukraine, treated as expendable cannon fodder in a conflict that has nothing to do with them.

    A damning CNN investigation has now pulled back the curtain on the sophisticated recruitment machinery that Russian agents have deployed across the African continent. Through hundreds of chats on messaging apps, military contracts, visa documents, flight bookings and firsthand accounts from African fighters trapped in Ukraine, the investigation reveals a systematic campaign of deception that transforms jobless young men into reluctant mercenaries.

    The promises are intoxicating for men struggling to survive in economies where youth unemployment can reach 67 percent. Agents dangle signing bonuses of $13,000, monthly salaries as high as $3,500, jobs as drivers or security guards, and the ultimate prize of Russian citizenship. For men like Francis, who was unemployed and living with his mother in a small community outside Nairobi, the $620 he paid to a recruitment agent seemed like a small investment for life-changing opportunities.

    But the reality waiting in Russia bears no resemblance to the glossy promises made on social media by men in Russian military uniforms who claim the work is “very, very easy and very good, no stress.” When these recruits land in Moscow or St. Petersburg, their passports are confiscated, they are forced to sign military contracts written entirely in Russian without translation or legal assistance, and within three weeks they find themselves in basic military training before being deployed to the Ukrainian front.

    Patrick Kwoba, a 39-year-old carpenter who had also worked construction in Qatar and Somalia, thought he was going to be a security guard in the Russian army, not a combatant on the front lines. The four months he spent in Ukraine were, in his own words, “hell.” After just three weeks of basic military training and firearms handling, he was shipped to a war zone where death stalked every moment.

    During an ambush by a Ukrainian drone and subsequent grenade attack, Kwoba was wounded. When he called for first aid using the military code “3-star,” his Russian partner turned hostile, chased him away and began shooting at him. The message was clear: African fighters were disposable, mere bodies to absorb bullets and explosions while protecting more valued Russian troops.

    “So long as you’ve stepped in the Russian military, you escape or you die,” Kwoba told CNN after managing to desert and make his way back to Kenya. “There’s no way that you’re going to Russia and you’ll come back alive. Because if you finish your contract, these people force you to stay there. They can’t release you.”

    Kwoba’s testimony aligns with accounts from a dozen other African fighters currently trapped in Ukraine who spoke with CNN. Most came from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda, lured by civilian job offers that evaporated the moment they set foot on Russian soil. None of them spoke Russian, despite Russian law requiring foreign soldiers to know the language. Their salaries and bonuses differed from those offered to Russian soldiers and even varied between the recruits themselves.

    The exploitation extends beyond forced conscription. Some recruits accused unscrupulous Russian colleagues of outright theft from their bank accounts. One African fighter, speaking on condition of anonymity, recounted how a Russian soldier forced him at gunpoint to hand over his bank card and PIN while on the front lines. When he checked his account, nearly $15,000 from his bonus had been withdrawn, leaving it nearly empty. Seven months into his deployment, he had not been paid a single cent. Four others who came to Russia with him had already died.

    The military contracts these men are forced to sign contain clauses far more binding than recruitment agents typically advertise. Beyond promises of pay and benefits, the contracts lock servicemen into broad, open-ended obligations including participation in combat operations and deployments abroad, strict loyalty requirements, and an obligation to reimburse the state for military training if required. Access to state secrets can trigger bans on foreign travel, mandatory surrender of passports, limits on privacy, and lifelong restrictions on disclosing sensitive information.

    While agents advertise quick pathways to post-military civilian employment, the fine print reveals that meaningful help with jobs through free professional retraining only becomes available after at least five full years of service, and only if dismissal occurs for specific reasons such as age, health or contract expiration.

    The stories emerging from the battlefield paint a portrait of systematic racism, psychological abuse and shocking casualty rates. African fighters describe seeing the bodies of fellow Africans rotting on the battlefield for months, countrymen losing limbs without compensation, and constant degradation from Russian soldiers who refer to them as “disposable” and mock their suffering. In one widely circulated video, a Russian officer films African recruits singing and dancing in a snowy forest clearing, laughing as he comments, “Oh, look how many disposables there are.”

    Charles Njoki, a 32-year-old Kenyan photographer hoping to support his pregnant wife, applied directly to a Russian army recruitment portal for a drone operator role and received a response within two hours. He sold his car to pay for his flight and accommodation, dreaming of surprising his parents with a big windfall and Russian citizenship. Instead, his wife miscarried while he was in training, and he only learned about it days later after his phone had been confiscated.

    When deployed to the front, Njoki never got to fly the drones he had been trained to operate. A Ukrainian drone attack left him with a limp left hand and a spinal issue requiring surgery. A Russian doctor told him they were only interested in the two fingers he used to shoot. Njoki claims African fighters were deliberately exposed in dangerous situations as bait for Ukrainian drones. “They tell people that you’re going to guard the place, that you won’t go to the front as an assault, but you find yourself at the front, fighting,” he said after escaping back to Kenya.

    The scale of the problem has forced several African governments to acknowledge the crisis. Botswana, Uganda, South Africa and Kenya have all confirmed that their citizens have been duped into becoming mercenaries for Russia. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa ordered an investigation after 17 men were found trapped in the Donbas region, saying they had been lured “under the pretext of lucrative employment contracts.”

    In a particularly explosive development, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, daughter of former South African President Jacob Zuma, resigned from parliament in November 2025 after allegations that she was involved in recruiting 17 South African men to join Russian forces in Ukraine. Her own half-sister filed a police report accusing her of recruiting fighters for Russia, claiming eight family members were among those recruited.

    Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha revealed in November that more than 1,400 people from 36 African nations are known to be fighting for Russia in Ukraine. He described their recruitment as tantamount to “a death sentence,” noting that most foreign fighters are immediately sent to so-called “meat assaults” where they are quickly killed. Of more than 18,000 foreigners Ukraine has identified in Russian ranks, at least 3,388 have been confirmed killed.

    The recruitment methods have grown increasingly sophisticated and predatory. Young South African men were contacted through Discord while playing the military simulation game Arma 3, then lured to Russia via the United Arab Emirates. Russian recruiters operate openly on Telegram, with channels like “Friend of Russia” posting hundreds of invitations for men from Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria to join the military after sending images of their passports.

    The infamous Alabuga Start program presents itself as a work-study and career acceleration opportunity but is actually a pipeline to supply labor for military drone production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. The program targets young women aged 18 to 22 from at least 27 African countries with promises of well-paid jobs in logistics and catering, only to trap them in factories assembling kamikaze drones for use against Ukraine.

    For African students already in Russia, the recruitment takes on an even more sinister dimension. Authorities threaten not to extend student visas or offer a choice between deportation and military service. Some African prisoners in Russia are given the same ultimatum. Gambian national Lamin Jatta was arrested and told point-blank to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense or face deportation. He was later killed in Ukraine.

    The financial lure is overwhelming in countries where economic desperation runs deep. Russia’s monthly salary of around $2,200 and signing bonuses can be more than ten times what local military forces pay. This pay gap has driven soldiers in countries like Cameroon to desert their own national armies, creating security risks for states already fighting multiple conflicts against ISIS, Boko Haram and separatist groups.

    Even though recruits who escape describe a nightmarish reality, Russian state media actively promotes a very different narrative. State television spotlights individual stories of African-born fighters receiving Russian citizenship, public congratulations from lawmakers, and televised send-offs framed as orderly and honorable. Social media videos show men in Russian military uniforms speaking in Igbo, Swahili and Twi, claiming their salaries could “feed your father, mother and whole family for, like, two or three years.”

    Ukraine has urged African nations to halt the flow of men to Russia’s ranks. “If they’re on the front lines, they’re our enemies and Ukraine defends itself,” Ukraine’s ambassador to Kenya, Yurii Tokar, told CNN. “This pipeline should be stopped.”

    Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary reported in December that at least 82 Kenyans were caught up in Russian military operations, with many injured, some dead, and others stranded far from home. Only five have been successfully repatriated so far. The Kenyan embassy in Moscow has been issuing temporary travel documents to help escapees avoid detection, since many entered Russia on single-entry tourist visas that have long since expired.

    Anne Ndarua, Francis’s mother, refuses to give up hope even as months pass without word from her son. She agreed to be interviewed as a last-ditch effort to pressure the Kenyan and Russian governments into action. “I’m appealing to the Kenyan and Russian governments to work together to bring those children home,” she said, her voice breaking. “They lied to them about real jobs and now they’re in war with their lives in danger.”

    The families of hundreds of other young African men across the continent echo her desperate plea. They check their phones obsessively for messages that never come, watch disturbing videos circulating on social media hoping not to recognize a loved one, and lie awake at night wondering whether their sons, husbands and brothers are still alive somewhere in the frozen trenches and deadly forests of eastern Ukraine.

    For these young men who left home dreaming of better lives, the choice facing them in Russia’s war machine is brutally simple, as Patrick Kwoba learned: “You escape, or you die.”

    Russia’s Defense and Foreign Ministries have not responded to requests for comment on allegations that recruits were misled or coerced.

  • The Koko Conspiracy: How a Clean Energy Darling Became Kenya’s Biggest Carbon Credit Scandal

    The Koko Conspiracy: How a Clean Energy Darling Became Kenya’s Biggest Carbon Credit Scandal

    Millions invested, thousands jobless, and a government fighting back against what it calls fraudulent emissions trading

    When Koko Networks abruptly shuttered its operations on January 31, leaving 700 employees jobless and 1.5 million households without cooking fuel, the company blamed Kenyan bureaucracy.

    But interviews with government officials, carbon market experts, and leaked internal documents paint a vastly different picture: one of questionable accounting, opaque business practices, and a carbon credit scheme that Kenya’s economic advisers now openly question.

    The London-headquartered firm, which raised over $300 million from blue-chip investors including the Microsoft Climate Innovation Fund and Rand Merchant Bank, positioned itself as a revolutionary force in clean cooking. Its bright blue ethanol dispensers became fixtures across Nairobi’s low-income neighborhoods, offering bioethanol fuel at prices 50 percent below market rates. What customers didn’t know was that they were unwitting participants in what critics now call one of the most sophisticated carbon credit arbitrage schemes in East Africa.

    President William Ruto’s chief economic adviser David Ndii fired the opening salvo in what promises to be a protracted legal battle. In a tersely worded statement on social media, Ndii questioned the “veracity of cookstove carbon credits” and cited “lack of transparency in Koko’s business model” as critical factors in the government’s decision to withhold authorization letters that would have allowed the company to sell credits in compliance markets.

    The statement represents a dramatic departure from the usual diplomatic language surrounding investment disputes. For Kenya to publicly challenge the legitimacy of carbon credits certified by Gold Standard, one of the industry’s most respected verification bodies, signals either extraordinary evidence of malfeasance or a government preparing for an expensive fight.

    That fight centers on a $179.6 million political risk insurance policy from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The policy, issued just last March in what was trumpeted as the world’s first carbon-linked political insurance, explicitly covers government breach of contract. Koko is expected to file claims that could saddle Kenyan taxpayers with a bill exceeding Sh23 billion.

    But the government appears ready to contest those claims on grounds that strike at the heart of the global carbon trading system. Sources familiar with the negotiations, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of pending litigation, say Kenyan officials discovered significant discrepancies between the emissions reductions Koko claimed and what independent audits suggested were achievable.

    The controversy arrives at a particularly damaging moment for cookstove carbon credits globally. Last year, researchers at the University of California Berkeley published a peer-reviewed study concluding that clean cookstove projects save only a fraction of the carbon emissions claimed. The study sent shockwaves through a market already reeling from revelations of fraud.

    Those revelations came in spectacular fashion when United States federal prosecutors charged two executives of C-Quest Capital, another cookstove carbon credit operator with Kenya connections, with obtaining over $100 million through fraudulent emissions schemes. Kenneth Newcombe and Tridip Goswami stand accused of systematically manipulating survey data from projects in Malawi, Zambia, and Angola to inflate emission reductions.

    The criminal indictment describes a pattern of fabrication eerily similar to concerns Kenyan officials now raise about Koko. When actual emission reductions fell short of projections, the indictment alleges, C-Quest executives simply invented better numbers. They falsified survey results, inflated stove usage rates, and misrepresented how many stoves remained operational. The fabricated data was then submitted to verification bodies to fraudulently claim carbon credits worth tens of millions of dollars.

    US Attorney Damian Williams was unsparing in his assessment. The defendants, he said, had “undermined the integrity of a market that is crucial to combating climate change.”

    For Kenya, the implications extend far beyond one failed startup. The government has staked significant political capital on positioning itself as a climate leader, hosting major UN environmental summits and promoting ambitious reforestation programs. The notion that carbon credits generated on Kenyan soil might be fraudulent or grossly overvalued threatens not just revenue sharing agreements but the country’s international environmental credibility.

    The business model Koko employed should have raised red flags from the beginning. The company sold cooking stoves for $12 that cost $115 to produce. It dispensed fuel at prices guaranteeing substantial losses on every liter. The entire operation was predicated on carbon credit revenues that had not yet materialized and required regulatory approvals the company did not possess.

    This was not a sustainable business. It was financial engineering disguised as social enterprise, a Ponzi-like structure where each funding round covered losses from the previous one while executives promised that carbon credit sales would eventually close the gap. When the Kenyan government declined to provide the authorization letters, the emperor’s new clothes vanished.

    What remains are hard questions about due diligence and accountability. How did sophisticated investors commit hundreds of millions of dollars to a business model dependent on regulatory approvals that didn’t exist? Why did the World Bank issue political risk insurance for a company that apparently couldn’t verify its core product? And why did it take a government pushback to expose what now appears to be a fundamentally flawed enterprise?

    Industry analysts point to a troubling pattern in climate finance where wealthy institutional investors, eager to demonstrate environmental credentials, pour money into African projects with minimal scrutiny of the underlying economics. The projects generate impressive metrics for sustainability reports and carbon offset portfolios. When they collapse, the investors file insurance claims or write off the losses while host communities are left with broken promises and abandoned infrastructure.

    Koko’s 1.5 million former customers now face an immediate crisis. Many had sold their charcoal stoves and cooking equipment, betting on the reliability of ethanol fuel. They are now being forced back to charcoal, reversing years of health improvements from reduced indoor air pollution and accelerating the deforestation Koko claimed to prevent.

    The 700 laid-off workers, meanwhile, received their termination notices via text message after two days of closed-door meetings at the company’s Nairobi headquarters. No severance packages were offered. No explanations were provided beyond boilerplate statements about regulatory challenges.

    For conservation expert Mordecai Ogada, who has long criticized carbon offset schemes as “carbon colonialism,” the Koko collapse validates years of warnings. Foreign companies, he argues, extract value from African environmental resources while exposing host nations to massive financial and reputational risks. When the schemes fail, the companies retreat to London or New York while Africans deal with the consequences.

    The government’s decision to fight back, to openly question the legitimacy of Koko’s carbon credits rather than quietly signing authorization letters, represents a potential turning point. It signals that Kenya may no longer be willing to serve as a compliant host for carbon trading schemes that privatize profits while socializing risks.

    But the fight will be expensive and legally complex. Miga’s authorization letter template, introduced in 2024, includes explicit provisions requiring host governments to compensate investors for revenue losses resulting from regulatory delays. The letter’s language is heavily weighted toward investor protection, reflecting the World Bank’s mandate to encourage private sector participation in development projects.

    Kenya will need to prove not just that it had legitimate concerns about Koko’s carbon credits, but that those concerns rise to the level of fraud or fundamental breach of contract. It will need to demonstrate that Koko’s methodology was flawed, that its emission calculations were inflated, or that the company misrepresented its capabilities to both investors and the Kenyan government.

    The legal discovery process promises to expose the inner workings of carbon credit generation in unprecedented detail. How exactly did Koko calculate emissions savings? What assumptions underpinned those calculations? Were the assumptions reasonable given actual stove usage patterns and fuel consumption data? Did the company have evidence supporting its claims before it raised hundreds of millions of dollars?

    These questions matter far beyond Kenya. The global carbon credit market is worth billions of dollars and is central to corporate climate strategies worldwide. If a significant portion of cookstove credits prove to be overvalued or fraudulent, it undermines the credibility of the entire offset mechanism.

    Already, the revelations about C-Quest Capital have triggered widespread skepticism about cookstove projects specifically. Major credit rating agencies have downgraded the value of cookstove offsets. Some corporate buyers have quietly stopped purchasing them altogether. Koko’s collapse, coming so soon after the C-Quest indictments, reinforces the perception that this entire category of carbon credits may be built on sand.

    The timing could not be worse for climate finance. As countries negotiate implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which governs international carbon trading, the Koko scandal provides ammunition to skeptics who argue the system is inherently prone to gaming and fraud. How can governments verify emissions reductions happening in remote rural areas? How can third-party auditors prevent the kind of data manipulation alleged in the C-Quest case? What happens when a verification body certifies credits a government later deems fraudulent?

    These are not abstract policy questions. They have immediate, tangible consequences for the 1.5 million Kenyan families now scrambling to find cooking fuel and the 700 workers wondering how they will pay next month’s rent. They have consequences for the investors who bet on Koko and may now face total losses. They have consequences for Kenya’s relationship with the World Bank and its ability to attract future climate finance.

    Most fundamentally, they have consequences for trust in market-based climate solutions. If carbon credits cannot reliably represent real emissions reductions, if verification systems can be so easily manipulated, if business models can collapse so spectacularly despite oversight from prestigious institutions, then what hope is there for using markets to address climate change?

    The Koko story is still unfolding. Court filings, insurance claims, and regulatory investigations will eventually provide a fuller picture of what went wrong and who bears responsibility. But the preliminary evidence suggests this was not simply a case of bureaucratic delays or regulatory uncertainty. It appears to be something far more troubling: a fundamental mismatch between the carbon credits Koko claimed to generate and the emissions reductions it actually achieved.

    If Kenya can prove that case, it will mark a watershed moment in climate finance. A government in the Global South will have successfully challenged the carbon accounting of a well-funded, internationally backed company and its prestigious verification partners. It will have asserted that host nations have not just the right but the obligation to scrutinize carbon credit claims, even when doing so means fighting powerful financial interests and risking future investment.

    That fight is just beginning. The outcome will reverberate far beyond Kenya’s borders, shaping how carbon markets function, how developing nations engage with climate finance, and whether the promise of using market mechanisms to fund sustainable development can survive the reality of fraud, opacity, and broken trust that now defines too much of the carbon trading world.

  • EACC Probes Otuoma Over Sh1.4 Billion Tenders Awarded to Close Associates

    EACC Probes Otuoma Over Sh1.4 Billion Tenders Awarded to Close Associates

    Busia Governor Paul Otuoma has been drawn into a deepening corruption probe after appearing before the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission over allegations that his administration irregularly awarded tenders worth more than Sh1.4 billion to companies linked to his close associates and family members.

    The governor reported to the EACC Western Regional Offices in Bungoma on Tuesday morning, February 3, 2026, where he recorded a statement with investigators in connection with the ongoing inquiry.

    He arrived shortly after 9.30am and was grilled for several hours as detectives pieced together what they describe as a complex web of proxy companies and suspicious payments spanning multiple financial years.

    At the centre of the investigation are tenders and payments amounting to over Sh1.4 billion allegedly awarded between the 2022/23 and 2024/25 financial years to at least 26 firms believed to be linked to relatives and close associates of senior Busia County officials.

    Investigators say the firms may have been used to siphon public funds through inflated contracts and irregular procurement processes.

    According to the EACC, Governor Otuoma is among eight county officials under scrutiny over allegations of conflict of interest, procurement irregularities and theft of public funds.

    EACC Director of Legal Services and Asset Recovery David Too said the officials are also suspected of amassing wealth that is not commensurate with their known sources of income.

    One line of inquiry focuses on Sh90 million allegedly paid to four private entities said to have direct links to the governor.

    Detectives are seeking to establish whether the payments were lawful and whether the firms met the legal requirements to do business with the county government.

    The commission is also probing the construction of a county yard undertaken during the 2023/24 financial year.

    Investigators allege that 2.4 hectares of public land were irregularly leased to a private contractor for 25 years without a competitive tendering process, raising concerns of abuse of office and loss of public land.

    The governor’s summons follows a series of search operations conducted in August 2025, when EACC officers raided homes and offices of several senior Busia County officials, including three county executive committee members and a chief officer.

    Documents and electronic devices were seized during the raids as part of efforts to trace the flow of funds and identify the true beneficiaries of the contested tenders.

    While confirming the governor’s appearance, the commission was keen to stress that the investigations are still ongoing.

    Mr Too said no conclusions have been reached and that any culpability will only be determined after the probe is complete and, where necessary, files forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

    Governor Otuoma has not publicly commented on the substance of the allegations, but allies have previously dismissed claims of corruption in the county as politically motivated.

    The unfolding probe now places the Busia boss under intense scrutiny, with pressure mounting for accountability as the EACC tightens its grip on county procurement scandals across the country.

  • DCI Warns Kenyans to Shun Stolen Phones as Detectives Tighten Noose on Crime Syndicates

    DCI Warns Kenyans to Shun Stolen Phones as Detectives Tighten Noose on Crime Syndicates

    The Directorate of Criminal Investigations has issued a stern warning to Kenyans buying second-hand mobile phones, saying the era of casual purchases from backstreet dealers and online shadows is coming to a brutal end.

    Detectives say a nationwide crackdown is underway targeting not just phone thieves, but the powerful receivers who bankroll and sustain the criminal networks behind the booming black market for stolen devices.

    In a dramatic operation in Nairobi’s Kamukunji area, detectives came within inches of arresting a key suspect believed to be a major conduit in the stolen phone trade. The suspect, identified as Silas Kivyatu, is accused of coordinating the collection, storage and export of stolen mobile phones, some destined for markets outside Kenya.

    According to investigators, forensic trails led officers to Silas’ hideout in California Estate within Kamukunji Sub-County. But in a scene straight out of a crime thriller, the suspect sensed danger and fled on a motorbike moments before officers closed in.

    His escape, however, was sloppy.

    As he sped off, Silas dropped a black carrier bag that turned out to be a treasure trove of criminal evidence. Inside were three tightly wrapped packages sealed with yellow cellotape. When opened, detectives discovered 62 assorted mobile phones, all believed to be stolen.

    The haul exposed the sheer scale of the operation and confirmed detectives’ fears that mobile phone theft in Nairobi and other urban centres is no longer the work of petty criminals, but well-organised syndicates with supply chains, storage points and cross-border links.

    Two of Silas’ alleged accomplices were arrested last week in a related operation, where detectives recovered another batch of stolen phones reportedly headed for the Ugandan market. Investigators believe the syndicate has been active for months, possibly years, feeding on phones snatched from commuters, passengers, clubgoers and unsuspecting Kenyans across the country.

    The DCI says the latest operations mark a shift in strategy. Instead of only chasing thieves on the streets, detectives are now aggressively targeting receivers, the silent engines that keep phone theft profitable.

    “These buyers are not innocent,” a senior investigator said. “They know exactly what they are buying, and they are the reason phones keep getting stolen every day.”

    The warning to the public is blunt. Anyone found in possession of a stolen phone risks arrest, prosecution and forfeiture of the device, regardless of how cheap or convincing the deal appeared.

    With recovered phones now secured as exhibits and detectives still hunting down Silas and other suspects at large, the DCI insists the dragnet is only tightening.

    For Kenyans tempted by suspiciously cheap smartphones, the message is clear: that bargain could land you in handcuffs.

  • Inside Nairobi’s Sh37 Million Gold Scam: How a U.S. Investor Was Duped

    Inside Nairobi’s Sh37 Million Gold Scam: How a U.S. Investor Was Duped

    Kenya, January 31, 2026 – Detectives from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) are probing a sophisticated gold fraud scheme in which a United States national was allegedly defrauded of KSh 37 million after being lured into what he believed was a legitimate gold purchase in the affluent Kilimani area of Nairobi.

    The case highlights growing concerns around precious metals scams, investor vulnerability and regulatory gaps in Kenya’s informal gold market.

    According to police, the American national, identified in court filings as David White Odell, travelled to Kenya with the understanding that he would buy 150 kilograms of gold from individuals posing as credible dealers.

    He recalled being shown gold nugget samples and even witnessing smelting operations during at least one meeting designed to build trust. “And so I witnessed an operation where they were smelting. They had 150 kg there in nugget form, and they did the smelting there at the compound,” Odell told investigators.

    In one conversation with journalists at Central Police Station, Odell described how access to a purportedly secure vault was controlled by combination codes shared between him and one of the suspected dealers, reinforcing the illusion of a genuine transaction. “Both had joint combinations… he put in two, everybody turned their back, and then I put in mine, and that was that,” he said.

    The deal reportedly began in December 2025 after Odell was introduced to the suspects as gold dealers operating from a residential property along Rosewood Avenue, Kilimani, described by investigators as the “safe house and nerve centre” of the syndicate.

    Despite paying the upfront amount, the agreed transport plans changed, with scammers insisting on using a private jet for shipment, a condition not part of the original agreement.

    After communication broke down, the complainant became suspicious and reported the matter to police.

    DCI officers later raided the Kilimani premises on January 28, 2026, gaining entry during the complainant’s presence.

    Investigators seized metallic bars from a safe as evidence and forwarded samples to the Ministry of Mining for analysis. Laboratory tests determined that the material was not gold but brass, a cheap yellow alloy often used to mimic the appearance of precious metal.

    Gold fraud in Kenya is not isolated to this case alone. Similar schemes have been uncovered by authorities over recent years, some involving large sums and sophisticated operations:

    In April 2025, DCI arrested 11 suspects and seized about 350 kg of fake gold in a Nairobi scam involving more than KSh 70 million in fraudulent transactions.

    In May 2025, four individuals were arrested in Runda following reports of a KSh 25.8 million fake gold deal targeting a foreign national.

    In September 2025, police apprehended a suspect in Lang’ata over a KSh 4.5 million fake gold sale, reinforcing the recurring nature of these schemes in Nairobi.

    Fraud experts note that scammers often go to great lengths to feign legitimacy, including assaying samples in front of victims, arranging staged storage facilities, and even alleging seizures by customs to complicate deliveries.

    The Kilimani gold scam underscores the risks foreign and local investors face when engaging in high-value commodity deals outside formal regulated markets.

    Kenya’s gold trade, while attracting global interest due to discoveries in counties such as Migori, Turkana and Kakamega, remains largely informal, with limited oversight on intermediaries, certification processes and safeguards against fraud.

    For legitimate traders and buyers, this environment raises concerns about due diligence, title verification, and the reliability of physical inspections.

    Financial regulators and mining authorities have repeatedly urged investors to verify licensing, assay certificates and chain of custody for precious metals, steps that can mitigate exposure to fraud.

    The DCI is now seeking two suspects, Paul Chogo and Collins Onyango, believed to be at the centre of the Kilimani scaffold network, even as the investigation may lead to broader revelations about mechanisms used by fraud rings targeting foreign capital.

  • The Mystery of Oketch Salah and The Business He Was Doing With Raila

    The Mystery of Oketch Salah and The Business He Was Doing With Raila

    How a Migori Businessman Leveraged Proximity to Kenya’s Political Icon to Build a Gold Mining Empire

    Three months after the death of former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, questions continue to swirl around Mohammed Abdi Jama, better known as Oketch Salah, the self-styled adopted son who has emerged from the shadows to position himself at the intersection of Kenya’s most powerful political and business networks.

    At the heart of the mystery lies a simple question that has captivated and divided the nation. What business was Salah really conducting with Raila, and how did a relatively unknown figure from Migori transform himself into a man who now arrives at political events by helicopter, dines with presidents, and claims intimate knowledge of Kenya’s most revered politician’s final wishes?

    The answer, investigations reveal, lies in the lucrative and politically connected world of gold mining in Nyatike, where fortunes are made not just underground but in the corridors of power.

    Salah’s family background offers the first clue to understanding his trajectory. Born to Abdi Salah, a wealthy businessman who owned Migori’s first storey building in the 1970s and ran a successful bakery, young Mohammed grew up in relative privilege. The family, part of the Somali immigrant community that settled in Migori through Mandera, integrated fully into Luo society. Salah became fluent in Dholuo, attended Ombo Primary School and later Kangeso Secondary School, and built the cultural bridges that would later serve his ambitions.

    But his path was far from linear. After his father’s death and burial in a Migori cemetery, Salah moved to Mombasa, where he worked as a loader for a transport company in Miritini before being promoted to supervisor. From there, he made his way to Somalia and eventually to the United States under the Temporary Protected Status program, a humanitarian provision that Congress created for nationals from countries facing armed conflict or disasters.

    It was during this period abroad that Salah accumulated capital that he would later wire back to Kenya. When President Donald Trump’s administration ended the protected status for Somali immigrants in March this year, Salah had already returned to Kenya with a fortune and a plan.

    The gold rush in Nyatike provided the perfect opportunity. The Migori Greenstone Belt, an extension of the gold-rich Tanzanian Craton, has long been one of Kenya’s most productive gold regions. With an estimated production of 34 tonnes per year generating approximately 67 billion shillings, the area attracts investors from around the world. But success in this sector requires more than geological knowledge. It demands political connections and government goodwill.

    This is where Raila Odinga entered the picture, and where Salah’s story takes a calculated turn.

    Sources familiar with the arrangement say Salah initially befriended former Nyatike MP Onyango Anyanga while the politician was still in Parliament and close to Raila. Through Anyanga, who later fell out with the ODM leader so spectacularly that he vowed to denounce his party membership, Salah gained his crucial introduction to the former Prime Minister.

    What followed was a masterclass in leveraging political proximity for business advantage. Salah registered a gold mining company and began telling potential partners and investors across Africa that Raila was not just his mentor but a shareholder in his ventures. His social media pages, which only became active in late September 2025 as Raila’s health declined, became a carefully curated showcase of access and influence.

    Photos showed Salah with Raila on flights, enjoying meals, dancing at events, and visiting foreign capitals. Unlike many Muslims, Salah was photographed enjoying hard drinks and shisha with the political elite, a detail that former schoolmates say reflects his pragmatic approach to business and networking. The images served a dual purpose: they cemented his credentials as Raila’s confidant while simultaneously advertising his access to power for business purposes.

    The strategy worked spectacularly. Salah secured meetings with African leaders, including Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, framing his visits as business missions focused on mining and energy. For a private Kenyan citizen with no formal government position, such access raised obvious questions about the networks and interests at play. Was he genuinely Raila’s adopted son, or was this designation a convenient business card that opened doors across the continent?

    Dr. Oburu Oginga, Raila’s elder brother who now leads ODM, has publicly endorsed Salah, calling him “a son of Raila” and highlighting his role during the former Prime Minister’s final days in India. At Salah’s son Abdinoor’s wedding at Serena Hotel on October 25, just ten days after Raila’s death, Oburu told the gathering that Salah “was taking care of Raila until the day he breathed his last.”

    But Raila’s own family tells a starkly different story. His daughter Winnie Odinga has been unequivocal in her rejection of Salah’s claims. In a recent television interview, she dismissed him as someone she “would like to believe nobody really knows” and suggested he should be “rushed to Mathare or the DCI” for making false and dangerous statements about her father. Her sister Ruth Odinga, Kisumu Woman Representative and Raila’s sister, was equally devastating in her assessment, admitting she cannot even place who Salah is despite his claims of intimate family ties.

    The contradictions extend to Salah’s professional credentials. While he styles himself as “Dr. Oketch Salah” and claimed to be Raila’s personal physician, investigations by multiple media houses have found no trace of his name in the Kenya Medical Practitioners, Dentists and Pharmacists Council registers. The real Raila family doctor was Dr. David Oluoch Olunya, a respected neurosurgeon who attended to the former Prime Minister for over two decades.

    Oketch Salah and Raila Odinga.
    Oketch Salah and Raila Odinga.

    Some of Salah’s claims strain credulity entirely. Reports have credited him with performing brain surgeries on hippopotamuses in Muhuru Bay, heart operations on hyenas in Seme, stopping coronavirus spread among animals in the Serengeti and Maasai Mara, and upgrading the Raboral VRG vaccine, all supposedly done “using pure talent, not textbooks.” Medical professionals describe these claims as fantastical.

    Yet despite these red flags, Salah has successfully inserted himself into Kenya’s political machinery in ways that suggest either genuine connections or sophisticated manipulation. He attended State House functions alongside President William Ruto and Oburu Oginga during celebrations for broad-based government legislators. He has pledged to financially support ten youths from Jacaranda Bunge la Wananchi with 50,000 shillings each, plus motorcycles for men and hairdressing equipment for women, mirroring Raila’s 2022 campaign promise of a 6,000 shilling monthly stipend.

    Most controversially, Salah claimed at an ODM meeting in Bondo that Raila wanted the party to endorse President Ruto in the 2027 presidential race, a statement that has split ODM down the middle and thrust him into the eye of a political storm. Neither Government Spokesperson Isaac Mwaura nor State House Spokesman Hussein Mohamed has commented on who Salah is or whether he holds any official government position.

    The silence from State House is particularly telling given Salah’s documented visits and the fact that when Raila died in India, President Ruto stated he had been briefed by both the family and “his friend who was in India.” Multiple sources suggest Salah was providing intelligence from Raila’s inner circle to government operatives, much as critics now accuse Junet Mohamed of having done during the 2022 elections.

    Political analyst David Makali draws parallels between Salah’s operations and those of Mohamed Noor, the feared oil tycoon and State House agent during the Moi era who wielded enormous power through his proximity to the presidency. “The pattern is familiar,” Makali says. “Position yourself close to a political figure, claim special knowledge and access, and monetize that proximity. The question is always: who benefits, and what is being traded?”

    For Salah, the benefits appear substantial. He now travels by helicopter, maintains multiple business interests including his gold mining operations in Nyatike, and has positioned himself as a kingmaker within ODM factions supporting the broad-based government. His financial backing of pro-government ODM politicians has become an open secret in political circles.

    But the arrangement raises troubling questions about the final months of Raila Odinga’s life. Why was Salah, rather than long-time aide Maurice Ogetta, present during critical moments in India? In his own statements, Salah revealed that the security officer present when Raila had a health scare at his Karen home was Francis Ogolla, not Ogetta, contradicting earlier accounts and fueling speculation about who controlled access to the ailing leader.

    Activists and Raila supporters have noted Salah’s shifting and contradictory accounts of the former Prime Minister’s final days. Some claim he is traveling across the country distributing money to quell dissent and questions about what really transpired in India. Others point to allegations that Salah was secretly recording Raila using high-tech surveillance equipment, pens, buttons, and other discreet spying gadgets, then forwarding information to unnamed masters.

    The broader implications extend beyond one man’s alleged opportunism. Salah’s story illuminates the murky intersection of business and politics in Kenya, where mining licenses, government contracts, and political influence are often traded in ways that benefit a connected few while excluding the communities most affected.

    In Nyatike, where artisanal miners dig 400 feet underground in dangerous conditions for a fraction of the profits, the gold sector generates billions while locals struggle. County officials complain that bureaucratic processes and national government involvement mean the county sees little benefit despite hosting such lucrative operations. Artisanal miners capture only 25 percent of the gold value, with 75 percent remaining in waste materials later collected by those with “advanced technology,” a category that likely includes well-connected businessmen like Salah.

    The question of what business Salah was really doing with Raila may never be fully answered. The former Prime Minister took many secrets to his grave. But the evidence suggests a transactional relationship in which Salah provided companionship, assistance, and perhaps intelligence during Raila’s declining years, while extracting in return the ultimate business asset: proximity to power.

    Whether Salah was genuinely devoted to Raila or skillfully exploiting an aging politician’s need for support may be less important than understanding the system that allowed such arrangements to flourish. In a country where political connections can transform a Migori businessman into a player on the national stage, the Oketch Salah phenomenon is less an aberration than a symptom.

    Attempts to reach Salah for comment were unsuccessful. His social media pages continue to post photos from political events and business meetings, each image a testament to a proximity he claims as family ties but which others see as something far more calculated.

    As Kenya heads toward the 2027 elections with ODM fractured and Raila’s legacy contested, the shadow of Oketch Salah looms large. His gold mining ventures in Nyatike continue. His political influence appears to be growing. And the questions about what really happened during Raila Odinga’s final days, and who benefited most from that access, remain largely unanswered.

    In the end, the mystery of Oketch Salah and the business he was doing with Raila reveals an uncomfortable truth about Kenyan politics. Power, proximity, and profit form a triangle in which the lines between family, friendship, and transaction blur beyond recognition. And in that ambiguity, fortunes are made while the public is left to wonder who was serving whom, and at what cost.

  • How Phones Stolen in Kenya End Up Being Sold in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania

    How Phones Stolen in Kenya End Up Being Sold in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania

    Your phone could be snatched on Moi Avenue in Nairobi on Monday morning, have its identity wiped by a technician in a dingy backstreet shop by noon, and be on sale in a Kampala market by Tuesday evening.

    This is the chilling reality of Kenya’s multi-million shilling cross-border phone theft syndicate that is turning smartphone owners into sitting ducks while criminals feast on a lucrative black market stretching across East Africa.

    The Star can now reveal how a sophisticated criminal enterprise involving motorcycle-riding snatchers, corrupt technicians, and cross-border traffickers has turned phone theft into a regional industry worth hundreds of millions of shillings annually.

    The syndicate has become so audacious that a phone is stolen in Nairobi every 10 minutes, with most ending up in neighbouring countries where weak enforcement and hungry markets keep the business thriving.

    The latest bust has exposed the ugly underbelly of this trade. On January 23, elite officers from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations Operation Support Unit stormed hideouts in Shauri Moyo, Kasarani and the Nairobi Central Business District, arresting seven suspects and recovering more than 150 stolen smartphones, 16 tablets and six laptops.

    But what they found was just the tip of a criminal iceberg that stretches from Kenya’s bustling streets to the backstreet markets of Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Kigali and Bujumbura.

    At the heart of the operation was a Ugandan woman running what investigators describe as the logistics command centre from her Shauri Moyo hideout.

    When detectives raided her residence, they found 75 mobile phones packed in boxes sealed with yellow tape and two laptops. She was the crucial link, the person coordinating the rapid movement of stolen devices from Kenyan snatchers to eager buyers across the border.

    “She acts as the link. Once a phone is snatched on Moi Avenue, it is flashed, repackaged, and put on a bus to Kampala within 24 hours. This rapid transit makes recovery nearly impossible for the average victim,” a DCI source told this writer, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of ongoing investigations.

    The operation is brutally efficient and frighteningly well-organized.

    Street-level criminals operating on motorcycles or on foot snatch phones from unsuspecting pedestrians stuck in traffic, passengers in matatus, or revellers in nightclubs.

    These devices, often worth tens of thousands of shillings, are immediately handed over to receivers who ferry them to repair shops hidden in the city’s maze of backstreets.

    This is where the real magic happens.

    Tech-savvy criminals armed with specialized flashing equipment get to work.

    They wipe the phone’s memory through factory resets, delete all user data, and most crucially, alter the International Mobile Equipment Identity number, the unique 15-digit code that acts as every phone’s fingerprint. By changing the IMEI, these technicians render the devices invisible to Kenyan authorities who might be searching for them.

    Some phones never make it across the border intact. Detectives have discovered that certain high-end devices are dismantled for spare parts, which are sold separately to make tracking even more difficult. The parts end up in repair shops across the region, their origins impossible to trace.

    Once the phones have been scrubbed of their previous identities and repackaged, they begin their journey across borders.

    Transporters use public service vehicles and private cars to conceal the trade, moving the devices through porous East African borders where enforcement remains weak.

    The destination cities of Kampala, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam and Kigali provide the perfect market for these stolen goods.

    “In Kampala, for instance, a simple Tecno cellphone can be sold at Sh4,000 only,” a senior DCI detective revealed. The bargain prices attract buyers in countries with lower smartphone adoption rates, where consumers are less concerned about the origin of their devices and more interested in affordability.

    The numbers paint a grim picture.

    Police statistics show that at least 574 suspected stolen phones have been recovered by state security agencies in Nairobi in the past year alone.

    But this is just a fraction of the actual theft.

    Security sources estimate that most cases go unreported, with victims simply replacing their SIM cards and moving on, creating a shadow economy that authorities struggle to quantify.

    The human cost is even more devastating. In 2023 alone, 10 Nairobi residents lost their lives to phone snatchers.

    The crime has evolved from petty theft to violent robbery, with criminals increasingly willing to use force.

    Victims are dragged from matatus, attacked in traffic jams, or assaulted in broad daylight, all for the sake of devices that will be worth a fraction of their value once they cross the border.

    The syndicate thrives because of Kenya’s unique position in the region. With 42.35 million smartphones reported by the Communications Authority of Kenya as of March 2025, representing an 80.8 percent penetration rate, Kenya has become the primary hunting ground for phone thieves.

    The country’s high smartphone adoption, driven by increased affordability and growing demand for digital services, has created an irresistible target for criminals.

    But the real fuel for this criminal enterprise is the fragmented legal landscape across East Africa. While Kenya has implemented strict IMEI registration requirements and systems to blacklist stolen phones, other countries in the region have failed to create aligned legal frameworks.

    A phone blocked in Kenya can be reactivated and used freely in Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda or Burundi, where enforcement mechanisms are weaker or non-existent.

    “The cross-border syndicate uses a flash-and-dash method to evade detection. Major cities in Kenya, including Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu, Mombasa and Eldoret, serve as hubs where the mobile phones are stolen, collected and prepared for transport to cities with a high demand for cheap handsets,” the DCI detective explained.

    The pattern repeats itself with alarming regularity. On November 5, 2025, Nyeri police arrested three suspects at a mobile phone repair shop and recovered 417 smartphones and 47 SIM cards. On October 14, 2023, police in Nairobi arrested two Kenyans and two Ugandans with 13 stolen smartphones destined for Uganda.

    In another case, detectives arrested a suspect with 265 stolen iPhones and 10 Android phones in Kasarani.

    DCI Director Mohamed Amin has made clear that authorities are fighting back. “We are coming for the technicians who flash these phones and the individuals who help transport them to neighbouring countries,” he declared after the latest raid.

    Detectives are now working with telecommunications companies across East Africa to share data on blacklisted phones, a move designed to make it harder for criminals to profit from their trade.

    Interpol has also been brought into the fight, with regional cooperation aimed at dismantling the smuggling networks.

    But challenges remain.

    The ready market for cheap smartphones in East African capitals continues to fuel demand, and inconsistent legal frameworks create vulnerabilities that criminals eagerly exploit.

    The other enablers of this criminal economy include fintech companies that have inadvertently become victims.

    Firms like M-Kopa, Watu Credit and Mophone Kenya, which provide pay-as-you-go financing for smartphones, have suffered significant losses through the unlocking of loaned devices.

    Cyber cafe operators and IT experts have been caught assisting criminals by unlocking phones leased to users, creating a secondary layer of criminality.

    Online marketplaces have also become conduits for stolen goods, providing discreet platforms where criminals can offload devices without raising suspicion.

    Street shops and repair stalls serve as fronts for the trade, with some operators maintaining legitimate businesses while secretly dealing in stolen goods.

    The theft syndicates have become so sophisticated that they now involve women and men who draw minimal suspicion of being criminals. Gone are the days when phone theft was the preserve of dirty street urchins.

    Today’s criminals look like ordinary Kenyans, blending into crowds and operating with impunity until raids expose their networks.

    For victims, the aftermath of phone theft extends beyond the loss of a device.

    Personal data, photos, financial information stored in mobile banking apps, and access to digital services all vanish in an instant.

    The emotional toll is significant, with many victims reporting feelings of violation and vulnerability long after the theft.

    Safaricom shops experience their busiest periods on Monday mornings, filled with customers who lost their phones over the weekend when people tend to be more carefree and less vigilant about their belongings.

    The queues at mobile operator shops have become a visible reminder of how endemic the problem has become.

    Authorities are urging victims to report thefts immediately, both to police and mobile operators, to create a paper trail that can be used as evidence if the phone is misused for fraudulent activities.

    But the reality is that many Kenyans have lost faith in the recovery process, viewing it as futile given how quickly devices disappear across borders.

    The battle against phone theft syndicates represents a new frontier in law enforcement, requiring coordination between multiple countries, telecommunications companies, and technology manufacturers.

    Until regional legal frameworks are harmonized and enforcement mechanisms strengthened, the criminals will continue to exploit the gaps, turning Kenyan smartphone owners into unwitting suppliers for East African black markets.

    As Kenya’s smartphone adoption continues to grow, with mobile penetration reaching 145.3 percent and digital services becoming increasingly essential to daily life, the stakes have never been higher.

    Every stolen phone represents not just a financial loss but a disruption to the digital economy that Kenya has worked hard to build.

    The message from investigators is clear.

    The days of easy money are numbered for phone thieves and their cross-border networks.

    But until that day arrives, Kenyans must remain vigilant, holding their phones tightly in traffic, avoiding distractions in public spaces, and understanding that in the world of phone theft, a moment of carelessness can mean losing more than just a device.

    It can mean fueling a criminal empire that spans borders and destroys lives.

  • How Rogue Hospitals Siphoned Sh11 Billion From SHA in Massive Healthcare Heist

    How Rogue Hospitals Siphoned Sh11 Billion From SHA in Massive Healthcare Heist

    NAIROBI, Kenya – Kenya’s healthcare system has been rocked by revelations of a staggering Sh11 billion fraud orchestrated by rogue private hospitals and health facilities in just six months, exposing the darkest side of the country’s flagship universal health coverage programme.

    In a shocking exposé, Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale has lifted the lid on what he describes as “real theft” that nearly crippled the Social Health Authority between October 2024 and April 2025, with private hospitals leading the criminal enterprise that has left the government reeling.

    The scale of the fraud is breathtaking. Hospitals converted simple outpatient visits into fake inpatient admissions, billed for surgeries that were never performed, and in the most audacious cases, healthcare workers registered themselves as patients to steal from the system meant to serve millions of vulnerable Kenyans.

    “This is when the real theft took place. The situation was shocking,” Duale revealed during an exclusive interview, pulling back the curtain on why the Health Ministry earned its notorious nickname, Mafia House.

    The Anatomy of Healthcare Robbery

    The fraud scheme reads like a crime thriller. Desperate Kenyans who walked into hospitals for minor ailments found themselves mysteriously admitted overnight, not because their conditions warranted it, but because greedy facility owners saw an opportunity to inflate their claims and pocket taxpayer money.

    In a particularly brazen twist, some maternity hospitals claimed that every single delivery they handled was a caesarean section, a medical impossibility that defies World Health Organisation standards and common sense. The CS did not mince his words when describing these claims as outright fraud.

    Private facilities, which have historically profited handsomely from the now-defunct National Health Insurance Fund, emerged as the primary culprits in this grand theft. Faith-based hospitals, by contrast, recorded the lowest rejection rates, suggesting a moral compass that their private counterparts appear to have lost in their pursuit of profit.

    Ghost Patients and Phantom Surgeries

    The fraud went deeper. Surgical claims became a lucrative avenue for theft, with missing theatre notes and incomplete documentation making it impossible to verify whether procedures were ever performed. Hospital owners had the audacity to complain about SHA’s high rejection rates for surgeries, even as investigators uncovered evidence of systematic billing fraud.

    In some facilities, the betrayal was internal. Healthcare workers who had taken oaths to heal instead turned into thieves, registering themselves as patients and logging false claims into the system. These facilities have since been shut down, but the damage was done.

    Government Fights Back

    Duale has declared war on the fraudsters. Last year alone, he presented 118 files to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. Twenty-four files have been completed, with 15 forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions just last week. Court cases are already underway, including some involving senior SHA staff.

    More than 18 doctors and 22 clinicians have been permanently banned from the SHA portal, their careers in the public health system effectively over. The message is clear: those who steal from sick Kenyans will face the full force of the law.

    In October last year, DPP Renson Ingonga approved charges against 10 suspects, including four directors of health facilities in Kilifi and Vihiga counties. Two facilities, Jambo Jipya Medical Clinic and St Mark Orthodox Hospital, allegedly colluded with a SHA employee in a criminal conspiracy to defraud the system. Jambo Jipya alone submitted Sh2 million in fraudulent claims.

    The Road to Recovery

    Despite the massive losses, the government has poured Sh75 billion into the Social Health Insurance Fund over the last 14 months, alongside Sh4 billion to the Public Officers Medical Scheme and Sh1 billion to the Emergency, Chronic and Critical Fund. The healthcare system runs on government money, and Duale wants facilities to deliver what Kenyans have paid for.

    Some hospitals with smaller debts have signed consent agreements and are negotiating repayment terms. Those willing to disclose what they stole and commit to paying it back will be given a chance, but the CS has warned that no one involved in fraud will be spared.

    Digital safeguards and investigative mechanisms have now been deployed. The daily claims and revenue are balanced, and the system automatically notifies facilities when claims are rejected, explaining what documentation is required. The era of easy theft, Duale insists, is over.

    A Vision for the Future

    Looking beyond the scandal, the CS has set an ambitious vision for Kenyan healthcare. He wants the country to become the leading nation in healthcare delivery in Africa, where even presidents can be treated in the same facilities as ordinary citizens.

    It is a bold dream, but one that can only be realised if the thieves in white coats are completely weeded out and the system rebuilt on a foundation of integrity. For now, the government is focused on one thing: recovering every shilling stolen from sick Kenyans who deserved better than to be robbed by those who swore to heal them.

    The Sh11 billion heist has exposed the rot in Kenya’s healthcare system. Whether the government can successfully recover the stolen funds and restore public trust remains to be seen. What is certain is that the days of unchecked fraud are numbered, and those who participated in this grand theft should be looking over their shoulders.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

  • Paul Ndung’u Sues SportPesa for Sh348 Million in UK Court, Accuses Safaricom Boss of Sh2.3 Billion Conspiracy

    Paul Ndung’u Sues SportPesa for Sh348 Million in UK Court, Accuses Safaricom Boss of Sh2.3 Billion Conspiracy

    A Kenyan investor is demanding Sh348 million in compensation after a UK court exposed what a judge described as a brazen conspiracy involving SportPesa directors and a senior Safaricom executive to strip him of shares worth billions.

    Paul Ndung’u has filed notice to appeal a November 2025 High Court ruling that found SportPesa Global Holdings Limited guilty of illegally slashing his shareholding from 17 percent to a paltry 0.85 percent, but stopped short of awarding him damages.

    In a sensational twist, court documents reveal that Sitoyo Lopokoiyit, now Chief Executive Officer of M-Pesa Limited, a Safaricom subsidiary, allegedly orchestrated the transfer of Sh2.3 billion from SportPesa’s Kenyan operation to a new company controlled by Bulgarian nationals, defying court orders that had frozen the accounts.

    The bombshell allegations, laid bare in legal filings, paint a picture of corporate intrigue involving forged documents, phantom addresses, disabled email accounts and what Justice Edward Johnson called a pattern of lies and perjury by SportPesa’s Bulgarian directors.

    Dr Ekuru Aukot, Ndung’u’s lead lawyer, has accused Lopokoiyit of violating conflict of interest rules because he is married to the sister of Ronald Karauri, a key figure in the SportPesa network.

    The transfers allegedly happened while High Court preservation orders were in full force over all Pevans East Africa Limited bank accounts and M-Pesa paybills.

    The three-week trial at the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales heard damning testimony about how Bulgarian directors Ivalyo Petev Bozoukov and Kalina Lyubomirova Karazhova deliberately sent share offer letters to a non-existent address in Kenya and to an email domain that had been shut down by the Communications Authority of Kenya for fraud.

    Justice Johnson found the company had breached sections 561 and 562 of the UK Companies Act 2006, laws designed to protect shareholders from unfair dilution. The company admitted to a second breach during the trial.

    Yet in a ruling that has left legal observers baffled, the judge dismissed Ndung’u’s claim, arguing he could not have afforded the £170,000 needed to buy the shares. This finding flew in the face of bank evidence showing Ndung’u had access to over £896,000 through personal accounts, business accounts and overdraft facilities.

    Court records show Ndung’u maintained a Sh50 million overdraft, held Sh60 million in his personal account and over Sh100 million in his business account. By early 2023, he had already spent more than £300,000 prosecuting the case and had committed in writing to invest up to £500,000.

    Dr Aukot called the judgment contradictory and said the case would likely become a landmark study in Western law schools on how ordinary investors face injustice when pitted against those with access to proceeds of money laundering and tax evasion.

    The UK trial exposed a web of corporate malfeasance. SportPesa Global Holdings Limited violated accounting requirements by failing to prepare audited consolidated accounts, the court found. The company did not qualify for small company exemptions because its balance sheet exceeded statutory limits and the group employed more than 50 people.

    Ndung’u had appointed KPMG as auditors, but the Bulgarian directors claimed the firm was too expensive and difficult to work with. They testified that KPMG advised them to prepare accounts under a regime that does not require audits. Justice Johnson found no written record of such advice and no record of any board meeting discussing the matter. In paragraph 677 of his judgment, the judge concluded the directors had lied under oath.

    The trial heard that Ndung’u, who served as chairman and director until January 2021, never received offer letters for a rights issue until after the subscription deadline had passed.

    While other shareholders were called to inform them of the offer, Ndung’u was deliberately excluded, the court heard.

    Justice Johnson acknowledged in paragraph 313 that some forgery allegations were beyond the scope of the case, stating there was no means of investigating certain claims because they fell outside the proceedings.

    The UK case followed explosive litigation in Kenya, where the Court of Appeal overturned its own February 2023 ruling after discovering it had been misled by a forged court order.

    In an April 2025 judgment delivered just weeks before the UK trial began, the Kenyan appellate court cited the intricacies of fraud and forgery.

    The discovery prompted the Kenyan judiciary to issue a public notice warning about criminal activity involving the forgery and misuse of court documents. The Court of Appeal ordered that Ndung’u be included in all matters relating to Pevans East Africa Limited, the Kenyan registered company that contributed 98 percent of SportPesa Global Holdings group revenue.

    The SportPesa saga traces back to July 2019 when the Kenyan government shut down Pevans East Africa Limited and deported its Bulgarian directors. Then Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’i accused them of committing heinous crimes in their own country and doing things they could not do in Bulgaria.

    Court documents allege that after the shutdown, core assets of Pevans including M-Pesa paybills and funds were transferred to Milestone Games Limited, which now operates the SportPesa brand in Kenya. The transfers were allegedly executed by Lopokoiyit in his capacity at Safaricom.

    Milestone Games Limited is owned by a complex web of companies including Commtech Limited with 25 percent, small shareholdings held by lawyers Deborah Linet Ontiri and Peter Jr Okaalet, and a 72 percent stake held by TPLC Holdings Limited, a UAE Free Zone Establishment controlled by the Bulgarian nationals.

    During cross-examination in London, the defendants admitted to more than 20 breaches of statutory obligations, claiming their actions were inadvertent and caused unknowingly.They attempted to frame the dispute as foreign investors against Kenyan investors, characterizing Ndung’u and fellow non-executive directors Asenath Wacera and Kinuthia as trying to push out the Bulgarians.

    However, evidence showed the conflict centered on how the executive directors passed resolutions and spent money without full board approval.

    Justice Johnson noted that cases involving deliberate shareholder dilution through breach of pre-emption rights have no precedent in UK courts. The judge described the case as containing convoluted facts, outright lies, fraud and perjury that the court found strange and mysterious.

    Ndung’u has until January 28, 2026, to lodge his appeal papers. His lawyers have notified the Court of Appeal that he is owed £2.4 million in cash invested in SportPesa Holdings Limited in the Isle of Man between 2016 and 2017, funds sufficient to meet any security for costs requirements.

    Court filings show that Ndung’u’s 17 percent shareholding in Pevans East Africa Limited was valued at £7.5 million, representing his share of the company’s net assets of £41.2 million as of June 30, 2019.

    The appeal will challenge what Dr Aukot called the central contradiction in the judgment, namely how a court can find serious breaches of company law yet dismiss a claim based on an assessment of affordability that contradicts documented evidence of substantial financial resources.

    The Bulgarian directors, Bozoukov and Karazhova, now control 90 percent of SportPesa Global Holdings after the dilution of Kenyan shareholders Ndung’u and Wacera. Karazhova is the sister of Gene Grand, one of the defendants in the UK case.

    Neither Safaricom nor Lopokoiyit has publicly responded to the allegations. Safaricom’s conflict of interest policy requires disclosure of personal interests that could affect business decisions.

    The case has drawn attention to the murky world of offshore betting companies and the challenges faced by minority shareholders in complex corporate structures spanning multiple jurisdictions.

    Dr Aukot said the complexity of the claim and the unraveling of lies, fraud, forgeries and statutory breaches will likely become a case study on how ordinary investors can face miscarriage of justice.

    As the appeal looms, the question remains whether British justice will ultimately side with the Kenyan investor who claims he was systematically robbed of his stake in one of Africa’s most recognizable betting brands, or with the Bulgarian directors whom a High Court judge found had lied under oath.