Author: Kenya Insights Team

  • THE BRAZEN RETURN: Triton Thief Yagnesh Devani, Who Pillaged Kenya of Sh7.6 Billion and Fled, Now Asks the Same Courts He Escaped to Restore His Stolen Wealth

    THE BRAZEN RETURN: Triton Thief Yagnesh Devani, Who Pillaged Kenya of Sh7.6 Billion and Fled, Now Asks the Same Courts He Escaped to Restore His Stolen Wealth

    Yagnesh Mohanlal Devani has the nerve of a man who has never truly been made to pay. Last week, the principal shareholder of the long-collapsed Triton Petroleum Company Limited walked into the High Court’s Commercial and Tax Division, clutching an urgent petition demanding a full account of his company’s 17-year receivership.

    The same receivership that followed, inexorably, from his own documented fraud.

    The same courts whose processes he tied up for over a decade fighting extradition from Britain. The same Kenya whose fuel supply he plunged into chaos, whose banks he bankrupted of billions, and whose long-suffering taxpayers were left to absorb the systemic fallout of his spectacular greed.

    The petition, filed through Echessa and Bwire Advocates LLP, names the appointed receiver managers, Kenya Commercial Bank, the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, and the Central Bank of Kenya as respondents. In it, Devani argues with remarkable straightforwardness that the receivers have for 17 years failed to provide the company’s board of directors with updates on the status of the receivership, the disposal of assets, or the composition of outstanding loan balances.

    He wants a forensic audit.

    He wants an independent inquiry into potential misconduct. He wants compensation for losses he says were suffered during the receivership period.

    The court has certified the matter as urgent and directed respondents to file their responses within seven days. A mention has been set for April 29 for further directions.

    A man who stole 126 million litres of fuel worth Sh7.6 billion now returns to court complaining that his receivership has been insufficiently transparent.

    THE ANATOMY OF A CAREFULLY PLANNED THEFT

    Devani did not stumble into fraud. He engineered it, over years, with the precision of a man who understood exactly which institutions he could corrupt, which officials could be compromised, and which legal loopholes could be exploited to buy time when the scheme eventually collapsed.

    Triton Petroleum Company Limited was registered in 2000, with Devani holding 4,999,500 of the company’s five million shares. The remaining 500 shares were held by a shell entity called Triton Business Solutions.

    From the beginning, the corporate architecture was designed to concentrate control while obscuring accountability.

    Forensic auditors who later picked through the wreckage noted that despite operating a multi-billion-shilling business with multiple subsidiaries, Triton rarely kept complete records. As one audit observation grimly noted, the company’s files revealed “a lot of information gaps.” Those gaps were not accidental.

    The scandal’s foundations were laid through a system known as the Open Tender System, through which the Kenya Pipeline Company awarded monthly contracts to a single importer to supply petroleum products across Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

    The logic was straightforward: economies of scale would benefit the entire market.

    Triton, despite being a relatively small player with an 11.5 per cent market share, managed to outmanoeuvre seasoned international giants including Shell and BP to secure a six-month national oil supply quota.

    According to the African Centre for Open Governance, which produced one of the definitive analyses of the scandal in July 2009, there was considerable evidence to suggest that Triton enjoyed exceptional political connections that could have given it preferential treatment at KPC.

    Those connections were not subtle. At the 2006 launch of Triton’s LPG depot in Nairobi, the guest list included then Vice President Moody Awori, Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta.

    During President Daniel arap Moi’s administration, Triton had secured lucrative contracts to supply petroleum products to the Kenya Power and Lighting Company. Devani was, by his own carefully cultivated design, the kind of businessman Nairobi’s political establishment wanted at their tables.

    The actual theft, as reconstructed by the PricewaterhouseCoopers forensic audit and subsequent investigations, was executed between November 2007 and November 2008.

    Taking advantage of a new computerised stock-tracking system at KPC that had not yet been fully implemented and could not provide live data, Triton conspired with KPC officials to draw oil from the pipeline system for which it had not paid.

    KPC staff then falsified records to show the stocks remained in the system. By the time financiers demanded accurate stock positions, 126.4 million litres of petroleum products worth Sh7.6 billion had been irregularly and illegally released to Triton without the authorisation of the financiers who held the cargo as collateral.

    THE BANKS LEFT HOLDING PHANTOM COLLATERAL

    The scale of the financial damage was staggering. When KCB wrote to KPC asking for the official stock position of Triton products held for the bank, it discovered to its horror that 25.9 million litres of fuel it believed was being held in storage was simply missing.

    By the time the full picture emerged, Triton had accumulated an estimated Sh7.6 billion in obligations it could not meet: Sh1.85 billion owed to KCB, Sh2.3 billion to Glencore Energy UK Limited, Sh906 million to Fortis Bank of the Netherlands, and Sh2.5 billion to Emirates National Oil Company of Singapore.

    The Kenya Revenue Authority separately demanded Sh4 billion in unpaid taxes and penalties, plus Sh2 billion in unpaid corporation taxes.

    These were not abstract figures on a balance sheet. Banks that had issued letters of credit and financial guarantees on the strength of collateral that did not exist were facing catastrophic losses.

    The Collateral Financing Agreement that governed such transactions required KPC to hold oil stocks and release them only upon written authorisation from the financiers.

    That requirement was systematically ignored, with KPC issuing false acknowledgement letters while Devani’s company drew down inventory it had not paid for and sold it into the market.

    The country’s entire petroleum supply system was thrown into crisis.

    The illegal drawdown of stocks at the Kipevu Oil Storage Facility left insufficient storage space for other oil marketing companies to import their own products fast enough to fill the resulting shortfall. Fuel shortages spread across the country.

    Total Kenya Limited, which had a supply contract with Triton to fuel KenGen’s thermal power plants, was forced to terminate the arrangement after Triton consistently failed to deliver.

    With Kenya already experiencing a drought that had pushed power producers toward greater reliance on thermal generation, the prospect of fuel shortages compounding a power crisis was not theoretical. The country teetered on the edge of electricity rationing.

    Televisions and radio stations broadcast the chaos. Ordinary Kenyans queued for fuel they could not find, and paid more for power they could barely afford.

    THE SPIRITUAL CLEANSING AND THE LONG FLIGHT

    In mid-December 2008, as the walls closed in, Devani and his right-hand man Mahendra Pathak boarded a flight to Prayagraj, India, ostensibly to attend the Magh Mela pilgrimage, a Hindu religious festival held at the confluence of the Ganga, Yamuna and Saraswati rivers, where pilgrims bathe to cleanse themselves of their sins.

    Whether the spiritual symbolism was intentional or merely coincidental, both men knew exactly what was waiting for them in Nairobi.

    Triton was placed under receivership on December 19, 2008, at the request of KCB and the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, after the company’s catastrophic inability to service its debts became undeniable.

    Pathak eventually returned to Kenya and faced charges. Devani did not. He surfaced in London, where he would spend the next 15 years deploying an extraordinary array of legal arguments to resist extradition, while Kenya’s banking sector absorbed his losses and ordinary Kenyans paid the price of disrupted fuel markets.

    An arrest warrant was issued in June 2009. Interpol was activated. Kenya filed extradition proceedings with the British authorities in 2011.

    What followed was a masterclass in how wealth, access to expensive legal representation, and the structural complexity of international extradition law can be weaponised to delay accountability indefinitely.

    Devani argued variously that he would not receive a fair trial in Kenya, that Kenyan prisons were dangerous, that there was cholera at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison, and that his extradition would violate his human rights.

    He appealed at every available level of the British judicial system. The UK Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed all his challenges in the judgment Secretary of State for Home Department v. Yagnesh Mohanlal Devani (2020) EWCA Civ 612, delivered on May 7, 2020 by Lord Justice Underhill.

    The court found his claims about Kenyan prisons and trial conditions unsubstantiated. Even then, the actual extradition did not happen for nearly four more years.

    He was finally returned to Kenya on January 23, 2024, after more than 15 years as a fugitive.

    The country that had spent enormous diplomatic and legal capital extracting him from Britain expected, at minimum, a reckoning.

    THE PROSECUTION COLLAPSE THAT BEGGARED BELIEF

    What followed was not a reckoning. It was a farce that exposed the deep rot in Kenya’s accountability infrastructure with almost surgical precision.

    On his return, Devani was charged with four counts over the irregular sale of petroleum products at Kipevu, relating to a Sh1.5 billion jet fuel case, and released on bail of Sh1 million.

    In August 2024, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission separately arrested him and charged him afresh with 11 counts in the Sh7.6 billion case, including two counts of fraudulent disposition of mortgaged goods, eight counts of conspiracy to defraud, and one count of obtaining by false pretences.

    He pleaded not guilty to all charges and was eventually freed on a Sh5 million cash bail after spending 13 days in remand at Industrial Area Prison.

    The charges were detailed and specific. Count one alleged that on September 5, 2008, as managing director of Triton Petroleum, he disposed of 13,054.85 cubic metres of diesel valued at US$10.2 million to Total Kenya Limited without the consent of Emirates National Oil Company, the mortgagee.

    Count two alleged the disposal of aviation fuel worth US$550,020 to the same company without authorisation. Counts three through ten alleged conspiracies to defraud Kenya Shell Limited, Engen Kenya Limited, GAPCO Kenya Limited, Hashi Empex Limited, Muloil Kenya Limited, and Emirates National Oil Company of sums totalling hundreds of millions of shillings, by fraudulently representing that Triton held stocks at Kipevu that it no longer owned.

    By October 2024, Anti-Corruption Magistrate Harrison Barasa had allowed Director of Public Prosecutions Renson Ingonga’s application to withdraw the entire case.

    The stated reasons were: the death of certain witnesses; the unwillingness of former Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi, once described as the man who ordered the original investigation, to testify; and the inability to locate the original complainant. The magistrate found that the DPP and EACC could not be compelled to proceed when key witnesses had become uncooperative.

    The case that Kenya had spent 15 years and substantial diplomatic capital to prosecute collapsed in under a year of Devani’s return, without a single conviction, on the ground that witnesses who had been alive for the entire period of his fugitive existence were suddenly unavailable when the moment of reckoning actually arrived.

    Fifteen years in hiding. Fifteen years of diplomatic effort. Fifteen years of waiting. Collapsed in ten months. Without explanation.

    POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF IMPUNITY

    The Devani story is impossible to understand outside the context of his extraordinary political network. The Africog analysis noted explicitly that Triton’s past transactions with government, its ability to secure lucrative state contracts from the Moi era onward, and the presence of senior political figures at its corporate events all pointed to connections that extended deep into the Kenyan state.

    The company held the tender in partnership with Total Kenya to supply petroleum products to KenGen, the state power producer. It was considered a local champion in an industry historically dominated by multinationals.

    Forensic auditors noted that despite his company’s multi-billion-shilling operations, Triton maintained minimal records.

    The company’s cross-ownership structures, spreading assets across Triton Bulk Storage, Triton Gas Stations Limited, Triton Service Stations and Triton Network Solutions Limited, created a corporate maze that complicated any attempt to trace funds or hold a single entity accountable. This was not the structure of a businessman who expected to be investigated. It was the structure of a businessman who expected to be protected.

    When the scandal broke, the then-managing director of KPC was fired immediately. The chairman of the KPC board was removed shortly thereafter.

    Several KPC officials were charged with corruption.

    The managing director, the chairman, the board, and multiple line staff all faced consequences. The man who had bribed and conspired with them to steal 126 million litres of fuel, and who had then run to London, faced nothing for 16 years.

    THE PROPERTIES, THE ASSETS, AND THE RECEIVERSHIP GAMES

    Triton was placed under receivership in December 2008. Abdul Zahir Sheikh and Peter Kahii were appointed receiver and manager by KCB. The receivership, now entering its 18th year, has become a legal battleground in its own right.

    What is not disputed is the extraordinary breadth of assets that once existed in the Triton estate. Devani’s own petition before the High Court records that the receivers took full control of the company’s warehouses, vehicles, stocks, offices and even post office boxes.

    Triton operated service stations in Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Nakuru, as well as in Kampala, Uganda. Separate litigation has established that the Triton estate once included Karen Cross Road Mall, Lang’ata Road Arcade, Westland Plaza along Waiyaki Way, 60 acres of land in Karen, and over 20 other properties, most of them petrol stations.

    A deed of settlement signed between Triton, Devani and the receivers on March 16, 2009 referenced the Camelot property, to be sold for not less than Sh1.1 billion.

    KCB sued Devani for Sh2.7 billion. The bank also sued Triton for Sh2 billion. Courts ordered the disposal of various Triton assets to service debts. Devani was separately stopped from offering for sale shares or assets held in 19 other companies until KCB’s case was heard and determined.

    Now, in 2026, Devani argues that he has never been informed of how those assets were disposed of, what recoveries were made, what expenses were incurred during the receivership, or what remains of the company’s estate after 17 years.

    He frames this as a transparency and accountability issue, invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the courts to compel a trustee who has remained in possession of trust assets to render account.

    He wants a full forensic audit. He wants an independent inquiry into potential misconduct. He wants compensation.

    THE OBSCENITY OF THE CURRENT PETITION

    It is worth pausing to appreciate fully what Devani is asking for.

    A man who engineered the theft of 126 million litres of petroleum products, who conspired with state officials to falsify inventory records, who defrauded international banks of the equivalent of US$100 million, who fled the country on the eve of his arrest, who spent 15 years in London exhausting the British legal system with arguments about Kenyan prisons, and who watched the case against him collapse through witness attrition he may well have had some hand in creating, is now petitioning the Kenyan High Court, on an urgent certificate, to protect assets he claims were mishandled during the receivership his own fraud necessitated.

    He argues that shareholders have never been informed of the status of loan accounts, that assets have been disposed of without transparency, and that there has been no meaningful regulatory intervention despite repeated complaints.

    The Central Bank of Kenya, he argues, failed in its oversight role.

    The receivers failed in their statutory obligations.

    The lenders failed to account for assets under their control. Having destroyed the company, stolen its inventory, bankrupted its creditors, and evaded justice for nearly two decades, he is now positioning himself as the wronged party in a badly managed insolvency.

    The audacity of the argument would be almost admirable if it did not represent such a profound insult to every institution, every creditor, every worker, and every ordinary Kenyan citizen whose daily life was disrupted by fuel shortages that Devani’s greed directly caused.

    He has the temerity to call himself a shareholder seeking accountability. The rest of Kenya calls him something rather different.

    THE CITIZENS WHO PAID

    The Triton scandal is often discussed in the financial press as a corporate governance failure and a banking sector crisis.

    This framing, while accurate, systematically understates its human cost.

    When 126 million litres of fuel disappears from the national supply chain in a market as dependent on petroleum imports as Kenya’s, the consequences do not stay inside boardrooms and balance sheets.

    They spread into every sector of the economy, carried on every lorry that cannot refuel, every matatu that raises its fare, every generator that goes dry, every farmer whose produce cannot reach market.

    By early January 2009, fuel shortages were visible and reported across the country.

    Televisions and radio stations broadcast the queues. The termination of Triton’s supply contract with Total Kenya, and Total’s consequent inability to meet its obligations to KenGen, threatened to compound a fuel crisis with an electricity crisis at a moment when Kenya was already managing drought-related power pressures. The threat of a return to power rationing, with its cascading damage to manufacturing, services, and small businesses, was entirely real.

    KRA’s demand for Sh4 billion in unpaid taxes meant revenue that would otherwise have supported public services simply did not exist.

    The exposure of KPC, a wholly state-owned parastatal, to multi-billion-shilling lawsuits from defrauded international financiers meant that any damages awarded would ultimately be absorbed by the Kenyan public.

    The systemic damage to the banking sector’s confidence in collateral financing arrangements for petroleum imports had long-term effects on how those arrangements were structured and priced, with costs ultimately passed on to consumers.

    None of the ordinary Kenyans who queued at petrol stations in January 2009, who paid inflated transport costs, who sat in the dark during unscheduled power outages, who absorbed higher prices for goods whose supply chains ran on diesel, none of them have ever received any acknowledgement from Yagnesh Devani that his actions caused their hardship. Nor have they received compensation. Nor, it now appears, will they.

    A WARNING TO INVESTORS AND HOST COUNTRIES

    Devani spent his London years living in a house estimated to be worth Sh550 million. In 2007, at the peak of his fraudulent enterprise, he flew guests in first class from London and India to celebrate his wife’s 40th birthday in Nairobi.

    He chartered a private jet for an Indian performer. He brought hairdressers from London and the UAE. He gave each guest a Rolex watch. The entire event was estimated to cost Sh300 million.

    This was the lifestyle of a man whose business model depended on stealing from state infrastructure, corrupting public officials, and bankrupting international banks.

    The United Kingdom, which hosted Devani for 15 years and became the venue for his prolonged legal resistance to extradition, deserves to know the character of the man it sheltered.

    The elaborate proceedings in the British courts, the claims about prison conditions and fair trial rights, were not the principled stand of a man persecuted by an unjust state.

    They were the tactical deployment of a wealthy fugitive’s legal resources against the legitimate accountability claims of a country he had robbed.

    Any investor, business partner, or financial institution that is currently dealing with Devani, in whatever jurisdiction, should understand that they are dealing with a man whose fundamental business method, as documented in thousands of pages of forensic audit findings, criminal charge sheets, and court judgments, has been the systematic falsification of records, the corruption of public officials, the exploitation of regulatory gaps, and the strategic use of legal delay to avoid accountability.

    The receivership petition now before the Kenyan High Court is entirely consistent with that method. Its purpose is not justice. Its purpose is asset recovery.

    WHAT THE COURTS MUST DECIDE

    The High Court’s Commercial and Tax Division will on April 29 give further directions in Devani’s receivership petition.

    The respondents, KCB, the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, the receiver managers, and the Central Bank of Kenya, have been directed to file their responses within seven days.

    There is a legitimate question embedded within Devani’s petition, entirely separate from the question of whether he deserves to benefit from the answer. Receiverships that run for 17 years without formal reporting to shareholders are a governance problem.

    The accountability obligations of receiver managers under Kenyan law are real, and a court is entitled to examine whether those obligations were met. These are questions the commercial courts have the capacity and the authority to address.

    But the Kenyan judiciary must be clear-eyed about the context in which these questions are being asked, by whom, and for what purpose.

    This petition is not a good-faith inquiry by a wronged shareholder.

    It is the latest manoeuvre in a 17-year campaign by the principal architect of one of Kenya’s largest corporate frauds to recover, preserve, or otherwise access assets that were pledged as collateral for debts his own fraud created.

    Every order it secures, every disclosure it compels, every forensic audit it initiates, will be scrutinised not merely for its compliance with receivership law but for what it ultimately delivers into Devani’s hands.

    There is also a broader accountability question that neither this petition nor the criminal case collapse has answered.

    What happened to the assets? Where did the Sh7.6 billion worth of stolen petroleum products ultimately go? Who, beyond Devani and his immediate co-conspirators, benefited from the scheme? These questions have never been fully answered in a court of competent jurisdiction, because the man who held the answers spent 16 years in Britain and his prosecution collapsed in under a year of his return.

    Kenya deserves those answers.

    The institutions that lost billions deserve them. The workers who lost their jobs when Triton collapsed deserve them.

    The ordinary citizens who paid through their fuel bills and their electricity tariffs and their transport costs for a scandal that enriched one man and his associates deserve them.

    Yagnesh Devani has returned to Kenya’s courts. He will not find the sympathy or the silence he found in London. Not this time.

  • THE UNTOUCHABLE CLERK: How Fatuma Mwalupa Allegedly Turned Kwale Assembly Into a Personal Treasury and Outsmarted Scrutiny

    THE UNTOUCHABLE CLERK: How Fatuma Mwalupa Allegedly Turned Kwale Assembly Into a Personal Treasury and Outsmarted Scrutiny

    She walks into the Kwale County Assembly’s gleaming new headquarters in Matuga with the unhurried authority of someone who has seen rivals come and go. Fatuma Hassan Mwalupa, the Clerk of the County Assembly of Kwale, has outlasted at least one predecessor who was dragged through the courts, survived reported interrogation by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, navigated the minefields of successive political transitions, and still, according to whistleblowers who have spoken to Kenya Insights, controls the flow of billions of shillings in public procurement with an iron hand that leaves almost no fingerprints.

    The question that civil society groups, MCAs, and increasingly, investigators are asking is not whether corruption has infected the Kwale assembly. The Auditor-General’s reports have answered that already, in excruciating and repeated detail. The question is who, at the centre of the machine, is driving it, and who has made it their business to ensure the machine keeps running without accountability.

    Multiple sources, speaking to Kenya Insights on condition of anonymity, point their answers firmly at Mwalupa.

    ‘Whenever any scandal emerges, she normally silences it. To her, money is everything. She uses proxy companies because they give huge figures and kickback percentages without asking questions.’

    THE ARCHITECTURE OF ALLEGED IMPUNITY

    In the past three weeks, explosive allegations have emerged from whistleblowers within the county assembly ecosystem that Mwalupa has accumulated funds spread across at least 20 different bank accounts, with the total figure alleged to be in the region of KSh 20 million at any given time.

    The use of multiple accounts, sources say, is a deliberate fragmentation strategy designed to frustrate detection by the Financial Reporting Centre and to confuse any asset declaration analysis.

    A contractor who dealt with the assembly, and who has asked not to be identified for personal security reasons, described Mwalupa as an figure of such institutional dominance that approaching assembly business without her blessing is not merely difficult, it is professionally fatal.

    According to this source, the Clerk has a preference for working through proxy companies, particularly those drawn from business networks in the Somali community, whose members, the source claims, are selected precisely because they are willing to issue inflated invoices and return kickbacks without seeking explanations.

    Kenya Insights could not independently verify the specific bank account figures at the time of publication. Mwalupa was approached for comment; she had not responded by press time.

    A BUILDING THAT KEPT GETTING MORE EXPENSIVE

    Perhaps no single piece of evidence captures the culture of impunity at the Kwale County Assembly more starkly than the story of the assembly’s own headquarters. What began as a project budgeted at KSh 508 million swelled to KSh 624 million following contractor changes, an unexplained increase of KSh 116 million that the Auditor-General’s office has flagged but which has attracted no prosecutorial consequence.

    The construction saga stretched across nearly eight years before the building was partially occupied. When it was finally inaugurated in late 2024, Speaker Seth Mwatela Kamanza crowed about its architectural magnificence, describing it as a testament to devolution.

    What he did not address was the KSh 155 million that had been paid out by 2022, when the project was terminated, with, in the Auditor-General’s words, no meaningful progress visible on the ground. The contractor at that point had simply walked. The money, however, had not.

    The original acting clerk who presided over early phases of the building project was Fatuma Hassan Mwalupa, who in 2023 was still describing the structure to The Star newspaper as a transformative facility that would revolutionise service delivery in Kwale. She did not address the ballooned costs or the contractor termination.

    THE AUDITOR-GENERAL’S DAMNING PAPER TRAIL

    The Auditor-General’s reports, which Mwalupa and Speaker Kamanza have appeared before the Senate County Public Accounts Committee to answer, detail a series of institutional failures that go far beyond administrative sloppiness.

    The Assembly has been consistently employing staff in excess of legally permitted ceilings. The Commission on Revenue Allocation caps county assembly staffing at 100 regular employees.

    The Kwale assembly employed 126, and layered on top of that an additional 159 temporary workers irregularly attached to Members of the County Assembly and the Speaker’s office.

    That is a combined workforce of 285 people being paid from the public purse through an institution legally mandated to sustain fewer than half that number. The Clerk, as the accounting officer of the assembly, bears institutional responsibility for that excess.

    The auditors further established that nine assembly employees had committed more than two-thirds of their gross salaries to deductions, a direct violation of the Employment Act, which caps such deductions to protect workers from debt bondage through payroll manipulation. Other staff members went for months without being paid at all, a paradox in an institution simultaneously over-staffed and, apparently, selectively cashless.

    Conference expenditure of KSh 15.9 million was flagged as entirely unsupported, meaning no procurement documentation existed and no price justification was offered to explain how nearly KSh 16 million in public funds was disbursed to facilitate meetings.

    In any functional accountability ecosystem, unsupported expenditure of that magnitude would constitute grounds for criminal referral. At the Kwale assembly, it appears on audit reports and then, apparently, disappears.

    Of the six vehicles assigned to the assembly, only two were operational during the audit period.

    The remaining four were grounded with no credible explanation for their mechanical failures, while the assembly continued to spend additional public funds on vehicle rentals to compensate for the very fleet that was already owned and budgeted for.

    At the Kwale County Assembly, KSh 15.9 million in conference expenses was flagged as entirely unsupported. No procurement documentation. No price justification. No consequence.

    EACC IN THE ROOM, AND THE CULTURE OF SILENCE

    Kenya Insights has established that Mwalupa has reportedly been called in for questioning by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission over allegations of financial misconduct and violations of financial regulations.

    The EACC’s Mombasa regional office, which covers Coast operations, has historically been active in Kwale County, a county that the Commission’s own 2024 National Ethics and Corruption Survey ranked among the most bribery-prone counties in Kenya, alongside Kilifi and Wajir.

    That survey, conducted across all 47 counties between November and December 2024, found that bribery remains the dominant form of unethical conduct in Kenyan public institutions, and specifically identified county executive employment as the sector commanding the highest average bribe nationwide, at KSh 243,651.

    The county assembly space, with its extensive patronage networks for temporary staff recruitment, sits within precisely this corruption ecosystem.

    What sources find extraordinary is not the interrogation itself but the outcome, or rather the absence of one. Mwalupa continued in her role, continued to issue tenders through the assembly’s procurement office, and continued to be received as a senior official at national forums even as questions mounted.

    THE WIDER WEB: A COUNTY THAT CANNOT STOP LOOTING ITSELF

    To understand Mwalupa’s alleged position, it is necessary to understand the county she operates in. Kwale is not simply a county with a corruption problem. It is a county where corruption has, over the decade-plus of devolution, become structurally embedded across departments, families, and procurement networks in ways that have defeated repeated interventions.

    In the county executive, a scandal of breathtaking scale has also been unfolding involving the family of Francisca Kilonzo, the county’s CECM for Social Services and Talent Management. Whistleblower documents obtained by Kenya Insights indicate that three companies with direct or indirect connections to the Kilonzo family secured contracts from the county government that together amount to more than KSh 390 million.

    Diani Occasions, owned by Kilonzo’s late nephew Muema Christopher Kilonzo, received KSh 33,670,500. Mutanga Investments, registered under the name of the CECM’s late mother and listing multiple directors including Peter Njagi, Catherine Sonia Wairimu Mahan, and Abraham Vinner among others, was awarded contracts worth KSh 266,644,200. R Flink, owned by Kilonzo’s sister Fatuma Kilonzo and described by sources as a briefcase company with no visible operational footprint, received KSh 90,296,011.

    The total alleged siphoning through these three entities alone approaches KSh 391 million of public money flowing into a single politically connected family network through a procurement system that was supposed to be competitive and transparent.

    Chief Officer of Finance Alex Thomas Onduko has also been drawn into the web of allegations. Sources allege that Onduko, whose contact details appear on official county tender documents as the designated accounting officer, used his office to facilitate and shelter fraudulent dealings. He is further alleged to have links to Cloemart Company, which reportedly won a KSh 16 million tender to construct an oxygen plant at Msambweni Hospital during the 2021/2022 financial year, as well as the Kilolapwa Laboratory project, which consumed additional millions in circumstances sources describe as deeply irregular. Within three years of holding his position, Onduko is alleged to have amassed properties worth more than KSh 200 million.

    Alex Thomas Onduko, listed as accounting officer on County Government of Kwale tender documents. Sources allege his personal wealth grew by more than KSh 200 million in three years.

    A HISTORY THAT REFUSES TO HEAL

    The current scandal at the county assembly is not Kwale’s first rendezvous with institutional rot. In 2014, the EACC conducted one of the most dramatic anti-corruption operations in the county’s post-devolution history, arresting five brothers employed across various county departments. Vincent Chirima Mbito, the County Head of Treasury, was arrested alongside his siblings Mongo Mbito Mongo, the County Revenue Officer; Hassan Shilingi Mbito, a driver at the Kwale Water and Sewerage Company; Mwaiwe Mongo Mbito, the County Procurement Officer; and Chindoro Mongo Mbito, then posted in the Ministry of Health.

    Together, they had allegedly channelled 10 county contracts into two family-controlled companies, Rome Investments and Chilongola Holdings, collecting KSh 44,919,341 and KSh 4,007,943 respectively in payments for the supply of sanitation materials, food rations, office supplies, and institutional appliances, all procured using what the EACC described as forged documents. They were arraigned at the Mombasa Anti-Corruption Court and each released on a bond of KSh 1 million.

    In 2022, the EACC completed a separate inquiry into alleged procurement irregularities of KSh 462 million in the construction of the Kwale County Headquarters, a contract awarded to Green County Construction Company Limited, which investigators established was a proxy vehicle associated with a former Member of Parliament for Mandera South and a former CECM at Kwale County. The EACC recommended prosecution in August 2022. The DPP returned the file for further investigations in October 2022. As of this publication, no prosecution has concluded.

    More recently, ten months before this publication, Vincent Mbito and his four brothers appeared again in the Mombasa courts, re-arraigned in February 2024, more than a decade after they first entered the legal system. The wheels of justice in Kwale County appear to turn with particular, grinding slowness.

    The EACC recommended prosecution in 2022. The DPP returned the file for further investigations. No prosecution has concluded. The pattern repeats, year after year.

    THE PREDECESSOR WHO DARED AND PAID

    The political history of the Kwale County Assembly Clerk position is itself a cautionary tale. Hamisi Bweni Dzila, who held the role before Mwalupa eventually consolidated the position, spent years fighting a legal war against the very board that employed him after he declined to authorise payments to a contractor whose project was under active EACC investigation. The board suspended him in March 2020. The Employment and Labour Relations Court reinstated him. The board refused to let him enter the building, deploying police to block his access.

    The Supreme Court ultimately settled the constitutional question of suspension versus removal in 2025, years after Dzila’s removal had long been a fait accompli. The institutional lesson appears to have been absorbed clearly: in the Kwale assembly, the person who protects public money is the one who loses their job.

    The person who allegedly directs it into private channels, in contrast, appears to be the one who stays.

    THE CALLS FOR ACTION

    The revelations have generated sustained outrage among Kwale residents and civil society organisations, many of whom are now demanding that the EACC’s Mombasa office escalate any open investigation into the assembly’s finances to the highest priority level. The Asset Recovery Agency, they argue, should be simultaneously activated to trace and freeze assets that may have been acquired using diverted public funds.

    Within the assembly itself, moves are underway to present impeachment motions against both Mwalupa and Speaker Kamanza, following the dismissal of the County Public Service Board and the installation of new members who are expected to be less protective of the existing order. Whether those motions will succeed, or whether the political insulation that Mwalupa has allegedly built over years will absorb the blow, remains to be seen.

    The Senate County Public Accounts Committee, before which both the Clerk and the Speaker have already appeared to answer Auditor-General findings, is being urged by accountability advocates to revisit the outstanding issues with a renewed urgency and to demand forensic audits rather than accepting the narrative management that has thus far characterised the assembly’s engagements with oversight bodies.

    For the EACC, the public dossier now sits in plain view. The allegations against Mwalupa, the documented staffing violations, the unsupported conference expenditure, the ballooned construction contract, the fragmented bank accounts, the proxy company network: these are not marginal claims from disgruntled individuals. They are the accumulated evidence of an institution that has, across multiple audit cycles and multiple administrations, operated as though the law does not apply within its walls.

    The Kwale assembly has faced audit after audit, committee appearance after committee appearance. And still the money disappears. The question is no longer whether this is corruption. It is who has the authority to stop it.

    KENYA INSIGHTS IS WATCHING

    Kenya Insights has formally submitted questions to Fatuma Hassan Mwalupa, Speaker Seth Mwatela Kamanza, Chief Officer of Finance Alex Thomas Onduko, and CECM Francisca Kilonzo, seeking responses to the specific allegations detailed in this report. None had responded at the time of publication. This investigation is ongoing. Any responses received will be published in full.

    The EACC has been formally requested to confirm whether active investigations into the Kwale County Assembly are ongoing and whether asset declarations submitted by the Clerk and other named officials have been scrutinised. The Asset Recovery Agency has been asked to specify what, if any, steps have been taken regarding assets allegedly acquired through irregular county procurement in Kwale.

    Kenya Insights will continue to publish as new information becomes available. Sources with documents or information pertaining to this investigation are encouraged to make contact through our secure channels.

  • A Case That Refuses To Die: EABL Stake Sale Faces Fresh Challenge After Temporary Reprieve

    A Case That Refuses To Die: EABL Stake Sale Faces Fresh Challenge After Temporary Reprieve

    THE DEAL AT A GLANCE

     Transaction: Diageo PLC sells 65% EABL stake + 53.68% UDV (Kenya) to Asahi Group Holdings

     Value: Sh303.5 billion ($2.354 billion) at Sh590.51 per share

     Status: Regulatory approvals pending in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania — expected May-June 2026

     Petitioner: Bia Tosha Distributors Limited — distributor dispute dating to 2000

     Latest development: High Court dismissal April 9, 2026; Court of Appeal notice filed April 10, 2026

    It was the ruling that was supposed to end it all. On the morning of Thursday, April 9, 2026, Justice Bahati Mwamuye of the High Court’s Constitutional and Human Rights Division delivered what Diageo, EABL, and their legal teams had been arguing for three months was the only legally defensible outcome: a clean dismissal of Bia Tosha Distributors Limited’s petition to block the Sh303 billion sale of Diageo’s majority EABL stake to Japan’s Asahi Group Holdings. ‘The petitioner’s notice of motion dated 5th January 2026 is hereby dismissed,’ the judge declared, lifting all interim orders that had restrained the finalisation of the transaction.

    EABL issued a statement welcoming the ruling and noting that the deal could now proceed through standard regulatory channels. Diageo’s camp exhaled. Asahi’s representatives, watching from Tokyo, had cause for quiet satisfaction. The deal they had committed $2.354 billion to — one of the largest investments a Japanese company has ever made in Africa — appeared, finally, to be free of its most persistent legal obstruction.

    It lasted twenty-four hours.

    By Friday morning, April 10, Bia Tosha had filed a notice of appeal against the ruling in its entirety. The notice, addressed to the Court of Appeal, stated that the company was ‘dissatisfied with the ruling and orders of the Honourable Mr. Justice Bahati Mwamuye, delivered on the 9th day of April 2026,’ and that it intended to challenge the whole of that ruling. In a tactical escalation that will unsettle the deal’s timeline, Bia Tosha also announced it was enjoining two regulatory bodies — the Capital Markets Authority and the Competition Authority of Kenya — as additional respondents in the appeal.

    Both agencies are currently processing approvals that Diageo and Asahi need to complete the transaction. By pulling them into court proceedings, Bia Tosha has raised the possibility that approvals expected between May and June 2026 could become contested on grounds that go beyond the transaction’s commercial merits.

    “The sale will render its case useless as splitting the shares and the exit of Diageo from the Kenyan market would have the effect of frustrating the realisation of any decree.” — Bia Tosha court filings

    THE MWAMUYE PARADOX

    There is a biographical irony in Justice Mwamuye being the judge who ultimately dismissed the case. Weeks earlier, it was his transfer to Kiambu High Court on February 26 — announced on the day the substantive hearing was due — that triggered the most explosive chapter of this dispute.

    Bia Tosha interpreted that transfer, and his refusal to extend interim orders on that same day, as the pivotal moment that stripped them of constitutional protection and handed the deal a green light.

    Managing Director Anne-Marie Burugu wrote directly to Chief Justice Martha Koome, deploying language that compared the alleged dynamics to the Epstein-Prince Andrew affair and accusing unnamed foreign actors of diplomatic intervention in Kenya’s judiciary.

    Yet on April 9, when the case came before the court in Milimani as originally directed, it was Justice Mwamuye himself who sat in judgment. Whatever the circumstances of his February transfer — Judiciary officials described it as routine administrative redeployment — he returned to the matter for its final hearing.

    His ruling was categorical. The court found that the issues Bia Tosha raised were contractual in nature, that the existence of a commercial dispute between private parties does not automatically justify suspension of a major corporate deal, and that appropriate legal remedies remain available to the distributor should it succeed in the underlying claim. Any other orders impeding completion were simultaneously lifted.

    The ruling was precise in its separation of two things Bia Tosha has consistently attempted to conflate: the legitimacy of the underlying distributorship dispute, which the court did not dismiss or invalidate, and the appropriateness of using that dispute as a lever to halt an upstream shareholder transaction. On that second question, Justice Mwamuye sided decisively with Diageo and EABL.

    WHAT THE APPEAL ACTUALLY CHANGES

    The filing of an appeal notice does not automatically freeze the deal. Under Kenyan procedural law, Bia Tosha would need to separately apply to the Court of Appeal for a stay of the High Court ruling and for fresh conservatory orders if it wants to halt the transaction pending the appeal.

    Given that the High Court has just declined to issue such orders after a full hearing, obtaining a stay from the appellate court will require demonstrating that the High Court made a clear error of law, or that there is a novel legal question that the Court of Appeal should consider before the deal closes.

    Bia Tosha’s strategic decision to join the CMA and the CAK as respondents in the appeal adds a new dimension.

    The implication is that these bodies, in processing and potentially granting regulatory approvals for the transaction while litigation is pending, may be enabling a process that the distributor contends should be paused.

    Whether the Court of Appeal finds merit in that framing will depend on how it characterises the relationship between regulatory review processes and pending commercial litigation — a question that Kenyan courts have not definitively answered in a transaction of this scale.

    The deal’s parties have expressed confidence that completion will occur in the second half of 2026. That timeline was built on an assumption of regulatory approvals arriving between May and June.

    If the Court of Appeal is persuaded to issue any form of stay — even a partial one targeting the regulatory bodies — that timeline shifts. KBL, in opposing the original petition, argued that Kenya’s attractiveness as an investment destination depends on the security and predictability of property rights and the ability of companies to engage in legitimate commercial transactions without what it called unwarranted judicial interference.

    That argument cuts both ways: the same predictability norm would counsel the Court of Appeal to be cautious about reopening a question that a full High Court hearing has just resolved.

    THE SH25 BILLION CLAIM AND WHY IT MATTERS

    A figure that emerged with greater clarity in the April proceedings is the quantum of Bia Tosha’s damages claim: Sh25 billion. This is distinct from the Sh38 million goodwill refund that anchors the original contractual dispute, and from the Sh39 billion contempt fine that Bia Tosha once sought at the Supreme Court.

    The Sh25 billion figure represents the company’s assessment of the total commercial loss it has suffered from the termination of its distribution routes across the 22 territories granted to it under the 2000 agreement — a decade of lost revenues, compounded by years of litigation costs and business attrition.

    This number matters for the appeal in a specific way. One of Bia Tosha’s core arguments has always been that enforcing a Sh25 billion judgment against a UK-headquartered multinational with no remaining Kenyan assets is materially different from enforcing the same judgment against one that holds a controlling stake in East Africa’s dominant brewer.

    Diageo’s general counsel, Anthony David William Smith, swore in an affidavit that the company’s $48 billion market capitalisation and continued submission to Kenyan jurisdiction made enforcement concerns illusory.

    But as Bia Tosha’s advocate Kenneth Kiplagat noted to Bloomberg in January, Diageo will have no known asset within Kenya after the sale is complete.

    Those are two legally distinct positions, and the Court of Appeal may be asked to assess which characterisation of the enforcement risk is more legally credible.

    THE REGULATORY GAMBIT: CMA AND CAK IN THE CROSSHAIRS

    The decision to join the CMA and the CAK as respondents is the most tactically aggressive element of the notice of appeal. It signals that Bia Tosha’s next legal objective is not merely to argue for a reversal of the High Court ruling on its merits — it is to insert the court into the regulatory approval process itself.

    The CMA, under the Capital Markets Act, is required to approve any change of control of a publicly listed company’s parent. EABL is listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange.

    Diageo Kenya Limited, the vehicle through which Diageo holds its 65 percent stake, will be transferring that vehicle to Asahi. The CMA’s review of this transaction is a statutory process. Similarly, the CAK reviews mergers above a prescribed threshold for competition law compliance.

    By arguing before the Court of Appeal that these approvals should not be granted — or should be conditioned on resolution of the Bia Tosha dispute — the company is attempting to weaponise the regulatory process against the deal’s closure timeline.

    Whether any Kenyan court would direct a statutory regulator to hold approvals pending resolution of a private commercial dispute is an open question.

    The argument has no direct precedent. But the Court of Appeal has, in previous high-profile cases, issued orders with sweeping practical effect on regulatory processes — and the distributorship dispute, unlike most commercial cases, carries a Supreme Court contempt finding against EABL that gives Bia Tosha a stronger than usual platform from which to argue that it is not an ordinary commercial claimant.

    “The application is collateral to the pleadings, disproportionate to any pleaded right, and seeks orders whose practical effect would bind non-parties and disrupt capital markets processes in multiple jurisdictions.” — Diageo court submission

    DIAGEO’S EXIT AND THE PRESSURE BEHIND IT

    To understand the urgency driving both sides, it is necessary to appreciate what is at stake for Diageo beyond this single transaction.

    The company’s new CEO Dave Lewis has staked his strategic credibility on a programme of asset disposals and debt reduction. EABL was one of the crown jewels of Diageo’s African portfolio, but it was also a complexity — a partly-listed, multi-jurisdiction operating group in markets that simultaneously delivered strong returns and persistent regulatory, legal, and reputational friction. The $2.354 billion Asahi deal was designed to address all of that in a single transaction.

    Diageo is navigating headwinds on multiple fronts simultaneously.

    US tariff uncertainty has rattled its North American business. Global alcohol consumption trends among younger consumers are unfavourable. Debt levels, elevated by years of acquisitions, need addressing.

    The company cannot afford protracted legal entanglement in Nairobi to delay net proceeds of approximately $2.3 billion that it has already factored into its balance sheet improvement projections. Every month of delay costs Diageo in financing charges, management bandwidth, and investor confidence.

    Asahi, for its part, has been clear-eyed about what it is buying.

    Its CEO Atsushi Katsuki, meeting EABL staff shortly after the December announcement, described the company as offering an attractive portfolio of brands, marketing capabilities, and production facilities across one of the world’s fastest-growing consumer markets.

    For Asahi, the litigation cloud is a price of entry — but an unacceptable delay to entry is a different proposition entirely.

    WHAT COMES NEXT

    The immediate procedural clock is as follows.

    Bia Tosha must file its memorandum of appeal with the Court of Appeal and, if it seeks to pause the transaction, apply separately for a stay of the High Court ruling.

    The Court of Appeal will determine whether to grant that stay on an urgent basis, balancing the distributor’s claimed irreversible prejudice against the deal parties’ commercial interests and the public interest argument that a Sh303 billion investment attracting one of Japan’s largest companies into East Africa should not be held hostage to private litigation.

    Regulatory approvals at the CMA and CAK are expected between May and June 2026.

    If the Court of Appeal grants a stay or issues any order touching the regulatory bodies before those approvals are issued, the timeline shifts materially.

    If it declines, the transaction proceeds toward completion in the second half of the year as projected, and the underlying distributorship dispute — which remains very much alive before the High Court — continues in its separate track, now with Diageo on the other side of the world.

    That is the precise outcome Bia Tosha has fought to prevent for four months and, in different forms, for ten years.

    The Supreme Court found EABL in contempt.

    The High Court confirmed EABL’s competing distributors were wrongly appointed on Bia Tosha’s protected routes. The underlying constitutional petition has not been dismissed and will proceed to full hearing.

    What Bia Tosha cannot allow — and what it is now taking to the Court of Appeal to resist — is the scenario in which all of that happens after Diageo has collected its $2.354 billion and boarded its flight out of Nairobi.

    Whether the Court of Appeal agrees that this scenario represents the kind of irreversible harm that justifies halting one of Kenya’s largest-ever corporate transactions is a question that will be answered in the coming weeks. The case that refuses to die has found its next arena.

  • THE POISON THAT WON’T GO AWAY: Why Rejected Fuel From One Petroleum May Still Be Circulating Despite Assurances

    THE POISON THAT WON’T GO AWAY: Why Rejected Fuel From One Petroleum May Still Be Circulating Despite Assurances

    When Energy and Petroleum Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi stood before the nation on Tuesday, April 7, and ordered the immediate withdrawal of 60,000 tonnes of condemned super petrol from the Kenya Pipeline Company’s storage network, his directive arrived with the gravity of a man trying to unring a bell.

    By then, according to multiple industry executives who spoke to Kenya Insights, the fuel was not waiting obediently in a tank to be recalled.

    It had already been absorbed into the veins of a national pipeline system that does not segregate cargoes, does not reserve space by importer, and does not operate with the kind of surgical precision that would allow any single consignment of tainted petrol to be extracted from a system that, by its very design, blends everything it receives.

    The question that Kenya’s energy governance apparatus refuses to formally answer — and that Wandayi and the Kenya Pipeline Company have conspicuously avoided — is whether millions of Kenyans who filled their tanks over the Easter holiday weekend were unknowingly consuming petrol laced with levels of sulphur, manganese, and benzene that the Kenya Bureau of Standards has explicitly declared unacceptable for the Kenyan market.

    THE PIPELINE DOES NOT LIE

    Understanding the catastrophic implications of One Petroleum’s assurance requires understanding how KPC’s infrastructure actually works. When a petroleum tanker docks at the Port of Mombasa and discharges its cargo, the product does not flow into a dedicated tank bearing the importer’s name. It flows directly into the national pipeline system by grade — petrol into the petrol stream, diesel into the diesel stream, and dual-purpose kerosene into its own channel. KPC’s depots at Kipevu, Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kisumu all receive product from the same undifferentiated streams.

    Three separate oil marketing company executives, speaking anonymously to avoid what one described as fear of State reprisals, confirmed to Kenya Insights and Business Daily that the moment One Petroleum’s MT Paloma discharged its 68,000-tonne cargo at Mombasa between March 27 and 29, that product was irreversibly blended with whatever was already in the national system.

    “KPC does not segregate fuel at the discharge point. The product is stored separately for each grade. One Petroleum cannot retrieve the fuel that they supplied.”

    The statement above, attributed to one of three industry executives, encapsulates what the government has been unable to publicly concede: that the withdrawal order issued by Wandayi, legally and politically sound as it may have been, is physically impossible to execute.

    Oil marketers who had already booked cargo under One Petroleum’s consignment — including Astrol Petroleum with 2.35 million litres, Aftah Petroleum with 2.065 million litres, Be Energy with 636,657 litres, and Ainushamsi Energy with 363,029 litres — had already paid their taxes to the Kenya Revenue Authority and were, in all likelihood, lifting product from a pipeline that no longer distinguished between good and bad fuel.

    THE EASTER WINDOW: WHEN OVERSIGHT WENT SILENT

    The timeline is damning precisely because of what it reveals about the window during which oversight was absent. MT Paloma docked and discharged between March 27 and 29. The Easter public holiday weekend began on April 3. The DCI arrests of Petroleum Principal Secretary Mohamed Liban, KPC Managing Director Joe Sang, and EPRA Director-General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria, though also conducted on the night of April 2, triggered immediate resignations that left the regulatory apparatus effectively headless during one of the highest fuel-demand periods in Kenya’s annual calendar.

    Business Daily, citing State fears, reported that the government ordered the exit of the consignment from the country precisely because of concerns that part of the emergency cargo had already been consumed over the Easter holiday.

    That phrasing, embedded in an official government narrative, is as close to an admission as Kenya’s political class has yet managed: the fuel may already be gone, pumped into the tanks of millions of motorists who had no way of knowing that the petrol they purchased had been flagged by a KPC quality assurance manager as non-compliant with national standards.

    The KPC quality assurance manager at the centre of the scandal reportedly halted distribution upon testing the consignment and escalated the matter through internal channels.

    Yet the internal disagreement that followed — over whether the product should be released into the market before a full investigation could be conducted — suggests that pressure was applied to release the fuel anyway. The question of who applied that pressure, and why, is at the heart of the DCI’s criminal investigation.

    A WAIVER THAT OPENED THE GATE

    The bureaucratic infrastructure that allowed substandard fuel to enter Kenya’s system at all was constructed through an extraordinary set of regulatory waivers that bypassed the very safeguards designed to protect consumers.

    On March 26, 2026, then-PS Mohamed Liban wrote to Kenya Bureau of Standards Managing Director Esther Ngari, seeking a temporary waiver on standard pre-export verification procedures.

    His rationale was the disruption caused by the US-Iran conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which had trapped 85,000 tonnes of Gulf Energy petrol at the Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai.

    The letter Liban wrote to Ngari acknowledged that ship-to-ship transfer methods, which the emergency importers were using, meant that cargo originally destined for other markets — markets with different, often lower, quality standards — might not have received the standard certificate of conformity issued by KEBS-authorised agents at the load port. In plain language: Kenya was asking its standards regulator to allow in fuel that had been tested for another country’s requirements, not Kenya’s.

    What followed was even more remarkable. A letter dated March 28, signed by Trade and Investment Cabinet Secretary Lee Kinyanjui and addressed to Energy CS Wandayi, granted a waiver on the petroleum products on the grounds that they contained high levels of manganese, sulphur, and benzene. Kinyanjui listed six conditions for the waiver. The fuel came in anyway.

    The conditions, whatever they were, were not sufficient to prevent a cargo that the nation’s own standards body acknowledged was non-compliant from flowing into the KPC system.

    “Waiver is hereby granted on the petroleum that has high levels of manganese, sulphur and benzene.” — Trade CS Lee Kinyanjui, leaked letter dated March 28, 2026

    THE JAFFER NETWORK: WHO STANDS BEHIND ONE PETROLEUM

    One Petroleum Limited is not a company that emerged from nowhere to win a Sh11.8 billion emergency fuel contract. Corporate registry documents reveal a firm whose shareholder structure includes Mohamed Jaffer, Mujtaba Jaffer, Ali Abbas Jaffer, and Mohamed Husein Jaffer — members of a prominent Mombasa business dynasty with long roots in the coastal petroleum trade.

    The presence of Mbaraki Holdings Limited, a Mauritius-registered entity holding 41,098 ordinary shares, introduces an offshore financial dimension that investigators note is commonly used to obscure beneficial ownership and move value across jurisdictions beyond the reach of Kenya’s financial monitoring systems.

    Preliminary DCI findings have reportedly indicated that the fuel itself originated with Saudi Aramco before being sold to a separate international intermediary and then redirected through One Petroleum to Kenya.

    This chain of custody — from a legitimate sovereign supplier, through an offshore resale mechanism, into an emergency procurement corridor that bypassed normal verification — is the architecture investigators say may constitute criminal economic sabotage.

    The DCI has confirmed it is liaising with investigative agencies in other countries under Mutual Legal Assistance frameworks to trace the full provenance of the cargo.

    Searches of suspects’ homes during the April 2 DCI raids reportedly recovered close to Sh500 million in cash and assets, according to sources cited by Kenya Today, believed by investigators to potentially represent proceeds from the petroleum transactions under scrutiny.

    No charges have been formally filed, and all five detained officials — Liban, Sang, Kiptoo, Deputy Director of Petroleum Joseph Wafula, and KPC Supply and Logistics Manager Joel Mburu — were released on Sh100,000 police cash bail each pending court appearance.

    THE DATA WAS FALSIFIED: A MANUFACTURED CRISIS

    The scandal takes on an even more sinister dimension when the origins of the emergency procurement are examined.

    According to a statement from the Chief of Staff and Head of Public Service Felix Koskei, primary duty bearers in the petroleum supply chain are alleged to have manipulated data on in-country fuel stocks, deliberately creating a false impression of an impending supply shortfall.

    That falsified data was then used to trigger the NSCC directive that instructed Liban to seek alternative fuel sources.

    The NSCC meeting that approved the emergency importation on March 9 was copied to an extraordinary roster of the country’s top security chiefs: National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji, Chief of Defence Forces Charles Kahariri, Inspector-General of Police Douglas Kanja, and three principal secretaries.

    The political cover was immaculate.

    If the data on which that NSCC recommendation was based had been manipulated, then the entire emergency procurement chain — from the NSCC directive, through Liban’s letters, through Kinyanjui’s waiver, to One Petroleum’s discharge at Mombasa — was built on a manufactured crisis.

    Before Uganda could serve as a regional buffer, Kenya had reportedly approached Kampala requesting to borrow fuel stocks as a stop-gap. Uganda rejected the request, partly because Ugandan petrol stations had already raised pump prices over fears of regional shortages linked to the Middle East conflict.

    Kenya then pivoted to the emergency import contracts awarded to One Petroleum and Oryx Energies.

    That Uganda, which depends on Kenya’s pipeline infrastructure for its own fuel supplies, was also drawn into the regional disruption illustrates how a domestic manipulation of stock data can have cascading cross-border consequences.

    THE PIPELINE’S SEVEN LABORATORIES AND THE ALLEGATION OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPTURE

    KPC operates seven ISO-accredited laboratories across its depot network. Under normal circumstances, those laboratories represent an insurmountable quality firewall between suspect fuel and Kenyan consumers.

    The problem, as described by insiders to Nation Media Group’s investigative team, is that those laboratories are only as independent as the officials who manage the institutions around them.

    If the regulator and the pipeline company are in institutional alignment — which the alleged collusion of Kiptoo and Sang would suggest — then quality certificates can cease to be a defence and instead become what one source called a mask for the fraud.

    The DCI is specifically investigating how the consignment passed through KPC’s quality assurance framework. A KPC quality assurance manager reportedly flagged concerns, halted distribution, and escalated the issue.

    But the internal disagreement that followed suggests that someone above that manager pushed for distribution regardless. Who gave that instruction, and at whose behest, remains the centrepiece of the criminal probe.

    FUEL RATIONING, ENGINE DAMAGE FEARS, AND THE KTA WARNING

    Even as the government maintained that fuel supply was stable, reality unravelled conspicuously at the pump. The Kenya Transporters Association formally wrote to EPRA, the Ministry of Energy, KPC, and all oil marketing companies on April 8, warning of paralysing fuel shortages along key logistics corridors.

    Transporters reported being turned away at fuel stations, forced to buy in small quantities across multiple stops, and experiencing a complete withdrawal of credit facilities by oil marketing companies. The KTA letter described the situation as making it nearly impossible to sustain long-haul operations.

    Motorists had already been raising alarm about fuel quality even before the scandal broke publicly, with reports of engine damage linked to contaminated petroleum products circulating in the weeks before the DCI arrests.

    Martin Chomba, chair of the Petroleum Outlets Association of Kenya, noted in an April 7 interview that some shipments may contain higher sulphur content than Kenya’s preferred standards, acknowledging that while technically usable, such fuel raises compliance questions and could affect vehicle performance.

    The National Assembly’s Energy Committee summoned Wandayi to appear before it on April 9, alongside KPC and EPRA, to explain both the substandard fuel and the worsening shortage.

    “Every motorist, every hawker, every schoolchild breathing roadside air in Nairobi is an unwitting participant.” — Kenya Insights, April 2026

    THE KPC IPO FALLOUT: SH106 BILLION AT RISK

    The scandal lands at the worst possible moment for President William Ruto’s flagship privatisation programme. The KPC initial public offering, completed in March 2026, was celebrated as a landmark success — 105 percent oversubscribed, with 70,000 ordinary Kenyans purchasing shares at Sh9 each.

    Yet as Nation Africa’s analysis revealed, non-EAC foreign investors took only 0.02 percent of the shares on offer, a detail that in retrospect suggests international institutional money may have priced in governance risks that domestic retail investors were not informed about.

    If those who ran KPC at the time of the IPO — including Joe Sang, who has now resigned in disgrace — are proven to have been complicit in a scheme to flood Kenya’s national fuel supply chain with substandard, adulterated product, then every investor who purchased KPC shares on the basis of governance disclosures made during the IPO roadshow faces a question that should alarm any regulatory authority: were material facts withheld?

    The Sh106 billion valuation of KPC now rests on the credibility of an institution whose former management is under criminal investigation for allegedly poisoning the very product it was tasked with delivering.

    WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT SAY

    The official position, as articulated by Wandayi, is that the fuel did not enter the Kenyan market because One Petroleum confirmed it had taken steps to ensure the cargo from MT Paloma does not enter the Kenyan market.

    One Petroleum’s statement, published after consultations with the government, maintained that the petroleum cargo brought in via MT Paloma would not enter the market.

    What neither statement addresses is what happened between March 27, when MT Paloma discharged, and the date those commitments were made. KPC’s own structural reality, confirmed by three anonymous industry executives, is that a discharged cargo of petrol cannot be isolated once it enters the pipeline.

    The physics of petroleum infrastructure are not subject to ministerial directives. The fuel mixed the moment it was discharged. The assurance that it will not enter the market is, at best, a commitment about future conduct.

    It says nothing about what has already flowed out of Mombasa’s Kipevu depot and through the pipeline to Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kisumu, where oil marketers were already lifting volumes and paying KRA taxes on cargo they had booked before Wandayi issued his instruction.

    Kenya Insights has established that Wandayi and KPC remained tight-lipped on the full fate of the fuel even as the Business Daily reported industry fears that part of the consignment could have already flowed to motorists’ tanks.

    In a country where motor vehicle penetration continues to rise and where the informal transport sector runs almost entirely on petrol and diesel, a silent contamination of the national fuel supply is not a technical inconvenience.

    It is a public health event.

    The government’s silence on exactly how much of the One Petroleum cargo was already distributed before the withdrawal order was issued is not just a communications failure. It is an accountability failure of the highest order.

    CONCLUSION: THE BELL CANNOT BE UNRUNG

    One Petroleum’s public statement of compliance with Wandayi’s withdrawal directive achieved exactly what it was designed to achieve: it shifted public attention from the irreversible to the procedural.

    By issuing a statement of compliance, the company converted a question about what had already happened into a question about what it would do next. The government, desperate for a political resolution ahead of the April 14 EPRA price review cycle — when pump prices are expected to rise by as much as Sh53 per litre — accepted that framing.

    But the pipeline industry’s physical reality does not accommodate political framing. The Kenya Pipeline Company is a flow system. It does not hold cargo in named containers.

    It does not reserve capacity per importer.

    It does not have a mechanism to reverse the discharge of 68,000 tonnes of substandard petrol once that petrol has been blended with the national supply stream.

    Three industry executives said so, on the record within their anonymity, to Kenya Insights and Business Daily. The DCI knows it. The oil marketing companies know it. The motorists who filled their tanks over Easter weekend did not know it — and they were given no opportunity to find out.

    The most important question in this scandal is not whether One Petroleum complied with the withdrawal order.

    It is whether any Kenyan filling a tank at a petrol station between March 27 and the date of that order was protected by the regulatory system that their taxes fund.

    The answer, based on everything Kenya Insights has established, is that they were not. And the government, as of this writing, has offered them nothing except silence.

  • The Teflon Company: How Gulf Energy’s Insiders Built Billions on Kenya’s Fuel, and Walked Away Clean

    The Teflon Company: How Gulf Energy’s Insiders Built Billions on Kenya’s Fuel, and Walked Away Clean

    In the final days of March 2026, as Kenyans crowded Easter forecourts across the country, the Republic of Kenya stood eleven days from running dry. Not because of a global supply catastrophe, not because the world’s oil wells had seized, but because a single company — handpicked by the government, awarded the most lucrative fuel import mandate in the country’s history, and shielded by ownership structures deliberately routed through Mauritius — had failed to deliver what it was contracted to deliver. That company was Gulf Energy Limited. And its principals, having already cashed out billions from a French buyout, were nowhere near the docks when the crisis erupted.

    Four senior government officials were arrested on April 2, 2026. The Petroleum Principal Secretary, Mohamed Liban. The Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority Director-General, Daniel Kiptoo. The Kenya Pipeline Company Managing Director, Joe Sang. And the KPC Deputy Director for Petroleum, Joseph Wafula. All four have since resigned. None are named Gulf Energy. Yet Gulf Energy controls over 80 percent of Kenya’s petrol imports under the government-to-government arrangement — the largest single allocation awarded to any oil marketing company in the country. The question that Kenya’s investigators, politicians, and long-suffering motorists must now demand an answer to is simple: when the contracted company fails, fabricated shortage or not, who authorised the emergency exit, who profited from it, and why has no one touched the company that made all of this possible?

    THE ARCHITECTURE OF DOMINANCE

    Gulf Energy did not become the most powerful oil company in Kenya by accident. Its rise is a story of patient relationship-building, regulatory capture, and political access spanning more than two decades — a story whose protagonists built personal fortunes measured in billions of shillings before the company changed hands, and whose successors continue to operate the machinery from inside its boardrooms today.

    The company was founded in 2005 as a Nairobi-based special purpose vehicle for bulk oil supplies, initially serving commercial and institutional clients. It expanded methodically across East and Central Africa — Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, South Africa — accumulating fuel storage infrastructure in both Mombasa and Nairobi. By the time the original shareholder group began engineering their exit, Gulf Energy had become what industry insiders described as a company whose footprint exceeded its market share: a business with outsized influence over Kenya’s petroleum supply chain.

    The original ownership structure has been extensively documented in records from the Business Registration Service. Suleiman Said Shahbal, the Mombasa investment banker and politician who would later serve as an East African Legislative Assembly Member of Parliament, held a 25 percent stake through his wholly-owned vehicle, Monte Carlo Investments Limited. Francis Koome Njogu, the Meru businessman and hotelier who served as Managing Director, held 20 percent directly. Duncan King’ori Mukira held 12.5 percent. Paul Kiprotich Limoh — who today serves as Gulf Energy’s CEO and its public face before Senate committees — held a matching 12.5 percent stake.

    The remaining 25 percent stake was held through a company called Nama Kenya Limited, a United Kingdom-registered entity with a minority Kenyan director in Ahmed Said Bajaber, who also sits on the board of Gulf African Bank. The beneficial ownership of Nama Kenya Limited beyond Bajaber’s disclosed minority stake has never been definitively established in public records — a structural opacity that, as events in 2026 demonstrate, is far from incidental.

    Mauritius is not a coincidence. It is a decision. When the majority shareholder of Kenya’s most powerful fuel importer sits in an offshore jurisdiction beyond the reach of Kenya’s disclosure laws, that is a governance failure the government chose to live with.

    THE RUBIS WINDFALL AND THE OPAQUE RESTRUCTURING

    In November 2019, French multinational Rubis Energie — which had already acquired KenolKobil in a Sh36 billion transaction in March of that year — announced it had signed a share purchase agreement for the acquisition of Gulf Energy Holdings Limited. The deal was completed in December 2019, giving Rubis a combined market share exceeding 21 percent and making it Kenya’s largest petroleum retailer overnight. The Competition Authority of Kenya approved the transaction; the Energy Regulatory Commission gave its blessing; the machinery of the state nodded through the consolidation of an already dominant player into an even more dominant foreign-owned conglomerate.

    For the original Gulf Energy shareholders, the Rubis deal was transformative. Suleiman Shahbal is estimated to have earned approximately Sh2.4 billion from the transaction — the largest single payout of any named shareholder, commensurate with his 25 percent stake through Monte Carlo Investments. Francis Koome Njogu is estimated to have received approximately Sh1.9 billion for his 20 percent holding. Duncan Mukira and Paul Kiprotich Limoh each received an estimated Sh1.2 billion for their matching 12.5 percent stakes. The total value extracted by the four named Kenyan principals exceeded Sh6.7 billion — and that is before accounting for the Nama Kenya Limited stake and the Mauritius-based Auron Energy holding that, depending on the transaction structure, may represent an additional layer of beneficial wealth that has never been publicly disclosed.

    Shahbal payout (est.): Sh2.4 billion

    Njogu payout (est.): Sh1.9 billion

    Mukira payout (est.): Sh1.2 billion

    Limoh payout (est.): Sh1.2 billion

    Combined named Kenyan principals: Sh6.7 billion+

    What happened after Rubis took control is where the story becomes significantly more complex. The Competition Authority of Kenya’s records show a separate transaction: the proposed acquisition of 80 percent of the issued share capital of Gulf Energy Limited — a distinct operating entity from the holdings company — by Auron Energy Limited, registered in Mauritius. This Auron Energy is not the same Auron Energy E&P Limited that Gulf later used to acquire Tullow Oil’s Kenya assets in 2025. The structures have multiplied, the Mauritius connections have deepened, and the beneficial ownership of the largest single bloc of Gulf Energy’s operating entity remains, in 2026, a matter the company has been permitted to leave unresolved.

    In September 2025, Gulf Energy’s affiliate Auron Energy E&P Limited completed the acquisition of Tullow Oil’s entire Kenyan working interests — the Lokichar oil fields — for a minimum consideration of US$120 million. The deal was advised by Dentons Hamilton Harrison and Mathews. It was hailed as a landmark transaction, proof of Gulf Energy’s strategic evolution from a downstream fuel distributor into an upstream exploration player. What it also represented was a dramatic expansion of Gulf Energy’s footprint across Kenya’s entire petroleum value chain — from the wellhead in Turkana to the pump in Nairobi — at precisely the moment when the government’s G2G arrangement was making it the indispensable gatekeeper of Kenya’s fuel supply.

    THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT: A MONOPOLY BY DESIGN

    The government-to-government petroleum import framework was established in 2023, following the severe fuel shortages of 2022 that produced long queues at filling stations and a foreign exchange crisis that threatened to paralyse the economy. The framework was designed to stabilise supply by removing the volatility of open-market procurement, replacing it with sovereign-backed agreements with Gulf state oil majors: Saudi Aramco, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, and the Emirates National Oil Company. Payment in Kenyan shillings, with a 180-day credit facility, was supposed to ease pressure on the dollar.

    Three local oil marketing companies were nominated to handle the imports: Gulf Energy, Galana Oil Kenya, and Oryx Energies. The selection criteria — centred on liquidity thresholds that only the largest players could meet — was described by the IMF and the National Treasury as a structural distortion of market competition. The framework, critics noted from its inception, concentrated procurement power among a handful of politically connected firms and gave five major Kenyan banks outsized influence over dollar allocation. It was, in short, not merely a logistics arrangement but an economic chokepoint — and Gulf Energy held the most lucrative position within it.

    Under the G2G framework, Gulf Energy was contracted to import between 170,000 and 200,000 metric tons of diesel monthly — the largest single allocation awarded to any nominated oil marketing company. Its dominance extended to petrol: Gulf Energy handles more than 80 percent of Kenya’s petrol imports under the arrangement. By 2023, Gulf Energy’s CEO Paul Kiprotich Limoh was appearing before Senate committees to confirm that the company had remitted US$686 million in fuel payments — a figure that speaks not merely to the scale of the G2G business but to the extraordinary concentration of national risk in a single, Mauritius-shadowed corporate entity.

    Gulf Energy was not just an oil company. Under the G2G framework, it was the load-bearing wall of Kenya’s fuel supply. When it failed, the entire structure cracked.

    THE EASTER CRISIS: HOW GULF ENERGY FAILED KENYA

    The crisis of March 2026 was not sudden. It was bureaucratic, documented, and — crucially — known to every senior official in Kenya’s energy architecture weeks before Kenyans noticed anything at all. Gulf Energy was under cargo code KG05/2026, contracted to deliver 85,000 metric tons of petrol. The vessel designated for the cargo, MT Elka Apollon, had loaded fuel at Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates. It never sailed. The Strait of Hormuz had been effectively closed following the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, and the tanker sat at anchor while Kenya’s stocks declined.

    Gulf Energy admitted the problem on March 18, 2026, during an emergency crisis meeting with the technical committee of the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. Their proposed solution was a partial fix: two smaller vessels delivering a combined 76,000 metric tons — a shortfall of 9,000 tons against the contracted quantity, in a week when Easter demand was projected to spike 20 percent. The ministry’s own internal projections, contained in a leaked document reviewed by The Standard, concluded that national petrol stocks as of March 19 would sustain only 11 days of normal consumption. A demand surge would reduce that to seven days. The country would run dry by April 2.

    The National Security Council Committee, chaired by the President, was convened. Emergency powers were granted to the Ministry of Energy to bypass the G2G framework. On March 25, the government awarded emergency contracts to One Petroleum Services and Oryx Energies — neither of them Gulf Energy — to deliver fuel at a rate of $290 per metric ton, against the $84 per metric ton G2G rate. The premium was not a negotiating failure. It was the arithmetic of desperation, and Kenyans would pay for it at the pump: a surcharge of Sh17.49 per litre attributable to the emergency procurement.

    Gulf Energy, to compound the crisis it had triggered, kept attempting to recover the situation with proposals that arrived too late and at specifications below Kenyan legal standards. On March 21, three days after admitting failure, the company proposed a 37,000-ton cargo from Saudi Aramco to be carried by MT NCC Najeem, with a projected delivery date of April 8 to 10 — a week after Kenya would have run out of fuel. When the cargo documentation was reviewed, ministry officials confirmed in a letter dated March 25 that the petrol in question had an octane rating of RON 91 against Kenya’s mandatory minimum of RON 93, contained elevated sulphur levels, and included manganese — a metallic additive banned under Kenyan petroleum regulations. The ministry nonetheless granted a quality exemption, characterising it as a matter of national security of supply.

    Gulf Energy did not bid for the emergency tender issued on March 18. While Hass Petroleum, Oryx Energies, E3 Energies, and One Petroleum submitted competitive offers, Gulf — the company that had created the emergency — was absent from the process entirely.

    THE MV PALOMA AND THE MANUFACTURED SHORTAGE

    It is the events surrounding the MV Paloma that have drawn criminal investigators most acutely and most dangerously close to a network of actors that extends well beyond the four officials already arrested. The DCI’s public statements confirm that the vessel docked at Mombasa between March 27 and March 29, 2026. Preliminary findings indicate that the cargo originated from Saudi Aramco before being sold to a separate international firm and redirected through a local Kenyan importer. The vessel was, according to investigators, originally destined for Angola — a routing that, if confirmed, would establish that the fuel was deliberately diverted to Mombasa through intermediaries at a moment of manufactured vulnerability.

    KPC’s quality assurance manager tested the cargo and rejected it for excess sulphur content. Officials then allegedly attempted to offload the fuel regardless, triggering the DCI raids of April 2. The preliminary overpricing estimate stands at Sh4 billion. If a second anticipated shipment under similar arrangements is confirmed, the figure rises to Sh8 billion.

    Presidential spokesperson Felix Koskei confirmed that primary duty bearers within the petroleum supply chain may have manipulated data on in-country fuel stocks to exploit rising global oil prices and heightened public anxiety — the precise conditions that Gulf Energy’s contractual failure had created. The government’s statement to the nation was direct: the emergency shipment was procured in blatant breach of the G2G framework, at a price significantly above contracted rates, in complete disregard of established emergency procurement procedures, and was of substandard quality. The DCI has confirmed it is tracing bank accounts of companies in the petroleum trade for kickbacks, and has stated that a wider network beyond the arrested officials is under active investigation.

    Gulf Energy created the emergency. The emergency created the pretext. The pretext created the profit. And the profit, preliminary estimates suggest, was Sh4 billion — potentially Sh8 billion if the second shipment is confirmed.

    THE POLITICAL IMPUNITY AND THE WANDAYI QUESTION

    Energy Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi was copied on every warning. The ministry letter of March 17 from Petroleum PS Mohamed Liban to Gulf Energy’s CEO Paul Limoh, requesting an update on the missing PMS cargo, was a ministry communication — which means its contents were available to the CS. By March 18, the technical committee had already classified the situation as dire. By March 19, the stock projections showing an April 2 stockout date were circulating at the ministry level. And by March 25, Wandayi’s ministry was granting quality waivers to below-specification fuel from a company that had already failed its primary obligation.

    Wandayi did not speak publicly about the crisis until after the arrests. When he finally issued a statement, it was framed as a declaration of decisive action — the ministry had stopped the second cargo, he said, to protect the public interest. He accused a section of political leaders of spreading disinformation. He warned cartels against exploiting uncertainty. He did not address why Gulf Energy, which had triggered the crisis, received neither a financial penalty, nor a public censure, nor a suspension from the next import cycle. He did not address whether he or his office had approved the quality exemption for the RON 91 cargo. He has not been arrested. He has not been summoned. He continues to serve.

    The silence of politically powerful actors in the face of documented institutional failure is not new in Kenya. But the scale of the benefit asymmetry in this case is stark. Four career civil servants have been arrested, resigned, and subjected to criminal investigation. The company that created the preconditions for the entire scandal — by failing to deliver a contracted cargo it had accepted sovereign-backed payment terms to supply — has faced no consequences. Gulf Energy remains a nominated oil marketer for the next import cycle.

    THE DEEPER NETWORK: GULF POWER, GALLANT, AND THE MAURITIUS WEB

    The governance questions surrounding Gulf Energy are not confined to the petroleum import arrangement. The company’s directors and former shareholders sit at the centre of a web of energy interests that extends into power generation, real estate, and banking — all of them touching, in various configurations, publicly funded revenue streams.

    Gulf Power Limited, a thermal electricity generation company with an installed capacity of 80.32 megawatts, holds a Power Purchase Agreement with Kenya Power under which it received Sh3.569 billion in the financial year ended June 2022 — at an average rate of Sh44.07 per unit, more than four times the national average generation cost. The company’s majority shareholder is Gallant Power Limited, registered in Mauritius, which controls 80 percent of Gulf Power. The remaining 20 percent is split between the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme and Noora Power Limited — in which both Suleiman Shahbal and Francis Koome Njogu hold 50 percent stakes respectively. A Senate committee examining the Gulf Power arrangement in 2023 directly asked whether former officials — including former Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi and former permanent secretaries — held beneficial interests in the Mauritius entity. The managing director denied this but declined to produce a list of Gallant Power’s actual beneficial owners.

    Shahbal’s GulfCap Group, operating across finance, real estate, energy, and hospitality, has continued to expand its footprint under his EALA parliamentary platform. His Gulf African Bank, Kenya’s first fully Shariah-compliant financial institution, ranks among the country’s top 15 banks by assets. His GulfCap Real Estate is developing properties in Nairobi and a Sh120 billion lakeside project in Kisumu in partnership with a politically connected family. For a man who cashed out Sh2.4 billion from Gulf Energy in 2019, the subsequent years have represented not an exit from the energy sector but a lateral migration into its regulatory and political architecture.

    THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT

    President William Ruto, addressing the scandal, declared zero tolerance for cartels in the oil sector. He described the scheme as an attempt to exploit rising global prices and public anxiety. His language was unsparing. But the architecture of the arrangement he was denouncing — the G2G framework itself, with its concentration of procurement power, its Mauritius-resident beneficial owners, and its explicit exclusion of competitive market forces — was one his government had inherited, extended to 2027/28, and continued to rely upon even as the criminal investigation unfolded.

    Kiharu MP Ndindi Nyoro offered a different reading. The arrests, he suggested publicly, had less to do with protecting Kenyans than with settling scores between small players who had eaten what belonged to bigger ones. It was a remark that attracted predictable criticism but also — in Kenya’s political ecology — a knowing nod from those familiar with how petroleum sector disputes typically resolve. The DCI’s stated commitment to following bank accounts wherever they lead has been noted. Whether that commitment survives the gravitational pull of the interests involved remains the defining question of the investigation.

    The IMF and the National Treasury had already concluded, in assessments predating the scandal, that the G2G framework distorted market competition, concentrated procurement among liquidity-tested oligarchs, and gave major commercial banks disproportionate influence over foreign exchange allocation. The framework was always, in other words, a design choice — one that created systemic vulnerabilities while enriching a narrow group of connected actors. The Easter 2026 crisis was not an anomaly. It was the inevitable consequence of building critical national infrastructure on a foundation of deliberately opaque beneficial ownership and structurally asymmetric accountability.

    Gulf Energy failed. Officials cooked the books to paper over it. Competitors were rushed in at three times the price. Kenyans paid Sh17.49 extra per litre. Four civil servants have been arrested. The company that started it all is planning its next import cycle.

    WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY LOOKS LIKE

    Kenya Insights has confirmed that the DCI’s investigation is being conducted in collaboration with international partners under the Mutual Legal Assistance framework. Bank accounts across the petroleum trade are being traced. Executives from Oryx Energies have been summoned. The investigation has been described as extending well beyond the four officials already in custody. Whether that extension reaches Gulf Energy’s current corporate structure, its Mauritius-resident beneficial owners, or the political network that awarded and maintained the G2G arrangement is the measure by which this investigation will ultimately be judged.

    What the evidence establishes, independent of criminal verdicts not yet delivered, is this. A company with opaque beneficial ownership, operating under a government-mandated monopoly over the most sensitive commodity in Kenya’s economy, failed a critical contractual obligation at the worst possible moment. That failure created the conditions for an emergency procurement that cost Kenyans billions. The officials who managed that emergency in breach of legal procurement frameworks are facing criminal charges. The company whose failure triggered the emergency is continuing to operate. And the Cabinet Secretary who was copied on every document, who authorised the quality exemption, and who has not spoken about Gulf Energy’s accountability, remains in office.

    Paul Kiprotich Limoh, Gulf Energy’s CEO, has confirmed publicly to Senate committees that the company remitted $686 million in a single year under the G2G arrangement. He was once a shareholder who received an estimated Sh1.2 billion from the Rubis buyout. He is now the operational face of a company whose majority beneficial ownership sits, deliberately, beyond the reach of Kenya’s corporate disclosure requirements. The question of what he knew, when he knew it, and what obligation his company bears for the consequences of its contractual failure is one the DCI says remains very much under investigation.

    Kenya has been here before. Oil, contracts, Mauritius, anonymous beneficial owners, emergencies that create windfall profits, and officials who take the fall while the companies that profit walk away clean. The fuel in the pumps is different this time. The structure of impunity is identical.

  • Inside Details Of Sh78 Billion Fraud in KPC’s Mombasa-Nairobi Line 5 Pipeline Project That Has Continued To Bleed The Country

    Inside Details Of Sh78 Billion Fraud in KPC’s Mombasa-Nairobi Line 5 Pipeline Project That Has Continued To Bleed The Country

    The pipeline was supposed to be a triumph. Stretching 450 kilometres from the port of Mombasa to Nairobi, the new 20-inch multi-product conduit was Kenya’s most ambitious petroleum infrastructure project since independence, a Vision 2030 centrepiece awarded in July 2014 to Lebanese construction firm Zakhem International Construction Limited for a contract valued at approximately USD 484.5 million. It was commissioned in 2018. It was handed over. It was celebrated. And then, almost immediately, it became something else entirely: the locus of a financial extraction scheme so elaborate, so sustained, and so damaging to the Kenyan public that independent analysts now place the total documented exposure to taxpayers at over KSh 78 billion and still rising.

    That figure is not a projection or an estimate conjured for effect. It is derived from audited financial statements, High Court filings, Auditor-General reports, and the records of at least sixteen interconnected civil suits that have wound through the Milimani Commercial Court since 2018, engaging five different judges, triggering four recusal applications, and attracting a Directorate of Criminal Investigations inquiry into whether a sitting High Court judge was improperly approached to tilt the outcome. What began as a procurement dispute has metastasised into a matrix of garnishee orders, Mareva injunctions, consent judgments, and counter-applications that have effectively turned Kenya’s judiciary into an instrument of financial extraction from a state corporation.

    Activist and politician Morara Kebaso brought the matter back into public focus in early April 2026, when a video he originally posted in September 2024 resurfaced on social media.

    In the nearly 35-minute recording, Kebaso presents bank transfer documents, Auditor-General excerpts, and High Court filings, alleging what he describes as dirty dealings involving excessive post-completion payments, opaque variations, and the routing of public funds through prominent advocates. The video, amplified by the Nyakundi Report account on X, has reignited demands for a parliamentary probe and a full forensic audit. KPC has not issued a direct public response to the resurfaced claims.

    But Kebaso’s intervention, however pointed, tells only the surface layer of a story that is far darker and far more structurally dangerous than any single video can convey. Kenya Insights has reviewed court records, financial statements, and legal filings spanning twelve years to assemble the most comprehensive account yet of how Kenyan public infrastructure funds were pledged to a foreign bank through instruments that KPC’s own leadership appeared not to understand, and how a Lebanese construction dynasty then used that pledge as the foundation for a decade of litigation that has bled the corporation of billions while shielding the original wrongdoing from prosecutorial scrutiny.

    THE DEBENTURE THAT PRECEDED EVERYTHING

    The architecture of the scheme was assembled eight years before the pipeline contract was signed. In February 2006, a Lebanese construction company registered in Nigeria as Zakhem Construction Nigeria Limited executed a Deed of Debenture with Ecobank Nigeria PLC in Lagos. The instrument pledged all of Zakhem’s present and future assets globally, including future receivables, as security for financial facilities that Ecobank might extend. To most observers, such instruments are routine commercial arrangements. In this case, the debenture was a loaded mechanism that would lie dormant for nearly a decade before being activated with devastating consequences for the Kenyan public.

    In July 2014, KPC awarded the Mombasa-Nairobi Line 5 pipeline contract to Zakhem International Construction Limited, the Cypriot-registered arm of the Zakhem group, for approximately KSh 49.5 billion at prevailing exchange rates. Within months of that award, Zakhem secured a financing facility estimated at USD 300 million from Ecobank Nigeria, using the KPC contract proceeds as collateral. The instrument activating that pledge was a set of domiciliation letters, dated October 2014, in which Zakhem gave what court filings describe as unconditional and irrevocable instructions directing KPC to channel 70 percent of all contract payments into Zakhem’s account at Ecobank Nigeria, with the remaining 30 percent routed to Ecobank Kenya.

    KPC confirmed receipt of those Domiciliation Letters on 13 October 2014, placing its dated stamp upon them. What the corporation did not disclose, and what would become the central controversy of litigation that continues to this day, is that by stamping those letters, KPC had effectively bound itself as a party to a three-way financial obligation involving a Nigerian bank, a Cypriot holding company, and a Nigerian construction entity, all connected by an eight-year-old debenture that predated the KPC contract entirely. Ecobank had engineered itself a senior claim over contract proceeds that ranked, in practical terms, ahead of anything KPC’s own legal advisers had contemplated. None of this was disclosed in KPC’s annual reports for years, even after the corporation had been named as a defendant in a lawsuit demanding over USD 52 million.

    The financing consortium that KPC’s own documentation acknowledges included CFC Stanbic, Citibank Kenya, Co-operative Bank, Rand Merchant Bank, and Standard Chartered. Ecobank was not among them. Yet by virtue of the domiciliation letters, Ecobank’s claim to contract proceeds was arguably superior to any arrangement KPC had formally sanctioned. Legal experts have since argued that by accepting those letters, KPC created a binding financial obligation to a foreign bank without parliamentary approval or Treasury oversight, in potential violation of the Public Finance Management Act.

    THE BALLOON THAT NEVER STOPPED INFLATING

    The contract itself was a source of controversy from the outset. Zakhem International Construction Cyprus had submitted two different bid figures during the procurement process, USD 591 million and USD 485 million, a discrepancy that competitors alleged was irregular. KPC awarded the contract at the lower figure. Construction commenced shortly after signing, with project completion and handover to KPC occurring in July 2018 following a commissioning process. But the price had already moved well beyond the original contract value through a sequence of variation orders and extensions of time that KPC’s Auditor-General-reviewed accounts would later acknowledge as design changes and omitted works.

    By the financial year ending June 2019, official records showed total expenditure on the Line 5 project reaching KSh 51.4 billion, a material increase from the original contract sum. The Auditor-General’s reports for successive years flagged billions in additional disbursements to the contractor, including a red-flagged payment of KSh 2.8 billion in a single financial year. KPC’s own 2018 financial statements contained a startling admission: that until matters related to contract variations and extensions of time were resolved, it was not possible to confirm that the carrying value of the pipeline as stated in the accounts was true and fair. That was not a footnote. That was an auditor’s signal that the numbers could not be vouched for.

    The variation dispute had by then been transplanted from the boardroom into the courts. A partial decree of USD 44 million was awarded against KPC by Justice Grace Nzioka in June 2020, covering unpaid sums that both parties had been negotiating to resolve but which the intervention of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations in July 2019, which ordered KPC to suspend all payments to Zakhem pending its own inquiry, had transformed into a court battle. The DCI’s intervention, whatever its merits, produced an outcome that would prove financially catastrophic. The delay in paying the agreed amount triggered contractual interest charges of approximately 6 percent per annum. By independent calculations, those avoidable penalties cost Kenyan taxpayers upwards of KSh 3 billion.

    THE LAWSUIT THAT BLED THE NATION

    In 2018, Ecobank Nigeria Limited and its Kenyan subsidiary filed Civil Suit 292 of 2018 at the Commercial and Tax Division of the High Court of Kenya, naming KPC as the fifth respondent. The bank’s case rested on those domiciliation letters from 2014. Its position was that Zakhem had colluded with KPC to divert contract proceeds to Stanbic Bank rather than through the Ecobank accounts as instructed, causing Ecobank to suffer a loss of USD 52.3 million, the outstanding balance of the USD 206 million it claims to have advanced for the project. KPC, which had not borrowed directly from Ecobank and had not been a party to the 2006 debenture, found itself defending a claim arising purely from its own acceptance of those domiciliation letters.

    The corporation reportedly spent at least KSh 90 million in legal fees in a single year defending the suit. High Court Judge Mary Kasango issued permanent orders in November 2018 barring KPC from paying contract proceeds to any party other than Ecobank Nigeria and Ecobank Kenya, effectively freezing KPC’s ability to settle its acknowledged debts to Zakhem while simultaneously exposing it to interest penalties for non-payment. The bind was structurally inescapable. By the time a final decree in the Ecobank matter was issued on 16 February 2024, consolidating an earlier partial decree, the award in favour of Ecobank Nigeria and Ecobank Kenya had grown to USD 31.9 million in undisputed and disputed sums combined.

    The list of case references alone tells the story of a judiciary under siege. Civil Suit 292 of 2018, HCCC E322 of 2019, HCC Misc E042 of 2021, HCCC E276 of 2019, Civil Case E132 of 2020, Civil Case E202 of 2020, Miscellaneous Civil Application E1215 of 2020, HCCC Misc E329, E330, and E331 of 2022, Civil Application E503 of 2024, Civil Application E420 of 2024, Civil Application E436 of 2023, Miscellaneous Application E395 of 2025, and Miscellaneous Application E590 of 2025. That is not a record of different legal disputes. It is a matrix of interconnected applications, stay orders, garnishee proceedings, recusals, appeals, arbitrations, and counter-applications, all orbiting the same contract while the clock on interest ran continuously at the expense of the Kenyan taxpayer.

    The recusal attempts alone were extraordinary in their audacity. Four judges handled the matter before being recused or transferred. Justice Abigail Mshila, the late Justice David Majanja, Justice Wilfrida Okwany, and Justice Freda Mugambi all passed through the matter. Senior Counsel Ahmednasir Abdullahi, representing Zakhem, then filed an application demanding that Justice P.J. Otieno also recuse himself. Justice Otieno refused on 8 August 2024, observing that abandoning the case after substantive judicial resources had been invested would perpetuate the very delays that the litigation had created. The Court of Appeal separately ordered the DCI to file a report on allegations that Professor Tom Ojienda, acting for subcontractor Oilfields Engineering and Supplies, had allegedly approached Justice Otieno to tilt the outcome in his client’s favour. That report, if it has been completed, has not been made public.

    THE SETTLEMENT THAT WAS NOT FINAL

    In September 2023, KPC and Zakhem recorded a consent judgment of USD 69.6 million, approximately KSh 9 billion at prevailing rates, which KPC’s own financial reporting described as the resolution of a long legal dispute with one of its contractors. It was not final. It was not even a pause. Within months of the consent judgment being recorded, Zakhem was back in court. Ahmednasir Abdullahi filed applications seeking to freeze KPC’s bank accounts at Standard Chartered Bank over an alleged remaining debt of KSh 926 million.

    That application was dismissed by Justice Wayua Mong’are on 29 May 2025, on the grounds that Zakhem was raising the same arguments before a court of concurrent jurisdiction that it had already placed before another court, which the law does not permit. But Zakhem immediately regrouped. In June 2025, fresh garnishee applications were filed against KPC’s accounts at Equity Bank, Stanbic, KCB, NCBA, Citibank, Co-operative Bank, and Absa. The High Court ultimately ordered Equity Bank to release KSh 485 million from KPC’s accounts and pay it directly into the trust account of Ahmednasir Abdullahi Advocates LLP, finding that KPC had failed to comply with a January 2021 order to pay that balance after settling its tax obligations with the Kenya Revenue Authority.

    The KRA angle adds another dimension to the damage. Following the June 2020 decree awarding Zakhem USD 44 million, KPC made two payments to KRA as part of Zakhem’s assessed tax liabilities, KSh 3.09 billion in October 2020 and KSh 915 million in January 2021. KPC then argued that additional KRA agency notices consumed the remaining balance owed to Zakhem. The court rejected that position, finding that any payments made beyond the court-ordered amounts were at KPC’s own risk. The effect was that KPC had remitted over KSh 4 billion to KRA and still owed Zakhem the outstanding balance, leaving the corporation exposed on two separate financial fronts simultaneously.

    It was in this context that the July 2024 payments described in Kebaso’s video must be understood. The certificate of urgency filed by Ahmednasir on 1 August 2024 in the High Court’s Commercial Division confirmed that KPC had by then released USD 25 million out of USD 31.3 million owed pursuant to the February 2024 decree in favour of the Ecobank entities, with funds preserved in the trust accounts of Ahmednasir Abdullahi Advocates LLP and Majanja Luseno and Company pending the resolution of a Mareva injunction sought by the Oilfields subcontractor. High Court Judge P.J. Otieno ordered on 8 August 2024 that those funds be preserved and not disbursed pending determination of the competing claims.

    THE SUBCONTRACTORS LEFT BEHIND

    While billions moved between corporate accounts and law firm trust funds, the companies that actually performed the physical labour on the Line 5 project were left to chase payment through their own separate litigation. Oilfields Engineering and Supplies Limited, a local subcontractor engaged by Zakhem, moved to court in 2024 seeking to freeze KSh 4.1 billion that was to be paid by KPC to Zakhem, arguing that Zakhem owed it money for completed work. That court fight became so vicious, with accusations of judicial interference and counter-allegations of manipulated arbitration, that the matter was effectively frozen at the appellate level while the DCI investigation dragged on.

    Azicon Kenya Limited, which handled electrical, instrumentation, and telecommunications installations on the project, received formal certification for payment in March 2019 and had still not been paid by mid-2025. A Nairobi court ordered Zakhem to settle KSh 537.3 million owed to Azicon, clearing the way for enforcement action. Ruhpumpen Global Limited, another subcontractor, had sued KPC alleging it was induced to favour Ebara Corporation in equipment procurement, though that case was ultimately dismissed. The pattern is consistent: the main contractor extracted billions from a state corporation, the foreign bank that financed the contractor extracted further billions through litigation, and the Kenyan subcontractors who built the thing were left to pursue enforcement through courts that were themselves ensnared in the larger dispute.

    THE IPO AND THE CONTINGENT LIABILITY NO ONE DISCUSSED

    This is the context in which Kenya Pipeline Company conducted its landmark initial public offering in January 2026. The government sold 65 percent of KPC, offering 11.81 billion shares at KSh 9 per share and targeting gross proceeds of KSh 106.3 billion, in what Reuters described as East Africa’s biggest IPO in local currency terms in over a decade. The offer exceeded its target by 5.7 percent, according to Bloomberg, closing on 24 February 2026 with listing on the Nairobi Securities Exchange on 9 March 2026. For the year ended 30 June 2025, KPC reported revenue of KSh 38.6 billion and profit of KSh 7.49 billion. The transaction was positioned, in President Ruto’s own framing, as a once-in-a-generation opportunity for ordinary Kenyans to own a share of their national energy artery.

    What was not foregrounded in that framing was the fact that as of the close of the IPO, active garnishee applications from Zakhem remained pending against KPC’s accounts at seven separate banks, that the total documented financial exposure from the Zakhem-Ecobank litigation exceeded KSh 78 billion by the most conservative accounting, and that no forensic investigation into the original domiciliation arrangements had been publicly ordered. The KPC prospectus, by regulatory requirement, would have disclosed material litigation. Whether the full scope of that exposure was sufficiently communicated to retail investors who were encouraged by government to participate in a patriotic act of share-buying is a question that Kenya’s Capital Markets Authority and Nairobi Securities Exchange have not yet publicly addressed.

    Former KPC Managing Director Joe Sang, who served during the critical phases of the contract and the subsequent litigation, resigned following a separate fuel procurement scandal in which Petroleum PS Mohamed Liban and EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria were also arrested following a public signal from the President. Their resignations came within two days of the arrests. The state can move when it chooses to. The Zakhem-Ecobank exposure, which dwarfs the fuel procurement matter in both scale and duration, has attracted no equivalent executive accountability.

    WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRES

    Ahmednasir Abdullahi has stated publicly on X that the KPC payments described in Kebaso’s video were not legal fees to his firm and that he does not act for KPC in the matter. He dismissed suggestions of personal enrichment as misguided. KPC has not issued a direct public response to the resurfaced allegations. Faith Boinett, who chairs the KPC board and was reappointed to that position by President Ruto, has also not commented publicly on the Zakhem litigation exposure or the adequacy of disclosures made during the IPO.

    The questions that remain unanswered are not complicated. Who within KPC authorised the acceptance of the October 2014 domiciliation letters and on what legal advice? Did the National Treasury, which has board representation at KPC, receive any disclosure of the Ecobank domiciliation arrangement before or after it was executed? What is the total sum disbursed by KPC in all forms, including principal payments, interest, penalties, legal fees, and tax payments, in connection with the Zakhem contract since commissioning in 2018? And why, despite the DCI being ordered by the Court of Appeal to investigate allegations of judicial interference in the proceedings, has no report been made public and no prosecution initiated?

    The Director of Public Prosecutions and the DCI Director face a specific evidentiary record that is already assembled in court files, audit reports, and financial statements. The 2006 debenture was registered in Nigeria. The domiciliation letters were stamped in Kenya in 2014. The contract was awarded, the pipeline was built, and the financial extraction has been running ever since through mechanisms that the courts, the auditors, and parliamentary committees have each partially illuminated but none has comprehensively prosecuted. A full forensic investigation into the banking records, the legal instruments, and the decision-making chain within KPC between 2014 and 2018 is not optional. It is the minimum that accountability to the Kenyan public requires.

    For now, the pipeline pumps fuel. The litigation pumps money. And the KSh 78 billion figure grows.

  • THE ZAKHEM-ECOBANK MACHINE: How Kenya’s Courts Were Weaponised to Drain a State Corporation of Over KES 78 Billion

    THE ZAKHEM-ECOBANK MACHINE: How Kenya’s Courts Were Weaponised to Drain a State Corporation of Over KES 78 Billion

    THE SLEEPING GIANT: A DEBENTURE BORN IN LAGOS

    In February 2006, a Lebanese construction company called Zakhem Construction Nigeria Limited signed a Deed of Debenture with Ecobank Nigeria PLC. To the uninitiated, a debenture is merely a technical word in commercial law.

    To those who understand its lethal implications, it is a document that can reach across borders, across years, and across jurisdictions to claim everything a company will ever earn. In this case, Zakhem pledged every asset it owned or would ever own anywhere in the world.

    Not just property and equipment, but all receivables. Every debt that any person, company, or government owed to Zakhem, anywhere on the planet, from that moment forward belonged first to Ecobank.

    The original debenture covered a facility of One Hundred Billion Naira. It was registered with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission on 7th June 2006. For eight years, it sat dormant, a perfectly engineered legal instrument waiting for a sufficiently large target to emerge.

    The target arrived in July 2014. Kenya Pipeline Company, the strategic state corporation that moves petroleum products from the coast to the interior of Kenya, awarded Contract No. SU/QT/032N/13 to Zakhem International Construction Limited.

    The contract was for the construction, testing, and commissioning of Line 5, a 450-kilometre oil pipeline from Mombasa to Nairobi.

    The contract value was USD 484,502,886.40. At current exchange rates, that is approximately KES 62.9 billion. It was supposed to be Kenya’s infrastructure century project, a Vision 2030 flagship that would modernise fuel distribution and cement national energy security.

    Within two months of winning the KPC contract, Zakhem had secured a USD 300 million credit facility from Ecobank, using the KPC contract proceeds as its primary collateral.

    What followed was not the construction of a pipeline. What followed was the activation of the most sophisticated financial extraction mechanism ever deployed against a Kenyan public institution.

    THE 300 MILLION DOLLAR TRAP

    On 23rd September 2014, barely two months after winning the KPC contract, the board of directors of Zakhem International Construction Limited convened in Lagos, Nigeria. They approved a USD 300,000,000 credit facility from Ecobank Nigeria. That is three hundred million US dollars, approximately KES 39 billion at prevailing rates.

    The securities Zakhem provided to Ecobank for this facility are documented in court papers filed in Nairobi’s Commercial and Tax Division. They include an All Assets Debenture covering all of Zakhem’s fixed and floating, present and future assets. They include a Personal Guarantee from Albert Zakhem for the full facility amount, supported by a notarised statement of his net worth.

    They include Corporate Guarantees from Zakhem International S.A. dated 25th February 2005 and from the Kenyan entity dated 4th January 2014. They include 20 percent cash collateral for advance-payment guarantees and retention-money guarantees. And they include Letters of Domiciliation of the proceeds of the KPC contract to Ecobank’s accounts.

    It is this last item that is the engine of the entire scheme.

    The Letters of Domiciliation gave Ecobank a direct claim over the money that KPC owed Zakhem under the pipeline contract.

    Not a secondary claim. Not a claim that would crystallise after Zakhem defaulted. A direct, first-ranking claim on the contract proceeds, structured in such a way that Ecobank effectively became an invisible sub-party to a government contract it had never won, in a country where it bore no regulatory obligation and offered no value.

    Court documents filed in Nairobi reveal the precise terms of the facility.

    Ecobank is recorded as having financed the contract upto an amount of USD 206,433,676.80. Against this, the bank received from KPC the sum of USD 17,943,447.40 through its Nigerian operations and USD 8,899,960.00 through its Kenyan subsidiary.

    The combined recovery through both channels of USD 26,843,407.40 left a shortfall of approximately USD 52,785,027.27 that Ecobank would eventually pursue in Kenya’s Commercial Court.

    THE DOMICILIATION LETTERS: THE SMOKING ARCHITECTURE

    On 11th October 2014, less than three months after the KPC contract was signed, Zakhem sent two letters to KPC headquarters.

    The letters gave what court filings describe as unconditional and irrevocable instructions. Seventy percent of the entire contract value, seventy percent of USD 484 million, was to be paid directly into Zakhem’s account with Ecobank Nigeria. The remaining thirty percent was to go to Zakhem’s account with Ecobank Kenya.

    KPC confirmed receipt of these Domiciliation Letters on 13th October 2014, placing its dated stamp upon them.

    What KPC did not disclose, and what would form the centrepiece of litigation that continues to this day, is that these letters created a three-way financial obligation involving a Nigerian bank, a Cypriot holding company, a Nigerian construction entity, and a Kenyan state corporation, all bound together by a 2006 debenture that predated the KPC contract by eight years.

    KPC stamped the Domiciliation Letters on 13th October 2014. By doing so, it effectively invited a Nigerian bank into the most sensitive infrastructure contract in Kenya’s history without Treasury authorisation, without parliamentary oversight, and without public disclosure.

    Court filings in Civil Suit 292 of 2018 reveal that Ecobank issued bank guarantees on behalf of Zakhem totalling at least USD 39 million in four tranches between September 2015 and September 2016. These guarantees enabled Zakhem to access advance payments and retention payments under the KPC contract.

    The mechanism was elegant in its ruthlessness: Ecobank fronted the guarantees, KPC paid Zakhem, Zakhem was supposed to remit proceeds to Ecobank, and the debenture stood as the ultimate backstop.

    When Zakhem allegedly began diverting payments to accounts at Stanbic Bank rather than Ecobank, the entire structure collapsed into litigation. Kenya became the arena in which a Nigerian bank, a Cypriot holding company, and their Kenyan-registered fronts fought over the spoils of a state contract.

    What had been structured as a pipeline construction arrangement had, in reality, been structured as a foreign-controlled cash extraction mechanism from the moment the ink dried on the contract.

    THE MANDATE THAT WAS NEVER DISCLOSED

    A mandate letter dated 15th July 2015, obtained and reported by The Standard newspaper in its earlier investigation, reveals a fact of devastating significance.

    The official financing arrangement for the KPC pipeline project involved a consortium of six Kenyan and international banks: CFC Stanbic Bank, Citibank, Commercial Bank of Africa, Co-operative Bank of Kenya, Rand Merchant Bank, and Standard Chartered Bank. These six institutions agreed to provide USD 350 million in financing, split among them in defined proportions.

    The mandate letter, according to reporting by The Standard, specified explicitly that no other entities were to be involved as mandated lead arrangers, underwriters, or documentation agents, and that no additional compensation should be paid to any party not included in the original contract.

    Ecobank Nigeria was not in this consortium. Ecobank Kenya was not in this consortium. Neither Ecobank entity appears in any official KPC financing document publicly available. And yet, by virtue of the debenture signed in 2006 and the Domiciliation Letters signed in October 2014, Ecobank had engineered itself a senior claim over contract proceeds that ranked, in practical terms, ahead of anything KPC’s own legal advisers had contemplated.

    When KPC’s own annual reports spanning 2020 through 2023 were analysed, there is no mention of Ecobank Nigeria or Ecobank Kenya in connection with the financing of Line 5. The corporation that was a named defendant in a lawsuit demanding over USD 52 million had apparently not seen fit to disclose the existence of that lawsuit, or the financial arrangements that gave rise to it, in its annual reports for years.

    HCCC 292 OF 2018: THE LAWSUIT THAT BLED THE NATION

    In 2018, Ecobank Nigeria Limited and Ecobank Kenya Limited filed Civil Suit 292 of 2018 at the Commercial and Tax Division of the High Court of Kenya.

    The defendants were Zakhem International Construction Limited of Nigeria, Zakhem Construction Nigeria Limited, Zakhem International Construction Limited of Cyprus, Zakhem Construction (Kenya) Limited, and critically, Kenya Pipeline Company Limited.

    KPC, a state corporation owned entirely by Kenyan taxpayers, found itself a defendant in a foreign bank’s debt recovery action against a foreign construction company.

    KPC had not borrowed money from Ecobank. KPC had not guaranteed Zakhem’s facility with Ecobank. KPC’s exposure arose entirely from the Domiciliation Letters it had stamped in October 2014, by which it had given unconditional irrevocable instructions to pay contract proceeds to Ecobank’s accounts.

    When those instructions were subsequently honoured in part and diverted in part, Ecobank dragged KPC into court.

    KPC immediately retained legal representation, entering into an engagement agreement for KES 90,000,000 in legal fees with MMA Advocates LLP, according to a separate court case, MMA Advocates v Kenya Pipeline Company, filed as Civil Case E202 of 2020 at the High Court.

    Ninety million shillings in lawyers’ fees, paid by Kenyan taxpayers, to defend a state corporation from a lawsuit arising from its own decision to stamp letters it had apparently not fully understood.

    KPC paid KES 90 million in legal fees in 2019 alone to defend itself in the Ecobank suit, a suit that arose from KPC’s own decision to stamp the Domiciliation Letters in 2014.

    Justice Mary Kasango, presiding over the case in its early stages in July 2018, issued a freeze order on Zakhem’s bank accounts at CFC Stanbic and KCB banks while simultaneously stopping KPC from making any payments to Zakhem outside the terms of the Ecobank arrangement.

    The order lasted only six days before expiry, but its significance was profound.

    A Kenyan court had confirmed that there was a serious and arguable case that Zakhem’s contract proceeds were legally encumbered in favour of a Nigerian bank. The pipeline was finished; the accounting war had just begun.

    THE DCI LETTER THAT COST KENYANS KES 3 BILLION

    On 26th July 2019, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations wrote to KPC management directing the suspension of all payments to Zakhem pending investigation. It was, on its face, a legitimate exercise of investigative authority. In practice, it became one of the most expensive government letters in Kenyan history.

    The dispute over Zakhem’s Extension of Time claims had been referred to an independent expert scheduler, M/s Nyara, who assessed the four core claims and determined the payable amount at USD 44,019,024.64. Both Zakhem and KPC had reportedly agreed on this figure. The DCI letter halted payment at the precise moment the parties were closest to resolution.

    As a result of that halt, Zakhem initiated legal proceedings in the High Court in HCCC E322 of 2019, filed on 26th September 2019, seeking the full amount of USD 126,255,812.62 in unpaid sums. On 16th June 2020, the High Court issued a partial decree in Zakhem’s favour for USD 44,019,024.64. And because KPC had been directed by the DCI to stop paying, and had complied, Zakhem was now entitled to charge interest and penalties on the unpaid sum for every day it remained unpaid.

    According to Kenya Pipeline’s own audited accounts and a July 2024 report by Business Daily Africa, the penalties and interest that accrued as a result of the DCI-ordered payment halt amounted to KES 3,027,732,573, equivalent to over USD 23 million at the time of accrual. Auditor General Nancy Gathungu noted in KPC’s 2023 audit that the delay in payment was occasioned by the DCI directive, and that the resulting penalties and interest were entirely avoidable.

    A single letter from the DCI, suspending payments that both parties had agreed on, cost Kenyan taxpayers over KES 3 billion in avoidable penalties and interest.

    Three billion shillings. Gone. Not from a heist at gunpoint. Not from a cyber fraud. From a government directive, written by one arm of the state, destroying the carefully negotiated financial position of another arm of the state, in circumstances where no charges were ever filed and no person was ever convicted of any offence related to the original contract.

    THE ‘FULL AND FINAL’ SETTLEMENT THAT WAS NEITHER

    In September 2023, KPC and Zakhem signed what was recorded as a consent judgment in HCCC E322 of 2019. The consent judgment fixed the total amount owed by KPC to Zakhem at USD 69,684,238.46, comprising USD 48,140,000 in principal and USD 21,544,238.46 in interest at six percent.

    Business Daily Africa, reporting on KPC’s 2024 annual accounts, confirmed that KPC had treated this as a final settlement, describing it as the resolution of a long legal dispute with one of its contractors.

    It was not final. It was not even a pause.

    Within months of the consent judgment, Zakhem was back in court. Senior Counsel Ahmednasir Abdullahi, appearing for Zakhem, filed applications seeking to freeze KPC’s bank accounts at Standard Chartered Bank over an alleged remaining debt of Sh926 million.

    The application was dismissed by Justice Josephine Mongare on 29th May 2025, on the grounds that Zakhem was raising the same arguments and tabulations it had already made before a court of concurrent jurisdiction, which the law does not permit. But Zakhem immediately regrouped.

    In June 2025, Zakhem filed fresh garnishee applications against KPC’s accounts at Equity Bank, Stanbic, KCB, NCBA, Citibank, Co-operative Bank, and Absa Bank. This time, Justice Mongare allowed the application in respect of the Equity Bank account, issuing a Garnishee Order Absolute directing Equity Bank to pay Zakhem KES 485,000,000 from KPC’s accounts. The money was to be remitted directly to the bank account of Ahmednasir Abdullahi Advocates LLP at UBA Kenya Bank Limited, Upperhill Branch, account number 55030160006446.

    So the money passed through not just from a state corporation to a foreign construction company but through the trust account of one of Kenya’s most politically connected and publicly controversial lawyers.

    Court records confirm the transfer was executed. Equity Bank complied. KES 485 million left KPC’s accounts and entered a law firm’s trust account.

    THE KRA DIMENSION: TAXING THE EXTRACTED

    Amid the cascade of claims and counter-claims, the Kenya Revenue Authority inserted itself into the money flow in a manner that further complicated and multiplied KPC’s exposure. Following the 2020 partial decree in favour of Zakhem, KRA issued agency notices demanding tax from Zakhem. Because the money was to flow through KPC’s accounts, KPC found itself obligated to withhold and remit significant amounts to KRA before releasing the balance to Zakhem.

    Court records show that KPC paid KRA KES 3,099,971,539 in October 2020 and a further KES 915,316,830 in January 2021, totalling over KES 4 billion in tax deductions from the Zakhem decree. Zakhem subsequently obtained letters from the National Treasury dated November 2022 and February 2023 confirming that all penalties and interest on its tax liabilities had been waived.

    Justice Mongare, in her June 2025 ruling, found that KPC’s additional payments to KRA beyond the ordered amounts were at KPC’s own risk and could not extinguish its obligation to Zakhem, effectively ruling that KPC had overpaid KRA and was still indebted to Zakhem for the balance.

    By this arithmetic, KPC paid the contractor. KPC paid the taxman. The taxman gave the contractor a waiver. The court told KPC it still owed the contractor more. And then the contractor refused to pay its own subcontractors.

    THE SUBCONTRACTORS LEFT TO DIE

    While billions flowed from KPC to Ecobank and from KPC to Zakhem and from Zakhem’s court-ordered recoveries into lawyers’ trust accounts, the Kenyan companies that physically built this pipeline were left destitute.

    Azicon Kenya Limited was engaged by Zakhem to carry out electrical, instrumentation, and telecommunications installation works under a subcontract valued at approximately KES 1.3 billion. The firm completed its works, obtained certification for the installations, and was paid approximately KES 840 million, leaving a balance exceeding KES 460 million that has remained outstanding since 2020. The firm obtained a court decree ordering Zakhem to pay the amount. The decree has not been honoured.

    In January 2025, Azicon served Zakhem with an insolvency statutory demand. Twenty-one days elapsed. Nothing was paid. Azicon then filed an insolvency petition at the High Court seeking to liquidate Zakhem International. In court documents filed in this proceeding, Azicon’s lawyer Collins Taliti alleged that Zakhem was actively scheming to avoid payment by incorporating new companies, including Mokowe Traders Limited and Bangal Marina Resorts Limited, to conceal assets and defeat enforcement. When Azicon attempted to attach Zakhem’s bank accounts at Stanbic Bank, they found a balance of KES 393,000. A company that had extracted over KES 9 billion from a government contract had KES 393,000 in its main banking account.

    As of July 2025, when Zakhem received KES 485 million from KPC through the Equity Bank garnishee order, Azicon immediately moved to court demanding that the directors of Zakhem be jailed for contempt of court.

    The directors in question, Ibrahim Salim Zakhem and Abdallah Salim Zakhem, the latter being the Honorary Consul of Lebanon in Nairobi, were summoned to appear before the court to explain why the decree had not been paid. Abdallah Zakhem is not just a contractor. He is a diplomat. He holds honorary consular status. He appears at official functions. His company has extracted billions from Kenyan taxpayers, left Kenyan subcontractors unpaid, and his family enjoys the protections of diplomatic courtesy while Kenya’s courts scramble to enforce their own orders.

    Multiple ICD (Kenya) Limited pursued a separate claim against Zakhem for USD 3,286,590. They obtained a court order freezing KPC’s bank accounts in connection with this debt, arguing that KPC and Zakhem had conspired to defeat justice by refusing to release funds. The order was eventually lifted.

    Oil Fields Engineering and Supplies Limited obtained a Mareva injunction in August 2023 restraining KPC from paying any further funds to Zakhem, an order that froze USD 31.3 million. Quality Inspectors obtained an arbitration award and found collection nearly impossible.

    Zakhem extracted over KES 9 billion from a government contract. Its main Stanbic Bank account held KES 393,000 when creditors came looking. This is not insolvency. This is engineered invisibility.

    THE JUDICIAL BATTLEFIELD: CASES, RECUSALS, AND THE CAROUSEL OF CLAIMS

    No honest account of this scandal can avoid grappling with the sheer scale of the judicial manipulation that has accompanied it. The cases in which Zakhem, Ecobank, KPC, and their related parties have appeared include HCCC No. 292 of 2018, HCCC E322 of 2019, HCC Misc E042 of 2021, HCCC E276 of 2019, Civil Case E132 of 2020, Civil Case E202 of 2020, Misc Civil Application E1215 of 2020, HCCC Misc E329, E330, and E331 of 2022, Civil Application E503 of 2024, Civil Application E420 of 2024, Civil Application E436 of 2023, Miscellaneous Application E395 of 2025, Miscellaneous Application E590 of 2025, and Petition E021 of 2024. That is not a list of different legal disputes. That is a matrix of interconnected applications, stay orders, garnishees, recusals, appeals, arbitrations, and counter-applications, all circling the same KES 62.9 billion pipeline contract like vultures over a carcass.

    The recusal attempts alone are staggering in their audacity. Ahmednasir Abdullahi filed an application demanding that Justice P.J. Otieno recuse himself from hearing the Oil Fields case on grounds of alleged partiality and bias.

    The Court of Appeal was drawn into this recusal fight in Civil Application E503 of 2024, where it noted that questions of partiality had been raised even before a substantive order was granted, and that the integrity of the process itself had been called into question.

    Justice Otieno refused recusal on 8th August 2024, observing that abandoning the case after substantive judicial resources had been invested would perpetuate the very delays that litigation abuse had created. Meanwhile, the DCI was ordered to investigate whether Professor Tom Ojienda, acting for Oil Fields, had allegedly approached Justice Otieno to tilt the scales in his client’s favour. The investigation report, if it exists, has not been made public.

    The Legal fees claim by LJA Associates LLP, the firm that had previously represented various Zakhem entities and then fell into a dispute with them, was taxed at KES 279,792,000. That is two hundred and seventy-nine million shillings in legal fees claimed for work done in a single matter.

    Lady Justice Mshila ruled in July 2023 that Ahmednasir Abdullahi Advocates LLP, which had come on record to replace LJA Associates, could only do so if it paid these fees into an escrow account.

    The resulting dispute between the two law firms over who gets paid what, out of money that is itself the product of a dubious extraction from a state corporation, has spawned its own litigation in CA No. 134 of 2023.

    Each court application, each appeal, each recusal attempt, each garnishee proceeding represents not just a legal strategy but a financial extraction in itself. Court fees, advocate fees, process server fees, and the time cost of senior state officials defending KPC in matters they cannot explain to auditors or to Parliament.

    JOE SANG: THE MAN AT THE CENTRE OF EVERY STORM

    No name appears more consistently at the intersection of the Zakhem-Ecobank scandal and Kenya’s broader energy sector dysfunction than Joe Sang. His career at Kenya Pipeline Company is a biographical mirror of the corporation’s descent into institutional crisis.

    Sang was first appointed Managing Director of KPC in April 2016. During his first tenure, the Zakhem contract was in active execution. The Domiciliation Letters instructing KPC to pay 70 percent of contract proceeds to Ecobank had already been stamped.

    The disputes over Extension of Time claims were escalating. The Ecobank lawsuit that would be filed in 2018 was being prepared. In December 2018, Sang was arrested alongside other senior KPC officials over the Sh1.9 billion Kisumu Oil Jetty project, charged with abuse of office and engaging in a project without prior planning. He resigned.

    In December 2022, Sang and his co-accused were acquitted. A magistrate ruled that the prosecution’s case lacked merit and that the project had been properly planned. The Law Society of Kenya challenged his subsequent reappointment to KPC in January 2023 and formal reinstatement in April 2023 on grounds that it bypassed merit-based constitutional competition procedures. The challenge was unsuccessful.

    During Sang’s second tenure, the consent judgment with Zakhem was signed in September 2023. As KPC’s own annual report for that year obliquely noted, a major reason for the KES 2.85 billion decline in the corporation’s cash reserves was the settlement of a long legal dispute with one of its contractors.

    That contractor was Zakhem. The settlement Sang’s management signed was the one that was supposed to be full and final. Seventeen months later, Zakhem was back in court seeking hundreds of millions more.

    On 2nd April 2026, Sang was arrested by the DCI, along with Petroleum Principal Secretary Mohamed Liban and EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria, over allegations that they had manipulated fuel stock data to fabricate a shortage and justify the irregular emergency procurement of a KES 4 billion fuel shipment outside the Government-to-Government framework.

    The shipment, carried by the vessel MV Paloma, docked between 27th and 29th March 2026 and is alleged to have been sourced from Saudi Aramco before being resold through international intermediaries at prices well above contracted rates. Investigators have suggested that the total loss to the public could reach KES 8 billion when a second related shipment is factored in. Sang resigned on 4th April 2026. He has not publicly addressed the Zakhem-Ecobank dimension of his time at KPC.

    Joe Sang was KPC’s Managing Director when the Domiciliation Letters were confirmed, when the DCI halt letter was issued, when the consent judgment was signed, and when the fuel manipulation scheme allegedly ran. He must now account for all of it.

    THE PATTERN OF KPC: AN INSTITUTION DESIGNED TO BE LOOTED

    The Zakhem-Ecobank affair does not exist in isolation. It is the latest chapter in a documented pattern of systematic extraction from Kenya Pipeline Company that stretches back two decades.

    In 2009, the Triton Oil Scandal saw corrupt KPC staff exploit a new computer system to steal 126 million litres of petroleum products valued at KES 7.6 billion. It remains one of the largest corporate frauds in Kenya’s history. The Managing Director was dismissed. No comprehensive recovery was ever achieved.

    In 2013 and 2014, KPC purchased 60 hydrant pit valves for JKIA at a cost of KES 647 million, pricing each valve at approximately KES 10 million when the market price was KES 1.5 million. In January 2025, four individuals were convicted over this procurement fraud. They received non-custodial sentences. Fines instead of prison. The message was clear: loot KPC, pay a small fine, walk free.

    In 2016 and 2017, the Kisumu Oil Jetty project saw KES 1.9 billion spent on infrastructure that prosecutors alleged was improperly planned. Joe Sang was charged. He was acquitted in 2022. The money does not appear to have been recovered.

    Now in April 2026, the fuel data manipulation scandal has cost the country at least KES 4 billion and potentially KES 8 billion in a single fraudulent procurement cycle. And all the while, the Zakhem machine has been running in the background, extracting tens of billions through court orders and consent judgments and garnishee proceedings, using Kenya’s commercial courts as a factory for the transfer of public wealth to foreign interests.

    The cumulative financial exposure from the Zakhem contract alone now exceeds KES 78 billion when all claims, settlements, penalties, interest, and legal costs are aggregated. This from a contract originally worth KES 62.9 billion. The contractor has extracted more than the original contract value. And the claims continue.

    THE FINANCIAL RECKONING: WHAT HAS KENYA LOST

    THE MONEY TRAIL: DOCUMENTED FINANCIAL EXPOSURE

    Original KPC Contract Value: USD 484,502,886 (KES 62.9 billion)  July 2014

    Ecobank Facility Extended to Zakhem: USD 300,000,000 (KES 39 billion)  September 2014

    Ecobank Claim in HCCC 292/2018: USD 52,785,027 (KES 6.8 billion)  Amount in arrears

    Partial Decree, June 2020: USD 44,019,024 (KES 5.7 billion)  HCCC E322/2019

    Consent Judgment, September 2023: USD 69,684,238 (KES 9 billion)  Inc. interest at 6%

    KRA Tax Payments by KPC: KES 4,015,288,369  October 2020 and January 2021

    Avoidable Penalties from DCI Halt: KES 3,027,732,573 (KES 3 billion)  Auditor General confirmed

    KPC Cash Reserve Decline, FY 2024: KES 2,850,000,000 (KES 2.85 billion)  Zakhem-linked payments

    Garnishee Order, June 2025: KES 485,000,000  Equity Bank, paid to Ahmednasir LLP trust

    LJA Associates Legal Fees Taxed: KES 279,792,000  In escrow dispute

    Azicon Kenya Unpaid Decree: KES 460,000,000+ Subcontractor, unpaid since 2020

    TOTAL DOCUMENTED EXPOSURE EXCEEDS KES 78 BILLION. NEW CLAIMS REMAIN PENDING.

    THE CRIMINAL QUESTION

    The evidence assembled from court files, audited financial statements, parliamentary records, and media investigations raises questions that the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations cannot continue to ignore.

    The 2006 debenture registered in Nigeria and the 2014 Domiciliation Letters signed in Kenya together created a mechanism by which Kenyan public contract proceeds were pledged as collateral for a foreign private bank loan without Treasury approval, without parliamentary sanction, and without the knowledge of the Kenyan public. Whether the legal instruments themselves constitute fraud under Section 318 of the Penal Code or obtaining by false pretences under Section 313 turns on facts that only a properly resourced forensic investigation can establish. But the question must be asked and it must be answered.

    The signing of a consent judgment described as full and final in September 2023 and the subsequent filing of fresh claims on the same contract in 2025 raises the question of whether a conspiracy to defraud under Section 317 of the Penal Code was engaged. The consistent pattern of filing multiple overlapping applications across different case numbers, obtaining interim freeze orders on KPC accounts, causing operational disruption to a national infrastructure operator, and then negotiating settlements that are immediately relitigated, constitutes, at minimum, potential abuse of court process and at maximum, a coordinated scheme to extract public funds through judicial mechanisms.

    The routing of Kenyan public contract proceeds through Nigerian bank accounts, Cypriot holding companies, and ultimately through a chain of corporate entities whose beneficial ownership structure has never been made transparent to Kenyan authorities raises serious questions under the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009. Money laundering does not require that the underlying transaction be a robbery. It requires only that the movement of money be structured to obscure its origin or ultimate destination. The debenture-domiciliation structure described in this report does precisely that.

    Finally, KPC’s failure to disclose in its annual reports the existence of the Ecobank lawsuit, the domiciliation letters, the foreign debenture structure, and the quantum of financial exposure from the Zakhem contract over a period of years raises questions about whether directors and management breached their fiduciary duties under the State Corporations Act and the Companies Act.

    WHAT MUST NOW HAPPEN

    The DCI has demonstrated in April 2026 that it can move swiftly when the political will exists. Petroleum PS Mohamed Liban, KPC Managing Director Joe Sang, and EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria were arrested within hours of the President’s public signal. Their resignations followed within two days. The state can act when it chooses to.

    The question is whether this same resolve will be applied to a scheme of far greater financial magnitude and far longer duration. The Zakhem-Ecobank extraction has been running since at least 2014. It has already cost the public, by the most conservative accounting, more than KES 20 billion in unnecessary payments, avoidable penalties, legal fees, and financial drain on a state corporation. By a comprehensive accounting, the exposure exceeds KES 78 billion.

    The DPP Renson Ingonga and DCI Director Mohamed Amin must initiate a full forensic investigation into the debenture signed in Lagos in 2006, the credit facility extended in September 2014, the Domiciliation Letters stamped by KPC in October 2014, the banking records of all relevant entities at Ecobank Nigeria, Ecobank Kenya, Stanbic Bank, and any other institution that processed contract proceeds, the settlement of September 2023 and the persons who negotiated it on KPC’s behalf, and the source and destination of the USD 485 million disbursed through Equity Bank in June 2025 and remitted to a law firm trust account.

    Travel bans and asset freezes must be considered for the principals of Zakhem International, foreign nationals who have demonstrated the capacity and willingness to move money offshore and to place assets out of reach of creditors and courts. Abdallah Zakhem holds honorary consular status in Kenya. That status does not confer immunity from criminal process. It does, however, make early action essential before documents, assets, and persons disappear.

    Joe Sang must be questioned comprehensively, not just about the fuel scandal for which he has already been arrested, but about the entire Zakhem affair from 2016 to 2026. He was the Managing Director when the DCI halt letter was issued. He was the Managing Director when the consent judgment was signed. He was the MD when fresh claims were filed on a supposedly settled contract. He must account for all of it.

    The Law Society of Kenya must investigate whether advocates who signed full and final settlements and subsequently filed fresh claims on the same contracts, or who facilitated the legal architecture of the domiciliation scheme, committed professional misconduct within the meaning of the Advocates Act.

    Parliament’s Public Investments Committee, which four years ago threatened to issue arrest warrants for Ibrahim Zakhem when he ignored its summons, must reconvene. The full financial exposure of KPC from this contract must be tabled before the National Assembly and Senate. Kenyans must know how much was paid, to whom, on whose authority, and what, if anything, remains to be paid.

    The pending Fast Track case filed by Zakhem in January 2026 seeking a further USD 6,029,388.94 must be stayed pending the outcome of criminal investigations. If judgment is entered before investigations are complete, Kenya will have no legal basis to resist further enforcement. The courts have been weaponised long enough. They must now serve justice.

    THIS IS KENYA’S MONEY. IT MUST COME BACK.

    The ordinary Kenyan who fills their vehicle at a petrol station pays a fuel levy that flows in part to KPC. The businessperson who depends on timely petroleum delivery pays when KPC is financially hamstrung by runaway litigation. The citizen who believes in an independent judiciary sees that institution exploited as a cash machine for interests that have never paid a tax in this country, never built anything that was not already paid for, and have left not one genuine legacy in this land except a pipeline that leaks, a string of lawsuits that never end, and a balance sheet that bleeds.

  • Poison at the Pump: How Kenya’s Fuel Marking System May Be Exposing Millions to Cancer-Causing Chemicals

    Poison at the Pump: How Kenya’s Fuel Marking System May Be Exposing Millions to Cancer-Causing Chemicals

    Every morning, across the length and breadth of Kenya, tens of millions of citizens queue at fuel stations from Moyale to Mombasa, Kisumu to Garissa, and fill their vehicles, matatus, bodas, generators, and cooking stoves. They have been told, repeatedly, by the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority, that the fuel flowing from those pumps is protected by a sophisticated biochemical marking system. What they have never been told is what, precisely, is in that marker — or what it becomes when it burns.

    A bombshell legal notice filed on March 31, 2026 by the Consumers Federation of Kenya (COFEK) to EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria now alleges that the answer to both questions may be deeply alarming. According to the notice, the fuel marking system — administered in Kenya by Swiss corporation SICPA SA under a contract worth Sh2.35 billion — is suspected of releasing brominated compounds into petroleum products, compounds that the federation characterises as posing cancer risks to every Kenyan who breathes exhaust fumes or handles fuel.

    The timing of the allegation is extraordinary. Even as COFEK’s letter was wending its way through EPRA’s official channels, DCI detectives were moving in the opposite direction — arresting Daniel Kiptoo himself, alongside Petroleum Principal Secretary Mohamed Liban and Kenya Pipeline Company Managing Director Joe Sang, over a separate but equally alarming scandal: the alleged importation of substandard, high-sulphur fuel that fell outside Kenya’s own regulatory specifications. The men spent Thursday night, April 3, 2026, in police custody at Gigiri Police Station.

    In the space of four days, Kenya’s entire petroleum governance architecture has been called into question from two directions at once — the quality of the fuel entering the country, and the safety of the chemicals used to mark it. Together, the crises constitute what may be the most serious challenge to the integrity of Kenya’s fuel supply chain in recent memory.

    “Every motorist, every hawker, every schoolchild breathing roadside air in Nairobi is an unwitting participant in this experiment.” — COFEK formal notice, March 31, 2026

    THE COFEK BOMBSHELL

    The Consumers Federation of Kenya is not, by nature, a sensationalist organisation. Operating under the Consumer Protection Act 2012 and anchored in Article 46 of the Constitution of Kenya — which guarantees the right to goods and services of reasonable quality — it has, over the years, built a reputation for measured, legally grounded interventions. Its letter of March 31, 2026 is therefore remarkable not only for what it alleges, but for the deliberateness with which it is constructed.

    Addressed to EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo Bargoria and copied to the Head of Public Service, Cabinet Secretary for Energy Opiyo Wandayi, the Attorney General, the Auditor-General, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Director of Public Prosecutions, the letter states that COFEK has spent at least three months reviewing whistleblower reports, documented complaints, and technical literature pointing to risks arising from the Fuel Integrity Solution. Its central contention: that the biochemical markers injected into petroleum products at the point of entry may generate brominated compounds during combustion, and that those compounds are potential carcinogens.

    The federation explicitly names SICPA SA, the Swiss firm EPRA contracted to implement the Fuel Integrity Solution, as the vendor at the centre of its concern. The letter demands immediate and verifiable regulatory action and constitutes, in its own words, unequivocal notice of COFEK’s intention to commence legal proceedings should EPRA fail to respond adequately. A social media post accompanying the notice reveals that COFEK has already dispatched fuel samples to an independent laboratory in the United States, with results awaited.

    EPRA had issued no formal public response to the letter as of publication date.

    THE SCIENCE OF THE ALLEGATION

    To understand what COFEK is alleging, it is necessary to understand what bromine chemistry in a combustion context actually means. The SICPA Fuel Integrity Solution works by injecting a patented biochemical tracer — whose precise molecular composition is proprietary and undisclosed — into petroleum at the point of entry or distribution. EPRA and SICPA have consistently described this marker as non-toxic and stable. The question COFEK is now forcing into the open is what happens to that marker under the conditions of an internal combustion engine, burning at temperatures that can exceed 600 degrees Celsius.

    The scientific literature on brominated compounds in combustion environments is not reassuring. Research published across multiple peer-reviewed journals has established that when organic compounds containing bromine are subjected to high-temperature combustion, they can generate brominated polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons — a class of chemicals whose toxic equivalency has been compared, in some environmental matrices, to dioxins. Separately, a 2021 review in the journal Environmental Science and Technology found that certain brominated flame retardants, which share structural properties with many organic bromine compounds, act as endocrine disruptors, with studies in humans and animals suggesting correlations with thyroid disorders, neurodevelopmental damage, reproductive harm, and oncological disease.

    The critical scientific distinction — and the one that regulators will be forced to address — is between the chemical marker in its injected state, which SICPA claims is harmless, and what that marker’s constituent compounds may become upon thermal decomposition inside a vehicle engine. These are two entirely different chemical questions, and it is the second one that the available public documentation on the SICPA system appears never to have addressed publicly.

    Without knowing the precise molecular structure of the SICPA marker, it is not possible to make definitive assessments of combustion by-products. COFEK’s decision to dispatch samples for independent analysis in the United States is, in this context, a rational evidential strategy. The results, when they arrive, will either validate or undermine the federation’s central allegation.

    “What burns in your engine is not necessarily what was injected at the depot. The chemistry of combustion transforms compounds — sometimes into something far more dangerous.” — Public health researcher, speaking to Kenya Insights

    THE SWISS COMPANY WITH A BRIBERY PAST

    SICPA SA is headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, and describes itself as a global leader in secure traceability and authentication technologies. It has been active in Kenya since 2013, initially through its Excisable Goods Management System for the Kenya Revenue Authority, covering security stamps on tobacco and alcohol products. The company marks over 60 billion litres of fuel annually across multiple continents.

    In April 2023, however, SICPA’s global reputation sustained a significant blow. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland issued a penalty order finding the company criminally liable for failing to take all necessary and reasonable organisational precautions to prevent its employees from bribing foreign public officials. The order related to bribery of high-ranking officials in the Colombian and Venezuelan markets between 2009 and 2011. SICPA was ordered to pay CHF 81 million — comprising a CHF 1 million fine and an CHF 80 million compensation claim based on profits from the relevant period. A former sales manager was handed a conditional prison sentence of 170 days.

    The Swiss OAG’s findings identified organisational deficiencies in SICPA’s corporate governance, risk management, and compliance processes as having made the bribery possible. Investigations into SICPA’s conduct were reportedly also ongoing, at various stages, in Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Senegal, Vietnam, and Ukraine at the time of the Swiss conviction. The company has since obtained ISO 37001 anti-bribery certification and says it will not appeal the Swiss order.

    The bribery history takes on added weight in the Kenyan context because of how SICPA obtained its EPRA contract in the first place. Business Daily investigations published in August 2024 revealed that the fuel marking tender awarded to SICPA was worth Sh2.35 billion — more than three times the Sh694 million that competing firms Intertek Testing Services and Authentix had offered to do the same job. The tender was cancelled in December 2021 on the instruction of then-Interior Principal Secretary Karanja Kibicho, who directed EPRA’s Daniel Kiptoo to abandon the competitive process and award the contract to SICPA through a specially permitted procurement procedure.

    Kenya’s Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu subsequently flagged the deal as having no justification for single-sourcing, arguing that taxpayers could not realise value for money. The Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority told Business Daily it had not been consulted on the cancellation. More damaging still, the Auditor-General found no evidence that the SICPA system had even been fully implemented nine months after the contract kicked off in 2023.

    It is against this background — an overpriced, single-sourced contract pushed through by a political directive and whose vendor carries a bribery conviction — that COFEK’s health allegations must be assessed. The story of Kenya’s fuel marking programme is not simply a technical question. It is a procurement scandal with a potential public health dimension.

    THE FUEL SECTOR IN FREEFALL

    The COFEK allegations do not arrive in isolation. Kenya’s petroleum sector is, as of this week, experiencing what amounts to a systemic governance crisis on multiple simultaneous fronts.

    On Thursday night, April 3, 2026, DCI detectives from the Operations Support Unit conducted a coordinated operation, picking up Petroleum Principal Secretary Mohamed Liban, EPRA Director General Daniel Kiptoo, and Kenya Pipeline Company Managing Director Joe Sang. A fourth official, identified as Simon Wafula, was also detained. Their homes were searched and unspecified cash and documents recovered. Capital FM reported that the fuel at the centre of the investigation is suspected to have elevated sulphur levels, rendering it non-compliant with Kenya’s petroleum specifications.

    Sources familiar with the investigation told this publication that a KPC quality assurance manager had raised concerns after testing the consignment and declined to authorise its discharge, escalating the matter through internal channels before investigators were alerted. The fuel in question was linked to the government-to-government import arrangement launched in 2023 with Gulf suppliers including Saudi Aramco, ADNOC, and ENOC under a 180-day credit facility. The G2G deal, praised for stabilising supply amid foreign exchange pressures, now stands at the centre of a criminal probe.

    The arrests come as Kenya grapples with a broader fuel supply anxiety driven by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which has pushed Brent crude prices sharply upward and complicated the country’s import logistics. Government Spokesperson Isaac Mwaura confirmed on April 4 that Kenya’s April fuel consignment had been secured, but the arrests of the very officials responsible for guaranteeing fuel quality have done nothing to steady public confidence.

    Separately, over a period stretching back through 2025, EPRA has itself been conducting enforcement sweeps of petrol stations across the country, flagging outlets selling diesel blended with kerosene. The regulator’s own biannual statistics report noted that 23 stations were found non-compliant out of 10,598 samples collected from 2,305 outlets during the review period — a 99 per cent compliance rate that is now being held up for scrutiny in light of the arrested officials who presided over the very enforcement regime that generated those numbers.

    The arrests of the Petroleum PS, EPRA Director General, and KPC Managing Director in a single night represents an unprecedented collapse of faith in Kenya’s fuel governance infrastructure.

    WHAT THE REGULATOR HAS NOT SAID

    EPRA has, over the years, mounted a vigorous public defence of the SICPA Fuel Integrity Solution. In promotional materials and official commentary, the authority has described the biochemical marker as patented, non-toxic, and stable. It has cited the programme’s World Bank and IMF recognition for improving fiscal governance. It has pointed to a compliance rate of 98.67 per cent across nearly 6,000 petroleum sites as evidence of the system’s effectiveness. What EPRA has never done, in any publicly accessible document reviewed by Kenya Insights, is publish the chemical composition of the marker, commission or release an independent toxicological assessment of its combustion by-products, or subject the health claims around the system to external peer review.

    This opacity is precisely what COFEK is now demanding be ended. The federation’s legal notice asks EPRA to produce, among other things, a comprehensive scientific disclosure of the marker’s chemical constituents, an independent health impact assessment covering both direct handling and inhalation of exhaust emissions from marked fuel, and a regulatory framework that would require ongoing monitoring of consumer exposure. These are, on their face, demands that any regulatory authority operating in good faith should be able to accommodate — unless the answers to those questions are themselves unwelcome.

    Cabinet Secretary for Energy Opiyo Wandayi, who was copied on COFEK’s letter, is the political head of a ministry whose top bureaucrat is now in police custody and whose regulatory arm faces a landmark public health complaint. His response — or the absence of one — will be a defining moment for the administration’s handling of the crisis.

    THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

    COFEK grounds its intervention explicitly in Article 46 of the Constitution of Kenya, which establishes that consumers have the right to goods and services of reasonable quality, the right to information necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and services, and the right to compensation for loss or injury arising from defects in goods or services. Article 42 further establishes the right to a clean and healthy environment.

    If laboratory results from the American testing facility confirm the presence of toxic combustion by-products from the SICPA marker, the constitutional implications are substantial. Kenya would face the prospect of a class-action type constitutional petition on behalf of millions of consumers who have, without knowledge or consent, been exposed to potentially hazardous chemical compounds with every tank of fuel they have purchased. Section 6 of the Consumer Protection Act 2012, which COFEK also invokes, creates strict liability obligations for suppliers of defective goods — a category that, if the allegation is proven, could encompass every Oil Marketing Company that has handled marked fuel.

    The legal proceedings that COFEK has threatened to initiate, should EPRA fail to act, would likely name the authority as a respondent for regulatory failure, and potentially SICPA as a second respondent for the deployment of a product with undisclosed hazardous properties. The Attorney General, who was copied on the notice, would be required to advise on the Crown’s liability exposure.

    The immediate timeline is driven by two sets of results. The first is from the DCI investigation into substandard fuel imports, which investigators say will expand to encompass other officials within the petroleum supply chain. The second is from COFEK’s American laboratory, whose findings on the chemical composition and combustion by-products of the SICPA marker will either validate the federation’s allegations or force it to recalibrate its legal strategy.

    EPRA, in the meantime, is effectively headless. Its Director General is in police custody. Its most recent public posture on the SICPA system — confident, promotional, data-rich — is now being held against it. The authority faces the prospect of having to respond simultaneously to a criminal investigation over one set of fuel quality failures and a constitutional complaint over the safety of the very system it has deployed to prevent them.

    SICPA SA, reached for comment through its global communications channels, had not responded to Kenya Insights queries by the time of publication. The company has previously maintained that its fuel marking technologies are globally recognised and non-toxic.

    For the millions of Kenyans who fill up at the pump each day, the questions being raised this week are not abstract. They are breathed in with every kilometre driven on marked fuel, absorbed with every spilled litre at a filling station forecourt, and inhaled with every puff of exhaust from the matatu that carries them to work. They deserve answers — and they deserve them now.

    NB: This investigation is based on COFEK’s official legal notice of March 31, 2026; publicly available procurement records and audit findings relating to the SICPA-EPRA contract; the Swiss Attorney General’s 2023 penalty order against SICPA SA; peer-reviewed scientific literature on brominated compound toxicology; and independently sourced reporting on the April 3, 2026 DCI arrests. COFEK’s health allegations remain unproven pending independent laboratory verification. SICPA denies that its markers pose any health risk. The DCI investigation is ongoing and no charges have been formally filed. EPRA, SICPA, and the Office of the Cabinet Secretary for Energy had not responded to Kenya Insights queries at time of publication.

  • Steel, Graft & Impunity: Inside the Kenya Railways Scandal Driving Away Investors and Bleeding Billions

    Steel, Graft & Impunity: Inside the Kenya Railways Scandal Driving Away Investors and Bleeding Billions

    For nearly a decade, Managing Director Philip Mainga has presided over a corporation in open institutional free fall. Court orders have been flouted within hours of service. Tenders worth tens of billions have been awarded to higher bidders in defiance of procurement review rulings. Public land worth hundreds of millions has been grabbed, sold and transferred under forged documents. A Sh88.2 million tender was directed to a company controlled by the MD’s own fiancée. And through it all, the board has maintained a studied silence while investigators have repeatedly been stopped in their tracks. This is the true state of Kenya Railways Corporation.

    A CORPORATION BUILT ON IMPUNITY

    Kenya Railways Corporation occupies a peculiar and deeply troubling position in the landscape of Kenyan state institutions. It controls some of the most valuable real estate in the country, manages the single largest infrastructure debt obligation in the nation’s history, and is tasked with delivering a multi-trillion-shilling pipeline of transport projects. Yet from the moment Philip Mainga took substantive control of the organisation in January 2020, the record is one of systematic procurement manipulation, predatory land dealings, judicial defiance, and the calculated suppression of internal dissent.

    The accumulated evidence, drawn from court records, parliamentary proceedings, audit reports and investigative disclosures, does not tell the story of a poorly-run institution. It tells the story of a deliberately captured one, where the machinery of procurement, recruitment and land management has been redirected to serve private interests at the expense of the public.

    Mainga’s tenure officially expired on January 3, 2026. Yet the Kenya Railways Corporation board, relying on a High Court ruling that declined jurisdiction to intervene in the matter, has maintained complete silence. No public notice of competitive recruitment has been issued. No announcement of a planned succession has been made. Insiders confirm that the board has been content to leave the expired MD in place, shielding him from accountability and allowing the corporation’s affairs to continue under a leadership whose mandate has lapsed.

    THE TENDER ENGINEERED FOR CRBC

    The single most brazen episode in Kenya Railways’ recent history concerns the Sh29.5 billion tender for the construction of the Nairobi Railway City Central Station. The project, which will anchor the 425-acre Railway City redevelopment partly funded by the United Kingdom government, drew bids from three Chinese firms. China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation submitted the lowest bid at Sh22.9 billion. China Road and Bridge Corporation submitted a bid of Sh29.5 billion. A consortium of China Overseas Engineering Group Company Limited and China Railway Group Limited submitted the highest quote at Sh32.5 billion.

    The rules governing the evaluation of such tenders exist for a reason. Technical and financial proposals are required to be submitted separately, precisely to ensure that evaluators assess technical merit without being influenced by price information. CRBC, according to proceedings before the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board, placed both its technical and financial proposals on flash disks inside a single envelope. The board, in a ruling issued on January 26, 2026, found this to be not a minor irregularity but a fundamental breach that rendered the CRBC bid non-responsive from the outset.

    The PPARB ruling was unequivocal. It held that Kenya Railways’ evaluation committee had acted erroneously and in a manner guided by misdirected reasoning in proceeding to score CRBC’s financial proposal despite the submission defect. The board nullified the award and directed Kenya Railways to re-evaluate the remaining compliant bids within 21 days.

    “No serious investor commits billions to a project where the rules change depending on who is receiving the kickbacks.”

    Kenya Railways ignored the directive. On February 16, 2026, the corporation again declared CRBC the best bidder, triggering a second appeal. When CCECC and the consortium mounted that second challenge, CRBC filed a High Court application to block the PPARB from hearing it. On March 11, the High Court suspended the PPARB proceedings, effectively freezing the review mechanism that exists to protect procurement integrity.

    Then came the deportations. Two days after the High Court suspended the PPARB proceedings, security operatives fanned out across Nairobi and Kisumu in coordinated night-time operations. Zhang Hongze, CCECC’s representative along Riverside Drive in Lavington, was taken by officers who did not identify themselves. Zhang Fangyi, based at CCECC’s camp along the Kisian-Usenge road in Kisumu where the firm is constructing the Sh2 billion Dhogoye bridge, was physically removed from his worksite by men who identified themselves as police.

    Both men were transported to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and placed on Kenya Airways flight KQ886 to Guangzhou. The Kisumu High Court subsequently issued an injunction restraining the deportation of further CCECC personnel, with CCECC arguing in court papers that the harassment was orchestrated by business rivals who had conspired with government respondents to intimidate the firm into abandoning its procurement challenge. The potential cost to the taxpayer of the government’s inexplicable preference for the higher bidder stands at Sh7 billion, representing the differential between CCECC’s Sh22.9 billion offer and CRBC’s Sh29.5 billion award.

    MAINGA’S PRIVATE PROCUREMENT CHANNEL

    The Railway City tender is not an anomaly. It is the most recent manifestation of a procurement culture that has operated throughout Mainga’s tenure. In March 2025, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations launched a probe into a Sh88.2 million tender, reference number KR/SCM/FRC/003/2019-2020, awarded to First Choice General Supplies, a business controlled by Peninah Patricks, Mainga’s long-term fiancée.

    The irregularities documented in the tender are specific and serious. The required procurement paperwork was allegedly backdated. Payments were processed hastily in a manner that investigators found inconsistent with normal disbursement procedures. The process used restricted bidding, keeping the field of competition deliberately narrow. Most significantly, the tender value was engineered to circumvent the Sh30 million threshold established under the Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations of 2020, a threshold that triggers additional oversight and approvals. By structuring the award at Sh88.2 million but through restricted bidding, the management avoided the scrutiny that a properly competitive process would have attracted.

    The matter was placed before a legislative oversight committee, which directed further inquiry. Activist group Bunge la Mwananchi subsequently petitioned the High Court seeking, among other remedies, a forensic audit of Kenya Railways and a lifestyle audit of Mainga personally. The petition called on the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate and recommend charges to the Director of Public Prosecutions if the evidence supported prosecution.

    Mainga’s response to the accumulation of allegations against him has been characteristic. In April 2024, having learned that dismissed employees were cooperating with media organisations to expose internal malpractices, he issued stern warnings invoking CAP 187, threatening legal action against any person who disclosed official documents without authorisation. Legal experts were quick to note that the provisions he cited had been declared unconstitutional, making the threat legally hollow. But the intent was transparent: the Managing Director of a public institution was deploying state apparatus to silence those who would expose his conduct.

    LAND: THE ORIGINAL SIN

    No aspect of Mainga’s record is more extensively documented than the systematic looting of Kenya Railways land under his watch. The scale is staggering. An audit report for the year ended June 30, 2020, identified 529 parcels of railway land that had been illegally allocated to third parties without the corporation’s consent, stretching from Nairobi to Mombasa, encompassing industrial plots in Limuru, parcels at Kikuyu and Mombasa stations, and significant acreage in Nakuru.

    In Mombasa’s Shimanzi area, three prime parcels reserved for the corporation’s expansion were grabbed and transferred to private developers through forged documents and misrepresentation. One parcel was reportedly sold for Sh58.2 million and earmarked for a grain handling terminal by its new, illegitimate owners. The properties were collectively valued at over Sh100 million.

    The most audacious scheme involved the Dupoto and Dafur Settlement Scheme in Embakasi, a 90-acre parcel sitting between the flight path, the Standard Gauge Railway corridor and Nairobi National Park. Under the scheme as reported, title deeds were issued to proxies for land fraudulently allocated within the settlement. The government was then induced to compensate these proxies to vacate, transferring billions of shillings in public funds into accounts that were subsequently drained by the scheme’s architects. Over 544 parcels of public land were, under Mainga’s tenure, illegally allocated to private individuals.

    A DCI investigation was opened into these dealings. It was abruptly halted following, according to investigative sources, a call from State House. The EACC, which separately attempted to investigate the Dupoto scheme, was similarly stopped before it could proceed to any meaningful conclusion. Meanwhile, Mainga himself was summoned to DCI headquarters in May 2019, where he recorded a statement for hours over dubious land compensation payments connected to SGR Phase 2. He was called back for further questioning the following day.

    On the Makongeni container yards and buildings, Mainga is alleged to have unilaterally leased the facilities for ten years without board approval, without following internal procedures, and with full knowledge that the Kenya Ports Authority had taken possession of the property without a formal handover. The consequence was the loss of Sh23 million per month in storage and container transport charges. Across the duration of that unauthorised arrangement, Kenya Railways haemorrhaged over Sh400 million. Not a single internal disciplinary process was initiated.

    THE SGR DEBT TRAP AND THE AUDITOR-GENERAL’S VERDICT

    Beneath the catalogue of procurement fraud and land theft lies a more fundamental financial catastrophe, one that now threatens the corporation’s very solvency. The Standard Gauge Railway, financed by the China Export-Import Bank at a total cost exceeding Sh500 billion across its two phases, was projected to move 22 million tonnes of freight annually. It moves roughly a quarter of that. In the year ended June 2025, Kenya Railways posted a net loss of Sh28.17 billion and sits on negative equity of Sh121 billion.

    Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu was blunt in her assessment. Her report for the year ended June 2024 found that Kenya Railways’ failure to meet loan obligations when due had attracted avoidable expenditure of Sh34.1 billion, comprising Sh5.3 billion in penalties and Sh28.85 billion in interest. The Auditor-General was explicit: this expenditure was not a proper charge to public funds. By June 2025, arrears on the SGR loan had accumulated to Sh413.36 billion, representing 80.82 percent of the total Sh511 billion owed to the Treasury by all state corporations combined.

    The SGR escrow account has never reached its required minimum balance of Sh25 billion, a structural failure that has locked out all revenue-based loan repayments since commercial operations began. The National Treasury has had to service the loans directly while attempting to recover reimbursement from a corporation that cannot generate sufficient cash flow.

    An Africa Star Railways operating deal, executed during a predecessor’s tenure but initiated by Mainga himself, saw Kenya Railways lose up to Sh1.4 million daily through a lopsided arrangement that ran essentially unchecked. Two activists petitioned the court in 2023 alleging that irregular extensions and dealings connected to the SGR establishment had led to a loss of Sh700 billion of taxpayer funds.

    Kenya Railways sits on negative equity of Sh121 billion. Arrears on the SGR loan have reached Sh413.36 billion. The board’s response has been silence.

    Busia Senator Okiya Omtatah has told courts that Kenya Railways is, for all practical purposes, technically insolvent. The Executive and Parliament have nonetheless approved a railway project portfolio for the corporation valued at approximately Sh2.824 trillion. The juxtaposition is grotesque: a corporation drowning in debt and governance failures is being handed an even larger mandate, with no credible mechanism for accountability in place.

    CONTEMPT AS INSTITUTIONAL POLICY

    The corporation’s attitude to judicial oversight has been consistent and deeply revealing. In January 2026, the High Court, before Justice Bahati Mwamuye, issued interim conservatory orders halting construction of the Sh11 billion Riruta-Lenana-Ngong metre gauge commuter railway project pending hearing of a constitutional petition filed by Senator Omtatah together with activists Bernard Muchiri and Naomi Misati. The orders were comprehensive: no further construction, no further financing, no disbursement of Railway Development Levy funds without parliamentary approval. The orders were served electronically and physically on January 20 and 21, with all parties acknowledging receipt.

    Construction resumed on January 22, 2026, one day after service. It continued on January 24 and January 25. Misati’s lawyers issued a cease-and-desist letter on January 23 warning of the breach. It was ignored. The contempt application filed on January 28 named Philip Mainga alongside Treasury Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo, Cabinet Secretary Mercy Wanjau, Transport Principal Secretary Mohamed Daghar, Attorney General Dorcas Oduor and CRBC General Manager Xiaodong Yu, among others.

    Kenya Railways’ response before the court was that activity on the site had been limited to securing the perimeter, a characterisation the petitioners contested as a euphemism for continued construction activity. The court varied its orders to permit works necessary for site safety, a concession the corporation appeared to receive with some relief. By March 2026, the court had ordered the disclosure of feasibility studies, procurement records, parliamentary approvals and environmental impact assessments, finding that the petitioners had established a valid constitutional basis for access to the information.

    The contempt proceedings were not the first time Mainga had been named for judicial disobedience. The pattern is structural, not incidental. When courts act, Kenya Railways management finds ways to circumvent, delay or procedurally outmanoeuvre the order rather than comply with its spirit.

    THE RECRUITMENT MARKET: POSITIONS FOR SALE

    The corruption at Kenya Railways is not confined to procurement. Internal sources have documented a pattern in which senior positions are awarded not on merit but for payment. The appointment in 2024 of Benedict Kiema Kavua, a procurement manager from Nairobi Water and Sewage Company, to the role of General Manager Procurement at Kenya Railways attracted immediate internal fury.

    Kavua is alleged to have lacked the requisite professional licence at the point of shortlisting. Two internal managers who had previously served in that position and whose experience and performance records were well-documented were passed over. Sources characterised the appointment as a direct result of a bribe paid to Mainga, and the broader wave of appointments made at the same time as a systematic purge of institutional memory ahead of the MD’s anticipated exit.

    The appointment of Stanley Cheruiyot as General Manager Business and Commercial generated similar consternation. Cheruiyot was a principal business development officer with no senior management experience. Two senior managers with demonstrated track records in that capacity were overlooked. Sources described the pattern as deliberate: Mainga was installing loyalists without institutional knowledge so that the documentation of his deals and the networks he had built would be impossible to reconstruct once he departed.

    A PENSION FUND IN TATTERS

    The victims of the Kenya Railways governance catastrophe are not abstract. They include thousands of former employees whose pension savings have been mismanaged with impunity. The EACC initiated an investigation into senior KRC officials over the alleged mismanagement of Sh8 billion designated for retirees through the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme, focusing on the scheme’s involvement in the questionable sale of 139 acres of Makongeni land.

    Five years before the EACC investigation, the DCI had already probed allegations that Kenya Railways sold prime properties belonging to the scheme at significantly reduced prices to preferred bidders, who immediately resold them at profit. Neither investigation resulted in prosecution. A parliamentary committee in 2025 directed Kenya Railways to pay outstanding pension to a former station manager who served for 17 years and had still not received his due. The committee found that administrative failures, deliberate or otherwise, had left pensioners destitute while management built personal fortunes.

    INVESTORS EXIT, QATAR FILES LEGAL NOTICE

    The cumulative effect of this governance environment on investor confidence is measurable and severe. A legal notice from a senior official of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce emerged in court proceedings, documenting unfulfilled real estate commitments made to Qatari investors in connection with the Railway City and SGR station land development programme. The accusation was that Kenya Railways had enticed foreign investors with land development promises and subsequently reneged, generating an international legal dispute that further damaged the corporation’s reputation in Gulf capital markets.

    Multiple credible local and international firms have either declined to engage with Kenya Railways procurement processes or withdrawn from negotiations after discovering the nature of the environment they would be operating in. When the lowest bidder can be disqualified not on technical grounds but through a procedural sleight of hand, then intimidated out of challenging the decision through deportation of its personnel, no rational investor with governance standards can remain at the table.

    The UK government’s involvement in financing the Railway City project amplifies the reputational stakes. British taxpayer funds are committed to a project whose procurement is now the subject of multiple court challenges and a PPARB ruling that Kenya Railways has twice refused to comply with. The Bunge la Mwananchi petition specifically sought to halt the disbursement of UK funding until a forensic audit had been conducted and governance standards established.

    WHAT THE INSTITUTIONS MUST DO

    The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations are not institutions without resources. They have the legal mandates, investigative powers, and prosecutorial pathways to act. What has been lacking, consistently, is the institutional courage to follow the evidence to its conclusion regardless of who the evidence implicates.

    The EACC must open a full forensic investigation into the Railway City tender process, examining not merely the procurement outcome but the entire chain from tender design through technical evaluation to final award and the subsequent deportation of competing bidders. It must interrogate the relationships between Kenya Railways management and both CRBC and the political intermediaries reportedly brokering contractor access. It must examine every land transaction under Mainga’s tenure, tracing money flows from fraudulent compensation schemes through the bank accounts identified in the Dupoto case to their ultimate beneficiaries.

    The DCI’s probe into the Sh88.2 million First Choice General Supplies tender must be concluded and its findings referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions without further delay. Peninah Patricks must be compelled to provide documentation of her company’s legitimate business activities preceding the award. Parliamentary committees must demand that Kenya Railways produce the full procurement file for that tender, including the backdated documentation flagged by investigators.

    The Attorney General, who is herself named as a respondent in the Riruta-Ngong contempt proceedings for failing to enforce the court’s orders, must answer for the decision to allow construction to resume within 24 hours of service. The Treasury Principal Secretary must account for the disbursement of Railway Development Fund monies for a project that a court had expressly barred from receiving such funds without parliamentary appropriation.

    The Kenya Railways board, having allowed a managing director with an expired mandate to continue exercising executive authority, must be held to account for this failure of corporate governance. The State Corporations Advisory Committee must compel an immediate competitive recruitment process for the position of Managing Director. Transport Cabinet Secretary Davis Chirchir, reportedly brought in to clean up the ministry’s affairs, must demonstrate that his mandate extends to Kenya Railways and that it is not merely rhetorical.

    The SGR debt restructuring secured in late 2025, which converted the dollar-denominated China Exim Bank loans to yuan and extended the maturity to 2040, was a necessary but insufficient measure. The Sh413.36 billion in accumulated arrears must be subject to a comprehensive public reckoning that explains, in granular detail, how penalties of Sh5.3 billion and avoidable interest of Sh28.85 billion were allowed to accrue when the Auditor-General had been flagging the problem for years.

    CONCLUSION: THE BILL ALWAYS COMES DUE

    Kenya Railways Corporation is not merely underperforming. It is actively being looted by its own leadership, and the mechanisms designed to prevent such looting have been captured, ignored or intimidated into ineffectiveness. The corporation carries the aspirations of millions of Kenyans who were promised that a modern railway network would transform the nation’s logistics, reduce congestion, lower the cost of doing business and connect communities from Mombasa to Malaba.

    Those aspirations have been subordinated to a culture of kickbacks so brazen that a tender is awarded to a higher bidder, the procurement review board is defied twice, the losing bidder’s personnel are forcibly deported, and the managing director remains in office past his contract’s expiry, protected by a board that knows exactly what it is protecting.

    The bill for this impunity is not paid by Philip Mainga or the directors who authorise the deals. It is paid by the pensioner who spent 17 years on the railway and cannot access his retirement benefits. It is paid by the communities displaced without compensation along SGR corridors. It is paid by the taxpayer servicing Sh34 billion in avoidable loan penalties. It is paid by the investor who commits capital to a procurement process, wins on merit, and watches the contract handed to a rival who paid the right people.

    Kenya cannot build a competitive economy on railways built on sand. The institutions of accountability exist. The evidence is on the record. The question that history will judge is whether those institutions chose to act when the rot was still containable, or whether they too became part of the machinery of plunder.

  • PROFITING FROM THE MISSILES: The Kenyan Tycoons Cashing In on the War Against Iran

    PROFITING FROM THE MISSILES: The Kenyan Tycoons Cashing In on the War Against Iran

    When the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on 28 February 2026, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggering what has since been described as the most severe disruption to global maritime trade since the Second World War, the immediate instinct among Nairobi’s business establishment was defensive. Fuel rationing, inflation, a weakening shilling, disrupted trade routes worth hundreds of billions of shillings. The models were grim. The projections were grimmer.

    Nobody modelled what actually happened.

    Within seventy-two hours of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issuing radio warnings prohibiting Western-linked vessel passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a cascade of unintended consequences began to flow southward along the Indian Ocean. Ships that had been bound for Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Jebel Ali found themselves wandering in open water, their insurers unwilling to issue cover for Hormuz transit at any price approaching commercial sanity. War-risk insurance premiums for vessels attempting the Strait surged past $200,000 per transit. Shipping companies did the arithmetic quickly. Many of their vessels began turning south, toward the only deep-water corridor that made geographic and financial sense: the Kenyan coast.

    What followed was a commercial windfall that Kenya’s most agile tycoons, port operators, logistics barons and manufacturers were positioning themselves to capture, even as millions of ordinary Kenyans braced for the inflationary consequences of a disrupted global fuel supply.

    One man’s geopolitical catastrophe is another man’s best financial year in a generation.

    THE PORT OF LAMU: FROM SLEEPY CURIOSITY TO GLOBAL LIFELINE

    There is no more dramatic symbol of Kenya’s unexpected war dividend than Lamu Port. For most of its short operational life, the facility on a UNESCO-listed island 340 kilometres north of Mombasa had been precisely the kind of infrastructure project that development economists write cautionary papers about: expensive, strategically visionary, chronically underutilised. Since it opened in 2021, the port had serviced a cumulative total of fewer than two hundred and fifty vessels. In the first quarter of 2025, it handled exactly two container ship calls.

    Then came the missiles.

    By 11 March 2026, less than two weeks after Operation Epic Fury began, the Kenya Ports Authority confirmed that Lamu had already received forty-three vessels in the year to date. By 19 March, that figure had jumped to seventy-four, representing roughly one-third of all ships the port had ever serviced in its entire existence. KPA Managing Director Captain William Ruto, the port’s most improbable namesake, offered the most candid assessment available from any Kenyan public official: revenues had already reached into the hundreds of millions of shillings from the surge alone. “We are overwhelmed,” he told reporters in Lamu. “The conflicts come with both blessings and challenges in business.”

    The vessels arriving were not carrying ordinary cargo. The MV Grande Auckland, a nine-thousand-capacity pure car carrier operated by Italy’s Grimaldi Lines, made its maiden Lamu call carrying a full load of high-end vehicles originally destined for Jebel Ali. It discharged four hundred and sixty-nine cars at the Kililana terminal, including Porsches that were photographed in a port warehouse and whose images circulated internationally, before continuing to Mumbai with its remaining cargo. Days later, the MV Grande Florida Palermo arrived from Yokohama, Japan, laden with three thousand eight hundred motor vehicles originally contracted for Saudi Arabia. Another vessel carrying five thousand units was confirmed expected imminently. More than four thousand luxury vehicles now sit at Lamu, effectively stranded until the security situation in the Gulf stabilises.

    The economics behind the diversion are mechanical in their simplicity. Lamu’s natural berths offer a draught of 17.5 metres, deeper than Mombasa’s 15-metre maximum, allowing it to accommodate the ultra-large carriers that the crisis is routing southward. Its location on the Indian Ocean places it roughly 3,300 kilometres from Dubai, close enough to make a forced diversion commercially bearable. And crucially, shippers using roll-on/roll-off vessels to offload thousands of cars at Lamu can then ferry individual vehicles to the Gulf on smaller craft that evade the war-risk insurance threshold entirely, an arbitrage that has turned Lamu’s once-mocked camels-and-dhows reputation into a logistics footnote.

    The port fees generated by a single five-thousand-vehicle shipment run into the tens of millions of shillings for Kenya Ports Authority alone, before calculating customs duties and associated warehousing charges. If the diversion rates of the past month continue through the year’s second and third quarters, the KPA and the Kenya Revenue Authority stand to collect revenues that would have been unimaginable in any pre-war forecast. KRA’s projections, according to officials who declined to be named, suggest customs duties on diverted vehicle shipments alone could approach Sh45 billion per major consignment, with total additional port-related revenues potentially reaching Sh1.8 billion over nine months when warehousing, bunkering and logistics taxes are aggregated. That is a 215 percent increase over the comparable period last year.

    Four thousand Porsches parked on a UNESCO heritage island is not a scene from a development plan. It is the disorienting arithmetic of war.

    KENYA AIRWAYS: THE NATION’S MOST PROFITABLE NATIONAL CARRIER, SUDDENLY

    In normal times, Kenya Airways exists primarily as a source of parliamentary anxiety, audit committee headaches, and recurring newspaper editorials demanding its privatisation. The national carrier posted a pre-tax loss of $138 million in 2025. Its Dubai and Sharjah routes, among its most commercially vital links to the Gulf’s enormous African diaspora, were suspended indefinitely the morning of 1 March 2026, when Gulf airspace closed. The initial damage assessment was severe.

    Nobody accounted for what Dubai’s closure would do to the global passenger market.

    Emirates, Etihad, Qatar Airways and Saudia collectively operate among the most extensive airline networks on earth, routing hundreds of millions of passengers between Europe, America, Asia and Africa through their Gulf hubs every year. When Gulf airspace closed, all four carriers either suspended or drastically curtailed operations. Emirates was reported at sixty-eight percent of normal service levels by mid-March. Qatar Airways had recovered to barely eighteen percent of pre-war operations, parking twenty aircraft in a Spanish storage facility. Etihad was barely functioning at forty-nine percent. The passengers who had been routed through Dubai and Doha had to go somewhere.

    They came to Nairobi.

    Kenya Airways acting CEO George Kamal, speaking at a press briefing in Nairobi, reported a thirty-two percent improvement in seat occupancy on long-haul routes, from an average seventy percent load factor to ninety percent, with some individual flights reaching ninety-nine percent capacity. “We took advantage of the current situation and mainly rerouted a lot of customers from Europe,” Kamal told journalists. “We see an increase from Europe, Asia and the US through Nairobi as a hub now.” The airline, which flies directly to London, Amsterdam, Paris, New York, Mumbai, Bangkok and Guangzhou, confirmed it was adding flights on multiple routes. Cargo shipments tell an equally striking story: daily freight volumes grew from approximately seventy tonnes per day to one hundred and eighty tonnes since January, as exporters bypassing closed Middle Eastern hubs discovered Nairobi’s commercial utility.

    The beneficiaries of Kenya Airways’ sudden commercial renaissance extend well beyond the airline itself. The jet fuel re-export business at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, which had grown into one of Kenya’s top five foreign exchange earners, worth an estimated Sh100 billion annually, was under threat from Gulf carrier suspensions. But the surge in long-haul traffic through JKIA has partially compensated for the loss of Gulf carrier fuelling, while simultaneously rewarding the oil marketing companies that supply jet fuel to the airport’s fuel farm. Companies including Total Energies Kenya, Rubis Energy Kenya and Vivo Energy, which operates the Shell brand locally, are positioned to benefit from the extraordinary volumes of fuel being consumed by long-haul aircraft that have rerouted through Nairobi.

    BIDCO AFRICA: THE SHAH FAMILY’S QUIET BILLION-DOLLAR MOMENT

    Vimal Shah does not habitually attract the kind of attention that Lamu’s Porsches or Kenya Airways’s packed flights generate. The sixty-four-year-old chairman of Bidco Africa, East Africa’s dominant manufacturer of edible oils, soaps, fats and personal care products, has spent four decades building a business that operates in eighteen African countries under more than sixty brands, including the household names Kimbo, Elianto, SunGold and Golden Fry. He holds the Chancellor’s chair at Maasai Mara University. Forbes once listed his family’s net worth at $1.6 billion, a figure Shah publicly dismissed as inflated even when the market was against him.

    In March 2026, the market is very much in his favour.

    The Strait of Hormuz’s effective closure has severed the supply chains that normally deliver competing edible oils from Gulf-region processors to East African supermarket shelves. Gulf-origin vegetable oils, which had commanded a significant share of the Kenyan retail market through price competitiveness and volume, are now stranded or rerouted on vessels adding weeks and thousands of dollars in additional freight costs to every consignment. The competitive arithmetic has shifted entirely. Bidco, which manufactures domestically with established regional supply chains and commands approximately forty-nine percent of Kenya’s edible oil market, has found its Middle Eastern competitors effectively removed from its shelves by an act of geopolitical force.

    The same logic applies to Bidco’s soap and detergent lines. With Gulf manufacturers unable to ship competitively into East African markets, Bidco’s Kimbo, Nuru and Power Boy brands are filling retail space that imported competitors previously occupied. Raw material costs have risen, given that Bidco itself depends partly on imported palm oil, but the elimination of finished-product competition has more than compensated. Industry analysts in Nairobi estimate that if the supply disruption continues through the second quarter of 2026, Bidco’s regional revenues could show a gain of fifteen to twenty-five percent over the same period in 2025, depending on how aggressively the company converts market share opportunity into volume.

    The Shah family, which privately holds Bidco through the Hemby Holdings structure, is not required to publish quarterly earnings or provide guidance to financial markets. The most reliable measure of Bidco’s performance is what happens on the shelves. Across Nairobi’s supermarket chains, Bidco products that were previously in price competition with Gulf-origin alternatives are now, for practical purposes, the market. That is a position Shah and his family have spent forty years trying to achieve through product quality and regional expansion. The war gave them what decades of effort approached but never fully delivered.

    The war gave the Shah family what forty years of effort approached but never fully delivered: a market without Gulf competition.

    MANU CHANDARIA AND THE COMCRAFT GROUP: STEEL, ALUMINIUM AND THE LAPSSET CORRIDOR

    At eighty-nine years of age, Manu Chandaria remains one of East Africa’s most significant industrialists, operating the Comcraft Group across more than forty countries with interests spanning steel manufacturing, aluminium processing, plastics and building materials. His Chandaria family holdings in Kenya include the Mabati Rolling Mills brand, the dominant manufacturer of iron sheets in East Africa, along with a portfolio of industrial operations that span the region’s construction and manufacturing supply chains.

    Comcraft’s strategic position in the current crisis derives from the same dynamic that is benefiting Bidco: the removal of Gulf competition from East African markets. Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, had established significant steel and aluminium manufacturing and re-export capacities aimed at African markets over the past decade. With those capacities now either damaged, stranded or commercially inaccessible, regional manufacturers find themselves as the default suppliers to construction and infrastructure projects that cannot wait for the war to end.

    The LAPSSET corridor is where Chandaria’s position becomes particularly powerful. Kenya and Ethiopia launched joint military patrols along the corridor on 4 March 2026, formally securitising the route as a strategic national and regional asset for the first time in the corridor’s history. The practical implication is that construction and infrastructure work along the LAPSSET route, including roads, pipelines, railway extensions and port facilities, is now being accelerated under wartime economic conditions. Comcraft, as East Africa’s leading steel and aluminium processor, is the default supplier for construction materials across that corridor. The Group is, according to sources familiar with the company’s operations, trading directly with partners in India and the Gulf’s neutral-shipping corridors to maintain supply to its own manufacturing operations while competitors remain stranded.

    THE BUNKERING BONANZA: MOMBASA’S HIDDEN WAR DIVIDEND

    One of the least discussed but most lucrative dimensions of the war’s impact on Kenya concerns bunkering. Ships rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean to avoid the Hormuz and Red Sea corridors are travelling thousands of additional nautical miles, exhausting their fuel reserves at accelerated rates. They require reprovisioning at Indian Ocean ports before they can continue to their destinations. Mombasa and, increasingly, Lamu are among the most practically situated reprovisioning stops on the affected routes.

    The oil marketing companies that dominate Mombasa’s bunkering industry stand to capture extraordinary revenues from this dynamic. Rubis Energy Kenya, Total Energies Kenya, and the trading arms of Vitol and Trafigura, which handle a significant share of Kenya’s fuel trading, are positioned to supply bunker fuel to diverted vessels at a moment when global demand for such reprovisioning is at a historical high. The Port of Mombasa had been developing its bunkering infrastructure as a strategic priority before the war; the war has simply accelerated the timeline on which that investment will generate returns. Bunkering demand at Kenyan ports is estimated by shipping industry analysts to have risen between thirty and forty percent in the weeks since Operation Epic Fury began.

    The revenues do not flow only to the oil companies. Port fees, pilotage charges, mooring services and stevedoring all accumulate with every additional vessel call. Kenya Ports Authority, which was in the process of converting from a state corporation to a public limited company under the Government Owned Enterprises Act assented to in November 2025, finds itself entering its new commercial structure at a moment of genuinely extraordinary revenue opportunity. KPA now has ministerially confirmed operational autonomy to make equipment purchases without government interference, a governance reform that was announced in February 2026 and whose commercial significance was dramatically amplified by the events that followed nine days later.

    THE AIRFREIGHT ARBITRAGE: HOW NAIROBI BECAME ASIA’S BACK DOOR TO EUROPE

    The closure of the Strait of Hormuz did not merely disrupt sea freight. It also transformed the economics of air cargo. With approximately eighteen percent of global air freight normally transiting through Gulf hub airports, and with Emirates, Etihad and Qatar’s cargo operations curtailed alongside their passenger services, European and Asian shippers requiring rapid delivery of electronics, pharmaceuticals, precision components and perishable goods found themselves competing for capacity on carriers that could actually fly the routes.

    Kenya Airways’s cargo surge, from seventy tonnes to one hundred and eighty tonnes of daily freight, is one dimension of this shift. But the more significant and enduring prize is Nairobi’s positioning as a transhipment node in the emergency air bridge that has formed to move consumer electronics from Asian manufacturing centres to European markets, bypassing the seventeen-thousand-kilometre sea detour that the Hormuz closure has imposed on ocean freight. The Jomo Kenyatta International Airport free trade zone, long a subject of government promotional literature and limited commercial traction, is attracting logistics operators who had previously regarded Nairobi primarily as a final destination rather than a through-routing point. That structural shift, if it persists beyond the immediate crisis, would represent a more valuable long-term asset than any of the immediate war-driven revenue flows.

    THE LOSERS IN THE ROOM

    Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging that the tycoons and entities profiting from the war are not the full story of what Iran’s missiles have done to Kenya’s economy. The country’s horticulture sector, which employs up to half a million Kenyans directly and generates over $800 million annually for the economy, is haemorrhaging. The Kenya Flower Council reported losses exceeding $4.2 million in the three weeks following the outbreak of hostilities. Exports at farms like Isinya Flower Farms in Kajiado have fallen by more than fifty percent. Cargo freight rates to Europe have spiked to $5.80 per kilogramme, a ten-year high, as Middle Eastern hub airports that normally provide transit capacity for Kenyan horticultural exports to European markets have become inaccessible.

    Kenya’s fuel supply chain is also genuinely stressed. The country obtains all its petroleum imports through government-to-government arrangements with Gulf producers and refiners. Those arrangements, which were renegotiated with a thirteen percent price reduction in April 2025, are now under structural strain as the supply corridors they depend on are disrupted. The Kenya Petroleum Outlets Association has reported that twenty percent of independent retail outlets have been affected by supply constraints, with some facing stock exhaustion. The Kenya Pipeline Company, which holds strategic reserves of more than one hundred and two million litres of petrol, one hundred and forty-six million litres of diesel and one hundred and sixty-seven million litres of kerosene, is providing a buffer but not an infinite one.

    The Nairobi Securities Exchange has absorbed significant damage. The NSE recorded its worst week since 2008 in the seven days ending 26 March 2026, with KSh 215.58 billion wiped from market capitalisation in four trading sessions. Safaricom alone shed KSh 54 billion in a single session. Brent crude above $106 per barrel, combined with the certainty of an EPRA fuel price review on 15 April, is feeding the kind of inflationary anxiety that the central bank can acknowledge but cannot easily contain.

    The beneficiaries of the war are a small, wealthy and largely private cluster of industrialists and quasi-state entities. The losers are a much larger and poorer group: flower farm workers in Kajiado, fuel retailers in Nairobi’s outer estates, investors on the NSE, and the nineteen million Kenyans who will see the April fuel price review reflected in their transport costs, food prices and utility bills.

    The beneficiaries of the war are a small, wealthy and largely private cluster. The losers are a much larger and poorer group.

    THE STRUCTURAL QUESTION: WINDFALL OR TRANSFORMATION?

    The question that animates Kenya’s policy community is whether the current disruption represents a temporary windfall or the beginning of a structural reorientation of East African trade. The distinction matters enormously. A windfall produces a brief revenue surge that dissipates when normal conditions return. A structural reorientation permanently increases the value of Kenya’s geography, infrastructure and productive capacity in global supply chains.

    The evidence on this question is genuinely mixed. The LAPSSET corridor, which had languished as an infrastructure aspiration for fourteen years since its announcement in 2012, has now been militarily secured and is carrying live commercial traffic at volumes that justify the investment. That is a structural shift of the kind that wars occasionally crystallise from ambition into reality. Kenya’s positioning as an alternative aviation hub, if the war persists long enough for shipping relationships to solidify, could yield long-term contract value that outlasts the immediate crisis.

    Against that, the deeper structural vulnerabilities remain: a fuel import dependency that is exposed to every Gulf disruption, a manufacturing sector that is not deep enough to absorb sustained input cost shocks, a financial market that sold off viciously on the first serious external shock in years, and a government that is spending its windfall port revenues servicing Eurobond obligations rather than investing in the port infrastructure that is generating them.

    President Ruto has a 2027 election to prepare for. The war has given him a budget breathing room he did not have in February. Whether his administration translates that breathing room into infrastructure investment or into political incumbency management will determine whether Kenya’s Iranian missile windfall outlasts the cease-fire negotiations that are, as of this publication, being described as ongoing in a number of diplomatic capitals.

    The tycoons in Vimal Shah’s position are not waiting for the government to decide. They are already at full capacity, supplying a market from which their competitors have been temporarily expelled. That is the nature of opportunism at the industrial scale. The missiles provided the opening. The question is who, and what, fills the space permanently.

  • THE HANDSHAKE THAT BECAME A NOOSE: How Tuju’s Alleged Intimate Access to EADB’s Yeda Apopo Produced a Sh294 Million Deal With No Written Contract, and Why That Trust Destroyed an Empire

    THE HANDSHAKE THAT BECAME A NOOSE: How Tuju’s Alleged Intimate Access to EADB’s Yeda Apopo Produced a Sh294 Million Deal With No Written Contract, and Why That Trust Destroyed an Empire

    There is a category of transaction that does not exist in the formal architecture of development finance. It has no name in the regulatory manuals that govern lending institutions from Kampala to Nairobi, no clause in the standard form agreements that are drafted by international lawyers billing at three hundred dollars an hour, and no mention in the governance frameworks that development banks present to their shareholders at annual general meetings.

    And yet it is the category into which, according to testimony that has surfaced across a decade of litigation, the most consequential portion of the loan that destroyed Raphael Tuju’s business empire quietly fell. It is called trust.

    In the wreckage of what was once a billion-shilling development, as armed police stand at the gates of Dari Restaurant and receiver managers prepare inventories of assets that Tuju built over three decades, this is the detail that nobody in the mainstream coverage of the EADB-Tuju dispute has examined with sufficient rigour: the second tranche of the 2015 loan facility, a sum variously described in court documents as Sh270 million to Sh294 million, the tranche that was supposed to fund the construction of luxury housing units whose sale would have serviced the entire debt, does not appear to have been governed by the same contractual rigour as the first. And the only credible explanation for why a businessman of Tuju’s sophistication would proceed on that basis lies in the identity of the person who ran the East African Development Bank when the loan was made.

    That person was Vivienne Yeda Apopo. She held the title of Director General for sixteen years and nine months, from January 15, 2009, until December 31, 2024, three months before police showed up at Tuju’s gates.

    She was, by any measure, one of the most powerful bankers in the East African region during the period when Kenya’s political and business elite were building the empires that they now fight to preserve.

    And the question that the courts, operating within the narrow procedural confines of foreign judgment enforcement, have never been required to answer is this: what was the precise nature of the relationship between Vivienne Yeda Apopo and Raphael Tuju, and did that relationship substitute for contractual certainty at the moment when certainty mattered most?

    The written contract bound Tuju absolutely. The alleged verbal assurance about the second tranche bound nobody. That asymmetry is the architecture of destruction.

    THE ARCHITECTURE OF A CONVENIENT DEAL

    To understand what happened, it is necessary to understand what EADB is and who controls it. The bank was established in 1967 under the treaty of the original East African Community and was re-established under its own charter in 1980 after the collapse of that union.

    Its founding members were Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Rwanda joined as the fourth Class A member state in 2008. But the bank’s shareholding extends well beyond the four governments.

    Class B institutional shareholders include the African Development Bank, the Netherlands Development Finance Company, the German Investment and Development Company, SBIC-Africa Holdings, Standard Chartered Bank in London, Barclays Bank in London, and, critically, the Commercial Bank of Africa.

    That last name is not incidental. The Commercial Bank of Africa, known as CBA before its merger with NIC Group to form NCBA in 2019, was effectively the house bank of the Kenyatta family.

    The Kenyattas, through an investment vehicle called Enke Investments Limited, controlled 24.91 percent of CBA, making them the single largest private shareholders. President Uhuru Kenyatta’s family was therefore a double shareholder in EADB at the time the Tuju loan was made: once as the Government of Kenya, which holds one of the four sovereign stakes in the bank, and again through CBA’s institutional Class B shareholding.

    The former Finance Minister who presided over the period when Yeda Apopo was appointed Director General was none other than Uhuru Kenyatta himself, who held the Treasury portfolio from 2001 to 2005 and had been deeply embedded in the bank’s political oversight architecture when Yeda Apopo rose through its ranks.

    Yeda Apopo had been at the EADB since at least 2006, serving as Director of Legal Affairs before being appointed to the top post in January 2009.

    By the time Tuju approached the bank in 2015 for funding for his Karen project, she had been Director General for six years.

    She sat on the board of the Central Bank of Kenya, had received the African Banker of the Year Award in May 2014, and had been named Business Leader of the Year by the Africa-America Institute in October 2014. She was, in the language of East African business, a woman of consequence.

    And she was Kenyan, in a bank that her own staff would formally accuse, in 2016, of favouring Kenya to the disadvantage of its other member states.

    A MAN WITH THE PRESIDENT’S EAR

    Tuju, in 2015, was not merely a borrower. He was a Cabinet Secretary without portfolio in Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration, a position that placed him in the inner sanctum of executive power.

    He was also Secretary-General of the Jubilee Party, the ruling coalition, which made him one of the most politically connected individuals in the country.

    He had previously served as Minister for East African Community under President Kibaki, giving him a history of direct engagement with the regional institutions that operated under the East African Community framework, of which the EADB is one.

    For a Director General seeking to maintain relevance in Nairobi, to secure the goodwill of the government that was simultaneously a sovereign shareholder and an indirect institutional shareholder through the Kenyatta family’s CBA stake, and to avoid the scrutiny that her own staff were beginning to direct at her management, Tuju was not a difficult case to approve.

    He was, by the internal political logic of the institution, the right kind of borrower: powerful, connected, and capable of running interference against the kind of parliamentary and governmental oversight that was already beginning to shadow her tenure.

    Staff within EADB had already begun to raise concerns about the manner in which Yeda Apopo was running the institution.

    A formal petition, which would become public in 2016 when The East African newspaper obtained it, accused her of approving projects from her home country while sitting on applications from Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

    The petition, copied to Kenya’s Treasury, demanded her immediate termination.

    It described a director general who frustrated viable projects from other member states while ensuring that Kenyan applications moved smoothly through the system.

    The Tuju loan, approved in April 2015, fits precisely that pattern. It was a Kenyan project, brought by a Kenyan political heavyweight, approved by a Kenyan director general, at a bank where Kenya was a double shareholder.

    Whether any personal relationship existed between Tuju and Yeda Apopo, as has been speculated in social media posts dating back to at least November 2020 and revived with considerable intensity in March 2026 as the Karen property seizures unfolded, the structural conditions for preferential treatment were more than sufficient on their own.

    Kenya was a double shareholder. The borrower was a cabinet minister. The lender was a Kenyan director general whose own staff accused her of running the bank as a Nairobi franchise. The political geometry was perfect.

    THE TRANCHE THAT WAS NEVER WRITTEN DOWN

    The loan agreement signed on April 10, 2015, between EADB and Dari Limited, Tuju’s company, was, on its face, a commercial document of reasonable sophistication.

    It was governed by English law, with disputes to be resolved in London, a choice that would prove catastrophic for Tuju’s defence when enforcement proceedings eventually commenced.

    It provided for a facility of $9.3 million, the disbursement of which was secured by charges over Tuju’s Entim Sidai property, his Tamarind Karen development, and the Dari Business Park, as well as personal guarantees from Tuju himself and his three children.

    The first tranche, approximately Sh932.7 million, was disbursed on July 29, 2015, and used to purchase the 94-year-old Victorian bungalow built by Scottish missionary Albert Patterson, which would become the centrepiece of the Dari Restaurant and Wellness project.

    The second tranche, approximately Sh294 million, was intended for the construction of high-end maisonettes on the property, the sale of which was the mechanism by which the loan was meant to repay itself.

    Thirty three-bedroom units on one parcel, eight five-bedroom units on another. The mathematics were straightforward: sell the units, retire the debt.

    But the second tranche, according to testimony that David Odongo, then EADB’s Kenya Country Manager, gave under cross-examination during Kenyan court proceedings, was structured differently from the first.

    Tuju’s legal team has consistently argued, and Odongo’s testimony appeared to support, that the disbursement of the second tranche was governed not by the four corners of the written facility agreement but by representations made outside it.

    The written agreement described conditions for disbursement.

    But the understanding of how and when those conditions would be satisfied, and indeed of whether they were conditions at all or merely administrative formalities that would be resolved through the relationship between the parties, appears to have operated on a different plane entirely.

    This is the missing link.

    The written contract bound Tuju absolutely. The alleged verbal assurance about the second tranche bound nobody. That asymmetry is the architecture of destruction.

    When Tuju’s team sought to introduce Odongo’s testimony as new evidence in 2024, seeking a review of the 2020 High Court decision that had adopted the UK judgment against him, the application was dismissed with a ruling that has become one of the most cited sentences in this litigation: the court said it would not permit a collateral attack on a final and valid foreign judgment already recognised and upheld on appeal.

    The Supreme Court of Kenya, when Tuju took his case to the apex court, was equally unsparing.

    Five justices, including the Deputy Chief Justice, found that the petitioners had not validated their averments with any proof.

    The allegations were described as bare and unsubstantiated.

    But the courts were not asked to evaluate whether the verbal representations were made. They were asked to evaluate whether those representations, even if made, could override a written contract governed by English law and already reduced to a London judgment. The answer to the second question is no. The first question was never properly examined.

    THE GRAVITY OF INSTITUTIONAL ACCESS

    To understand why a man of Tuju’s business experience would proceed on the basis of verbal assurances rather than written commitments, one must understand the gravitational pull of proximity to power in the Kenyan institutional environment.

    In 2015, Tuju was not dealing with a commercial bank whose loan officers operated within clearly defined matrices of credit authority.

    He was dealing with a regional development bank whose Director General had held her position for six years and whose decision-making, according to her own staff, had become increasingly concentrated at the apex of the institution.

    The EADB’s governance structure places the Governing Council, comprising the finance ministers of the member states, at the apex, with the board below it and the Director General responsible for day-to-day management.

    In practice, development banks of this size and complexity develop what practitioners call executive dominance, a tendency for the Director General’s personal judgement to substitute for collective institutional processes.

    The 2016 staff petition against Yeda Apopo described precisely this phenomenon: projects approved by senior management were stopped by the Director General without documented justification, while other projects she favoured moved through the system regardless of what the management recommendation said.

    If, in this environment, the Director General indicated to a borrower, through whatever channel, that the second tranche would be forthcoming once the first was deployed and the project had begun to take shape, a borrower operating in the Kenyan political economy would have had every reason to treat that indication as binding.

    Not because it was legally binding, but because in Nairobi in 2015, the word of a person of Yeda Apopo’s institutional stature, given to a person of Tuju’s political stature, carried a weight that no written contract needed to replicate.

    This is not a defence of Tuju’s financial management.

    The loan went into default in the second quarter of 2016, barely a year after disbursement. Only one interest payment was made, in October 2015.

    The grace period expired, the demand letters were ignored, and the international arbitration that followed produced a judgment that Kenyan courts have consistently upheld.

    Whatever verbal assurances were made, the written obligations were not met.

    But the question of why the obligations were not met, why the project that was supposed to generate the cash flow to service the loan never got off the ground, cannot be answered without examining the second tranche.

    And the second tranche cannot be examined without confronting the circumstances under which it was structured.

    THE OTHER DEALS THAT DIED THE SAME DEATH

    The Tuju case is not the only EADB lending relationship during Yeda Apopo’s tenure that followed this pattern.

    The 2020 reporting on the dispute by Kahawatungu identified at least three other projects that suffered what it described as the same fate: Quality Health Limited of Tanzania, where funds were allegedly disbursed for purposes other than those approved; the Kwale International Sugar Company, where a Sh2 billion agreement was signed but funds withheld after new conditions were introduced mid-stream; and the Infinity Industrial Park in Kenya, where $10 million was approved and offer letters executed before disbursement was declined following the imposition of new conditions.

    The pattern is consistent.

    An initial approval, sufficient to secure the borrower’s commitment and, in several cases, the pledging of security.

    A subsequent refusal to disburse on the basis of conditions that either were not in the original agreement or were introduced after the borrower had already committed to the project.

    The effect, in each case, is to leave the borrower exposed: the security is pledged, the project is underway or anticipated, but the funding that would make the project viable has been withheld.

    Whether this pattern was deliberate, systemic, or the product of individual lending decisions that simply went wrong is a question that falls outside the scope of this article.

    What it does establish is that the Tuju situation was not anomalous. It was one of several cases in which the gap between what was approved and what was disbursed became the site of the borrower’s destruction.

    Yeda Apopo had reduced the bank’s non-performing loan ratio from 26 percent in 2009 to 0.88 percent in 2024. The instrument of that reduction was aggressive recovery. The fuel for that recovery was the gap between approval and disbursement.

    THE BANKER WHO LEFT BEFORE THE RECKONING

    Vivienne Yeda Apopo retired on December 31, 2024. Three months later, armed police sealed the Dari Business Park.

    The timing is not conclusive of anything, but it is suggestive of the manner in which institutional accountability operates in the East African regional architecture.

    Her departure was announced with the language of celebration. The EADB described it as the conclusion of an outstanding 17-year career.

    Her successor in the interim was Benard Mono, the bank’s head of finance, pending a recruitment process.

    The bank she left behind was, by the metrics she had championed, a success: non-performing loans at 0.88 percent, down from 26 percent when she took over in 2009.

    That reduction was the signature achievement of her tenure.

    It was also, in the view of Tuju and at least three other borrowers, the product of recovery strategies that prioritised the bank’s balance sheet over the borrowers’ ability to complete the projects for which they had borrowed.

    She had survived multiple challenges during her tenure. The 2016 staff petition was investigated by Ernst and Young on the board’s recommendation.

    Its findings were not made public. In May 2023, then Treasury Cabinet Secretary Njuguna Ndung’u convened a meeting to deliberate on her term, raising questions in Nairobi’s financial circles about whether her position was finally under threat.

    She survived that too, remaining in post until the voluntary retirement that the bank characterised as entirely on her own terms.

    In November 2022, MP Joseph Makilap of Baringo North had risen in Parliament to table a pointed question: was there not a conflict of interest in the circumstance that the Director General of the bank that had provided the loan to finance the Lake Turkana Wind Power project was simultaneously serving as chairperson of the board of Kenya Power, the entity that was a party to the power purchase agreement arising from that loan? The question was never satisfactorily answered in parliament.

    Yeda Apopo was eventually pushed out of the Kenya Power chairmanship by the incoming Kenya Kwanza administration in 2022, but she retained the EADB directorship until her retirement.

    By the time she left, the EADB had spent $4.4 million in legal fees between 2016 and 2024 while declaring zero dividends to its shareholder governments, according to testimony presented to the East African Legislative Assembly by a civil society petition in September 2025.

    The largest single recovery action that consumed those legal fees was the Tuju case, pursued through London arbitration, the UK High Court, the Kenya High Court, the Kenya Court of Appeal, and eventually the Supreme Court of Kenya.

    Yeda Apopo’s departure meant she would not be present to answer for any of it.

    WHAT THE SILENCE CONCEALS

    Neither Tuju nor Yeda Apopo has made any public statement addressing the nature of their personal relationship.

    The social media posts that alleged a romantic connection between them, circulating from at least November 2020 and resurging in March 2026 as the property seizures became front-page news, remain unverified by any official record.

    Tuju’s court filings describe the second tranche’s non-disbursement as the cause of his default.

    They do not, in the filings that are part of the public record, attribute the initial loan to any personal relationship.

    What the filings do establish, read in conjunction with the testimony that Tuju sought to introduce as new evidence, is that there were representations made outside the written agreement that Tuju believed would be honoured.

    What they also establish is that a former EADB country manager, in sworn testimony, appears to have confirmed that the loan was structured in two phases in a manner that was not fully reflected in the contractual documentation.

    The courts declined to examine those representations because the procedural pathway to doing so was closed.

    The UK judgment came first.

    The Kenyan recognition of that judgment came second.

    Every subsequent attempt to introduce evidence that might have qualified or changed the outcome of those proceedings was dismissed as an attempt to relitigate matters already determined. That is not a failure of justice in the technical legal sense. But it is a failure of the full truth to emerge.

    And in that gap between legal process and full truth sits the relationship between Tuju and Yeda Apopo. Whatever its precise character, it was a relationship between two Kenyans at the apex of their respective spheres of influence, operating in an institution whose governance was already compromised by the kind of concentrated personal authority that makes verbal assurances feel as solid as signed documents.

    It was a relationship that, by the internal logic of EADB’s decision-making during Yeda Apopo’s tenure, made the Tuju loan possible on terms that a more arms-length process might not have produced.

    That relationship, whatever its character, appears to have been the invisible third party to the 2015 transaction.

    It is what substituted for the contractual certainty of the second tranche. It is what made a Sh294 million commitment feel real without ever being reduced to paper.

    And when it ended, or when its protections ceased to operate, what remained was a written security package that gave EADB everything it needed to enforce, and a borrower whose only defence depended on oral representations that no court was willing to evaluate.

    On March 14, 2026, three months and fourteen days after Vivienne Yeda Apopo retired from the East African Development Bank, armed police and uniformed officers arrived at Dari Restaurant and Business Park on the Ngong Road in Karen.

    They sealed the compound, changed the locks, and handed possession to the receiver managers appointed by EADB. Raphael Tuju stood outside the gates he could no longer enter and spoke directly to the cameras in the language of a man who understands public narrative.

    He described what was happening as a political assault. He invoked the constitution and the rule of law. He called the seizure an act of state-directed violence against a businessman who had tried to build something worth building in a country that should want more of the same. He was eloquent and composed, and he was, by any measure, a man watching the product of decades of work disappear behind a padlock that bore another institution’s name.

    Whether the story he told that night was the full story is the question that this investigation has sought to examine.

    The loan was real. The default was real. The judgment was real. The enforcement was legal. All of that is beyond dispute. But between the loan and the default, between the signing and the seizure, there was a phase of this transaction that has never been fully examined, a phase governed not by paper but by the assurances of a powerful woman to a powerful man in an institution where power was concentrated enough to make such assurances feel sufficient.

    That phase, and the relationship that made it possible, is the untold story of how Raphael Tuju lost Dari.

    NOTE

    This investigation is based on sworn court filings from proceedings in England and Kenya, testimony recorded during cross-examination of EADB witnesses, a formal staff petition submitted to the EADB Board of Governors and widely published in 2016, parliamentary records including the Hansard of the National Assembly of Kenya dated November 23, 2022, the EADB’s official shareholding disclosures, public records of the Commercial Bank of Africa’s ownership structure, and reports of proceedings before the East African Legislative Assembly. No court has found as a matter of fact that any personal relationship, romantic or otherwise, existed between Raphael Tuju and Vivienne Yeda Apopo, and neither party has confirmed or denied such a relationship on the record. The allegations of a personal relationship circulating in social media are presented here as unverified. Nairobi Law Monthly makes no finding on this question. EADB has not responded to queries specific to this investigation at the time of publication. Vivienne Yeda Apopo could not be reached for comment.

  • Fixer’s Deal for Nation Media Raises Fears for Press Independence and Ruto’s 2027 Bid

    Fixer’s Deal for Nation Media Raises Fears for Press Independence and Ruto’s 2027 Bid

    The Economist has raised the alarm. Kenya Insights goes further. The sale of the Nation Media Group to Tanzanian billionaire Rostam Azizi is not merely a commercial transaction with uncertain editorial consequences.

    It is, on the available evidence, the most structurally dangerous transfer of media power in East African history — timed, whether by design or fortune, to deliver maximum political utility to a Kenyan president fighting for his political survival in 2027.

    On March 10, 2026, in the gilded surroundings of the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, two men signed a document that ended 66 years of one of Africa’s most durable institutional arrangements. Sultan Ali Allana, representing the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, handed the keys of Nation Media Group to Rostam Abdulrasul Azizi, Tanzania’s first and most controversial dollar billionaire.

    The pen strokes took seconds. Their consequences will unfold across a decade.

    NMG is not a media company in the ordinary sense. It is a constitutional fixture. Its Daily Nation, Business Daily, NTV Kenya, The EastAfrican, Uganda’s Daily Monitor, Tanzania’s Mwananchi and The Citizen, and Rwanda Today collectively form the most credible independent information infrastructure in East and Central Africa, reaching over 62 million digital users monthly and thousands more through print and broadcast.

    For six decades, that infrastructure was owned by a philanthropic institution — the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development — insulated by both governance design and institutional culture from the transactional pressures of African politics. That insulation is now gone.

    In its place stands a man who built his fortune through intimate proximity to power, who resigned from Tanzania’s parliament under the shadow of a corruption scandal that brought down a prime minister, who personally counts among his close associates every sitting head of state in the four countries where NMG operates, and who has a Sh16.8 billion gas plant on the Kenyan coast that depends on continued goodwill from the very government his new newsrooms are supposed to hold to account.

    The Economist, in a careful piece published on March 19, noted the conflict of interest with characteristic restraint and asked whether Azizi could deliver on his pledges of editorial independence.

    This website — which has reported on Kenya’s political economy, its courts, its regulatory agencies and its media for years — believes the question deserves a blunter answer: the structural conditions for editorial interference are already fully assembled.

    Whether Azizi uses them will depend on his character.

    But character, history shows, is the least reliable protection any free press has ever had.

    THE PRESIDENT AT THE GROUNDBREAKING

    Begin with the most conspicuous fact. On February 24, 2023 — five months into William Ruto’s presidency — the head of state personally presided over the groundbreaking ceremony for Azizi’s Taifa Gas liquefied petroleum gas plant at the Dongo Kundu Special Economic Zone in Mombasa.

    Standing beside the Tanzanian tycoon in the coastal heat, Ruto told the assembled crowd: “I know the struggles he has been through to get to this point. The investment should have been done five years ago, but it was delayed due to government shenanigans here in Kenya. I have put that to an end.”

    President William Ruto (left) and Taifa Gas Group Chairman Rostam Aziz during the ground-breaking ceremony of the 30,000-tonne plant at the Dongo Kundu Special Economic Zone in Likoni, Mombasa on February 24, 2023.

    The plant — a 30,000-metric-tonne LPG terminal described as the largest private foreign direct investment in Kenya since 1977 — was valued at $130 million.

    The Ruto administration had cleared years of regulatory obstruction to make it happen. Azizi’s Taifa Gas was positioned as the vehicle to break the monopoly of Kenya’s domestic gas oligarchy and lower cooking fuel prices, giving the project a powerful populist veneer.

    What it also created was a specific, quantifiable financial dependency: Azizi now holds a flagship infrastructure asset on Kenyan soil whose profitability depends on regulatory licensing, port access, energy policy and the goodwill of the executive branch.

    Three years later, Azizi owns the newsrooms that cover that same government. The conflict of interest is not theoretical. It is structural, financial and explicit.

    Azizi, at a press conference on March 11, attempted to diffuse these concerns by insisting the Taifa Gas permits were obtained under former President Uhuru Kenyatta, not Ruto, and that he maintains relationships with leaders across the political spectrum.

    He also invoked his closeness to the late Raila Odinga, who attended his daughter’s wedding in Dar es Salaam.

    The deflection, while technically defensible in its narrow framing, misses the material point entirely. The question is not under whose government the permits were issued.

    The question is: under whose government the $130 million plant must operate, expand, be relicensed and be protected from competition.

    That government is Ruto’s.

    That government runs until at least 2027 — and, if its incumbent gets his way, well beyond.

    A TELLING COINCIDENCE OF TIMING

    Separately — and the word separately is doing significant work here — the Kenyan government moved with unusual urgency in the same week that Azizi’s acquisition was announced to prioritise settlement of a massive Sh410.6 million debt owed specifically to Nation Media Group.

    The arrears, accumulated through unpaid MyGov government advertising, had sat unresolved across years of the Ruto administration’s chronic delays in paying media houses.

    Budget requests obtained by Kenyan media reveal that settlement of NMG’s debt was elevated to priority status in the same fortnight as the Serena Hotel signing ceremony.

    Government sources have offered no formal explanation for the timing. Analysts and NMG insiders who spoke to this newspaper on condition of anonymity described it as, at minimum, a pointed signal.

    Whether it constitutes an inducement, a quid pro quo or a fortunate coincidence is, at this stage, a matter for the reader to judge.

    What is not in dispute is that a government which The Economist reports makes daily requests to State House to have critical NMG coverage removed suddenly found the money to pay almost half a billion shillings to the group at the precise moment its new owner was taking his seat.

    A BILLIONAIRE WHOSE HISTORY SPEAKS FOR ITSELF

    Rostam Azizi’s biography is, in the African business tradition, inseparable from politics.

    Born in the Tabora region of Tanzania, he was elected to parliament for the Igunga constituency in 1994 as a member of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party.

    He served three terms, rising to become CCM National Treasurer and a member of its Central Committee. He served as campaign manager for Jakaya Kikwete’s successful 2005 presidential run — a role in which, revealingly, he took such personal exception to Nation Media Group’s coverage of the candidate that he subsequently sold his stake in the Mwananchi Communications consortium he had co-founded with the Aga Khan’s group, and went out and bought competing media assets instead.

    That episode alone — of a media co-owner who exited a shared media venture over unfavourable political coverage of his preferred presidential candidate — should give every NMG journalist and editor serious pause.

    It is not a historical abstraction. It is a revealed preference.

    When editorial coverage conflicted with his political loyalties in 2005, Azizi voted with his feet. He now controls the newsrooms outright.

    Then there is the Richmond scandal.

    In 2006, the Tanzanian government awarded an emergency power generation contract to the US-registered Richmond Development Company — bypassing competitive procurement — for the provision of 100 megawatts of diesel generators to the state utility TANESCO.

    The contract, valued at approximately TSh172 billion, included a provision guaranteeing payment of $137,000 daily regardless of actual output.

    The generators underperformed, arrived late, and Tanzania lost over $120 million on the arrangement.

    A parliamentary select committee subsequently found that Richmond’s real proprietors included Prime Minister Edward Lowassa and, in the committee’s own words, “his close friend, Igunga MP Rostam Aziz.” Lowassa resigned. Two ministers resigned. The entire cabinet was dissolved.

    Azizi has consistently and strenuously denied wrongdoing. No criminal prosecution followed.

    He won a defamation case in 2009 against a Tanzanian newspaper that published the allegations verbatim. But in July 2011, when CCM demanded that leaders tainted by corruption allegations step down, Azizi became the first Tanzanian MP in history to voluntarily vacate his parliamentary seat — citing, with audible bitterness, what he called “gutter politics” within the party.

    That exit, widely read as recognition that the reputational damage was terminal, marked his formal pivot from politics to business expansion. The network of presidential relationships, however, never dimmed.

    A PATTERN ACROSS FOUR COUNTRIES

    What makes Azizi’s acquisition categorically more dangerous than a typical conflict-of-interest scenario is the geographic alignment of his political relationships with the precise governments that NMG newsrooms must hold to account. Consider the map.

    In Kenya, where the Daily Nation and Business Daily operate, Azizi has a $130 million energy asset and a documented personal relationship with President Ruto.

    In Tanzania, where Mwananchi and The Citizen publish, Azizi is intimately connected to President Samia Suluhu Hassan and to former President Kikwete — figures from his own party, CCM, a party he served for nearly two decades at the highest levels.

    In Uganda, where the Daily Monitor is one of the few remaining credible independent voices in an increasingly hostile media environment, Azizi has declared himself close to the leadership.

    In Rwanda, where the press freedom environment is among the most restrictive on the continent, NMG publishes Rwanda Today.

    This is not a portfolio of coincidental relationships. It is a complete political coverage of every jurisdiction in which NMG operates.

    A media owner who needs to maintain functional working relations with Ruto in Nairobi, Samia in Dar es Salaam, Museveni in Kampala and Kagame in Kigali — simultaneously — faces structural pressure to ensure that his newsrooms do not produce the kind of sustained, evidence-based investigative journalism that has historically been NMG’s distinguishing contribution to democratic life in the region.

    The Uganda evidence is already instructive. Long before Azizi’s acquisition was announced, Nation Media Group’s Ugandan publications — NTV Uganda and the Daily Monitor — were banned from covering President Yoweri Museveni’s events and barred from parliamentary grounds during his re-election campaign last year.

    The Committee to Protect Journalists documented the ban in detail, noting that security personnel cited unspecified “instructions” in refusing NMG journalists entry.

    Museveni’s deputy presidential press secretary confirmed on social media that the president had personally ordered the exclusion over what he termed “persistent instances of misreporting.” Museveni had previously threatened to force the Daily Monitor into bankruptcy and called journalists “parasites.”

    This is the media environment Azizi now inherits as majority owner in Uganda — a country where he has simultaneously declared himself close to the leadership.

    The tension between those two positions is irreconcilable in any democracy. It is the defining test he faces, in four countries at once, on day one.

    THE RSF RECORD AND THE RUTO PATTERN

    Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has been explicit about what Ruto’s presidency has meant for Kenyan media.

    Its country assessment states that Ruto’s election in August 2022 marked the start of a difficult period, with heads of major press groups including Nation Media Group and leading outlets such as the Daily Nation being removed from their positions as a direct result of political pressure.

    RSF notes that authorities can influence the appointment of media managers and editors through the regulator — described as nominally independent but practically government-aligned — and that this governmental presence generates systematic self-censorship.

    The Economist, drawing on a senior NMG company insider, reports that State House has made daily requests to have critical coverage removed from NMG platforms since Ruto took office in 2022. During the 2024 Gen Z protests — when Kenyan youth briefly came close to storming parliament — major advertisers including Safaricom withdrew revenue from NMG following its investigations into state surveillance of protesters.

    The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism’s 2025 Kenya report confirmed that mainstream media houses faced mounting pressure to align their coverage with the government’s narrative following those protests, with the result that audiences migrated in significant numbers toward YouTube, TikTok and independent digital platforms regarded as less susceptible to capture.

    Against this backdrop, the timing of the Azizi acquisition — with Kenya’s 2027 general election eighteen months away and Ruto campaigning for a second term amid significant public discontent — is not an inconvenient coincidence to be dismissed. It is a structural fact to be confronted.

    The president who wants Kenya’s most influential newspaper on his side for 2027 now has a media owner in place who has a quantifiable financial interest in keeping that president happy.

    WHAT AZIZI SAYS — AND WHAT HISTORY SAYS BACK

    Azizi, to his credit, has not hidden from the scrutiny. At the March 11 press conference and in a subsequent television interview on NTV Kenya, he offered detailed rebuttals: the gas permits predated Ruto; his relationships span the political spectrum; he has 26 years of media experience; he is a “great believer in print media”; and a newspaper that loses credibility loses its commercial value — therefore editorial independence is in his financial interest too. These are not unreasonable arguments. They deserve engagement rather than dismissal.

    The argument about commercial logic is the strongest, and in normal circumstances it would carry significant weight.

    The problem is that East African media economics do not operate in normal circumstances. Government advertising revenue is a structural lifeline for every major media house in the region. The threat to withhold it — or the promise to pay Sh410 million in arrears — is not a market signal but a political one. A media owner who holds a Ksh16.8 billion gas plant, who depends on regulatory goodwill for its continued operation, and who needs government advertising revenue to keep a loss-making media group solvent, faces a fundamentally different cost-benefit calculation than a purely commercial media investor insulated from state power.

    Tito Magoti, a Tanzanian human rights lawyer, put it bluntly in comments to Semafor: people of Azizi’s stature, he said, would never advocate for press freedom because it is against their business interest.

    Former NMG editor-in-chief Mutuma Mathiu, writing publicly after the deal was announced, asked two questions that have not been adequately answered: whether Azizi is a front for background investors whose identities have not been disclosed, and what the Aga Khan’s departure signals for the region’s democratic infrastructure.

    Churchill Otieno, president of the Africa Editors Forum, wrote on LinkedIn that NMG has for decades functioned as part of East Africa’s democratic infrastructure, and that when ownership shifts, the critical issue is not merely who buys, but what vision of the public sphere accompanies that purchase.

    THE MECHANISM OF INTERFERENCE

    Editorial interference in media institutions of NMG’s scale and institutional culture rarely arrives through the front door.

    It does not manifest as a proprietor calling a newsroom and ordering the removal of a story — at least not initially, and not in the early months when reputations are still being established and assurances are still being honoured.

    It manifests through appointments.

    The selection of editors and managing directors, decisions about which investigations receive resources and which are left unfunded, choices about which advertising campaigns to pursue and which state contracts to accept, and the accumulated effect of dozens of small decisions made by editors who understand, without being told, where the new owner’s interests lie.

    RSF has already noted that under the current Kenyan regulatory environment, authorities can influence media management appointments through the state-aligned media regulator.

    Azizi now sits above an editorial structure that is simultaneously subject to that external regulatory pressure and directly accountable to a single majority shareholder whose political relationships span every government in the region.

    The Aga Khan’s governance model — a philanthropic fund with institutional values embedded in its mandate — created structural insulation against precisely this dynamic. Taarifa Ltd, a private Mauritius-registered vehicle wholly owned by a single individual, creates none.

    The Committee to Protect Journalists, in its public statement on the acquisition, recommended that Azizi introduce binding editorial charters, independent editorial boards with genuine enforcement powers, transparent ownership disclosure across all subsidiary structures, and formal protections for editors against proprietorial interference.

    None of these recommendations has been adopted as policy. Azizi’s stated commitment to editorial independence remains exactly that: a stated commitment, backed by nothing more contractually binding than his personal assurance.

    THE PRECEDENT AZIZI HIMSELF SET

    There is one precedent that cuts through every assurance and every pledge with singular clarity. In 1999, Azizi co-founded Mwananchi Communications Limited with the Aga Khan’s media group — the very institution from which he has now acquired NMG.

    The partnership produced The Citizen, Mwananchi and Mwanaspoti newspapers, real vehicles of Tanzanian journalism.

    In 2005, serving as campaign manager for Jakaya Kikwete’s presidential run, Azizi took personal exception to NMG’s coverage of his candidate. He did not write a letter of complaint.

    He did not invoke editorial independence provisions. He sold his stake and walked out — and then went out and acquired competing media assets that he could control without the inconvenience of a partner with different political preferences.

    Two decades later, he has returned to those same newsrooms — as the sole controlling shareholder, with no institutional partner to check his preferences, and with a Kenyan president heading into an election whose outcome will determine the regulatory environment for his gas empire for the next decade.

    The structural logic of that arrangement does not require conspiracy to function. It operates through incentives. And the incentives all point in the same direction.

    WHAT MUST HAPPEN NOW

    The transaction remains subject to regulatory approval by Kenya’s Capital Markets Authority, the Communications Authority and the Nairobi Securities Exchange, as well as equivalent bodies in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda.

    Those regulatory agencies must exercise genuine scrutiny — not the formality of a rubber stamp — over the governance structures Azizi proposes for NMG’s editorial function.

    Specifically, they should require: binding editorial independence charters with independent oversight mechanisms; transparent disclosure of all beneficial ownership behind Taarifa Ltd; the establishment of an independent editorial board with genuine enforcement powers; and formal conflict-of-interest protocols requiring disclosure and recusal whenever NMG coverage touches on Azizi’s business interests or his political relationships.

    NMG’s journalists, editors and senior management have their own obligations. The real test of editorial independence is not what happens in the comfortable months after a proprietor’s honeymoon press conference.

    It is what happens the first time a Daily Nation investigation exposes a regulatory failure that touches on Taifa Gas’s licensing. It is what happens the first time NTV Kenya’s political desk publishes polling analysis that shows Ruto’s re-election campaign in serious trouble. It is what happens the first time a Business Daily reporter follows the money on a public procurement contract linked to a company in Azizi’s portfolio.

    The answers to those questions will tell East Africa everything it needs to know about what was really signed at the Serena Hotel on March 10.

    THE KENYA INSIGHTS ASSESSMENT

    The Economist asks whether Azizi can deliver on his pledges of editorial independence. We do not think that is the right question. The right question is whether any single individual — facing this specific matrix of financial dependencies, political relationships and regulatory exposure, in these four specific countries, at this specific moment in the East African political cycle — could resist the accumulated pressure of those incentives even if his personal intentions were entirely honourable. The structural answer, based on the evidence, is: probably not. The historical answer, based on what Azizi himself did when editorial coverage last conflicted with his political preferences, is: he won’t.

  • Big Shame: EY and PwC Found Guilty of Fraud and Corruption in Kenya as World Bank Bans Lay Bare Scandal Inside the Global Audit Elite

    Big Shame: EY and PwC Found Guilty of Fraud and Corruption in Kenya as World Bank Bans Lay Bare Scandal Inside the Global Audit Elite

    KEY FACTS

    EY Kenya  |  Debarment: 30 months from June 2024  |  Offences: Fraudulent practices, corrupt practices, concealment of conflict of interest, irregular allowances paid to project officials  |  Project: Somalia SCORE and PFM II programmes  |  Internal fallout: Laban Gathungu, senior partner, terminated; High Court awards him Sh43.12m for unlawful removal but orders him to repay EY Sh148m in related costs

    PwC Kenya, PwC Rwanda, PwC Associates (Mauritius)  |  Debarment: 21 months from 17 March 2026, running to 16 December 2027  |  Offences: Collusive practices, fraudulent practices, misrepresentation of key experts, failure to disclose sub-consultants  |  Project: Eastern Electricity Highway Project, Ethiopia-Kenya, valued at Sh149.8 billion  |  Cross-debarment: AfDB, ADB, EBRD, IADB


    For decades, the four giant accounting and advisory firms — Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and KPMG — have built their global empires on a singular, unassailable promise: that they are the guardians of financial probity in a world riddled with fraud. Corporates and governments have paid them hundreds of millions of dollars to audit their books, certify their accounts and keep the dishonest honest.

    That promise lies in ruins in Kenya.

    In a staggering sequence of admissions that has no parallel in the history of East African professional services, both Ernst & Young Kenya and PricewaterhouseCoopers Kenya have now confessed, under formal World Bank investigation, to the precise categories of misconduct their industry exists to combat. Bribery. Collusion. Fraudulent misrepresentation. The secret purchase of insider information from government officials. The Bank, which does not announce debarments lightly and investigates with the methodical thoroughness of a criminal court, has banned them both.

    EY Kenya was the first to fall. On 26 June 2024, the World Bank Group announced a 30-month debarment against the Nairobi-based arm of the global firm, citing fraudulent and corrupt practices committed in the course of World Bank-funded programmes in Somalia. It was a sentence that would bar EY Kenya and any entity it controlled from all World Bank Group-financed operations for two and a half years, a punishment simultaneously extended to the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank Group under a 2010 mutual enforcement agreement.

    EY Kenya had not yet completed nine months of that sentence when PwC was next.

    On 18 March 2026, the World Bank Group announced the 21-month debarment, with conditional release, of PricewaterhouseCoopers Associates Africa Ltd, based in Mauritius, alongside PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited Kenya and PricewaterhouseCoopers Rwanda Limited.

    The sanction relates to the Eastern Electricity Highway Project, the flagship Sh149.8 billion infrastructure initiative designed to construct more than a thousand kilometres of high-voltage transmission lines connecting a power substation at Wolayta-Sodo in Ethiopia to the Kenyan grid at Suswa, allowing Addis Ababa to export electricity to Nairobi while cutting power costs for Kenyan consumers.

    The project was everything development finance is supposed to look like: a $1.26 billion multilateral collaboration between the World Bank, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia, and the African Development Bank, conceived to reduce energy poverty and bind regional economies through shared infrastructure.

    It was precisely the kind of high-value, high-visibility contract that the Big Four have fed on for generations, and precisely the kind that the World Bank scrutinises most ferociously.

    “It suggests that something is broken in the profession.”

    Kwame Owino, Chief Executive, Institute of Economic Affairs

    What PwC and its African affiliates are accused of is not complexity. It is straightforward corruption of the most degrading variety.

    According to the World Bank’s findings, the three PwC entities obtained confidential procurement information from Ethiopian project officials in 2019 and used that information to gain an improper advantage in the competition to win a consultancy contract for implementing International Financial Reporting Standards at the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation.

    Rival firms, including South Africa’s Aurecon, BDO Consulting, a joint venture between Argentina’s Levin and Estudios Energeticos, Grant Thornton Ethiopia and Australia’s RHAS, competed on the assumption that the process was clean. It was not.

    The World Bank found that the PwC entities did not stop there. They sought further to steer the award of a second contract, for Fixed Asset Inventory and Revaluation for the Ethiopian Electric Utility, to PwC Associates.

    During both the selection and execution phases of that contract, PwC Associates misrepresented the availability, qualifications and employment status of key experts it was putting forward for the work, and failed to disclose all sub-consultants it was deploying on the project.

    The World Bank’s conclusion was unambiguous: this conduct constituted collusive and fraudulent practices under its Consultant Guidelines.

    PwC has not issued a public statement on the ban. A firm that would, in ordinary circumstances, advise a corporate client to communicate early, clearly and with contrition in the face of reputational crisis, has chosen silence.

    The EY Scandal: Bribery in the Horn of Africa

    The EY Kenya case, adjudicated before PwC’s, is arguably the more lurid of the two. EY Kenya had been engaged as a consultant under the Somalia Core Economic Institutions and Opportunities Programme, known as SCORE, and under the Second Public Financial Management Capacity Strengthening Project, both World Bank programmes designed to rebuild Somalia’s public financial architecture after decades of conflict and state collapse. The programmes carried a weight of humanitarian purpose that made the betrayal all the more pronounced.

    What the World Bank’s investigators found, after drilling through correspondence, financial records and the testimony of insiders, was a pattern of deliberate misconduct. EY Kenya failed to disclose a conflict of interest during the selection and implementation of four contracts under those programmes.

    It involved an unauthorised agent in those contracts. And during the execution of at least one contract, EY Kenya made provision for allowances to be paid to project officials, a transaction the World Bank characterised, without equivocation, as bribery.

    The man at the centre of it all was Laban Gathungu, a senior EY Kenya partner who led the firm’s operations in Somalia. Court papers filed in subsequent litigation in Nairobi reveal that Gathungu had secret and unethical communication with a Somali government official who provided him with confidential information about procurement discussions between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Development Bank, including intelligence on the proposed project price for the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods programme.

    That subcontractor, Horn Economic and Financial Institute, was later identified by forensic investigators as central to the alleged arrangement between Gathungu and the Somali official.

    A whistleblower letter dated 10 March 2018 was sent to Gathungu while he was operating in Mogadishu. He did not escalate it. When the firm’s chief executive eventually confronted him in October 2018, Gathungu’s response was found unsatisfactory and his partnership was terminated immediately.

    Gathungu then sued for wrongful removal, seeking Sh450 million in damages.

    EY countersued. The High Court ruled that both sides had proven their respective claims, awarding Gathungu Sh43.12 million for procedurally unlawful removal while simultaneously allowing EY Kenya to recover Sh148 million from him, a sum comprising $1.053 million paid to EY India for a forensic review, ZAR850,000 paid to EY South Africa to investigate the fraud allegations, and Sh5.69 million in related costs.

    The court’s refusal to award Gathungu the higher sum he sought, citing his own questionable behaviour, encapsulated the moral wreckage of the entire affair: a firm that polices the conduct of others, policed by the very courts to which it sells its governance expertise.

    The Regulator’s Silence is Deafening

    The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, which regulates all players in the Kenyan accountancy and audit industry and which wields the power to suspend or revoke practising certificates, has not publicly responded to either the EY Kenya or the PwC debarments.

    It did not respond to queries from the press following the EY ban in 2024. It did not respond after the PwC announcement in March 2026. Its silence, in the face of the two most damaging regulatory events in the history of Kenyan professional services, has itself become a story.

    Kwame Owino, chief executive of the Institute of Economic Affairs, says the debarments expose a structural failure that extends well beyond the firms themselves. He argues that after every World Bank ban, ICPAK should have taken visible, deterrent action to signal that the conduct was unacceptable under Kenyan professional standards, and that the absence of such action has contributed to a permissive environment in which firms calculated that the risk of exposure was manageable.

    Owino is not entirely without sympathy for the commercial pressures these firms face in markets where corruption is deeply entrenched, where government officials with information of financial value sell it as a matter of routine, and where firms that decline to play the game may simply find that their competitors do not share their scruples. But his sympathy stops well short of absolution.

    He notes that the World Bank is not an institution that is easily fooled, pointing out that the development lender typically deploys outside investigators to scrutinise its projects with exceptional rigour, and that anyone who decided to commit misconduct on a World Bank contract was not making a calculated bet so much as registering an eventual certainty of being caught.

    That EY Kenya and PwC proceeded regardless, he says, is among the most disturbing aspects of the entire scandal.

    A Global Giant Drowning in Scandal

    The Kenya PwC debarment arrives at a moment of profound institutional crisis for the global firm. Mohamed Kande, who became PwC’s global chair in July 2024, the first Black professional to hold the role and the first from a consulting rather than audit background, inherited a firm already on fire across multiple continents.

    In China, PwC’s auditing business was suspended for six months and fined $62 million by regulators who found that it had concealed or condoned fraud at the collapsed property developer Evergrande, which had accumulated more than $300 billion in debt before its spectacular implosion. Chinese state-owned enterprises departed the firm in a cascade.

    In Australia, a senior tax partner was found to have passed confidential government information to colleagues to help them win business from multinational technology companies, triggering a political furore and forcing PwC to sell its government consulting division entirely.

    In Saudi Arabia, the Public Investment Fund, the $925 billion sovereign wealth fund, severed its advisory relationship with the firm. By April 2025, PwC had shut down operations across more than a dozen African countries, including nine it exited simultaneously in a single announcement, as the firm scrambled to contain risk and distance itself from markets it could no longer guarantee it could police.

    Kenya, conspicuously, was not on that list of exits. Within months of that African retreat, PwC Kenya’s Africa affiliates stood accused before the World Bank.

    Kande has spoken publicly about rebuilding trust in the firm’s operations. The settlement that ended the World Bank’s Kenya investigation is, in one sense, a testament to his strategy: admit, cooperate, remediate, and accept a reduced sentence.

    PwC Associates, PwC Kenya and PwC Rwanda pleaded guilty in exchange for 21 months rather than the longer sanction that would otherwise have applied. The ban took effect on 17 March 2026 and will run until 16 December 2027 unless the firms satisfy the World Bank’s conditions for early release.

    PricewaterhouseCoopers Africa Limited, the continental coordination entity that sits above the national member firms and is responsible for compliance oversight across the network, was required to sign the settlement agreement as a non-sanctioned party. The World Bank’s insistence on that signature is itself a pointed commentary: the failure in Kenya was not an isolated deviation by a rogue unit but a failure of oversight at the continental level.

    Half the Big Four, Half the Industry, All of the Shame

    Kenya ranks second among African nations whose involvement in African Development Bank-financed projects has attracted multilateral sanctions, a grim statistic that speaks to the depth of the procurement corruption problem in the country’s public contracting ecosystem.

    The Big Four, with their air of unimpeachable rectitude and their global brand equity, are supposed to be the corrective force in that ecosystem. Instead, the evidence now before the World Bank shows they were participants in it.

    The commercial consequences are already visible. Both EY Kenya and the PwC affiliates face mandatory exits from the personnel involved in the misconduct, the forced termination of relationships with implicated sub-consultants and the obligation to construct from scratch integrity compliance programmes that satisfy the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency.

    They must submit to monitoring. They must train staff. They must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of an institution that was deceived by their own employees, that they have reformed.

    The question that neither firm has answered publicly, and that ICPAK has declined even to acknowledge, is the one that now confronts the entire East African professional services industry: if the firms that are paid to certify integrity do not have any themselves, who is left to certify them?

  • How EADB Threw Tuju Under The Bus

    How EADB Threw Tuju Under The Bus

    It was barely past two in the morning when the vehicles arrived. More than fifty officers, some in police uniform, others in balaclavas and arriving in unmarked vehicles, pushed through the gates of Dari Business Park on Ngong Road in Karen and sealed every entrance. Staff at the adjacent Tamarind Restaurant, who had done nothing wrong in their lives, were bundled out into the cold.

    Raphael Tuju, roused from sleep at his nearby residence, walked out to find a small army in possession of everything he had spent three decades building.

    They produced no court orders. They offered no explanation. They simply occupied. And behind that occupation, if you follow the trail of money and litigation far enough back, you find the East African Development Bank.

    The scenes that played out in the early hours of Saturday, March 14, 2026, brought an otherwise dry banking dispute crashing into public consciousness.

    Kenyans watched their television screens and social media feeds in astonishment as a former Cabinet Secretary, a former Jubilee Party Secretary-General, a man who had served his country in senior office across more than two decades, found himself locked out of his own business and speaking to a camera in the dark like a man who had lost everything.

    In a sense, he had. And the institution at the centre of it all, the Kampala-headquartered EADB, retreated behind a terse press statement about the rule of law and the finality of court orders.

    That statement, released on March 16, 2026, was clinical in its detachment. “The EADB distances itself from the ongoing public theatre of the borrower’s distortion of facts and disinformation,” it read. “There must be finality of court matters.”

    In eleven years of dealing with Tuju and his company Dari Limited, those are among the most revealing words EADB has ever committed to public record.

    They reveal an institution that is congenitally incapable of self-examination, that processes its borrowers through a machinery of foreign jurisdictions and immunity shields, and that walks away from the wreckage of ruined projects with the serene confidence of an entity that knows the courts will always give it the last word.

    This is the story of how that machinery worked, why it was allowed to work, and what it has cost the borrowers who dared believe in the bank’s development mandate.

    The Promise: A Two-Phase Deal, a Prestigious Karen Project

    To understand why Tuju is standing outside his own gates, you must go back to April 10, 2015, when Dari Limited, his project vehicle, signed a facility agreement with EADB for USD 9,197,084.

    The money was for a development that was, at first blush, exactly the sort of project a development bank should celebrate: the acquisition of a 20-acre prime parcel in Karen’s Tree Lane area, the rehabilitation of a 94-year-old Victorian bungalow originally built by Scottish missionary Dr. Albert Patterson into a high-end restaurant, the construction of luxury wellness villas under the Entim Sidai brand, and the creation of the Dari Business Park commercial complex off Ngong Road.

    Tuju himself, his three children Mano, Alma and Yma, and a related company, S.A.M Company Limited, signed on as guarantors and co-directors.

    The loan was structured in two tranches. Phase one, amounting to the bulk of the facility, was to finance the land acquisition, with EADB paying the vendor directly.

    Phase two, valued at Sh294 million, was earmarked for construction of the residential units: thirty three-bedroom maisonettes on the Tree Lane property and a further eighty-five units on a nearby seven-acre plot along Mwitu Road.

    The sale of these high-end units was the engine that was supposed to generate the revenue to service the debt. Without them, the project was a restaurant, and a restaurant alone, as Tuju and his lawyers have argued repeatedly, cannot service a loan of that magnitude.

    The first tranche was drawn on July 29, 2015. The first interest instalment fell due in October 2015, and Dari paid it. It would be the only payment EADB ever received.

    That single, faithful payment is a detail that tends to get buried in the avalanche of legal proceedings that followed, but it matters. It tells you that Tuju was not a man who borrowed money with no intention of repaying.

    It tells you that the project was at a stage where service was possible. And it tells you that whatever broke between October 2015 and the second quarter of 2016, when the loan formally fell into default, something went catastrophically wrong with the project’s cash flow.

    “I cannot explain why the second tranche was not disbursed since I was not in senior management. Conditions were to be met to release the money, but I did not know what happened.” – David Odongo, EADB’s own Kenya Country Manager, testifying in court, 2024

    According to Tuju, what went wrong was that EADB refused to disburse phase two. The bank, he alleges, suddenly introduced new conditions for the release of the construction funds, including additional security over an Upper Hill property that was already charged to the Bank of Africa.

    Without the construction money, the villas could not be built, the anticipated revenues never materialised, and the loan became unpayable. The bank counters that conditions for release were never met by Dari Limited and that it was never formally committed to the second disbursement.

    The truth, in the form of sworn court testimony, arrived in July 2024 when David Odongo, EADB’s own former Kenya Country Manager, the very officer who had appraised and presented the project for board approval, appeared before High Court Judge Alfred Mabeya and recanted. He confirmed the loan was two-phased.

    He confirmed the second tranche was for construction of the residential units. He confirmed that proceeds from food and beverage at the restaurant alone could not service the loan without the real estate component. And, most devastatingly, he said he could not explain why the second tranche was never disbursed. “I was not in senior management,” he told the court. In a related statement to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Odongo had confirmed that EADB’s board had approved both phases, including the additional Sh290 million for rehabilitation of structures and construction of demonstration villas.

    He also told the court that the affidavit bearing his name that had been filed in the UK proceedings, the document that helped obtain the English judgment against Tuju, had not been sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths in the usual manner.

    It was drafted by the bank’s lawyers, presented to him, and he signed it in good faith. Among the claims in that affidavit that he now said were not accurate: that Dari’s restaurant operations were generating revenues and profits sufficient to meet loan repayments without the construction component.

    That is not a minor discrepancy. That goes to the heart of whether EADB obtained its landmark UK judgment on the basis of evidence that its own witness now admits was inaccurate. Tuju has since returned to London seeking a review of the 2019 ruling in light of this new testimony. But the Kenyan courts have already closed that door, citing res judicata and the principle that issues already determined cannot be relitigated. The bank’s argument, echoed by every court that has since ruled in its favour, is that this matter is settled. Finality of courts must be upheld.

    The London Gambit: How EADB Armoured Itself Against Kenya’s Courts

    There is a clause buried in virtually every facility agreement EADB signs with its Kenyan borrowers, and prospective clients should read it with the greatest care before putting pen to paper.

    That clause specifies that disputes arising from the loan shall be resolved before the High Court of Justice in England, under English law, with the judgment to be registered and enforced in Kenya. For an institution whose mandate is to promote East African development, the choice of a London jurisdiction is remarkable.

    It means that when things go wrong, the borrower, whether a small Ugandan transport company or a prominent Kenyan businessman, must fight their corner against a well-resourced multilateral bank in a foreign court whose daily operating costs in lawyers’ fees alone can dwarf the original loan.

    EADB invoked that clause in December 2018 after years of correspondence with Dari Limited produced no payment. The case went before Judge Daniel Toledano of the High Court of Justice in London, who on June 19, 2019, granted summary judgment in EADB’s favour for USD 15,162,320.95, covering the outstanding principal, accrued interest, and penalties. Tuju’s appeal to the Court of Appeal in London, heard by Lord Justice Leggatt, was dismissed.

    The UK judgment was then registered by Kenya’s High Court on February 13, 2020, and when Tuju challenged it all the way up through the Kenyan court system, the Court of Appeal in Nairobi reaffirmed it on April 20, 2023.

    By that point, what had started as a USD 9.197 million loan had ballooned to the equivalent of Ksh1.9 billion, and depending on which party’s calculations you believe, the total exposure including continuing interest and legal costs may have reached Ksh4.5 billion by the time the auctioneers arrived.

    A loan that began at roughly Ksh943 million had more than quadrupled through the mechanics of compound default interest, currency movements, London legal fees, and a decade of enforcement costs. No payment was ever made after that single October 2015 instalment.

    The EADB Act that governs Kenya’s obligations to the bank was declared unconstitutional in March 2025 by a Machakos High Court judge, who found it allowed the Finance CS to channel public money out of the consolidated fund without parliamentary oversight or public participation.

    The London jurisdiction clause is also where EADB’s status as an international organisation becomes most consequential for borrowers. Article 44 of the EADB Charter grants the bank immunity from legal process in its member states.

    When Blueline Enterprises of Tanzania tried to execute an arbitration award against EADB’s bank accounts in the early 2000s, the Tanzanian Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the bank’s immunity, ruling that it enjoyed absolute immunity in the exercise of its lending powers, which is precisely the context in which a borrower would need to sue it.

    A judge warned prospective counterparties in plain terms: secure an express written waiver of immunity before you engage. Most borrowers, dazzled by the prospect of development financing, do not.

    Tuju has sought to test this immunity shield directly, filing a case at the East African Court of Justice challenging whether EADB’s blanket immunity is compatible with modern jurisprudence on the accountability of multilateral lenders.

    That case would be the first time the regional court had been asked to examine EADB’s charter in this light, making it one of the most consequential institutional law proceedings in East Africa’s recent history.

    The outcome remains to be seen. What is not in doubt is that immunity has functioned, in case after case, as a near-impenetrable shield for the bank and a near-insurmountable obstacle for anyone seeking redress against it.

    The Auction: A Ksh4.5 Billion Debt Recovered at Ksh450 Million

    On October 1, 2024, EADB auctioned the Ngong Road property that had been pledged by Dari Limited as loan security. Garam Investment Auctioneers, acting on behalf of the bank, conducted what it described as a competitive bidding process.

    The winning bid was Ksh450 million, accepted from a company called Ultra Eureka Limited. Court papers filed subsequently reveal that Ultra Eureka paid the full purchase price and was issued with completion documents, including the transfer instrument.

    By February 18, 2025, a certificate of lease had been issued in the company’s name. By March 2026, Ultra Eureka had charged the property to KCB Bank Kenya, meaning the asset had been refinanced within months of its purchase.

    Tuju was incandescent. He argued, publicly and in court, that the Ksh450 million sale price bore no relationship to the true value of the asset. He noted that EADB was simultaneously claiming a debt of Ksh1.9 billion to Ksh4.5 billion, and that even the lower figure was more than four times what the auctioned property fetched.

    At what price, exactly, were Knight Frank Valuers Limited, who conducted the valuation, placing the remaining assets? Tuju contested the valuation fiercely, and it was on the basis of that challenge that a temporary court injunction stopped the auction of the remaining properties, Entim Sidai Wellness Sanctuary and Tamarind Karen, until March 9, 2026, when Justice Josephine Wayua Mong’are of the Milimani Commercial Court struck out the amended plaint as barred by res judicata and set aside all interim orders.

    Six days later, on March 14, the masked operatives arrived at Dari Business Park. Ultra Eureka, which had hired Lavington Security Limited to guard the premises from March 10, moved to take physical possession.

    The police, specifically officers from the Rapid Response Unit, provided the muscle. No court order was shown to Tuju, despite his repeated requests on camera.

    He was allowed neither to collect his personal belongings nor to protect the interests of the tenants and employees whose livelihoods depended on the businesses operating within the park.

    The Judiciary, evidently stung by the optics, issued a clarifying statement on March 18 emphasising that the March 9 ruling had been delivered lawfully on grounds of issue estoppel and that the plaintiffs had since filed an appeal before the Court of Appeal.

    It urged all parties to exercise restraint.

    That plea for restraint came after the cameras had captured everything, after a former Cabinet Secretary had spent a night in the cold, and after dozens of workers had been locked out of their source of income in the early hours of a Saturday morning.

    The Allegations That Will Not Die: Bribery, the DCI, and a Petition to the Chief Justice

    No account of this dispute is complete without confronting its most explosive dimensions. Tuju, in a press conference outside the Supreme Court buildings after delivering a petition to Chief Justice Martha Koome on March 13, 2026, levelled an allegation that should send shockwaves through Kenya’s legal establishment.

    He claimed that agents of a commercial court judge had approached him for weeks demanding a bribe of Ksh10 million in exchange for a favourable ruling. He said he refused to pay.

    He said he instead chose to work with the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. He did not name the judge publicly, but he was clear that the bribe demand preceded the adverse rulings he subsequently received.

    These are unproven allegations. They are denied by the EADB. But Tuju made them in his own name, in public, outside the Supreme Court, with cameras rolling. He also recorded a formal statement at the Directorate of Criminal Investigations.

    The DCI, it should be noted, has previously summoned Tuju, his children, David Odongo, and other EADB officials in connection with the same dispute, suggesting the criminal investigation dimension of this case is very much alive.

    In the same press statement, Tuju applauded Justice Esther Maina of the Machakos High Court, who declined to dismiss a separate constitutional challenge to the EADB Act, allowing it to proceed to full trial.

    That case had already yielded a devastating ruling in March 2025, when Justice Francis Rayola Olei declared Sections 2(1) and 2(2) of the EADB Act 2014 unconstitutional, finding that they allowed the Cabinet Secretary for Finance to channel money out of Kenya’s consolidated fund into EADB without parliamentary oversight and without the public participation required by Article 10 of the Constitution.

    The judge ordered the Finance CS to produce records of all payments made to EADB since 2014, to be submitted to Parliament within sixty days. He also ordered the Auditor General to conduct a full audit.

    Kenya’s Machakos High Court declared the EADB Act 2014 unconstitutional, finding it allowed the Finance CS to funnel public money out of the consolidated fund and into a multilateral bank without parliamentary oversight, accountability, or public participation.

    Read that carefully.

    Kenyan taxpayer money has been flowing into EADB since 2014 through a legal mechanism that a court has now found to be unconstitutional.

    The bank whose charter grants it absolute immunity from judicial process in its own member states has been capitalised, in part, by public funds channelled in a manner that a Kenyan court has said violated the constitutional right to public participation.

    The same bank then uses that capital to sue its Kenyan borrowers in London courts, obtain judgments that dwarf the original loans, and auction prime Kenyan assets to buyers whose acquisition prices bear little obvious relationship to market value.

    At the East African Legislative Assembly in Arusha, a whistleblower petition filed by Peter Odhiambo of the Justice Alliance put additional allegations on the parliamentary record: board members clinging to seats for up to eighteen years, four times beyond what the EADB charter permits; allegations of insiders borrowing from the bank and sitting on the board that approves write-offs of the same loans; accusations that former Director General Vivienne Yeda leveraged her dual roles at EADB and as Kenya Power and Lighting Company chair to push dubious transactions.

    Vivienne Yeda Apopo
    Vivienne Yeda Apopo

    Tanzanian EALA legislator Dr. Abdullahi Makawe told the assembly he had been served with an arrest warrant simply for speaking to the media after raising questions about the bank before the House. Whether those allegations are established or not, they describe an institution for which transparency has historically been an afterthought.

    A Pattern Older Than Tuju: The Blueline Enterprises Precedent

    Those inclined to view the Tuju affair as an aberration, a unique collision of political timing, personal financial misfortune, and legal bad luck, need only read the dossier on Blueline Enterprises Limited of Tanzania.

    In March 1990, EADB advanced a loan of approximately USD 2.279 million in Special Drawing Rights to Blueline, a Tanzanian transport company, to finance the purchase of trucks, trailers, and haulage equipment for a petroleum logistics project serving Tanzania, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and neighbouring states.

    The project was exactly the kind of real-sector development financing that development banks are established to support. Blueline defaulted. EADB exercised its right to appoint a receiver-manager under the floating debenture.

    Blueline obtained an ex parte court order restraining the bank and the receiver from taking over its business. What followed was more than two decades of litigation across multiple courts and jurisdictions.

    The arbitrator, Mr. A.T.H. Mwakyusa, eventually awarded Blueline damages of USD 61,386,853 against EADB for losses allegedly occasioned by the bank’s conduct in the receivership. When Blueline commenced execution proceedings in 2006, a Tanzanian High Court allowed a garnishee order to attach EADB’s accounts at Standard Chartered Bank in Dar es Salaam. EADB invoked its immunity shield under Article 44 of its charter and the East African Development Bank Act.

    The High Court dismissed the immunity plea, finding that a liquid bank account was not the type of asset that enjoyed immunity.

    On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed that finding in a landmark 2011 judgment, holding that EADB enjoyed absolute immunity from all forms of legal process arising out of the exercise of its lending powers, and declared all proceedings against the bank a nullity.

    Blueline was left holding a USD 61 million arbitration award it could not enforce against an institution whose charter placed its assets beyond the reach of any court.

    The member states of EADB declined to step in with taxpayer funds to satisfy the award. EADB emerged intact. Blueline did not.

    The structural parallel with Tuju’s situation is striking. In both cases, EADB advanced a loan for a project that was supposed to generate revenues enabling repayment. In both cases, the borrower alleges that the bank’s own conduct in the transaction contributed to the default.

    In both cases, the bank pursued recovery through courts and enforcement mechanisms that placed it at an overwhelming procedural advantage, while the borrower’s avenues for counterclaims against the institution were constrained by the immunity shield. And in both cases, the bank won.

    The Broader Portfolio: Write-Offs, Bad Loans, and the Quiet Reckoning

    EADB has, to its credit, openly acknowledged the toll its lending portfolio has taken. Its audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2023, revealed that the bank wrote off loans amounting to USD 13.03 million during the year, a dramatic escalation from the USD 140,000 written off in 2022. Those written-off assets, secured by landed properties including apartment blocks and land in various locations across the region, were being offered for sale.

    The bank noted that the sale process was expected to take approximately one year and that the estimated sale values had been discounted to present value, meaning the assets were being marketed at figures below what the bank itself estimated they would ultimately fetch.

    That is the institutional version of the discount at which prime properties disappear from borrowers’ portfolios.

    At the time of reporting, Tanzania held the largest share of EADB’s gross loan balances at USD 72.83 million, representing 63 percent of the total. Uganda accounted for 28 percent at USD 33.03 million, with Kenya at six percent and Rwanda at three percent. Uganda had a non-performing loan balance of USD 1.02 million as of that reporting period. Kenya had resumed repayment of its loans after defaulting on a USD 5.2 million repayment in 2022. These are not the figures of a bank with a pristine lending record operating in a straightforward development environment.

    They are the figures of a multilateral institution managing a complex and contested loan book across four jurisdictions, with a history of defaults, receiverships, and contested recoveries.

    In 2024, EADB announced a significant policy shift, moving from dollar-denominated lending to local currency financing through currency swap agreements worth USD 90 million signed with Rwanda and Tanzania. The stated purpose was to eliminate exchange rate risks for borrowers and reduce the cost of loans.

    That is a welcome and long-overdue reform. It is also an implicit acknowledgment that lending in US dollars to borrowers earning in Kenyan shillings, Tanzanian shillings, or Ugandan shillings created a structural vulnerability in every loan it originated, a vulnerability that contributed to defaults across its portfolio when exchange rates moved adversely.

    It is a vulnerability that, in Tuju’s case, meant that a loan originally equivalent to Ksh943 million had, through interest, penalties, and currency movements, become a debt of Ksh1.9 billion to Ksh4.5 billion, depending on the calculation date.

    The Warning Every Borrower Must Heed

    This story is not, at its core, about Raphael Tuju. Tuju is the most visible casualty of an institutional structure that has, over decades, created conditions systematically unfavourable to borrowers across East Africa.

    The combination of factors that define EADB’s relationship with its clients is worth stating plainly, because every prospective borrower walking through its doors deserves to understand what they are signing.

    First, the dispute resolution clause. When you borrow from EADB, you agree that any dispute will be resolved in England under English law. You are consenting, in advance, to fight any grievance you have against a Kampala-headquartered institution in a foreign court thousands of miles from your business, your assets, and your country’s legal system. The cost of that fight, in London lawyers’ fees alone, can render a legitimate defence economically impossible.

    Second, the immunity shield. Article 44 of the EADB Charter, interpreted by courts from Tanzania to Kenya, grants the bank absolute immunity from legal process arising from its lending activities.

    If the bank’s conduct in relation to your loan contributes to your default, whether by refusing a second tranche, by introducing new collateral conditions, or by any other means, your ability to sue it for those actions is severely curtailed.

    You can lose. It cannot. That is not a metaphor. It is the legal architecture within which EADB operates.

    Third, the dollar denomination risk. Until 2024, every loan EADB advanced to East African borrowers was denominated in US dollars. If the shilling fell against the dollar during the life of your loan, your debt grew in local currency terms without any new borrowing. Tuju’s original facility of approximately Ksh943 million became Ksh1.9 billion in part because of this mechanism, compounded by default interest rates that the facility agreement permitted the bank to apply.

    Fourth, the affidavit problem.

    Evidence from the Tuju case shows that EADB’s own Kenya Country Manager signed court affidavits prepared by the bank’s lawyers in proceedings before the English court, affidavits that he subsequently recanted under cross-examination before a Kenyan judge.

    The same affidavits were used to obtain the UK summary judgment that forms the foundation of the entire enforcement action against Tuju and his family. That a Kenyan court has repeatedly declined to give effect to this recantation, citing issue estoppel and res judicata, does not make the underlying factual problem disappear. It simply means it cannot be relitigated domestically.

    Fifth, the valuation and auction mechanics. When EADB auctions a property to recover a debt, the valuation is conducted by a firm it appoints. The bidding process is managed by an auctioneer it appoints.

    The first Dari property, Tamarind Karen and Dari Business Park, was reportedly sold for Ksh450 million against a debt the bank simultaneously valued at Ksh1.9 billion.

    Whatever remained of that gap, after the auction proceeds were applied to the outstanding balance, continued to accrue interest. The remaining properties, Entim Sidai and the others, were next in line. If those too are sold at prices significantly below the bank’s stated debt, Tuju could lose everything and still owe money.

    When a development bank’s own official recants the evidence used to obtain a foreign judgment, but the courts say that judgment can no longer be questioned, something has gone wrong with the system. The question is who pays the price. In this case, it is the borrower.

    What EADB Says, and What It Does Not Say

    In fairness to EADB, its position is not without foundation. Contracts, once signed, must be enforced. A development bank that let every defaulting borrower walk away on the basis of hardship stories would cease to exist as a viable institution within a decade. The English court, the Kenyan High Court, and the Court of Appeal have all examined the facts and found for EADB. That is not nothing.

    The bank also makes a point that deserves to be taken seriously: it says it received no credible or verifiable repayment proposal from Dari Limited throughout the seven years of this dispute.

    Tuju’s counter-claim, that he made multiple settlement offers including an immediate Ksh1.29 billion payment and a KCB refinancing proposal that would have cleared the debt in cash, has not been established to the satisfaction of any court. The bank says those offers were not verifiable.

    Tuju says the bank refused to engage or issue a redemption statement. A decade of litigation has not settled this factual dispute to the satisfaction of the public, even if the courts have moved on.

    But here is what EADB does not say, and what no court has compelled it to explain. It does not explain why the second tranche of Ksh294 million, the construction money without which the project was designed to fail, was never disbursed.

    It does not address the recantation by its own Kenya Country Manager. It does not explain why the facility was originally denominated in a currency that would automatically inflate the borrower’s obligations as the shilling weakened.

    It does not explain what a property valued at Ksh4.5 billion in outstanding debt was doing selling at the auction for Ksh450 million.

    And it does not explain why, when the moment of enforcement came, it deployed masked operatives in unmarked vehicles in the middle of the night rather than the unambiguous production of court orders that the rule of law it purports to represent would seem to require.

    The Reckoning

    Tuju has appealed to the Court of Appeal. He has petitioned the Chief Justice. He has recorded a statement at the DCI. He has filed at the East African Court of Justice. He has returned to London seeking a review of the foundational judgment.

    Every door he knocks on has, so far, been closed by the same combination of res judicata, issue estoppel, and the formidable procedural architecture that EADB has built around itself over decades. Courts do not easily second-guess other courts, especially foreign ones whose judgments have been formally registered. That is the system working as designed.

    But behind the legal formalism, a set of questions that go to the heart of what development finance is supposed to be for remain stubbornly unanswered. EADB was created in 1967 to promote sustainable socio-economic development in East Africa through long-term lending to viable projects.

    It is owned by the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, capitalised partly by their taxpayers’ money, and endorsed by the African Development Bank, the Netherlands Development Finance Company FMO, and Germany’s DEG. It has won awards.

    It has been rated. It has been celebrated. And yet the pattern that emerges from decade after decade of its lending record is of an institution that extends credit under contractual terms that systematically disadvantage its borrowers, pursues enforcement through foreign courts that most borrowers cannot afford to match, hides behind a charter immunity that places it above accountability, and auctions its way to recovery at values that bear no obvious relationship to the outstanding debt.

    As for Tuju, he is outside his gates. His children, who signed as guarantors and whose properties are pledged as security, face the same enforcement machinery.

    The Tamarind Restaurant that once served Karen’s moneyed classes has a new owner. The Entim Sidai Wellness Sanctuary is next. What was once a Ksh943 million loan, drawn in the full confidence that a development bank was a partner in a legitimate enterprise, has become the instrument of demolition of everything he built.

    EADB calls it the rule of law. It calls it the finality of court orders. It calls it the inevitable consequence of a borrower who refused to pay.

    Raphael Tuju, standing in the predawn dark outside the gates of his own business park, calls it something else entirely.

    And the growing body of evidence from its loan book, its affidavits, its immunity battles, and its courtroom record across four countries and more than three decades suggests that this is not the last time East Africa will have this conversation about the bank that was built to develop the region and has become, for far too many of its clients, the institution that showed up in the night and took it all away.

  • Investigations Reveal The Depth Of Rot In City Hall’s Garbage Collection Tender To Corrupt Ghanaian Firm

    Investigations Reveal The Depth Of Rot In City Hall’s Garbage Collection Tender To Corrupt Ghanaian Firm

    At 5.05 on the morning of Monday, February 16, 2026, a technical delegation from City Hall was scheduled to board a Kenya Airways flight at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, bound for Accra.

    Their mission, conducted in conditions of unusual secrecy, was framed as a due diligence exercise: to inspect the facilities of Zoomlion Ghana Limited, a waste management company to which Nairobi County Government had, six days earlier, awarded a multibillion-shilling, twenty-year contract.

    The chairman of the tender evaluation committee, Engineer Charles Ngugi Gathara, never made it onto that plane. He collapsed at the airport after suffering a sudden illness and was pronounced dead. His colleagues departed without him.

    That a man died while preparing to perform due diligence on a deal that had already been awarded ought, under any functioning procurement regime, to have been the least of the questions raised by the City Hall-Zoomlion transaction.

    It was not. The Zoomlion contract, formally designated Tender No. NCC/ENV/RFP/109/2025-2026, is now the subject of a High Court conservatory order, a damning internal technical review, a separate Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission inquiry in Mombasa, and a chorus of civil society outrage that has drawn comparisons to Ghana’s own long experience of being looted by the very company Nairobi has now embraced.

    Investigations by Kenya Insights, drawing on court filings, procurement documents, internal government communications, international debarment records and multiple sources within City Hall and the National Treasury, reveal a procurement so fundamentally compromised that it calls into question not merely the contract itself but the integrity of every institution that permitted it to proceed.

    THE DEAL IN PLAIN TERMS

    The contract grants Zoomlion Ghana Limited exclusive rights to design, construct, operate, maintain and eventually transfer an integrated solid waste management system for Nairobi City County.

    The scope encompasses waste collection and haulage across the capital, control of the 76-acre Dandora dumpsite, sorting, recycling and disposal infrastructure, and the construction of a waste-to-energy facility that the national government has projected could generate electricity and produce fertiliser by 2027.

    The tenure is twenty years, a period that will outlast at least three gubernatorial terms and bind administrations not yet elected to a contract whose full financial terms have not been made public.

    The notification of award was issued in United States dollars, an irregularity that raised immediate concern among Treasury officials who reviewed the agreement.

    No dedicated funding mechanism, no escrow arrangement, no defined management fee schedule, and no guaranteed minimum waste supply commitment appear in the contract as reviewed by City Hall’s own technical team.

    That team characterised the document as providing Zoomlion with what amounted to a blank cheque drawn on the public of Nairobi.

    “Several commercial and financial safeguards require strengthening. The absence of provisions addressing ISPO arrangements, escrow mechanisms, clearly defined management fee schedules, guaranteed minimum waste supply and dedicated funding sources may expose the project to operational and financial risks.” — City Hall Technical Review

    Zoomlion Waste Services Limited, the Kenyan vehicle for the deal, was incorporated on August 23, 2025 with Zoomlion Ghana Limited listed as the sole shareholder and two Ghanaian nationals, Said Haidar and Joseph Kwame Siaw Agyepong, listed as directors.

    A single Kenyan, Mombasa lawyer Heeral Vishal Soni, appears as a director without shares.

    The incorporation of the local entity preceded the advertising of the tender by nearly four months, a sequence that procurement specialists say is consistent with a tender designed around a pre-selected beneficiary.

    THE SOLE BIDDER PROBLEM

    The tender was advertised on December 18, 2025, on the City Hall website and the Public Procurement Information Portal. Bids closed and were opened on January 8, 2026. Zoomlion Ghana Limited was the only entity to submit a response.

    In a project of this scale, complexity and duration, involving the primary waste infrastructure of a capital city of more than six million people, a single bid is not a market outcome.

    It is an administrative outcome: the product of deliberate choices about how a tender is structured, priced, timed and classified.

    A senior official in the National Treasury reviewed the tender documents and told Kenya Insights that the procurement was misconceived from inception.

    The project, by virtue of its financing, construction and long-term operational components, falls squarely within the Public Private Partnership Act 2021 and should have been processed through the PPP Directorate under the National Treasury.

    Instead, it was run under the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2015, a choice that stripped it of the safeguards that apply to major infrastructure concessions.

    The minimum advertising period for an open international tender is 21 days; without international classification the period can be compressed in ways that effectively exclude foreign competitors who might otherwise have entered the field.

    The tender document contains a clause stating that the process is open to both local and international bidders.

    However, the document bears none of the required classification initials that legally designate a tender as either Open National Tender or Open International Tender.

    In the absence of those designations, Kenyan companies were nominally eligible while the structural conditions of the tender ensured that only a firm already positioned and incorporated in Kenya before the advertisement could realistically respond within the window available.

    Zoomlion Waste Services Limited had been in existence for exactly that purpose since August.

    A HISTORY OF BRIBERY, OVERBILLING AND SCANDAL

    The company at the centre of this arrangement is not a newcomer to controversy. Zoomlion Ghana Limited and two subsidiaries, Accra Compost Plant and Zoom Alliance, were formally debarred by the World Bank in 2013 after an investigation found that the company had paid bribes to facilitate contract execution and invoice processing on the World Bank-financed Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation Project in Liberia.

    The debarment barred Zoomlion and its affiliates from bidding on any World Bank-funded contracts worldwide.

    The sanction remained in force until 2015, when the company entered into a Negotiated Resolution Agreement with the Bank, acknowledged the misconduct and agreed to strengthen compliance with integrity standards.

    The company’s own tender documents for the Nairobi bid contained an eligibility requirement stating that bidders must not have been blacklisted or debarred from participating in tenders by any national or state government agencies, autonomous bodies or institutions.

    Zoomlion met that criterion only by virtue of having subsequently resolved its debarment through negotiation.

    Whether that resolution, which involved an admission of wrongdoing, satisfies the spirit of a requirement designed to exclude corrupt actors is a question that City Hall’s procurement officials have conspicuously declined to answer.

    In Ghana itself, the record is substantially worse. Beginning in 2013, investigative journalist Manasseh Azure Awuni exposed the scale of corruption within the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency, known as GYEEDA, in what became one of the most significant procurement scandals in Ghanaian public life.

    A government ministerial committee confirmed the findings. Between 2009 and 2012, nearly 500 million dollars was spent through GYEEDA. Zoomlion and other companies within the Jospong Group were identified as primary beneficiaries.

    The committee found that Zoomlion received payments for work not done and systematically overcharged the government. As a single representative instance, the company charged the government 25 million cedis more than was warranted for providing tricycles.

    The committee recommended the discontinuation of Zoomlion’s contracts. Successive Ghanaian administrations declined to act.

    The Ghanaian Auditor-General returned to Zoomlion repeatedly in subsequent years. One report documented a waste bin contract, awarded on a sole-source basis to the Jospong Group, that was inflated by at least 130 million cedis.

    Another found that 98 million cedis had been paid to eleven Jospong-linked companies for fumigation services already covered under Zoomlion’s existing contractual obligations.

    Police investigations into the fumigation agreements were launched but produced no convictions. Under the Youth Employment Agency initiative, the arrangement that structured Zoomlion’s sweeper programme, the government paid 850 cedis per worker per month, of which only 250 cedis reached the workers themselves.

    Zoomlion retained 600 cedis per worker as a management fee, an arrangement that labour rights advocates characterised as structurally exploitative.

    Despite cabinet directives under President John Mahama’s first administration ordering the termination of Zoomlion’s sanitation contract, the company continued rendering services to the state after its contract expired in February 2013 and accumulated debts owed to it by the government in excess of 450 million cedis.

    In June 2025, President Mahama, returned to office after the 2024 elections, finally terminated the Youth Employment Agency contract with Zoomlion entirely, citing transparency concerns and the exploitative compensation structure. All payments made to Zoomlion after the original contract’s expiration were ordered into an audit.

    Jospong Group Executive Chairman Dr Joseph Siaw Agyepong, the controlling figure behind Zoomlion and listed as a director of Zoomlion Waste Services in Kenya, is simultaneously facing contempt proceedings in a Ghanaian High Court. In late 2025, he and three others were charged with flouting court orders after allegedly entering disputed land and directing the destruction of property belonging to Royal Bell Investment Limited and Terraform Development Limited despite the existence of a court order and a penal notice served upon them.

    The application before the Ghanaian court sought his committal to imprisonment.

    STATE HOUSE FINGERPRINTS

    The Zoomlion contract did not emerge in a vacuum within City Hall. The connection between State House and the award runs through a specific sequence of events. On August 13, 2025, President William Ruto attended the Devolution Conference in Homa Bay.

    The Jospong Group of Companies had been allocated a stand at the conference.

    President Ruto visited that stand on the opening day and publicly praised Zoomlion for its waste management technology and facilities in Ghana. Eight days later, Zoomlion Waste Services Limited was incorporated in Kenya.

    President Ruto and Sakaja in a past event.

    In a public address delivered in Nairobi on January 20, 2026, eleven days before the formal notification of award to Zoomlion, President Ruto confirmed directly that his administration was involved in the procurement process.

    He said at the time: “The national government is going to support the county government to deal with the menace of waste and garbage in Nairobi. There is procurement the county is doing; we are supporting them so that we provide a lasting solution to that challenge.”

    Sources with knowledge of the arrangement told Kenya Insights that awareness of the Zoomlion deal was confined to a small number of individuals at State House and City Hall throughout the procurement and contracting stages, with the details kept deliberately opaque.

    Governor Johnson Sakaja, for his part, has defended the contract in public primarily by speaking around it: insisting that no county functions have been ceded to the national government, invoking Section 6 of the Urban Areas and Cities Act 2019 to justify special financing arrangements for Nairobi as Kenya’s capital, and pointing to the scale of the city’s waste generation, approximately 3,000 metric tonnes daily, as justification for an ambitious intervention.

    He has not addressed the procurement irregularities identified by his own technical team, the eligibility questions arising from Zoomlion’s debarment history, or the absence of the financial safeguards that his officials found missing from the agreement.

    THE MAN WHO DIED BEFORE THE WHITEWASH

    Engineer Charles Ngugi Gathara had served for more than a decade as Deputy Director for Water and Sanitation at City Hall before being appointed to chair the Zoomlion tender evaluation committee. He was 49 years old.

    On the morning of February 16, 2026, he arrived at JKIA ahead of the flight to Accra, intending to lead a delegation that would verify, after the fact, the capacity and facilities of a company to which a contract had already been awarded. Aviation workers had gone on strike that morning, disrupting departures.

    While waiting for the situation to resolve, Gathara began vomiting and collapsed. He was pronounced dead. His colleagues, once a Kenya Airways flight eventually departed at 8.53 in the evening, flew to Accra without him and spent three days visiting Zoomlion’s operations at the company’s invitation. Engineer Gathara was buried on February 27, 2026, at his home village in Gathondo, Embu County.

    The decision to proceed with the Ghana trip without him, on the day of his death, has drawn quiet condemnation within City Hall.

    More fundamentally, the entire exercise exposed the character of what passed for due diligence in this procurement.

    An evaluation committee, headed by a Water and Sanitation official rather than a specialist in solid waste management or PPP finance, was assembled to travel to a company’s premises and see a presentation prepared by that company, after the contract had already been awarded.

    Walter Omwenga, the Deputy Director for Environment and Final Disposal who was among those who made the Accra trip, told Kenya Insights before the delegation departed that due diligence by definition required physically verifying that a bidder had the capacity described in their documents before a contract is signed. He did not explain why that verification was taking place after signing.

    THE COURT STEPS IN

    On March 5, 2026, Justice Moses Ado of the Milimani Commercial and Tax Division issued a conservatory order barring the Nairobi County Government, its Environment Chief Officer, its Director of Supply Chain Management and the County Secretary from executing or implementing the contract pending the hearing and determination of a petition challenging the deal.

    The order was obtained on an application filed by Jeremy Kinyua Emilio, who contends that the award to Zoomlion was illegal and unconstitutional, among other grounds because it was executed without the required approval of the Attorney General.

    Kinyua raised specific concerns about the Sh50 million bank guarantee submitted by Zoomlion as part of the tender, describing it as disproportionately low relative to the evident scale and value of the project.

    The figure is consistent with procurement documents that deliberately obscured the total contract sum: the tender, as advertised, specified no price. The conservatory order was granted pending a mention scheduled for March 16, 2026, for further directions.

    The petition additionally argues that at least two local companies are currently executing waste management contracts in Nairobi under earlier tenders, one for the supply of heavy equipment and machinery at Dandora, another for solid waste collection in Kibra, and that the Zoomlion concession threatens to displace those arrangements.

    Some of those contractors had already encountered delays in receiving county payments at the time the Zoomlion contract was awarded, an irony that has not been lost on the market.

    MOMBASA’S WARNING AND A NATIONAL PATTERN

    Nairobi is not the first Kenyan county to be drawn into the Jospong Group’s orbit.

    In October 2025, it emerged that Mombasa County, under Governor Abdulswamad Shariff Nassir, had already signed a 35-year waste management contract with a Jospong entity worth Sh17 billion.

    The Centre for Litigation Trust, a Mombasa-based civil society organisation, filed a High Court petition demanding disclosure of the procurement process and public participation records.

    The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has opened an investigation into the Mombasa arrangement. That investigation was ongoing when Nairobi signed its own, structurally similar, contract four months later.

    The pattern is being remarked upon by governance specialists with mounting alarm. Two of Kenya’s largest urban county governments have now awarded long-term waste management concessions to Jospong Group entities under procurement conditions that critics describe as opaque, legally deficient and designed to exclude competition.

    There is documented concern within government circles that other counties may follow, creating the conditions for a nationwide monopoly over one of municipal government’s most revenue-generating and publicly sensitive functions, held by a foreign company that Ghana itself has now repudiated.

    WHAT THE LAW REQUIRED, AND WHAT WAS DONE

    The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2015 requires that PPP projects above defined financial thresholds receive approval from the PPP Directorate and be subjected to competitive bidding processes designed to ensure value for money.

    The PPP Act 2021 sets out a distinct regulatory framework for arrangements involving private financing, construction and long-term operation of public infrastructure.

    By classifying the Zoomlion transaction as a local Request for Proposal rather than an international PPP concession, City Hall bypassed the PPP Directorate entirely, eliminated the requirement for international competitive advertising and compressed the timeline in a manner that precluded meaningful market participation.

    Senior procurement officials who reviewed the process for this publication used the word “irregular” with consistent frequency.

    Legal experts have separately warned that the structure of the contract, particularly the twenty-year tenure and the exclusive access to Dandora, is sufficient to sustain a successful legal challenge by any company that was denied the opportunity to compete.

    The Nairobi County Assembly was not consulted. Public participation records, required by statute for projects of this duration and character, have not been made available.

    The County Cabinet has not published any resolution approving the engagement on the disclosed terms. The terms themselves, including the financial model, the payment schedule, the revenue-sharing arrangement for recycling proceeds and the liability regime, have not been disclosed to the public whose assets and funds the contract deploys over the next two decades.

    THE COST OF WHAT WAS NOT DONE

    Dandora has operated for four decades as one of the most egregious examples of institutional failure in the history of Kenyan urban governance.

    In February 2026, the Environment and Land Court awarded Sh25.8 million in damages to 1,032 waste pickers whose constitutional rights were found to have been violated by their prolonged exposure to air pollution at the site.

    Both the Nairobi County Government and the National Environment Management Authority were found jointly responsible for permitting those conditions to persist.

    That judgment landed in the same week as the Zoomlion contract was being defended in public by the same county government that had just been found complicit in the suffering of the people who live and work at the dump.

    The city generates 3,000 metric tonnes of waste daily. The sector, if managed transparently and competitively, could sustain significant recycling revenue and waste-to-energy income for the public good.

    The question that the Zoomlion contract poses is not whether Nairobi needs a modern waste management system. It does, urgently and without further delay.

    The question is whether a company with Zoomlion’s documented record of bribery, fraudulent billing and exploitative labour practices, admitted in writing to the World Bank, exposed by an independent press and confirmed by multiple government bodies in its home country, and finally terminated by the government that spawned it, was the appropriate vehicle through which to pursue that transformation.

    The answer that City Hall’s own technical team gave to that question, in language that its political principals have chosen to disregard, was an unambiguous no.

  • The New Master of the Nation: How a Tanzanian Billionaire With a President in His Pocket Just Bought Kenya’s Most Powerful Press

    The New Master of the Nation: How a Tanzanian Billionaire With a President in His Pocket Just Bought Kenya’s Most Powerful Press

    The Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development issued a statement from Geneva on Tuesday that was polite, dignified and retrospective.

    It spoke of six decades of editorial independence, of a free press built from a Kiswahili-language weekly purchased in 1959, of 30 brands and 62 million digital users and a legacy of democratic contribution. What the statement did not adequately reckon with was the character of the man now inheriting all of that.

    Rostam Abdulrasul Aziz, Tanzania’s first dollar billionaire, former CCM parliamentarian, and the man Tanzanian parliamentary investigators linked to the Richmond Development Company corruption scandal that toppled a prime minister, has acquired the 54.08 per cent controlling stake in Nation Media Group PLC that the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED) held through NPRT Holdings Africa Limited.

    The deal, announced simultaneously in Geneva and confirmed by Nairobi market filings, transfers 92,618,177 ordinary shares to Aziz’s vehicle Taarifa Ltd. The transaction price has not been disclosed.

    The combined platform that Aziz now effectively controls includes the Daily Nation, Business Daily, NTV Kenya, Nation FM, The EastAfrican, the Daily Monitor in Uganda, The Citizen and Mwananchi in Tanzania, and a regional digital audience that the group itself values at over 62 million users. In any country, that would be a significant accumulation of editorial power for a single private owner with active business interests across the region.

    In Kenya in 2026, a country hurtling toward a general election while its press freedom ranking dropped from 102nd to 117th out of 180 countries in a single year according to Reporters Without Borders, it is something else entirely.

    THE MAN WHO JUST BECAME KENYA’S MOST POWERFUL PUBLISHER

    Aziz was born in August 1960 in the Igunga District of Tabora Region, the son of one of the wealthiest trading families in East Africa. He was educated at the University of Exeter before returning to Tanzania to multiply a fortune that eventually earned him a Forbes billionaire designation in 2013. He was, at the time, the only dollar billionaire in East Africa according to the Henley and Partners Africa Wealth Report, a distinction he held as recently as 2022.

    His business empire has ranged across telecommunications, mining, agriculture, real estate, and energy. He was the man who facilitated Vodacom South Africa’s entry into Tanzania, eventually accumulating a 35 per cent stake in Vodacom Tanzania before exiting in two tranches in 2014 and 2019, earning a combined $460 million from those transactions alone.

    He controls Caspian Limited, which operates as Tanzania’s largest contract mining company, servicing DeBeers and Barrick Gold. He controls MIC Tanzania, giving him ownership of Tigo Tanzania and Zanzibar Telecom, together reaching over 13 million mobile customers.

    He owns Taifa Gas Group, a company whose journey into Kenya is central to understanding how Aziz came to acquire NMG.

    He has also always been in media. In 1999, Aziz co-founded Mwananchi Communications Limited in Tanzania in partnership with Ambassador Ferdinand Ruhinda. The company later launched The Citizen, an English-language daily.

    Critically, he brought in Nation Media Group itself as a partner in that venture. NMG purchased the controlling shares of Mwananchi Communications in December 2002.

    The commercial relationship that began more than two decades ago has now been inverted. The junior partner has purchased the parent.

    Through his vehicle New Habari (2006) Limited, Aziz also maintains ownership of several influential Swahili newspapers in Tanzania including Mtanzania, The African, Bingwa, Dimba and Rai, though critics have long noted that his control there is exercised through proxies.

    The acquisition of NMG adds a regional media dimension that dwarfs anything he has previously owned, placing him in command of editorial operations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda simultaneously.

    The man who once forced Nation Media Group to pull down stories about him now owns Nation Media Group.

    THE RUTO CONNECTION AND THE GAS EMPIRE THAT OPENED EVERY DOOR

    To understand what the NMG acquisition means for press freedom in Kenya specifically, one must understand what happened in Mombasa in February 2023.

    Taifa Gas Investments SEZ Ltd, Aziz’s energy company, had for years been attempting to build a $130 million cooking gas terminal at the Dongo Kundu Special Economic Zone in Likoni, Mombasa.

    The project, intended to house a 30,000-tonne liquefied petroleum gas terminus, had been blocked by regulatory opposition in Kenya during the Uhuru Kenyatta era. Then came September 2022, and the election of William Samoei Ruto as Kenya’s fifth president.

    On February 24, 2023, five months into his presidency, Ruto personally presided over the groundbreaking ceremony for Aziz’s Mombasa gas plant.

    President William Ruto (left) and Taifa Gas Group Chairman Rostam Aziz during the ground-breaking ceremony of the 30,000-tonne plant at the Dongo Kundu Special Economic Zone in Likoni, Mombasa on February 24, 2023.

    At that ceremony, Ruto said of Aziz: ‘I know the struggles he has been through to get to this point. The investment should have been done five years ago, but it was delayed due to government shenanigans here in Kenya. I have put that to an end.’ The project was then described by Tanzanian and Kenyan media as the largest single private foreign direct investment in Kenya since the collapse of the East African Community in 1977.

    The Ruto administration’s clearing of the path for Aziz’s gas investment was not incidental.

    Analysts and business press had been explicit for years that the Aziz camp was closely allied with Ruto while Uhuru Kenyatta was in power.

    Business insiders pointed to rivalries with coast-based businessman Muhammed Jaffer of Africa Gas and Oil, who was seen as aligned with the late Raila Odinga camp that Kenyatta had backed before the 2022 election. When Ruto won, the Aziz gas investment, which had been stalled for years, suddenly had a presidential champion.

    That Ruto and Aziz share a bond warm enough for a sitting head of state to publicly launch a private business investment and describe its regulatory delays as ‘government shenanigans’ that he personally corrected is not a matter of speculation. It is on camera. It is on record. And it is now the backdrop against which journalists employed by Aziz’s newly acquired media house must decide how to cover William Ruto’s government in the run-up to the 2027 general election.

    THE RICHMOND SHADOW: A CORRUPTION SCANDAL THAT NEVER FULLY WENT AWAY

    Aziz’s path to extraordinary wealth has not been without shadow. The most significant of those shadows is the Richmond scandal, which shook Tanzania in 2007 and 2008 and ultimately forced the resignation of Prime Minister Edward Lowassa along with two cabinet ministers.

    In 2006, Tanzania faced a crippling electricity shortage caused by drought. The government, bypassing standard procurement procedures, awarded an emergency contract to Richmond Development Company, a US-registered entity, to supply 100 megawatts of diesel generators to the state utility TANESCO.

    The contract, valued at approximately TSh 172 billion, included a provision guaranteeing payment of $137,000 daily regardless of actual output. The generators arrived late, underperformed, and the deal was ultimately passed to another entity, Dowans Holdings. Tanzania lost over $120 million on the arrangement.

    A parliamentary select committee chaired by Dr Harrison Mwakyembe investigated and tabled its findings in February 2008. The committee found that Richmond was a briefcase company with no relevant experience, financial capacity, or clear US registration.

    The report found that Aziz had been granted power of attorney by Richmond by late 2005, making him the legal representative of the company at the critical time it won the tender in 2006.

    The report further stated that the real proprietors of Richmond were Prime Minister Lowassa and, in the committee’s words, ‘his close friend, Igunga MP Rostam Aziz.’ Lowassa resigned. Two ministers resigned. The entire cabinet was dissolved.

    Aziz denied the allegations then, as he has consistently since. He called for a panel of judges to review the committee’s findings, insisting the report was wrong about his role. No criminal prosecution followed. But the scandal’s association with his name never disappeared.

    In July 2011, when the ruling CCM party called on leaders tainted by corruption accusations to resign, Aziz became the first Tanzanian MP in history to voluntarily vacate his parliamentary seat, citing what he called ‘dirty politics’ within the party. He has remained outside active politics since, though his business influence and his relationships with sitting governments have never diminished.

    WHEN NMG WAS HIS ADVERSARY

    There is a particular irony sharpening Tuesday’s transaction.

    During the Taifa Gas regulatory battles in Kenya, Aziz’s lobbying machinery was pointed, among other targets, directly at Nation Media Group. Business news monitoring services reported that the group was forced to pull down critical stories about the Taifa Gas investment and apologise to Aziz. The details of those interactions have not been independently verified in full, but the broad pattern is on record.

    The man who once used political leverage to neutralise NMG coverage of his own business interests now sits at the top of NMG’s ownership chain.

    Journalists at the Daily Nation, Business Daily, NTV, and The EastAfrican are now ultimately employed by a proprietor whose business empire has active interests in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

    Their reporting on the Ruto administration, on energy policy, on telecommunications regulation and on regional business affairs will all occur within an ownership structure in which the proprietor has documented commercial relationships with the very governments and industries being reported on.

    Press freedom organisations have been watching NMG with concern for reasons entirely separate from the ownership change.

    Reporters Without Borders documented in December 2024 that Safaricom threatened the group with SLAPP suits, suspended advertising contracts, and demanded internal hearings following NMG’s investigation into surveillance practices.

    Cabinet Secretary Moses Kuria threatened to withdraw all government advertising from NMG in 2023 after the group published an investigation into a cooking oil import scheme allegedly involving government officials.

    The Kenyan government was estimated to owe NMG alone approximately Ksh 800 million in unpaid advertising debts as of 2024, a structural leverage point that no commercial media organisation can afford to ignore.

    Kenya’s press freedom ranking fell from 102nd to 117th place in a single year. Now its biggest media house has a new owner with active business deals involving the sitting government.

    A FINANCIALLY WOUNDED INSTITUTION

    NMG arrived at this ownership transition in a condition of significant financial distress. From a profit peak of over Ksh 2.5 billion in 2013, the group recorded its first back-to-back annual losses in more than a decade in 2023 and 2024. The net loss for 2024 was Ksh 254.4 million, following a Ksh 205.7 million loss the year before. Group turnover fell 12.5 per cent to Ksh 6.23 billion in 2024. The board suspended dividend payments to shareholders.

    The group has closed regional newsrooms in Mombasa, Meru, Kakamega and Kisii, in addition to implementing multiple rounds of staff reductions since 2016.

    These financial pressures are not unique to NMG. The global collapse of print advertising revenue, the rise of social media platforms that have captured advertising spend from legacy media, and the specific challenge of building viable digital subscription businesses in relatively low-income markets have combined to squeeze media economics across East Africa.

    NMG has been investing in its digital transformation, reaching 83 per cent digital content delivery by end of 2024 and targeting $55 million in digital revenue by 2027.

    But a financially distressed media institution is also a more vulnerable one. Advertisers, regulators, and now a new proprietor with active business interests across the region all have structural leverage over a newsroom that needs revenue to survive.

    Aziz and Taarifa Ltd have committed publicly to investing in NMG’s digital transformation, and Sultan Allana of AKFED has expressed confidence that editorial independence will be maintained. Those are the correct things to say at the moment of announcement.

    The harder test comes when a Taarifa-linked story needs investigating or when the Ruto government applies pressure to a newsroom whose majority owner has a Ksh 16 billion gas plant to protect in Mombasa.

    WHAT FOLLOWS IN THE REGION

    The implications extend beyond Kenya’s borders. NMG’s Daily Monitor in Uganda is one of that country’s most credible independent news organisations in a media environment that has become increasingly hostile under the Museveni government.

    The Citizen and Mwananchi in Tanzania, two publications that Aziz himself helped found before selling his stake, now return under his indirect control in a country where the ruling CCM, the party he served for nearly two decades, remains in government under President Samia Suluhu Hassan. Rwanda, a market where press freedom rankings are among the continent’s most restrictive, rounds out the group’s regional footprint.

    Aziz told the media at announcement: ‘NMG is an institution of profound importance to East Africa, and we will uphold its editorial independence while investing in its continued success as the region’s leading independent media organisation.’ The commitment is noted.

    But Aziz also has a documented history as both a political actor and a commercial operator whose interests regularly intersect with the state. The confidence of AKFED’s Sultan Allana that ‘NMG will continue to uphold the values of independent journalism’ is understandable from a departing shareholder who built those values over 66 years. It does not bind the incoming majority owner in any legally enforceable way.

    There is a school of thought that argues private billionaire ownership is neutral or even beneficial for media, that financial stability provided by a deep-pocketed proprietor is preferable to the slow death of a loss-making independent institution.

    That argument has merit in the abstract.

    It loses considerable force when the billionaire proprietor has publicly documented commercial ties to the sitting head of government in the group’s most important market, when that proprietor has a history of using business relationships to manage media coverage of himself, and when the country involved is approaching an election in an environment of documented government pressure on the press.

    The Daily Nation was founded on the conviction, articulated by its founder the late Aga Khan IV, that a free press is indispensable to democratic society.

    For 66 years, that conviction had the backing of an owner with no commercial interests in Kenya beyond the media house itself, and whose development mission was structurally incompatible with editorial capture.

    What backs that conviction now is the word of a Tanzanian billionaire with a gas terminal in Mombasa, a telecommunications empire in Dar es Salaam, and a warm relationship with the man in State House.

    Whether those assurances prove sufficient will not be determined in Geneva announcement rooms. It will be determined the next time a Daily Nation editor receives a call she would rather not have received, and decides whether the story runs.

  • The Minnesota Blueprint: How a Global Healthcare Fraud Model Is Now Targeting Kenya’s SHA Funds

    The Minnesota Blueprint: How a Global Healthcare Fraud Model Is Now Targeting Kenya’s SHA Funds

    TWIN SCANDALS, ONE PLAYBOOK

    When Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale stood before a gathering of Muslim medics at an Iftar dinner in Nairobi on Sunday evening and declared that 55 per cent of the 1,120 health facilities shut down for defrauding the Social Health Authority are Muslim-owned, he was not merely making a religious observation.

    He was, knowingly or not, echoing a scandal that has brought an American state to its knees and sent shockwaves across Washington D.C., Mogadishu, and Nairobi.

    More than 9,500 kilometres away, in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St Paul, Minnesota, federal prosecutors have spent the better part of four years unravelling what the United States Department of Justice has described as the largest Covid-era fraud in American history.

    The scheme, centred on a charity called Feeding Our Future, saw tens of millions of dollars meant to feed hungry children during the pandemic siphoned off by fraudsters, the overwhelming majority of whom are of Somali descent.

    Out of 98 defendants charged in Minnesota fraud-related cases to date, 85 are of Somali origin. In Kenya, the eight facilities recommended for criminal prosecution by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions are all from Mandera County, registered between January and February 2025, within months of SHA beginning to integrate hospitals into its payment system. Every single one carries a name that leaves no ambiguity about the community running it.

    The parallels are not coincidental. They are instructive. And in at least one documented instance, the two scandals are directly linked by money, property, and family ties rooted in Nairobi.

    GHOST CHILDREN, GHOST PATIENTS

    The mechanics of the Minnesota fraud were almost embarrassing in their simplicity. Feeding Our Future, a nonprofit, began claiming federal reimbursements for meals it said were being provided to thousands of needy children during the pandemic.

    The US Department of Agriculture, eager to ensure no child went hungry as schools closed, had loosened oversight requirements and allowed nonprofits to claim reimbursements with minimal documentation.

    What investigators eventually discovered was that the meals were never delivered. The sites either did not exist, were entirely unstaffed, or were shell operations registered solely to harvest federal payments.

    The playbook was replicated so aggressively that US First Assistant Attorney Joe Thompson, standing before journalists in Minneapolis in December 2025, declared the situation was not a case of a handful of bad actors but rather an industrial-scale fraud swamping the state.

    Half or more of the roughly Ksh1.5 trillion in federal funds supporting 14 Minnesota-run Medicaid programmes since 2018 may have been stolen, Thompson said. The figure is so staggering it has reshaped American politics, triggered congressional hearings, and prompted President Donald Trump to end temporary deportation protections for Somali immigrants in the state.

    In Kenya, the SHA fraud bears a signature that investigators and analysts find disturbingly familiar. Forensic audits by SHA’s digital health system have uncovered upcoding, where facilities claim for expensive procedures never performed; falsification of medical records to inflate claims; conversion of outpatient visits into inpatient billing; and ghost patients, individuals billed for services they never received.

    In Mandera alone, officials uncovered 312 false claims submitted on the same dates for the same patients across different facilities. Four facilities in the county were found to have colluded to submit duplicate claims for the same patient, in a level of coordination that investigators say goes far beyond opportunistic theft into organised criminal enterprise.

    The eight Mandera facilities recommended for prosecution by the ODPP, including Danaba Care Hospital, Kamishawa Medical Centre, Kaafi Nursing Home, Mama Nerbeel Nursing Home, Alati Nursing Home, Julun Nursing Home, Adfaal Kids Care Medical Centre and Dimtu Nursing Home Limited, were registered between January and February 2025.

    SHA itself only began integrating private hospitals into its payment system in late 2024. In the space of a few months, these facilities had apparently established themselves, enrolled patients, and begun submitting claims.

    Just as in Minnesota, where providers were created specifically to exploit a new programme before oversight mechanisms could catch up, the Mandera facilities appear to have been registered with a singular purpose.

    THE NAIROBI CONNECTION

    The link between Minnesota’s Somali fraud network and Kenya is not merely thematic. It is documented in court filings, wire transfers, and text messages retrieved by the FBI.

    Abdiaziz Shafii Farah, the Kenyan national who emerged as the central figure of the Feeding Our Future scheme, was sentenced to 28 years in federal prison in August 2025. Court documents detail how he sent millions of dollars in stolen federal funds to Kenya, where his younger brother Ahmednaji Maalim Aftin Sheikh, a resident of Nairobi, was awaiting the deliveries.

    The indictment against Sheikh, filed in September 2025, alleges that he and his co-conspirators laundered more than Ksh5.2 billion in federal funds. The money was used to purchase a 20 per cent stake in a Kenyan real estate company, an apartment building in the South C neighbourhood of Nairobi adjacent to Nairobi National Park, and land in Mandera Town.

    Court exhibits include photographs of stacked cash. On August 29, 2021, Sheikh sent his brother a photograph of Ksh17.8 million in cash.

    On December 9, 2021, he sent a photograph of banker boxes stuffed with Ksh34.8 million. A message from December 16, 2021 documents a Ksh38.7 million wire transfer from Minneapolis to Nairobi, with the stated purpose listed as family support and the income source listed as salary. The defendant’s salary was, in reality, stolen American food-programme money.

    The US Attorney’s office confirmed that a significant amount of Minnesota fraud proceeds were directed specifically to Nairobi’s real estate market, capitalising on the city’s large Somali diaspora and the relative ease of purchasing property. One defendant forfeited an apartment in Nairobi and an oceanfront resort in Kenya as part of his plea agreement.

    Another wired Ksh193.5 million to China and Kenya. A third sent a text message boasting that he had invested Ksh774 million in Kenya over three years. In December 2025, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt specifically named Kenya as one of the countries benefiting from the Minnesota schemes.

    The Capital View Properties case, reported by the Daily Nation, exposed how one of the registered Nairobi real estate firms, incorporated in February 2021, became a vehicle for laundering Minnesota fraud proceeds. Within months of its registration, millions of dollars were flowing from Minneapolis bank accounts into the company’s operations.

    LITTLE MOGADISHU AND THE HEALTHCARE ECONOMY

    To understand why Kenya became the preferred destination for laundered Minnesota fraud money, and why Kenya’s own health system appears to have been targeted through the same community networks, one must understand the extraordinary economic and demographic footprint of Kenya’s Somali population.

    According to the 2019 Kenya census, approximately 2.78 million ethnic Somalis live in Kenya, making them the sixth largest ethnic group in the country. They are overwhelmingly Muslim. The counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Tana River in the North Eastern region, which border Somalia, are their historic heartland.

    In Nairobi, the suburb of Eastleigh, colloquially known as Little Mogadishu, has become one of the most economically productive neighbourhoods in the city, contributing nearly a third of Nairobi’s tax revenue and hosting an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 residents, predominantly Somali.

    The Somali community in Kenya is entrepreneurial almost by definition. Somali refugees who were healthcare professionals in Somalia opened their own clinics and practices in Eastleigh, serving a community that is both densely populated and underserved by public hospitals.

    This gave rise to a sprawling private healthcare economy in Eastleigh and across the northeastern counties, one that predates SHA and operated profitably under the now-defunct National Hospital Insurance Fund.

    It is precisely this existing infrastructure of privately owned, community-run health facilities that appears to have been weaponised in the SHA fraud.

    The Kenya Association of Muslim Medical Professionals, in its statement condemning the fraud, acknowledged that a significant proportion of the facilities implicated in the first and second waves of SHA closures appear to be Muslim-owned and are concentrated in counties with large Muslim populations.

    KAMMP’s secretary-general Dr Abdallah Bajaber described the situation as a matter of profound concern, moral urgency, and deep national responsibility, noting that some individuals had attempted to rationalise defrauding public funds by arguing that stealing from the government was somehow less immoral than stealing from individuals.

    This rationalisation, KAMMP stated clearly, is false, dangerous, sinful and completely contrary to Islam.

    Duale, himself a Muslim and a son of the North Eastern region, put it more bluntly at the Iftar gathering. You must make sure you feed your children with halal money, he told the assembled medics.

    Health CS Aden Duale.
    Health CS Aden Duale.

    THE ARCHITECTURE OF FRAUD

    What makes the SHA scheme particularly alarming is its structural resemblance to the Minnesota model, not just in its perpetrators but in the specific mechanisms deployed to exploit a new, rapidly scaled public health fund.

    In Minnesota, investigators noted that fraudsters moved with extraordinary speed when new welfare programmes were launched, registering as providers before oversight systems could be put in place.

    The Integrated Community Supports programme, established in 2021 to help disabled adults live independently, paid out Ksh21.9 billion in 2024 compared to Ksh593 million in 2021 as fraudulent providers flooded the system. CBS News described the pattern as an explosion of fly-by-night operators.

    SHA’s trajectory has been almost identical. Launched with the ambition of delivering universal health coverage to millions of Kenyans who had been locked out of NHIF, the scheme began integrating private hospitals into its digital payment platform in late 2024.

    By March 2025, SHA had disbursed Ksh11.4 billion to hospitals in a single month. Civil society groups and doctors warned almost immediately that small private facilities were receiving disproportionately large sums and that some of these hospitals simply did not exist. A Ministry of Health audit later confirmed that SHA had lost Ksh11 billion to fraud between October 2024 and April 2025.

    The ghost hospital phenomenon was brazen. Investigators from a multi-agency team that included the DCI found facilities in Mandera sharing the same physical building while claiming to operate as separate hospitals in different constituencies.

    One Nairobi facility was found to have been officially established in the master health facility register five months before its parent company was even incorporated. It nonetheless received Ksh12.2 million in SHA payments within its first month of billing.

    In Minnesota, the fraud was sustained partly because state officials were reluctant to challenge providers for fear of being accused of racial discrimination. Feeding Our Future, which served primarily Somali-owned distribution sites, had in 2020 sued the Minnesota Department of Education for racial discrimination after officials slowed their approvals.

    The state auditor’s office later found that the threat of legal consequences and negative media attention had materially affected the state’s decision-making about regulatory action against the organisation. The pattern of regulatory paralysis in the face of fraud by a racially identifiable minority group is one that Kenya’s own institutions will need to guard against as the SHA crackdown deepens.

    PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE FORTUNES

    The lifestyle financed by the Minnesota fraud was spectacular by any measure. A CBS News review of court filings documented defendants spending stolen federal funds on a private villa in the Maldives for a honeymoon, a suite at a Minnesota Timberwolves basketball game, a Porsche valued at over Ksh12 million, a GMC truck worth Ksh11.4 million, a Mercedes at over Ksh12.9 million, lakefront properties in Minnesota, and luxury real estate in Ohio, Kentucky, Turkey, and Kenya. One defendant purchased an aircraft in Nairobi. Another bought an oceanfront resort on the Kenyan coast.

    In Kenya, while the SHA scheme has not yet produced the same level of documented personal enrichment in court filings, the scale of the fraud points to significant sums being extracted.

    Duale confirmed that 30 per cent of SHA’s insurance payouts have been linked to fraudulent claims. The first audit covered only the October 2024 to April 2025 period and found Ksh11 billion in losses. More facilities are under investigation.

    There is an additional dimension to the Minnesota scandal that Kenyan investigators and policymakers should note carefully.

    The US Treasury Department has been investigating whether any Minnesota fraud proceeds made their way to al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate that controls significant territory in southern Somalia and taxes businesses operating in areas under its control.

    Multiple federal investigators told CBS News there is no evidence taxpayer dollars were directly funnelled to the terror group, with former US Attorney Andrew Luger stating that the vast majority of the money went on personal luxury spending.

    Nevertheless, the FBI’s director Kash Patel has called the prosecutions to date only the tip of a very large iceberg.

    Given that al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to operate across the Kenya-Somalia border, including through the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garissa University massacre, the question of whether any SHA fraud proceeds could flow toward terrorist financing in the region is one that Kenya’s security architecture cannot afford to dismiss.

    In Minnesota, the political and institutional reckoning has been severe. Governor Tim Walz faced congressional hearings in January 2026 at which Republican lawmakers accused him and his administration of lying about their knowledge of the fraud and silencing whistleblowers.

    The DOJ has charged 98 defendants, conducted over 130 search warrants, and issued over 1,750 subpoenas. Federal agencies have frozen child care funding, paused Medicaid programme payments, and launched sector-wide audits.

    President Trump has made the Minnesota fraud a centrepiece of his anti-immigration messaging, ending temporary deportation protections for Somali immigrants and calling for mass deportations.

    In Kenya, the response has been more measured but is accelerating. Duale confirmed on Sunday that more facilities will be shut down this week and that 60 per cent of those on the upcoming closure list are also Muslim-owned.

    Eight Mandera facilities have been referred to the ODPP for criminal prosecution. The DCI is on the ground in Mandera. SHA has frozen payments, launched surcharge recovery proceedings, and referred dozens of healthcare professionals for disciplinary action.

    The Kenya Association of Muslim Medical Professionals has gone further than its equivalent organisations in Minnesota ever did, issuing a statement grounded in Quranic verse that condemns the fraud in unambiguous theological and legal terms.

    It has called on members of the public to refuse to allow their SHA membership details to be used to generate false claims and warned that assisting fraud, benefiting from fraud, or remaining silent in the face of fraud is morally and legally unacceptable.

    The warning is necessary. Evidence in Minnesota showed that some fraudulent schemes depended entirely on members of the public allowing their government programme membership details to be used to generate false claims.

    In one case, parents were paid cash kickbacks to enrol their children in fictitious autism therapy programmes. The same dynamic, KAMMP has confirmed, appears to be operating in Kenya’s SHA fraud.

    Former Chief Justice David Maraga has called for a forensic audit of all SHA operations. Former Rigathi Gachagua, in a striking intervention, has called on Trump to arrest beneficiaries of the Minnesota fraud in Kenya in the same manner the US president has pursued immigration enforcement elsewhere. The political temperature around the SHA fraud is rising rapidly.

    What is clear from Minnesota’s experience is that industrial-scale healthcare fraud of this nature, once embedded in community networks and facilitated by weak oversight of a fast-scaling public programme, does not resolve itself quietly.

    It expands. It metastasises into new programmes. It corrupts healthcare professionals, erodes public trust in the health system, and diverts critical funds from the sick and vulnerable who needed them most. Minnesota is still counting its losses. Kenya is just beginning to count its own.

  • Chairing The Referee: Kittony’s Dual Roles Cast Shadows Over KQ’s Governance Revival

    Chairing The Referee: Kittony’s Dual Roles Cast Shadows Over KQ’s Governance Revival

    When Kenya Airways unveiled its new board on March 5, 2026, the announcement had the trappings of institutional renewal.

    Four fresh faces, led by veteran businessman Kiprono Kittony as chairman, were presented as the architects of the airline’s long-awaited turnaround. The fanfare lasted about 48 hours.

    By the weekend, Kenya’s financial and legal commentariat had torn into a detail the airline’s press release buried in its third paragraph: Kittony is also the sitting chairman of the Nairobi Securities Exchange, the very bourse on which KQ shares trade.

    The question now circulating in boardrooms, on social media, and increasingly in the offices of regulators is blunt.

    Can the man who chairs the exchange that lists and oversees Kenya Airways simultaneously chair Kenya Airways itself without compromising the structural independence that market integrity demands?

    “One can’t sit in the board of NSE and be a board member of a listed company. There is complete conflict of interest. It is worse when the board member is a chairman in both places.” — Governance commentator Ike Ojuku

    Corporate governance commentator Ike Ojuku was among the first to go on the record. Writing on X, Ojuku argued that the dual positions amounted to a complete conflict of interest and called on the Capital Markets Authority and the National Treasury to account for what he described as a failure of regulatory vigilance. “National Treasury and Capital Markets Authority are not doing their work,” Ojuku wrote in a post that was widely shared and cited in online governance discussions.

    The concern is not theoretical. NSE, as a securities exchange, holds a quasi-regulatory function over its listed companies.

    It enforces listing rules, monitors continuous disclosure obligations, reviews board composition changes, and can recommend or initiate enforcement action against listed companies in concert with the CMA.

    Kittony, as NSE chairman, presides over that oversight function. As KQ chairman, he is now the primary custodian of one of the listed companies that the exchange regulates. The two roles, in their most literal sense, put him on both sides of the oversight relationship simultaneously.

    The Standard reported that the KQ announcement did not address how Kittony intends to manage the two roles, an omission that governance observers found telling.

    The Capital Markets (Public Offers, Listings and Disclosures) Regulations, 2023, which currently govern listed companies, require issuers to disclose conflicts of interest at the point of appointment.

    KQ made the announcement pursuant to those very regulations but included no such disclosure.

    Professor Winnie Nyamute, also newly appointed to the KQ board, simultaneously sits on the NSE board, compounding the structural overlap critics have identified.

    The conflict has layers. Beyond Kittony, Standard Media reported that Professor Winnie Iminza Nyamute, one of the three other new independent non-executive directors appointed to the KQ board alongside him, also currently sits on the NSE board.

    The two now share seats in both the exchange’s boardroom and Kenya Airways’. That dual boardroom overlap between the same pair of individuals at the regulator and a listed company would raise eyebrows in any jurisdiction with functioning governance enforcement.

    Kenya’s legal architecture does not make the arrangement outright unlawful. The Companies Act, 2015 permits multiple directorships. Kenyan governance codes allow a person to chair up to two publicly listed companies provided conflicts are declared and managed.

    The CMA’s Circular No.06/2024, issued to clarify the 2023 regulations, specifies that non-executive directors must not hold executive or employee positions in related entities, but does not prohibit non-executive board chairmanships across the exchange and a listed company.

    Kittony’s defenders will note that the NSE chairmanship is itself a non-executive governance role, not an operational regulatory post, and that the NSE board’s day-to-day market oversight functions are executed by management, not the chairman.

    But governance does not run on legal technicalities alone, particularly when a national carrier at the centre of a government privatisation drive is involved.

    Kenya Airways has been navigating a bruising investor search after years of accumulated losses.

    The government is actively scouting for a strategic investor to revive the airline, a process that involves valuations, disclosures, and market-sensitive negotiations, all of which flow through or past the NSE’s oversight apparatus.

    The argument that Kittony’s NSE role creates at minimum an acute perception of conflict in that environment is one that even commentators sympathetic to his personal credentials have found difficult to dismiss.

    Kittony’s credentials themselves are not in question.

    He co-founded Betway Kenya and Radio Africa Group, chairs Mtech Limited and CreditInfo CRB Kenya, serves as vice chairman of the World Chambers Federation in Paris, and is widely credited with the rehabilitation of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry during his tenure as its chairman.

    He holds a Bachelor of Commerce and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Nairobi and a Global Executive MBA from USIU and Columbia University. He was awarded the Elder of the Order of the Burning Spear in 2019 under former President Uhuru Kenyatta. The question his critics are raising is not about his competence. It is about institutional design.

    The government is actively scouting for a strategic investor for KQ. That process involves valuations, disclosures, and market-sensitive negotiations. Kittony’s role atop the exchange that oversees that market creates structural questions no amount of personal credentials can paper over.

    David Ndii’s appointment to the same board has attracted separate scrutiny of a political nature.

    Ndii previously served as chairperson of President William Ruto’s Council of Economic Advisors, a role that was declared unconstitutional by the High Court in January 2026 after Justice Bahati Mwamuye found the Executive had bypassed the Public Service Commission and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission in creating and staffing the advisory positions.

    The court barred the National Treasury from disbursing any further funds to the 21 former advisers. Ndii dismissed the ruling as a pyrrhic victory and indicated the advisory relationship with the presidency would continue informally.

    His presence on the KQ board raises questions about the commercial and political independence of a board now navigating a sale process under the same government whose economic agenda Ndii has publicly championed.

    Kenya Airways, through Company Secretary Habil Waswani, congratulated the new board members and expressed confidence in their ability to steer the company forward.

    The airline did not respond to specific questions about how the structural conflicts identified by critics would be managed or whether CMA had been consulted prior to the announcement.

    Neither the CMA nor the National Treasury had issued a public statement on the matter at the time of going to press. The silence is itself a form of answer.

    In jurisdictions where governance enforcement is robust, an appointment of this nature would typically require pre-approval from the market regulator or, at minimum, a formal conflict declaration and recusal protocol lodged with the exchange before the announcement was made public.

    That none of this appears to have happened is the detail that governance observers are finding most alarming.

    For Kenya Airways, the governance controversy arrives at the worst possible moment. The airline’s recovery strategy depends on the credibility of its leadership to attract institutional investors willing to take a long-term stake in a loss-making carrier.

    Institutional investors, particularly foreign ones, apply their own governance screens before committing capital.

    A board chairman whose other hat belongs to the very institution regulating the company they are evaluating is exactly the kind of structural anomaly that triggers red flags in due diligence. Whatever Kittony’s personal standing, the arrangement hands prospective investors a ready-made excuse to negotiate harder or walk away entirely.

    The CMA and National Treasury now face a choice. They can let the appointment stand and trust that Kittony will manage the inherent tensions through robust conflict declaration and recusal mechanisms, a workable outcome only if those mechanisms are visible, enforceable, and credible.

    Or they can require KQ and Kittony to resolve the structural conflict by vacating one of the two roles, a course that would be disruptive but would restore the institutional clarity that market integrity requires.

    The third option, continued silence, is the one neither the market nor investors can afford.

  • THE EMPIRE FIGHTS BACK: How Safaricom’s War on Starlink Shapes Kenya’s Satellite Future

    THE EMPIRE FIGHTS BACK: How Safaricom’s War on Starlink Shapes Kenya’s Satellite Future

    When the Communications Authority of Kenya quietly confirmed that it has opened a formal review of Airtel Kenya’s application to introduce Starlink’s direct-to-cell satellite service, the announcement arrived with the understated tone of routine regulatory administration. It was anything but.

    Beneath the procedural language of frequency coordination and interference thresholds sits one of the most consequential contests in Kenya’s telecoms history: who controls the invisible architecture of digital connectivity, and on whose terms does the next generation of internet access get built.

    The answers to those questions are being written right now, in meetings between regulator and operator, in the corridors of Parliament, and in the strategic rooms of a company that has spent decades turning market dominance into institutional permanence.

    “The satellites act as cell towers in space. Any 4G smartphone can connect. No extra hardware. No fibre contract. No incumbent.” That is the proposition Safaricom spent 2024 trying to bury.

    Airtel Africa announced in December 2025 that it had signed a partnership with SpaceX to roll out Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell technology across all 14 of its African markets beginning 2026.

    The service works by equipping satellites in low Earth orbit with evolved Node B modems, the same radio equipment used in conventional 4G towers, enabling standard smartphones to connect directly to satellites when terrestrial coverage is unavailable. No satellite dish. No specialised device. Just a sky view and a compatible handset.

    The initial rollout covers text messaging and basic data for select applications, with voice capability and broadband-grade speeds on a roadmap through 2028.

    The CA confirmed to the media that it has received a formal application from Airtel Networks Kenya Limited and that discussions are ongoing.

    The regulator says its primary technical concern is the potential for harmful interference: transmissions from higher-power low Earth orbit satellites can degrade noise levels in the licensed spectrum bands used by ground-based 3G, 4G and 5G networks. It is a legitimate engineering problem.

    It is also the kind of argument that has, in the Kenyan market, a habit of being deployed as cover for competitive resistance.

    THE LETTER THAT STARTED IT ALL

    Rewind to July 2024. Safaricom’s director for broadband services, Tom Waithaka, put his name to a formal submission to the CA that, had it succeeded, would have fundamentally altered Starlink’s position in Kenya.

    The letter, later leaked and reported by multiple outlets including this publication, argued that satellite coverage inherently extends across territorial borders and, in the absence of effective management, could provide services illegally and cause harmful interference to mobile networks. Safaricom’s prescription was precise: satellite internet providers should not be granted independent operating licences. They should instead be classified as infrastructure providers, permitted only to operate through partnerships with existing local licensees.

    The argument was dressed in regulatory language, but its commercial logic was transparent. Starlink had entered the Kenyan market in July 2023 and had immediately disrupted the pricing structure that local operators, Safaricom chief among them, had spent years calibrating.

    The entry price for a Starlink kit was initially steep at Sh89,000, but the American firm moved aggressively, slashing terminal costs to Sh45,500 and introducing monthly rental options at Sh1,950, making it genuinely accessible to a swelling middle class that had grown restless with the quality and cost of terrestrial broadband.

    Monthly data packages entered the market as low as Sh1,300, a figure that put competitive pressure on the entire local ISP sector.

    The CA, to its credit, held its ground. It told the court handling a parallel challenge brought by rights group Kituo Cha Sheria that it viewed Safaricom’s submission as the position of a market participant with a direct commercial interest, and that it was not bound to act on it.

    The regulator noted that Safaricom was, in the court’s own language, directly prejudiced by its market dominance and likely apprehensive about the entry of new players.

    That was then. In August 2024, Safaricom’s subscriber-growth machine was still running at pace. Its market share stood north of 65 percent. M-Pesa was the unrivalled architecture of Kenyan mobile money. The company could afford to fight.

    THE EROSION BEGINS

    Eighteen months later, the numbers tell a different story. Safaricom’s mobile subscriber market share has slid in consecutive quarters, falling from 65.7 percent in September 2024 to 64.4 percent by the end of 2024 and further to 63.3 percent in the first quarter of 2025.

    In the same period, Airtel Kenya added nearly three million new subscribers, lifting its share to a record 32.2 percent.

    Airtel Money, the company’s mobile wallet, punched through to double-digit market share for the first time, squeezing an M-Pesa platform that has now spent six consecutive quarters losing ground, even as it still commands around 90 percent of the mobile money market.

    The competitive strain does not end at subscriber numbers. In March 2026, the CA implemented a further reduction in mobile termination rates, cutting the interconnection fee that operators charge each other for completing calls from Sh0.41 to Sh0.37 per minute.

    The revision is the latest in a series of phased reductions that have compressed an income stream Safaricom has historically relied upon.

    In the year ending March 2025, the company collected Sh4.7 billion in interconnection revenue, down from Sh5 billion the year before, itself a decline from the higher figures that prevailed before prior regulatory reviews.

    Safaricom is the net beneficiary of termination fees precisely because it is the largest network: when the regulator trims the rate, the biggest network absorbs the largest absolute loss.

    The company has been open about its anxiety. In its most recent regulatory filings, Safaricom listed market disruption and competition among its top ten strategic risks, a disclosure that would have been unthinkable five years ago for a company that then appeared structurally immune to challenge.

    Its response to the competitive pressure has been partly technical, partly reactive. In September 2024, weeks after the Starlink-driven pricing panic, Safaricom quietly upgraded speeds on its home fibre packages to stem subscriber flight. It worked temporarily. But the structural arithmetic has not changed.

    Mobile data revenue has now overtaken voice revenue for the first time in Safaricom’s history, reaching Sh44.4 billion in the half-year to September 2025, an 18 percent increase.

    That figure looks impressive until one considers that data pricing is under perpetual downward pressure from Airtel, which charges less for comparable bundles, and from Starlink, which is redefining what affordable broadband looks like in areas beyond the fibre grid.

    A Direct-to-Cell service that brings satellite broadband to any standard smartphone, without infrastructure investment by the subscriber, threatens the one revenue pool that Safaricom has successfully grown while voice and interconnection decline.

    Data is now Safaricom’s beating heart. A space-based competitor that can reach every corner of Kenya without a single fibre cable is not a nuisance. It is an existential variable.

    THE ARCHITECTURE OF CAPTURE

    Safaricom’s July 2024 letter was not the company’s first attempt to shape the competitive environment through regulatory channels rather than product competition.

    The company has a documented history of engaging regulators, courts and government when new entrants threaten its ecosystem. It opposed the attempted merger of Airtel Kenya and Telkom Kenya on grounds of spectrum rebalancing and debt obligations. When Starlink introduced rental options and slashed kit prices in mid-2024, Safaricom’s submission to the CA arrived within weeks.

    What makes the Starlink episode distinctive is that it activated the entire weight of the regulatory apparatus simultaneously.

    Starlink.

    The CA turned to the International Telecommunication Union for a global framework rather than applying existing Kenyan rules, effectively delaying a definitive regulatory posture.

    A court case brought by Kituo Cha Sheria to defend Starlink’s independent operation was met with the CA arguing that the NGO’s suit was a proxy for Starlink’s commercial interests. The government, meanwhile, was simultaneously pursuing a registration and identity verification drive targeting Starlink subscribers specifically.

    That verification requirement, announced in February 2026 under the Kenya Information and Communications (Registration of Telecommunications Service Subscribers) Regulations 2025, mandates that all Starlink users complete in-person identity verification at an authorised retailer by April 30, 2026, or face service interruption.

    Starlink is required to collect national identity cards, postal addresses and phone numbers of each subscriber and authenticate them against the National Integrated Population Registration System. The consequence of non-compliance is deactivation.

    The CA frames the requirement as routine extension of Kenya’s Know Your Customer framework to satellite services. The language of security and fraud prevention runs through every official statement on the matter.

    But the practical effect is to eliminate one of the structural advantages that had made Starlink attractive to a specific and significant segment of Kenyan subscribers: those who had, after the events of 2024, become acutely conscious of what their digital footprint meant.

    THE SURVEILLANCE DIMENSION

    The year 2024 was, for Kenya, a year of rupture. Gen Z-led protests against the Finance Bill brought hundreds of thousands onto the streets in June and July, producing one of the most consequential political upheavals of the Ruto administration.

    The government’s response involved police live fire that killed dozens.

    It also, according to investigations by the Daily Nation, Nairobi-based journalist Namir Shabibi and international outlet The Continent, involved the systematic use of subscriber data by security agencies.

    The investigation, published in October 2024, alleged that Safaricom had allowed security agencies routine access to call data records and location data without court orders, assisting in the tracking and capture of individuals linked to the protest movement.

    The Kenya Human Rights Commission and Muslims for Human Rights wrote a formal open letter to Safaricom CEO Peter Ndegwa detailing specific allegations: that the company had facilitated the handling of call data records by police attached to its own Law Enforcement Liaison Office, creating a conflict of interest in which the accused agency controlled access to evidence of its own conduct; that it had produced records bearing signs of manipulation before courts; that it had retained data it claimed had been deleted; and that it had, in partnership with Neural Technologies Limited, developed a software system granting security agencies what the rights groups described as virtually unfettered access to subscriber data.

    The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights documented more than 80 cases of abductions and enforced disappearances following the protests.

    Activists who had been targeted publicly said they had abandoned their Safaricom lines in an effort to evade tracking, encouraging others to do the same. US Ambassador Meg Whitman weighed in, describing the mobile phone surveillance by security agents as a breach of privacy.

    Safaricom denied the allegations categorically.

    CEO Ndegwa said during the company’s half-year results presentation that the reports were inaccurate and that sharing subscriber data without a court order would produce chaos in the business.

    The company noted its ISO 27701 certification from the British Standards Institute for privacy information management. Its lawyers filed a complaint against Nation Media Group with the Media Council Complaints Commission, alleging that the publication had violated the journalism code of conduct.

    Safaricom CEO Peter Ndegwa.

    The Senate launched an ICT committee probe. Senators demanded to know whether Safaricom had a data-sharing agreement with the government and whether subscribers had been informed. The answers were never definitively provided.

    What the episode established, beyond reasonable dispute, is that Kenyan security agencies regard telco subscriber data as an operational asset, that the legal framework governing access to that data is porous and contested, and that the established operators, whether by design or systemic pressure, have operated within a surveillance ecosystem that serves state objectives.

    Against that backdrop, Starlink’s architecture represented something genuinely disruptive that had nothing to do with data speeds or pricing.

    A satellite operator headquartered in the United States, routing traffic through a constellation in low Earth orbit, does not sit inside the reach of the Law Enforcement Liaison Office.

    Accessing subscriber data from Starlink requires going through Starlink, which means navigating American corporate governance, US federal law and SpaceX’s own policy frameworks. For anyone who had spent 2024 watching their compatriots disappear after their calls were traced, that was not an abstract distinction.

    Joseph Khago, a Nairobi-based IT specialist, framed the implications of the KYC mandate with characteristic directness when speaking to this publication.

    Without the registration requirement, he noted, authorities seeking to identify a Starlink user from an IP address would have to go through the company itself. The new regulations give the government more control.

    What he did not need to add is that they simultaneously diminish one of the most significant practical privacy advantages that satellite broadband had offered to ordinary Kenyan internet users.

    Starlink’s architecture bypassed the surveillance architecture that terrestrial operators had spent a decade building with, and sometimes for, the Kenyan state. The KYC mandate closes that gap.

    PEACE IN OUR TIME

    Safaricom’s formal posture toward Starlink changed with conspicuous speed once the competitive arithmetic shifted. By late September 2024, CEO Ndegwa was telling interviewers that the company was open to discussions with satellite providers and viewed their technology as complementary.

    In November 2025, Safaricom’s parent company Vodacom signed a continent-wide agreement with SpaceX authorising Vodacom and its subsidiaries, including Safaricom, to resell Starlink’s satellite internet equipment and services to enterprise and small business customers across Africa.

    The deal was announced as a strategic evolution. In operational terms it is more accurately described as absorption: Safaricom gains a distribution relationship with the disruptor, integrating satellite backhaul into its network to reach remote areas without the capital cost of new towers, while Starlink gains a distribution partner with 50 million subscribers and a retail infrastructure that extends to the furthest reaches of the country.

    Both sides benefit. But the dynamic is not symmetrical. Safaricom retains control of the customer relationship, the billing relationship and the data relationship. Starlink enters as a supplier.

    The Airtel deal is structurally different, and that difference explains everything.

    Where Safaricom’s Starlink integration uses satellites to relay data between remote towers and the core network, the Direct-to-Cell arrangement turns the satellite into the tower. The customer connects directly to the sky.

    There is no Airtel-controlled data path in a dead zone; the connection is established between handset and satellite, with Airtel providing the licensed LTE spectrum that makes the integration legal.

    This is the architecture that Safaricom’s 2024 letter was specifically designed to prevent. It is the model that was, in the language of that letter, too risky to license independently.

    Airtel, of course, is not Starlink operating independently. It is a licensed Kenyan mobile operator using licensed Kenyan spectrum to partner with a satellite provider.

    That is precisely the model Safaricom claimed to want: satellite as infrastructure, working through a local operator.

    The irony is that the local operator enabling it is Safaricom’s most aggressive competitor. Airtel Kenya CEO Ashish Malhotra has not been coy about the strategic ambition.

    The promise that every Airtel customer in every corner of Kenya will get coverage the day approval comes is not just a connectivity statement. It is a competitive declaration addressed to a market leader whose rural reach has been one of its most durable advantages.

    THE REGULATOR’S TIGHTROPE

    The CA’s position in this contest is genuinely difficult, and there is reason to believe that the current review reflects something more than procedural caution. The interference concern is real: the GSMA, the ITU and independent telecoms analysts have all noted that high-power LEO satellite transmissions in flexible-use spectrum bands can degrade noise floors in ground networks. The CA will need to model signal propagation, assess the satellite constellation’s orbital parameters and determine operational conditions that protect existing licensees. That work takes time and requires technical capacity.

    What complicates the picture is that the CA’s track record on Starlink regulation has shown a consistent tendency to move slowly in ways that favour incumbents.

    The ITU referral in 2024 was cited by some industry observers as a means of deferring a decision that would otherwise have required the regulator to either grant or deny Starlink’s operating model explicitly.

    Safaricom is itself a partial government asset, with the Kenyan state holding a stake through the National Treasury alongside Vodacom and Vodafone. The institutional relationships that flow from that ownership structure do not require conspiracy to function as competitive cushioning.

    Airtel Kenya has a record of filing competition complaints against Safaricom over regulatory processes.

    In the LTE licensing process of the mid-2010s, Airtel and Telkom Kenya both raised objections about the manner in which the 4G licence was awarded to Safaricom. That grievance was never resolved in a manner satisfactory to the smaller operators. The frequency rebalancing dispute that Safaricom cited in opposing the Airtel-Telkom merger was, in the view of Airtel’s lawyers, precisely the kind of regulatory asymmetry that entrenches dominance under the cover of technical administration.

    The CA has, under the current government, moved to address at least one dimension of competitive imbalance.

    The reduction in mobile termination rates, opposed strenuously by Safaricom and implemented over its objections, is a structural intervention designed to reduce the automatic income advantage that accrues to the largest network.

    The logic of the Airtel-Starlink review should, in principle, run along similar lines: a technology that demonstrably extends coverage into underserved areas, using a licensed operator and licensed spectrum, should face a clear regulatory path.

    Whether it will is the question that the market, and Safaricom’s board, is watching with intense interest.

    WHAT A DECISION WOULD MEAN

    The CA’s approval of the Airtel-Starlink Direct-to-Cell service would reshape the competitive landscape in ways that cannot be contained by Safaricom’s current countermeasures.

    The technology does not require terrestrial infrastructure in the areas it covers. It reduces the capital cost of extending coverage to rural and pastoral regions, which have been the most durable source of Safaricom’s network advantage.

    An Airtel customer in a dead zone who can send a text, access emergency services or use a data application directly via satellite is no longer captive to whoever owns the nearest tower.

    The data pricing implications are potentially more significant still. Direct-to-Cell is initially limited in bandwidth capacity per satellite, but the roadmap that Airtel and SpaceX have publicly committed to includes next-generation satellites with data speeds described as twenty times greater than the first generation.

    If that roadmap executes on schedule, the service moves from a coverage solution for dead zones to a competitive broadband product for anyone with sky visibility.

    In a country where Safaricom’s mobile data revenue has become the primary growth engine, a satellite-delivered alternative that bypasses the terrestrial network is not a fringe concern. It is a core revenue threat.

    Starlink’s current position in Kenya’s fixed internet market, at 0.8 percent with roughly 19,470 subscribers, understates its competitive trajectory. The company grew at more than 2,500 percent between its entry and December 2024.

    The KYC mandate, the CA’s regulatory pace and the absence of a Direct-to-Cell approval have collectively dampened that growth. Remove those constraints and the growth dynamics change. Add a distribution partner with Airtel’s subscriber base and agent network, and the dynamics change again, at Safaricom’s direct expense.

    CONCLUSION: THE SATELLITE AND THE STATE

    Kenya’s satellite internet story is not, at its core, a story about technology. It is a story about power: who holds it, who extends it, and who is threatened when the underlying architecture of connectivity shifts in ways that cannot be controlled from the top of the existing hierarchy.

    Safaricom spent 2024 attempting to use the regulatory system to slow a competitor whose fundamental business model challenged the proposition that you need a tower, a cable and a licensed operator in your vicinity to get online.

    It failed to stop Starlink’s entry, but it succeeded in framing the terms of Starlink’s integration into the Kenyan ecosystem in ways that preserve the data relationship between subscribers and a state that has demonstrated it regards that relationship as an operational resource.

    The Airtel partnership now tests whether the CA is willing to approve a Direct-to-Cell model that, if it scales as its architects intend, materially changes the competitive landscape for the dominant operator and, as a consequence, changes the surveillance arithmetic for a state whose security agencies have shown a persistent appetite for subscriber data from within the country’s borders.

    That is not a regulatory question with a clean technical answer. It is a political and commercial question dressed in the language of spectrum management.

    The CA has said it is reviewing the application. The market is watching the clock.

  • ‪BAT Kenya Banks On Banned, Rebranded and Addictive Nicotine Pouches Targeting Vulnerable Youths To Maximize Profits

    ‪BAT Kenya Banks On Banned, Rebranded and Addictive Nicotine Pouches Targeting Vulnerable Youths To Maximize Profits

    British American Tobacco Kenya has resumed selling nicotine pouches after a five-year hiatus, rebranding a product once banned for illegally targeting minors and now projecting it to deliver up to a quarter of its revenues despite overwhelming evidence that the new generation of oral nicotine products is hooking school-going children on addiction.

    The cigarette manufacturer booked Sh232 million from sales of its Velo nicotine pouches in the six months to December 2025, contributing one percent of total turnover in its first half-year back on the market.

    Finance Director Philemon Kipkemboi told investors the product could grow to contribute between 15 and 25 percent of total revenues within three to five years.

    What the company calls a triumphant return, public health advocates describe as a predatory resurrection.

    The product now sold as Velo first entered Kenya in 2019 under the brand name Lyft, marketed through influencer campaigns on social media and sold on Jumia as a party product before the government intervened.

    “The registration and marketing of the nicotine pouch was shrouded by controversies,” stated a 2021 investigative report. “It is suspected that licensing officials were compromised to allow the product illegally into the market.” The Pharmacy and Poisons Board had granted import approval before the government reversed course and banned the product in October 2020 following public outcry.

    BAT Kenya Managing Director Crispin Achola, who admitted in a lifestyle interview that he does not use any tobacco products himself, had pushed for the company to sell remaining stock worth Sh33 million even after the ban was imposed, arguing that repackaging with warning labels would be sufficient.

    Anti-tobacco lobby groups protested that this would expose 400,000 young people to addiction.

    The company has now returned with a familiar playbook. After threatening to walk away from its Sh2.5 billion Nairobi plant, BAT successfully lobbied the Ministry of Health to relax warning label requirements.

    Investigative reporting by The Examination, Africa Uncensored and The Guardian revealed that BAT pressured the government to dilute health warnings, allowing the company to sell products with labels that only state “this product contains nicotine and is addictive” while omitting mention of carcinogenic tobacco-specific nitrosamines .

    In the United Kingdom, BAT informs consumers that nicotine pouches contain these cancer-causing compounds. Kenyan consumers are not afforded the same transparency.

    “The tobacco industry will stop at nothing to achieve its known objective of making profits, even at the detriment of public health,” the African Tobacco Control Alliance warned in 2021 when the bribery scandal broke.

    A public relations firm hired by BAT had attempted to bribe an investigative journalist for inside information on a report exposing the company’s marketing tactics.

    The company’s global strategy makes no secret of its ambitions. BAT Group aims to reach 50 million consumers of non-combustible products by 2030, having already secured 34 million users by the end of 2025 . In investor presentations, BAT speaks of “stimulating the senses of new adult generations” and expanding the overall nicotine market.

    Public health experts argue there is only one interpretation. “The only rationale for a corporation like BAT to spend big money on marketing the new product is not just to increase the overall size of the nicotine product but a clever way of recruiting a new generation of nicotine addicts,” an earlier investigative report concluded.

    The evidence from the ground supports this grim assessment. Velo has become immensely popular among Kenyan teenagers, with short videos of young TikTokers using the product garnering millions of views.

    Field surveys have revealed the products are being sold in schools. A draft report released by a government-appointed task force highlighted that young people are more susceptible to the influence of tobacco companies.

    The product itself is deceptively simple: small white pouches containing nicotine derived from tobacco mixed with fibres from pine trees, eucalyptus and flavouring agents. Users slip them between gum and lip, where the nicotine absorbs directly into the bloodstream. No smoke, no smell, no tell-tale signs. For a student in a classroom, it is undetectable.

    “Nicotine is toxic to the developing adolescent brain,” health experts warn. Yet BAT was forced to withdraw its nicotine pouches in Russia after products made by other brands were blamed for teenage hospitalisations and linked to one death. The company pressed on in Kenya regardless.

    The regulatory environment remains deeply concerning. The Tobacco Control (Amendment) Bill 2024 currently before the Senate seeks to ban flavoured vapes and nicotine pouches while restricting advertising and banning influencers from promoting tobacco products . Offenders would face up to three years imprisonment or fines of up to Sh500,000.

    But traders are pushing back. The Bar, Hotels and Liquor Traders Association has petitioned the Senate to shelve the Bill, arguing that banning flavours would drive consumers to illicit products. Secretary General Boniface Gachoka claimed the products are priced out of reach for minors at Sh600 per tin, despite clear evidence of widespread youth uptake.

    “Bans and excessive restrictions will only drive consumers to criminals, fuel unemployment and deepen poverty,” Gachoka argued . The association urged lawmakers to focus on enforcing existing laws, including the ban on sales to under-18s.

    Yet it was precisely the failure to enforce those laws that necessitated the 2020 ban. BAT had marketed Lyft as a harmless lifestyle accessory, hiring influencers to pose with the pouches and frame them as trendy, aspirational and classy. Because it was smokeless, young people deemed it safe. They were wrong.

    The company has since divested from its Nairobi manufacturing plant and now imports Velo from Pakistan, though it says local production may be reconsidered depending on performance.

    The shift to imports means Kenya loses jobs and investment while BAT retains the profits.

    Globally, non-combustible products account for 18 percent of BAT Group’s revenue. The target is 50 percent by 2035 . Kenya, described in leaked documents as one of BAT’s “most exciting trial markets” for low and middle-income countries, serves as the launch pad for East and Southern Africa.

    The human toll is already being felt. Studies show that more than 8,000 Kenyans die annually from tobacco-related diseases, part of what the World Health Organization calls the biggest public health threat the world has ever faced. Cigarettes kill about 15 people every minute.

    BAT’s response to questions about youth uptake remains consistent: “All marketing activity for our products will only be directed towards adult consumers and is not designed to engage or appeal to youth.” The company insists it follows local laws, legislation and platform policies.

    Investigative journalists have documented otherwise. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism established that BAT’s tactics in different countries have attracted a new generation including non-smokers to highly addictive nicotine products. BAT’s own research shows that at least half of adult vapers and those using nicotine pouches were not using nicotine before.

    BAT Kenya welcomed the Ministry of Health’s advisory that Lyft should be sold and regulated under the Tobacco Control Act, which demands graphic images and warnings on packages, sales only to adults, and higher taxation. But the damage, as one commentator put it, was already done.

    The company now has 13.5 million consumers of its nicotine pouches globally, a growth of three million in 2020 alone. Its Kenyan subsidiary defied Covid-19 business disruptions to record a 42 percent jump in net earnings that year.

    When Achola was asked whether he uses any tobacco product, his answer was no. The man steering BAT Kenya’s push into nicotine pouches does not consume his own product. He knows what the company’s internal research confirms: nicotine is toxic, addictive and harmful.

    But the numbers tell their own story. Cigarette sales are declining as taxes rise and health awareness grows. The solatium levy introduced by government now funds tobacco cessation programmes, but it also cuts into profits. Nicotine pouches offer a way forward: a new product, a new market, a new generation of addicts.

    The company argues it is helping smokers quit. Public health advocates see a corporation doing what corporations do: maximising profits by any means necessary. The difference is that the product kills. Cigarettes kill 15 people every minute. By the time this article is read, more than 100 will have died. Tobacco firms‘ profits will not.

    Kenya faces a choice. The Tobacco Control Bill offers an opportunity to ban flavoured pouches, restrict advertising and protect children. Or the country can continue as a trial market for multinational corporations willing to bribe, lobby and threaten their way into the pockets of young Kenyans.

    The evidence is overwhelming. BAT knows its product is dangerous. It warns British consumers about cancer-causing compounds while telling Kenyans only that nicotine is addictive. It claims to target only adults while its products flood schools and generate millions of TikTok views.

    “BAT was fully aware of what it was doing and the dark recruitment of addicts they were bringing without considering the future health of the young generation,” concluded the 2021 investigation.

    Nothing has changed except the name. Lyft became Velo. The factory closed then reopened. The product was banned then unbanned. Through it all, the pouches keep coming and the teenagers keep using them.

    The government has tools to act. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which Kenya ratified, requires a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. Marketing tobacco products online through influencers is a flagrant violation of Article 13.

    Yet influencers are precisely how the product spreads. Young Kenyans see their favourite personalities posing with pouches, framing them as fashionable and safe. They do not see the cancer warnings hidden in small print. They do not know that nicotine damages their developing brains. They only know it looks cool.

    BAT Kenya projects Velo will contribute up to 25 percent of revenues in the medium term. That projection depends on one thing: young people starting and continuing to use nicotine. It depends on recruitment. It depends on addiction.

    The company calls it growth. Public health calls it a tragedy.

    By the time the Senate finishes debating the Tobacco Bill, thousands more young Kenyans will have tried nicotine pouches for the first time. Some will get sick. Some will switch to cigarettes. Some will die. BAT’s profits will not.