Author: Our Correspondent

  • How IEBC Chair Ethekon Kicked Out CEO Marjan

    How IEBC Chair Ethekon Kicked Out CEO Marjan

    NAIROBI, Kenya – In a dramatic move that shocked Kenya’s political establishment Tuesday evening, newly appointed IEBC Chairman Erastus Ethekon orchestrated the unceremonious exit of Chief Executive Officer Hussein Marjan, bringing down the curtain on more than a decade of service in the controversial 399 days before his contract was due to expire.

    The bloodless coup at Anniversary Towers culminated in five commissioners being urgently recalled from a week-long workshop in Naivasha on Monday for a crisis meeting that sealed Marjan’s fate, with the executive’s future dissected in sessions held both in his presence and behind closed doors.

    Sources privy to the boardroom drama revealed that Ethekon, barely seven months into his tenure as chairman, had been methodically building a case against Marjan since the commission was fully constituted last July, focusing on procurement decisions made when commissioners were absent and questions around the extension of the controversial Smartmatic contract.

    The final act played out with surgical precision. When Marjan learned his days were numbered, he approached Ethekon seeking a dignified exit. The chairman obliged, offering a written confirmation that the departure would be by mutual consent. But in a twist that stunned the commission, Marjan returned on Friday at 5pm armed with legal counsel and a counter-proposal demanding full payment through March 2027 and compensation for unused leave.

    That move proved fatal. Ethekon convened an emergency session on Monday afternoon with five commissioners, deliberately excluding Vice Chairperson Fahima Araphat Abdallah who was attending to private matters. The session, fully minuted, became the formal basis for terminating Marjan’s contract and marked the point of no return.

    Commissioner Alutalala Mukhwana was first to arrive at Tuesday’s concluding meeting that began at 3:30pm, followed by Commissioner Anne Nderitu and Professor Francis Aduol. By 5:36pm, the verdict was sealed. When Marjan appeared at reception around 6pm, he found media already gathered, tipped off about the seismic shift underway. His terse “Sorry, I’m not going to speak to the media” response betrayed the tension of a man whose career had just been demolished.

    The catalyst for Marjan’s downfall was a perfect storm of opposition pressure and internal discontent. Opposition leaders led by Wiper’s Kalonzo Musyoka had spent weeks demanding his removal, accusing him of hastily renewing Smartmatic’s contract when the commission was not in office. The company, which supplied the Kenya Integrated Elections Management System kits for the 2022 polls, has been dogged by controversy across multiple countries.

    “We cannot have free and fair elections with Marjan at the IEBC,” Kalonzo had thundered at a funeral in Machakos County in January. “When there was no commission in place, he moved very fast and renewed Smartmatic’s contract. When the new commissioners came in, they found that he had already renewed those contracts. It was an illegal act.”

    DAP-Kenya leader Eugene Wamalwa went further, demanding not just Marjan’s exit but his prosecution for abuse of office. The opposition’s fury was amplified by explosive allegations from a former Venezuelan military intelligence chief linking Smartmatic to election manipulation in multiple countries.

    But it was not just external pressure that sealed Marjan’s fate. Inside the commission, questions swirled around procurement decisions and an Auditor-General’s report that raised governance concerns. During one particularly brutal confrontation, a commissioner pointedly asked Marjan whether his continued stay was sustainable given that the entire commission had lost confidence in him.

    The sticking point was the Smartmatic contract extension. Commissioners discovered that a two-year extension approved in 2024 to expire at the end of 2026 had been signed unilaterally by the CEO when commissioners were not in office. Under IEBC’s standard operating procedures, all purchases of strategic election materials including ballot papers, voter registration kits, and ballot boxes must receive commissioner approval.

    When Marjan attempted in November 2025 to extend the framework agreement to allow purchase of new equipment, commissioners flatly rejected the move. That rejection, sources say, was the beginning of the end.

    Marjan’s final hours at IEBC were a study in contrasts. On Monday, he reported for duty at 8am and left at 3pm. It remains unclear whether he attended the meeting that ratified his contract termination. By Tuesday evening, he was penning an emotional farewell to staff, thanking them for “over decade of invaluable experience in elections management.”

    “As I move on, I do so wiser, enriched and deeply grateful,” Marjan wrote, his words carefully chosen to maintain the fiction of mutual consent even as the walls closed in around him.

    The timing of Marjan’s exit, coming just 15 months before the 2027 General Election, has raised eyebrows about the wisdom of such upheaval at a critical moment. But Ethekon was unrepentant, framing the move as necessary for institutional reform.

    “The changes are meant to enhance effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability of the secretariat in service delivery to the people of Kenya,” the chairman declared in his statement, promising that the commission would embark on “critical reforms within the Secretariat.”

    For Marjan, who joined IEBC as Deputy Commission Secretary in March 2015 and rose to become CEO in March 2022 after serving nearly five years in an acting capacity, the fall from grace has been swift and stunning. He shepherded the commission through the tumultuous 2022 General Election and held the fort when the electoral body operated without commissioners for months.

    But in the cutthroat world of Kenya’s electoral politics, past service counts for little when new power arrives with its own vision. Ethekon, the 48-year-old Turkana native and former county attorney, had made clear during his vetting that he intended to restore integrity and public confidence in the commission.

    His first major act as chairman has sent an unmistakable message: there is a new sheriff in town at Anniversary Towers, and he answers to no one but the Constitution and the Kenyan people. Whether this shake-up will indeed enhance the commission’s credibility or plunge it into fresh turmoil ahead of 2027 remains to be seen.

    The commission has promised to announce an interim replacement “in due course” while the recruitment process for a substantive CEO begins. Marjan’s deputies, Ruth Kulundu and Obadiah Keitany, are scheduled to exit in March and May 2027 respectively, raising questions about whether they too might face the axe as Ethekon moves to put his stamp on the secretariat.

    As Marjan clears his desk and contemplates his next move, one fact is inescapable: his tenure, which began with such promise and survived years of political turbulence, ended not with a bang but with a carefully worded statement about “mutual consent” that fooled no one who watched the drama unfold over those fateful 48 hours.

    The real question now is whether Ethekon’s bold move will indeed deliver the credible, transparent electoral process he has promised or whether it has simply opened a new chapter of instability at Kenya’s most critical constitutional commission.

  • Sifuna Says ‘Linda Ground’ Rally Funds Not Coming From ODM HQ As Osotsi Clams Party Being Run From State House

    Sifuna Says ‘Linda Ground’ Rally Funds Not Coming From ODM HQ As Osotsi Clams Party Being Run From State House

    The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) Secretary General Edwin Sifuna has questioned the source of what he described as massive resources used by his party in the Linda Ground rallies across the country.

    Sifuna said that, as a signatory to the party’s bank account alongside National Treasurer Timothy Bosire, they have not signed off on any withdrawal to facilitate the rallies.

    The ODM official, who is also Nairobi Senator, told Citizen TV in an interview on Tuesday night that the party’s last spending was on its 20th Anniversary fete in Mombasa in November last year.

    “The money you see being spent in ODM rallies is not coming from ODM headquarters; there is parallel funding for activities clothed in ODM colours,” he said, rejecting reports that his party was funding the events.

    Sifuna added, “Forget this rubbish you hear people saying here. Timothy Bosire, the Treasurer, is also a signatory to the bank accounts, and the last money we expended as ODM officially was for the celebrations in Mombasa, and it was a fraction of what we saw there.”

    When asked if he knew the source of the funds, the SG said, “You will ask them. I can only account for monies that I am a signatory to.”

    The first Linda Ground rally was launched in Kamkunji, Kibra Constituency, last month and was attended by Interim Party Leader Oburu Oginga, party chairperson Gladys Wanga, among other party leaders.

    The ODM team has also since held similar rallies in Kakamega, Busia, Kisumu and Kisii counties, where speakers have been pushing for planned pre-election coalition talks with President William Ruto’s UDA.

    Sifuna’s comments came two days after ODM deputy party leader and Vihiga Senator Godfrey Osotsi was quoted in the media claiming that ODM is now being run from State House.

    Sifuna said he had distanced himself from the Linda Ground rallies while raising concerns about what he described as the irregular appointment of Oburu as party leader.

    “There is no requirement on the SG to attend all those rallies. The party leader has the freedom to be able to consult party members to meet delegates in the counties. If he asks me to join him, I will join him,” the Nairobi Senator said.

    He added, when asked why he has been absent from the ODM events, “I require to be involved to have information about where we are going tomorrow. I was not involved, I was not invited, and I was not informed. I saw them on the media the way that you saw them.”

    The party official, while referring to the ODM constitution, said Oburu’s installation as party leader was not done in line with the law.

    “The installation of Oburu Oginga as interim party leader was not procedural in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. What I would have advised had I been in that meeting is allow one of the deputies to act for one month and in 3 months’ time, call for a special NDC and do it procedurally and properly,” he stated.

    Sifuna said he did not attend the meeting that proposed to appoint his Siaya Senate counterpart, as he was among the delegation that travelled to India to accompany party leader Raila Odinga’s body home.

    “I was not in that meeting because I was going to fetch my party leader to bring Baba back home. I don’t think anybody considers me important enough to be waited upon, and they have their reasons why they did it in the manner they did,” he added.

    The Senator also responded to suggestions that the party may expel him for leading a section of members seen as dissenting voices.

    “It is okay. There is nowhere it is written that Sifuna can be the only one who is SG. I have said that I have predecessors, people who have done this job,” Sifuna said.

    He added, “I have young people in ODM who, I know for a fact, if they are given the opportunity, they can do this job even better than Sifuna or all the other SGs that have served before. It is not anyone’s birthright to be SG or to be any position in the party.”

  • IEBC CEO Marjan Hussein Marjan Resigns

    IEBC CEO Marjan Hussein Marjan Resigns

    Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Marjan Hussein Marjan has resigned.

    Marjan revealed he had mutually agreed to proceed on a structured transition as the CEO of the electoral body.

    “As you may be aware, the Commission and I have mutually agreed on a structured transition in the Office of the Commission Secretary/Chief Executive Officer. I write to you today to express my sincere appreciation to each one of you for the privilege of serving alongside you over the years,” Marjan wrote after a meeting with top IEBC officials on Tuesday, February 3, 2026.

    Marjan, who joined the commission in 2015, started as a deputy commission secretary and later rose in rank to the chief executive officer.

    “Since joining the Commission in April 2015, first as Deputy Commission Secretary/Chief Executive Officer and later as Commission Secretary/Chief Executive Officer, it has been an honour to work with a professional, dedicated, and resilient team committed to the constitutional mandate of the IEBC,” he explained.

    The resignation comes days after he joined other IEBC officials and the State Department of Public Service and Human Capital Development to review and validate key human resource tools that will guide the commission’s operations going forward.

    Pressure to exit

    Meanwhile, his exit comes weeks after pressure from former Nairobi Town Clerk Philip Kisia calling for his resignation.

    Speaking during an interview on Saturday, December 6, 2025, Kisia argued that Marjan should either be fired or voluntarily resign, noting that his prolonged stay at the commission has begun affecting the quality of his work.

    He maintained that Marjan has overseen two elections and has served in the commission for many years, yet continues to insist on remaining in office despite having exceeded a reasonable tenure for such a sensitive position.

    Kisia emphasised that principles of good governance require periodic leadership turnover, especially in institutions that handle critical national functions.

    He questioned why the same individual should occupy the role for over a decade, suggesting that the commission or Marjan himself should have nurtured other professionals capable of taking up the responsibility after his exit.

    He insisted that Marjan must leave office before the 2027 polls, adding that he personally has no confidence in the IEBC boss.

    He further stated that leaders within the United Opposition, and a significant portion of Kenyans also lack trust in Marjan’s ability to deliver credible elections.

    “This man must be shown the door before 2027; he actually must resign. This Marijan man must resign. I personally don’t have any confidence in Marjan. I can tell you from where I’m sitting that our leadership in the opposition and Kenya, to a large extent, have no confidence in him,” he said.

  • Kalonzo Appointed New Azimio Party Leader In Uhuru’s Led Meeting

    Kalonzo Appointed New Azimio Party Leader In Uhuru’s Led Meeting

    The Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition has appointed former Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka as its new party leader, following a joint meeting of the coalition’s Council and National Executive Committee held on February 2, 2026 and chaired by former President Uhuru Kenyatta.

    The coalition announced the changes to its top leadership in a public notice, after resolutions were passed by the Council and the National Executive Committee.

    The party has also dropped Suna East MP Junet Mohamed as its Secretary General, replacing him with Suba MP Caroli Omondi.

    “Following the resolutions of February 2, 2026, of the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition Party’s Council and National Executive Committee, the party notifies the public of the change of the following officials: the new Party Leader, Dr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, E.G.H, SC, the new Secretary General, Caroli Omondi, MP and the New Executive Director, Phillip Kisia,” reads the notice.

    Additionally, Philip Kisia has been appointed as the coalition’s new executive director and will take over former Cabinet Secretary Raphael Tuju’s responsibilities.

    The coalition has urged members of the public seeking additional details to consult its official platforms.

    The changes were subsequently acknowledged by the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) in a letter dated February 2, 2026 and referenced RPP/FRP/101 (73). In the correspondence addressed to the Chairperson of the Azimio Coalition Council, Registrar of Political Parties J.C. Lorionokou confirmed receipt of documentation arising from the joint meeting of the Azimio Council and the National Coalition Executive Council.

    “Reference is made to the above subject matter. This Office acknowledges receipt of your letter dated 2nd February 2026, on the joint meeting of the Azimio Council and the National Coalition Executive Council of February 2, 2026, submitting the following documents,” reads the letter.

    The Registrar listed the submitted records as including “a notice dated January 29, 2026 convening the meeting; minutes of the meeting held on February 2, 2026; resolutions of the meeting including change of officials; a letter dated 2nd February addressed to Junet Mohamed on his removal from the office of the Secretary General; a statutory Form PP7 on the change of officials; and an attendance list of the meeting.”

    In the same letter, the ORPP advised the coalition to publish the change of officials in line with Section 20 of the Political Parties Act, Cap. 7D.

    The letter was copied to MP Junet, in his capacity as Minority Leader, at Parliament Buildings in Nairobi.

    The leadership overhaul marks a significant shift within the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition as it reorganises its top organs following the death of the coalition’s party leader and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, a development that created a leadership vacuum.

    The party has also dropped Suna East MP Junet Mohamed as its Secretary General, replacing him with Suba MP Caroli Omondi.

    “Following the resolutions of February 2, 2026, of the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition Party’s Council and National Executive Committee, the party notifies the public of the change of the following officials: the new Party Leader, Dr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, E.G.H, SC, the new Secretary General, Caroli Omondi, MP and the New Executive Director, Phillip Kisia,” reads the notice.

    Additionally, Philip Kisia has been appointed as the coalition’s new executive director and will take over former Cabinet Secretary Raphael Tuju’s responsibilities.

    The coalition has urged members of the public seeking additional details to consult its official platforms.

    The changes were subsequently acknowledged by the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) in a letter dated February 2, 2026 and referenced RPP/FRP/101 (73). In the correspondence addressed to the Chairperson of the Azimio Coalition Council, Registrar of Political Parties J.C. Lorionokou confirmed receipt of documentation arising from the joint meeting of the Azimio Council and the National Coalition Executive Council.

    “Reference is made to the above subject matter. This Office acknowledges receipt of your letter dated 2nd February 2026, on the joint meeting of the Azimio Council and the National Coalition Executive Council of February 2, 2026, submitting the following documents,” reads the letter.

    The Registrar listed the submitted records as including “a notice dated January 29, 2026 convening the meeting; minutes of the meeting held on February 2, 2026; resolutions of the meeting including change of officials; a letter dated 2nd February addressed to Junet Mohamed on his removal from the office of the Secretary General; a statutory Form PP7 on the change of officials; and an attendance list of the meeting.”

    In the same letter, the ORPP advised the coalition to publish the change of officials in line with Section 20 of the Political Parties Act, Cap. 7D.

    The letter was copied to MP Junet, in his capacity as Minority Leader, at Parliament Buildings in Nairobi.

    The leadership overhaul marks a significant shift within the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition as it reorganises its top organs following the death of the coalition’s party leader and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, a development that created a leadership vacuum.

  • Govt Deploys KDF, NIS To Isiolo To Combat Cattle Rustling, Banditry

    Govt Deploys KDF, NIS To Isiolo To Combat Cattle Rustling, Banditry

    The government has resolved to deploy multi-agency security teams, including the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), in Isiolo and neighbouring counties to curb cattle theft and restore peace in drought-affected areas.

    Speaking on Tuesday during a security engagement in Isiolo, Interior Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen said the operation will target armed criminals, illegal firearms and those aiding banditry, while also reorganising police deployments to improve response to insecurity.

    “The prolonged drought situation in pastoralist areas has heightened resource conflicts and cattle rustling. This risks rolling back the gains the region has made following the implementation of Operation Maliza Uhalifu and other security interventions,” Murkomen said.

    He explained that the government is touring the region to assess the security situation and develop strategies to maintain peace and normalcy, alongside measures to mitigate the impact of the drought.

    “We resolved to immediately launch a security operation in Isiolo County and neighbouring Samburu and Laikipia. The operation targets illegal firearms, ammunition, criminals, and those abetting crime,” he said.

    The Interior CS added that the operation will also reorganise security teams on the ground, open new roads and strengthen network coverage to enable faster response to threats.

    Murkomen confirmed that KDF and NIS will be deployed alongside the National Police Service and Kenya Wildlife Service to flush out criminals, in line with directives from President William Ruto.

    Interior Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen addressing security officials and local leaders during a meeting in Isiolo on February 3, 2026, ahead of the launch of a multi-agency operation to curb cattle rustling and restore peace in the region. (Photo: Kipchumba Murkomen/X)
    Interior Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen addressing security officials and local leaders during a meeting in Isiolo on February 3, 2026, ahead of the launch of a multi-agency operation to curb cattle rustling and restore peace in the region. (Photo: Kipchumba Murkomen/X)

    “Security agencies will reopen some roads in the three counties that had been closed because of insecurity to allow security operations to be carried out more effectively. Within the next few weeks, we are working with the Ministry of Roads to ensure that some roads in Samburu, Isiolo, and Laikipia are opened to ensure that the places where we will be doing the operations will be accessible,” he said.

    He emphasised that the operation will be fully supported by the Commander-in-Chief.

    “This operation will be multi-agency because it will involve all the security agencies, and the Commander-in-Chief, who is our president, has given marching orders to restore security in Isiolo, Meru, and parts of Laikipia,” Murkomen said.

    Murkomen added that police officers accused of colluding with criminals or failing to act against them will face disciplinary and legal action.

    “The NPS leadership will track these officers, take the necessary disciplinary and legal action against them, and dismiss them from the service,” he said.

    He also announced that the Inspector General of Police is reorganising deployments to bring in fresh officers.

    “There are some officers who have overstayed in these areas, and they have made friends, and they are even fearing some people, so the IG is going to do some reorganisations to bring fresh new police officers,” he said.

    “There has been laxity in terms of police coordination in this county, and we can agree. Some of them rarely go to their stations, and some just watch as thieves take cows.”

    The announcement follows Murkomen’s earlier statement that KDF personnel would be deployed to secure the construction of the 740km Isiolo-Mandera road. Speaking after a meeting with Defence Cabinet Secretary and Transport Cabinet Secretary Davis Chirchir on January 20, he said the deployment will ensure the timely completion of the project.

  • EACC Probes Otuoma Over Sh1.4 Billion Tenders Awarded to Close Associates

    EACC Probes Otuoma Over Sh1.4 Billion Tenders Awarded to Close Associates

    Busia Governor Paul Otuoma has been drawn into a deepening corruption probe after appearing before the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission over allegations that his administration irregularly awarded tenders worth more than Sh1.4 billion to companies linked to his close associates and family members.

    The governor reported to the EACC Western Regional Offices in Bungoma on Tuesday morning, February 3, 2026, where he recorded a statement with investigators in connection with the ongoing inquiry.

    He arrived shortly after 9.30am and was grilled for several hours as detectives pieced together what they describe as a complex web of proxy companies and suspicious payments spanning multiple financial years.

    At the centre of the investigation are tenders and payments amounting to over Sh1.4 billion allegedly awarded between the 2022/23 and 2024/25 financial years to at least 26 firms believed to be linked to relatives and close associates of senior Busia County officials.

    Investigators say the firms may have been used to siphon public funds through inflated contracts and irregular procurement processes.

    According to the EACC, Governor Otuoma is among eight county officials under scrutiny over allegations of conflict of interest, procurement irregularities and theft of public funds.

    EACC Director of Legal Services and Asset Recovery David Too said the officials are also suspected of amassing wealth that is not commensurate with their known sources of income.

    One line of inquiry focuses on Sh90 million allegedly paid to four private entities said to have direct links to the governor.

    Detectives are seeking to establish whether the payments were lawful and whether the firms met the legal requirements to do business with the county government.

    The commission is also probing the construction of a county yard undertaken during the 2023/24 financial year.

    Investigators allege that 2.4 hectares of public land were irregularly leased to a private contractor for 25 years without a competitive tendering process, raising concerns of abuse of office and loss of public land.

    The governor’s summons follows a series of search operations conducted in August 2025, when EACC officers raided homes and offices of several senior Busia County officials, including three county executive committee members and a chief officer.

    Documents and electronic devices were seized during the raids as part of efforts to trace the flow of funds and identify the true beneficiaries of the contested tenders.

    While confirming the governor’s appearance, the commission was keen to stress that the investigations are still ongoing.

    Mr Too said no conclusions have been reached and that any culpability will only be determined after the probe is complete and, where necessary, files forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

    Governor Otuoma has not publicly commented on the substance of the allegations, but allies have previously dismissed claims of corruption in the county as politically motivated.

    The unfolding probe now places the Busia boss under intense scrutiny, with pressure mounting for accountability as the EACC tightens its grip on county procurement scandals across the country.

  • ARE YOU PASSING POWDERED MILK FROM UKRAINE AS FRESH? LAWYER QUESTIONS QUALITY OF KCC’S ‘GOLD CROWN’ MILK

    ARE YOU PASSING POWDERED MILK FROM UKRAINE AS FRESH? LAWYER QUESTIONS QUALITY OF KCC’S ‘GOLD CROWN’ MILK

    NAIROBI: A prominent Nairobi lawyer has thrown down the gauntlet to New Kenya Cooperative Creameries (New KCC), publicly questioning whether the state-owned dairy giant is secretly passing off reconstituted powdered milk as fresh Gold Crown milk to unsuspecting Kenyans.

    Advocate Donald B. Kipkorir, a man who has built a career built on cutting through corporate and government excuses, posted photographic evidence on X on Monday morning that sent shockwaves across social media and had thousands of people watching within hours.

    The images were damning.

    “For long, I have been using Fresh Gold Crown milk from KCC,” Kipkorir wrote in his post. “I take one glass of milk only as breakfast. But of late, the so called fresh milk from @newkcckenya tastes differently, has sediments which I have to use a sieve.”

    Then came the question that stopped Kenya’s dairy industry in its tracks.

    “Is KCC passing powdered milk from Ukraine as fresh milk instead of buying from local farmers?”

    The lawyer went on to tag both the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and the Kenya Dairy Board, demanding to know whether either body had actually verified that Gold Crown milk was fresh before stamping their seal of approval on it. “When will KCC rise from laziness and mediocrity?” he asked, in a line that has since been screenshotted, shared and quoted across every corner of Kenyan social media.

    A SCANDAL WITH HISTORY

    What makes this controversy particularly explosive is that it is not the first time New KCC has been accused of playing fast and loose with the origins of the milk in its packets.

    Records held by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations reveal that New KCC has, in the past, come under intense scrutiny over its association with the importation of contaminated milk powder from Ukraine, a consignment that was declared unfit for human consumption but was allegedly destined to be reconstituted by the creamery.

    The scandal cost KCC significant market share at the time and left a scar on the brand that the company has spent years trying to heal.

    And the practice of reconstituting powdered milk is not a secret inside New KCC.

    In November 2021, New KCC Chairman Ignatius Kahiu openly admitted during a media interview that the company was converting powdered milk back into liquid milk due to a drought-driven shortage.

    “We are being forced to reconstitute some of the powdered milk and blend it with fresh milk and back to the system,” Kahiu said at the time.

    Meanwhile, separate from KCC, revelations have surfaced that Kenyan milk processors have been importing powdered milk from Uganda and reconstituting it into long-life milk at the expense of local dairy farmers.

    The government has since impounded over 30 tonnes of illegally imported milk powder, worth an estimated Sh150 million, in a crackdown led by the DCI Anti-Counterfeit Unit.

    THE NUMBERS TELL A DAMNING STORY

    Kenya imported approximately $85.3 million worth of dairy products in 2023, of which 42 percent, roughly $36 million, was whole and skimmed milk powder. Uganda was the country’s top supplier, far ahead of the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Germany. Even as Kenya was importing milk powder by the tonne, the country was simultaneously producing a surplus. Data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics shows milk output rose 30 percent from 4 million tons in 2020 to 5.28 million tons in 2023, with provisional 2024 estimates placing production at around 5.33 million tons.

    So if Kenya is producing more milk than it needs, the question that hangs heavy in the air is this: why would KCC need to import powdered milk at all, let alone pass it off as fresh?

    Meanwhile, Ukraine, the very country Kipkorir named in his allegations, has been quietly ramping up its dairy exports.

    The Ukrainian dairy sector produced approximately 8.1 million tons of milk in 2023, with milk powder and whey each accounting for roughly 150,000 tons of processed output.

    The primary dairy products leaving Ukraine include butter, skim milk powder, whole milk powder and lower value cheeses.

    In May 2025 alone, Ukraine exported 14,880 tonnes of dairy products worth $50.83 million. The destinations, analysts note, stretch far beyond the European Union.

    FARMERS ALREADY ON THEIR KNEES

    The timing of Kipkorir’s allegations could not be worse for New KCC.

    The state-owned processor is already under siege from hundreds of furious dairy farmers across the North and South Rift who have gone months without being paid for the milk they delivered.

    As recently as November 2025, farmers staged protests outside the New KCC factory in Eldoret, some of them owed hundreds of thousands of shillings.

    One farmer from Trans Nzoia, Anne Kwamboka, told reporters she was owed Sh500,000 and had been forced to lay off workers as her cows’ milk production dropped from 1,000 litres a day to 600 litres because she could no longer afford to feed them properly.

    “We have been forced to sell our milk to private buyers just to raise some money to sustain our activities,” said another farmer, John Kirwa, from Eldoret.

    If the allegations that KCC has been quietly importing powdered milk and reconstituting it rather than buying from these struggling local farmers are true, the implications go far beyond a quality scandal.

    It would be nothing short of a betrayal of the very dairy farmers the cooperative was built to serve.

    WHAT THE EXPERTS ARE SAYING

    Brand and consumer trust analysts have wasted no time weighing in.

    One commentary circulating widely on social media called the whole saga a textbook case of product integrity failure leading to brand erosion.

    The analysis argued that for a legacy player like New KCC, the Gold Crown value proposition is anchored in premium freshness.

    When the customer experience involves needing a sieve to drink what is supposed to be fresh milk, the brand promise is, in effect, broken.

    The commentary went further, noting that vague supply chain origins, such as the powdered milk allegations, create what it called a credibility gap that competitors will exploit.

    It urged New KCC to mount an immediate crisis communication response and commission a visible quality assurance audit, warning that silence in the face of such allegations would only accelerate the churn of customers away from Gold Crown.

    KEBS AND KDB: WHERE ARE THEY?

    Neither the Kenya Bureau of Standards nor the Kenya Dairy Board had issued a public response to Kipkorir’s allegations as of press time on Tuesday.

    This silence has not gone unnoticed. Kipkorir himself called out both agencies directly in his post, demanding to know whether they had checked that Gold Crown milk was genuinely fresh before putting their stamps on it.

    The scrutiny is not new for KEBS. Earlier in 2025, the bureau was forced to conduct a thorough investigation after similar social media allegations were made against Mount Kenya Milk, a product of the Meru Central Dairy Co-operative Union.

    In that case, KEBS Director Dr. Godfrey Murira confirmed that the milk had passed all surveillance checks and carried both the Standardization Mark and the Diamond Mark. That investigation was resolved. This one, however, has yet to even begin.

    NEW KCC: A COMPANY UNDER SIEGE

    New KCC, once the dominant force in Kenya’s dairy sector with a 40 percent market share, has been battered by scandal, mismanagement and debt for years.

    The company owes farmers hundreds of millions of shillings in unpaid arrears. Its processing plants, some of them decades old, have been described as almost obsolete.

    The government has pledged billions in modernisation funds, including a reported Sh37 billion aid package from India, but progress has been painfully slow.

    New KCC is the largest dairy processor in East and Central Africa, and its core business is supposed to be simple: procure high quality raw milk from Kenyan farmers, process it, package it, and sell it.

    That is what Gold Crown is supposed to stand for.

    If a lawyer in Nairobi can crack open a packet of that milk, pour it into a glass, and watch white sediment collect in a sieve, something has gone terribly, terribly wrong.

    The ball is now firmly in the court of KEBS, the Kenya Dairy Board and New KCC itself. Kenyans, and the thousands of dairy farmers whose livelihoods depend on this company, are watching and waiting.

  • The Billionaire Refugee, the Glock Pistol, and the Shadow of Al-Shabaab

    The Billionaire Refugee, the Glock Pistol, and the Shadow of Al-Shabaab

    Tuesday, February 3, 202615 min read

    On the evening of January 12, somewhere between Vipingo and Kikambala on the rain-slicked Mombasa to Malindi Highway, a Toyota Land Cruiser V8 and a convoy of Orange Democratic Movement politicians collided in more ways than one. By the time the dust settled, two Turkish nationals were in custody, a Glock pistol had been seized, and within forty-eight hours, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit was before a Mombasa court alleging links to one of the most feared terror organisations in the Horn of Africa. What began as a road rage incident had morphed into what the Kenyan State now describes as a terrorism case of the highest order. The Standard has spent weeks piecing together the full story of Osman Erdinc Elsek, and what it reveals is far more unsettling than a single night on a dark highway.

    Elsek is not an unknown quantity in Kenya. For nearly two decades, he has been a fixture along the Coast, a man who built affordable housing estates, constructed parts of courthouses, partnered with Eco-Bank on mortgage schemes, and claimed investments worth over six billion shillings. He is, by his own telling and by the corporate branding of his Elsek Group Conglomerate, a benefactor. He is also, according to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, a member of Al-Shabaab.

    “The terrorism allegations directly contradict the police’s own records. This is purely a traffic accident in which I was the victim.”

    Osman Erdinc Elsek — sworn affidavit, January 2026

    The charge sheet presented before a Mombasa court on Monday, February 2, is a six-count document that lays bare the scope of what investigators have assembled. In the first count, the prosecution alleges that Elsek was a member of Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen, the full formal designation of the terrorist group that carried out the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, killing 67 people, and the 2015 Garissa University massacre that claimed 148 lives. In the second and third counts, investigators claim that a Samsung Flip 7 phone recovered from Elsek contained video recordings with titles referencing Osama bin Laden and bearing the hallmarks of jihadist propaganda. In the fourth count, he is accused of unlawfully possessing a Glock pistol, serial number RBV973. The fifth charge sees his associate, Gokmen Sandikci, accused of consorting with an armed man. The sixth and final count, added nearly twenty days after the initial arrest, accuses both men of assaulting Boniface Katana on the night the whole saga began.

    For a man who claims to have built parts of the Shanzu courthouse where he once stood trial, the irony of now facing the court’s judgment on terrorism charges is not lost on observers. But it is the Glock pistol, serial number RBV973, that keeps appearing at the centre of this story, and it is where the pattern becomes difficult to ignore.

    The Glock Pistol — Serial No. RBV973
    • Oct 2020 Seized from Elsek after he shot 15-year-old Frank Omwenga in the chest during an altercation following a football match in Kilifi. Police impounded the pistol along with 15 rounds of 9mm ammunition. Elsek’s civilian firearm licence was also held.
    • Jan 12, 2026 The same Glock pistol, same serial number, same 15 rounds of ammunition, recovered from associate Gokmen Sandikci during the arrest of both men in Mtwapa, Kilifi County.
    • Jan 14, 2026 Elsek tells the Mombasa court that the firearm is lawfully licensed and that his possession of it is entirely legal.
    • Feb 2, 2026 The DPP formally charges Elsek with unlawful possession of the firearm, alleging it was intended for use in a manner prejudicial to public order.

    In October 2020, Elsek was arrested at Kilifi Police Station after shooting a teenager named Frank Omwenga, who was fifteen years old, in the chest during a street scuffle. Police filed the report at Kijipwa Police Station. The Glock was confiscated. Elsek’s civilian licence was surrendered. The case attracted media attention, drew public outrage on social media, and then, as so many cases involving wealthy individuals in Kenya tend to do, it faded quietly from public discourse. The Standard found no record of a successful prosecution arising from that shooting.

    Now, five years later, that same pistol, identified by the same serial number, is back in police custody. This time it was found in the possession of Sandikci, not Elsek. The prosecution has not yet explained publicly how a firearm that was impounded in 2020 came to be in the hands of a man travelling with Elsek in 2026. The defence, for its part, has insisted the weapon was lawfully re-licensed. The court has yet to rule on the matter.

    A Refugee With Six Billion Shillings

    To understand how Osman Erdinc Elsek ended up in a Mombasa courtroom facing terrorism charges, it is necessary to understand the unusual shape of his life in Kenya. Court records and official filings paint a portrait that defies easy categorisation.

    Elsek arrived in Kenya in December 2008. According to his own statements in court, he came after falling out with the then Turkish president. He was granted refugee status by the Kenyan government, a designation that typically applies to individuals fleeing persecution, war, or serious threats to their safety. He settled in Kikambala, a coastal town in Kilifi County, and began building.

    Through the Elsek Group Conglomerate, he registered eighteen companies in Kenya operating across construction, real estate, hospitality, quarrying, transport, production, and mortgage banking. The company’s own website boasts of projects across East Africa including housing estates in Kikambala, a tourism university in Rwanda, and a consulate building in South Sudan. The firm partnered with Eco-Bank to offer mortgage financing and displayed model houses at trade expos in Mombasa. By the time he stood before the court in January 2026, Elsek claimed property worth more than six billion shillings, all invested in Kenya.

    A refugee with billions. A man who built courthouses and appeared before them. A philanthropist who shot a child. The contradictions in Elsek’s story are not new. They have been present for years, quietly accumulating like sediment, and it is only now, with the terrorism charges, that the full weight of the file is being examined.

    Timeline of Key Events
    Dec 2008
    Elsek arrives in Kenya, granted refugee status. Begins establishing businesses along the Coast.
    2016
    Charged in Mombasa court with defrauding a Mogadishu construction company of Sh7.6 million. Case later withdrawn after parties reportedly settle.
    Jan 2019
    Arrested by DCI, GSU and Interpol. Charged with ten counts of defilement and child prostitution involving minors aged 15 and 17 at his Kikambala home. Case transferred from Shanzu to Malindi after court finds Elsek had close relations with judicial officers at Shanzu.
    Oct 2020
    Arrested for shooting 15-year-old Frank Omwenga in the chest in Kilifi. Glock pistol serial no. RBV973 seized. No known successful prosecution follows.
    2021–22
    Charged with conspiring to defeat justice by interfering with witnesses in the defilement case. Case remains pending before Mombasa magistrate’s court.
    Jan 12, 2026
    Road altercation with ODM convoy on Mombasa-Malindi Highway involving Wajir Governor Ahmed Abdullahi Jiir. Elsek allegedly punches the governor and slaps his driver while brandishing a firearm.
    Jan 13, 2026
    Elsek and Sandikci arrested in Mtwapa at 1:37 am. Booked at Nyali Police Station. ATPU begins investigation into terrorism financing.
    Feb 2, 2026
    DPP okays prosecution. Six-count charge sheet presented in Mombasa court including Al-Shabaab membership, possession of terrorist material, firearm charges, and assault.

    The Night on the Highway

    The events of January 12 have been told differently by each side, and the version of events matters enormously to how the terrorism charges are understood. The ODM party had concluded a Central Management Committee meeting at Vipingo. A convoy of party leaders, which included Wajir Governor Ahmed Abdullahi Jiir, was making its way towards Moi International Airport in Mombasa when, according to police and multiple witnesses, a vehicle driven by one of the Turkish nationals cut aggressively into the convoy and struck the governor’s car from behind.

    What happened next has become the subject of fierce legal contest. Police sources and the initial reports indicate that Elsek alighted from his vehicle, drew a firearm, punched the governor, and slapped his driver. The Council of Governors issued a furious statement demanding to know who had authorised a foreigner to carry a gun along Kenyan roads. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki ordered a probe.

    Elsek’s account is starkly different. In a sworn affidavit, he states that he was the one hit from behind, that the governor’s convoy fled the scene, and that when he gave chase and confronted the occupants, he was assaulted. He claims the convoy members attempted to beat him using their own firearms. He says he identified the governor only afterwards, and that the governor subsequently threatened him with deportation.

    The truth of what happened on that highway may eventually emerge through the courts. But what is remarkable is how quickly the narrative shifted from a road rage incident to a terrorism investigation. Within hours of the arrest, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit was involved. Within a day, the State was before a court alleging terrorism financing. Within three weeks, the DPP had approved a charge sheet alleging Al-Shabaab membership.

    “I believe the terror allegation is an afterthought, politically instigated, wild and malicious, manufactured and aimed at unlawful detention.”

    Osman Erdinc Elsek — sworn affidavit, January 2026

    The Propaganda Videos and the Phone

    The terrorism charges hinge in significant part on what was allegedly found on a Samsung Flip 7 mobile phone recovered from Elsek. The charge sheet states that the phone contained video recordings that constitute articles connected to the commission of a terrorist act. The titles cited in the charge sheet include content referencing Osama bin Laden and phrases characteristic of jihadist recruitment material.

    The prosecution has framed these videos as evidence that Elsek was knowingly collecting information intended for use in terrorist activities. The offence, the State says, was committed on January 14 at the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit offices at Mombasa Police Station, the same location where Elsek was being held at the time.

    The defence has not yet publicly addressed the content of the videos in detail, focusing instead on the procedural defects in the charge sheet. In the hearing on February 2, Elsek’s three advocates raised a preliminary objection arguing that the first count, alleging Al-Shabaab membership, failed to specify a date, time, or location. They argued that without these particulars, the charge was fatally defective and that proceeding on it would amount to a miscarriage of justice.

    The prosecution countered that the absence of a specific date did not mean that no offence had been committed, and that investigators were entitled to add charges as they emerged during the course of an investigation. The magistrate is expected to rule on whether the charges will stand on February 3.

    Al-Shabaab and the Money Trail

    To appreciate the gravity of the charges against Elsek, it is necessary to understand the scale of the threat that Al-Shabaab poses and the sophistication of its financial operations. The United States Department of Treasury has repeatedly sanctioned networks of businesspeople across the Horn of Africa, the UAE, and Cyprus who have been identified as financial facilitators for the group. In 2024 alone, the Treasury designated sixteen entities and individuals comprising a money laundering network that funnelled funds to Al-Shabaab through business fronts in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, and Cyprus.

    Al-Shabaab generates between one hundred million and two hundred million dollars annually. A West Point counterterrorism assessment published in 2025 identified the group as al-Qaeda’s wealthiest affiliate in the world. Its funding streams include extortion of local businesses, taxation of imported goods, smuggling, trade-based money laundering, and the exploitation of hawala money transfer systems. The US State Department has placed a ten million dollar bounty on information leading to the disruption of Al-Shabaab’s financial mechanisms.

    Kenya’s Coast has long been understood as a region vulnerable to Al-Shabaab influence. In late 2024, an Interpol and AFRIPOL joint operation across eight East African countries resulted in the arrest of 37 terror suspects, including 17 in Kenya alone. Some of those arrested were connected to terrorism financing and propaganda networks.

    The question that the prosecution has not yet fully answered in open court is precisely how Elsek’s business empire, if at all, connects to these networks. The charge sheet alleges membership of Al-Shabaab but provides no specific date or location for when that membership began or how it was demonstrated. It alleges possession of propaganda material but has not detailed the chain of custody for the phone or the forensic analysis that was conducted on it. Investigators told the court in January that they were still analysing Elsek’s financial records, banking data, and call logs.

    The Six Counts — Charge Sheet, Feb 2, 2026
    1
    Membership of a Terrorist Organisation — Alleged membership of Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen, contrary to Section 24 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. No specific date, time or location cited.
    2
    Collecting Information for Terrorist Act — Possession of a Samsung Flip 7 phone allegedly containing video recordings intended for use in the commission of a terrorist act. Offence noted on January 14 at ATPU offices, Mombasa.
    3
    Possession of Articles Connected to Terrorism — The same video recordings, framed as articles connected to the commission of a terrorist act, contrary to Section 30 of POTA.
    4
    Unlawful Possession of a Firearm — Possession of a Glock pistol, serial number RBV973, on January 12, in circumstances raising suspicion of use prejudicial to public order.
    5
    Consorting with Armed Person — Gokmen Sandikci charged with being in the company of Elsek while aware that Elsek was unlawfully armed.
    6
    Assault Causing Actual Bodily Harm — Both men jointly charged with assaulting Boniface Katana on January 12 at Majengo Kananai, Kilifi South.

    The Questions That Remain

    The case of Osman Erdinc Elsek sits at the intersection of several uncomfortable truths about how Kenya handles powerful foreigners, how terrorism charges are deployed, and how quickly political altercations can be reframed as matters of national security.

    The first question concerns the speed of the escalation. Senior police sources confirmed to reporters in the days after the arrest that the two Turkish nationals were being detained in connection with the altercation with ODM politicians. The terrorism financing investigation, by the State’s own account, arose from intelligence received prior to the arrest. If that intelligence existed before January 12, the question becomes why Elsek was not detained or investigated on that basis before the highway incident brought him into contact with powerful political figures.

    The second question concerns the defilement case. In 2019, Elsek was arrested by the DCI, the GSU, and Interpol on charges of sexually abusing three minors at his home. The case was transferred out of Shanzu after the court itself acknowledged that Elsek had close relations with judicial officers at that station and had helped construct the courthouse. The case eventually collapsed after witnesses recanted and the prosecution failed to prove its case. A related charge of witness interference remains pending. No one has been held publicly accountable for the collapse of that prosecution, and no formal inquiry into the circumstances has been reported.

    The third question concerns the firearm. A Glock pistol that was seized in 2020 after Elsek shot a teenager is now back in the possession of his associate. The Standard has found no public record of the outcome of the 2020 shooting case. The pistol’s re-emergence raises questions about the integrity of evidence custody and the functioning of Kenya’s firearms licensing and enforcement regime.

    The fourth and perhaps most consequential question is whether the terrorism charges will survive judicial scrutiny. The defence has already argued that the first count is fatally defective for failing to specify when and where the alleged membership took place. The prosecution has not disclosed the intelligence that reportedly preceded the arrest. The financial analysis that investigators said they needed time to complete has not been summarised in open court. The magistrate’s ruling on February 3 will be the first significant test of whether the State has built a case or merely assembled allegations.

    “At this point, it is not possible to tell what kind of evidence the state has against the respondents.”

    Senior Resident Magistrate David Odhiambo — ruling, January 2026

    Elsek has maintained throughout that he is a victim, not a suspect. He has pointed to his investments, his corporate social responsibility programmes, and his years of residence as proof that he has no reason to flee Kenya and no motive to support terrorism. His lawyers, including prominent advocates George Khaminwa and Cliff Ombeta, have dismissed the terrorism allegations as politically motivated retaliation for the altercation with the governor’s convoy.

    The State, for its part, has said nothing publicly beyond what is contained in the charge sheet and the affidavits filed in court. The investigating officer, Hassan Sugal of the ATPU, told the court that credible intelligence was received before the arrest. What that intelligence was, where it came from, and what it contained has not been disclosed.

    What is clear is that a Mombasa court is now being asked to decide whether a Turkish businessman who has lived in Kenya for nearly two decades, built parts of its infrastructure, shot a child, and been charged with sexually abusing minors, is also a member of Al-Shabaab. The answer to that question will say as much about the Kenyan State as it will about Osman Erdinc Elsek.

    The case is before a Mombasa magistrate’s court. The ruling on the preliminary objection and the question of plea was expected on Tuesday, February 3, 2026. The Standard will continue to follow developments.


     

     

  • Probe Opened as Hijacked Petronas Exit Deal Costs South Sudan $600m in Lost Oil Revenue

    Probe Opened as Hijacked Petronas Exit Deal Costs South Sudan $600m in Lost Oil Revenue

    A high-stakes probe has been launched in South Sudan’s oil sector after investigators concluded that a botched takeover of Petronas assets has bled the country an estimated $600 million in lost revenue, deepening a fiscal crisis marked by unpaid salaries and widening deficits.

    The investigations, initiated after the appointment of Emmanuel Athiei Ayual as Nile Petroleum Corporation managing director and Dr Chol Thon Abel as Secretary General at the Ministry of Petroleum in November 2025, are now tracing what officials describe as systemic governance failures and possible institutional capture under the previous administration.

    At the centre of the scandal is the stalled acquisition of Petronas’ stakes in South Sudan’s oil blocks, a deal originally sanctioned by President Salva Kiir and billed as a national game-changer. When Petronas announced its exit on August 7, 2024, it held major interests across all three national oil consortia, including 40 per cent of DPOC, 30 per cent of GPOC and a controlling 67.8 per cent of SPOC. The buyback was designed to give the state immediate control of producing assets without upfront capital, with payments structured against future oil output.

    Fifteen months later, the ownership transfer remains incomplete. Arbitration proceedings initiated by Petronas at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes are still ongoing, while officials estimate the country has already forfeited about $600 million that should have flowed to the Treasury from production-linked revenues.

    Sources within Nilepet and the Ministry of Petroleum insist the problem was not the deal itself. Instead, they point to paralysis that set in after operational oversight shifted to then Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, former Petroleum Ministry Secretary General Deng Lual Wol and former Nilepet chief executive Ayuel Ngor Kacgor. Approvals stalled, timelines slipped and international partners were left in limbo, even as oil continued to flow with little benefit to the state.

    Senior officials privately describe the situation as economically irrational. With public servants enduring months of salary arrears, they argue that unlocking revenue from producing assets should have been an urgent priority. “This was meant to generate cash immediately,” said one official involved in the negotiations. “Instead, we imposed austerity while money sat trapped in administrative deadlock.”

    Attention has also turned to the role of foreign partners. Multiple sources accuse Chinese state firms CNPC and Sinopec of refusing to grant key technical and operational approvals required to complete the transfer, effectively blocking the deal. Their stance contrasts with India’s ONGC and Egypt’s Tri-Ocean Energy, which have supported the takeover.

    China’s dominance in South Sudan’s oilfield services sector, from drilling to logistics, has given it outsized leverage over production decisions. Policymakers now warn that this influence has become a structural threat to South Sudan’s economic sovereignty, allowing external actors to dictate the pace at which national revenues are realised.

    Investigators are further examining controversial consultancy payments made during the period. A Dutch national, Cornelis Nicolaas Abraham Loos, a reported associate of former Nilepet CEO Ayuel Ngor Kacgor, is said to have been hired on a $100,000-a-month contract while nearly 3,000 Nilepet workers went unpaid for months, triggering strikes in June 2025. Authorities are probing whether Loos or linked entities had commercial interests in Chinese oilfield service companies, potentially shedding light on inflated contracts, rising operating costs and declining output.

    The probe has also exposed what officials call a shocking lack of professional safeguards. While Petronas relied on top-tier international law firms and financial advisers, Nilepet allegedly engaged no reputable external counsel or investment bank. Negotiations over assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars were reportedly conducted in hotel rooms in Dubai and Nairobi, with thin documentation and little institutional oversight.

    To make matters worse, investigators say key contracts were destroyed or removed by former officials, leaving the current leadership without access to crucial agreements. Although Ayuel Ngor Kacgor was dismissed in November 2025, he is believed to still sit on boards of operating companies registered in Mauritius and to receive remuneration linked to legacy arrangements.

    The political backdrop has sharpened scrutiny. On November 12, 2025, President Kiir dramatically sacked Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel, stripped him of his general’s rank, demoted him to private and placed him under house arrest in Juba. Yet fundamental questions remain unanswered: where did the international financing for the acquisition go, who authorised the lavish consultancy fees and why the transfer remains stalled nearly 18 months after Petronas walked away.

    The crisis fits a broader pattern. The UN Human Rights Commission estimates that about $25.2 billion in oil revenues generated since independence in 2011 remain almost entirely opaque in their use, fuelling public anger and mistrust.

    Now, a new leadership team led by Petroleum Minister Dr Bak Barnaba Chol, Emmanuel Athiei Ayual and Dr Chol Thon Abel is racing to untangle what insiders describe as a toxic legacy. They face missing paperwork, legal disputes, operational disruptions at the Heglig oil field and what they believe is deliberate obstruction by entrenched interests.

    For many in South Sudan’s energy sector, finalising the Petronas–Nilepet deal is still within reach and could mark a turning point by restoring revenue flows and reinforcing national sovereignty. Until then, the country remains trapped between reform efforts and the heavy cost of past mismanagement, with hundreds of millions of dollars still locked out of reach.

  • How Nairobi Scammers Defrauded UK National Millions in a Fake Gold Deal

    How Nairobi Scammers Defrauded UK National Millions in a Fake Gold Deal

    A London based businessman has told a Nairobi court how a slick network of fraudsters lured him into an elaborate fake gold trade that ended with more than Sh200 million vanishing into advocate accounts, safe vaults and endless paperwork that never produced a single gram of real gold.

    Satbinder Singh, a UK national and director of Ireland registered firm Asianic Limited, gave chilling testimony before Principal Magistrate Paul Mutai detailing how what began as a promising bullion investment morphed into a textbook Nairobi gold scam involving forged documents, fake taxes, phantom penalties and staged airport drama.

    Singh told the court that in 2024 he travelled to Kenya with his associate Marco Colombo Conti, chasing a lucrative opportunity to buy gold from East Africa, a region long marketed to foreign investors as a bullion gateway but increasingly notorious for high end fraud.

    In Nairobi, they were introduced to Alain Mwadia Nvita, who presented himself as the chief executive of Quantum Minerals, a supposed gold trading company. Nvita was accompanied by Lehman John Raymond, introduced as his cousin, and later by Frank Kiteti, a Tanzanian national described as their regional agent.

    The pitch was seductive. The group claimed they could supply 112 kilogrammes of gold, with 31 kilogrammes offered as collateral to secure both a previous USD 400,000 payment made in 2022 and further payments planned for early 2025.

    Singh testified that the earlier USD 400,000 had been paid by Conti during a separate visit to Kenya in June 2022 when he was negotiating to buy 100 kilogrammes of gold from a man identified as Alain Lukuse, another name the prosecution is now treating as part of the same web of deception.

    To formalise the deal, Singh was invoiced through a company called PATVAD Trading. On February 5, 2024, Asianic Limited was billed 162,420 euros, followed the same day by a second invoice of 548,830 euros, allegedly to cover taxes. Both payments were wired to a Stanbic Bank account held by Mosota Abunga and Associates Advocates LLP.

    Singh told the court alarm bells rang when he queried why fresh taxes were being demanded yet the earlier USD 400,000 was said to have covered statutory charges. He was assured the issue was resolved because the taxes were now secured against the 31 kilogrammes of gold collateral.

    Two days later, another invoice followed. This time it was 14,112 euros for freight charges, also paid to the same advocate’s account.

    The court heard that the supposed gold collateral had been stored at a private vault facility identified as MySafe. On February 9, 2024, the businessmen collected the 31 kilogrammes and took it to PATVAD’s offices, where it was split into two consignments and packed into blue metallic boxes.

    Singh said the boxes were sealed, stamped and signed, and he personally recorded videos and photographs of the packaging and accompanying documents. The plan was to hand carry the gold to Italy on a commercial flight, a claim investigators say mirrors a common script used in fake bullion schemes.

    At the airport, Singh and Conti waited in the lounge for Daniel, a director of PATVAD Trading, and Kiteti to deliver the sealed boxes and final paperwork. They never arrived.

    Instead, the businessmen were told there was a problem with one document. As boarding time approached, Singh hesitated to leave Kenya without the gold. He was eventually persuaded to fly after being told the issue could not be resolved immediately.

    What followed was the hook. Singh testified that he was later informed customs authorities had imposed a 20 percent penalty on the consignment, valued at USD 1,562,000, due to an alleged discrepancy in the declared quantity of gold. If the fine was not paid, he was warned, the gold would be confiscated.

    Under intense pressure from Nvita, Singh and his associates flew back to Nairobi on February 20, 2024. In a desperate attempt to salvage the deal, they paid the demanded USD 1.5 million.

    The gold never came.

    Between February and June 2024, Singh said he was fed a steady stream of excuses, new procedural hurdles and subtle attempts to extract even more money. By June 20, convinced he had been conned, he reported the matter to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations.

    The DCI arrested Daniel of PATVAD Trading, Nvita and Kiteti, who are now facing fraud charges.

    Investigators say the case bears all the hallmarks of Nairobi’s entrenched fake gold industry, where scammers pose as miners, exporters or government connected brokers, launder payments through law firm accounts to add legitimacy, and exploit foreign investors’ limited understanding of Kenya’s regulatory environment.

    The trial is ongoing, with prosecutors expected to call financial crime experts and DCI officers to unravel how millions moved through the banking system without a single verifiable gold export taking place.

    For Singh, the courtroom testimony was less about the money and more about exposing a system that nearly perfected the art of deception.

    “I trusted the documents, the offices, the lawyers and the process,” he told the court. “Everything looked real. That is how they got us.”

  • Political Favors? How Ruto-Linked Sidian Bank Rose To The Top In A Short Time

    Political Favors? How Ruto-Linked Sidian Bank Rose To The Top In A Short Time

    In less than three years, a little-known bank once teetering on the edge of irrelevance has catapulted itself into the ranks of Kenya’s mid-tier lenders, securing billions of shillings in government contracts and raising serious questions about political patronage in the banking sector.

    Sidian Bank, formerly K-Rep Bank, has become the subject of intense scrutiny after former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua made explosive allegations in January 2025 suggesting that a senior official in President William Ruto’s administration acquired the bank to funnel billions from controversial government programs.

    While Gachagua stopped short of naming the bank or the official, the trail of evidence points unmistakably to Sidian and a web of politically connected shareholders who emerged immediately after the 2022 election brought President Ruto to power.

    The bank’s meteoric rise from a struggling Tier 3 institution to a Tier 2 lender in September 2025 coincided with a bonanza of lucrative state contracts, massive deposit inflows from government agencies, and a complete overhaul of its ownership structure that brought in figures closely associated with the current administration.

    The New Owners

    At the heart of the controversy is the bank’s dramatic ownership transformation in October 2023, just months after the 2022 election. Centum Investment Company, which had been trying to sell its majority stake to Nigeria’s Access Bank for Sh4.3 billion, suddenly terminated that deal in January 2023 and instead sold a 38.91 percent stake to a consortium of Kenyan entities.

    The biggest beneficiary was Wizpro Enterprises Limited, which acquired a 24.95 percent stake in the bank. Corporate records show Wizpro is wholly owned by Solomon Muriithi Maina, a businessman who chairs the Kenya Tea Development Agency Management Services and is widely known as a close ally of President Ruto.

    Mr Muriithi has emerged as one of the most prominent investors in the financial sector under the current administration.

    In 2024, he spent Sh326 million to increase his stake in HF Group to 24.2 percent from 18.27 percent, making him the mortgage lender’s largest individual shareholder. He is also reportedly eyeing the Mathira parliamentary seat, a move that would further cement his political ambitions.

    Other members of the consortium that bought into Sidian include Pioneer General Insurance, which acquired a 16.89 percent stake, and Afram Limited with 24.36 percent.

    Pioneer’s ownership is linked to UAE-based firms including Abcon International LLC, Parkview Investments Limited, and Medillon Trading FZE, raising questions about foreign influence in the bank’s operations.

    The shareholding structure was further complicated in September 2024 when former Ugandan Attorney General William Byaruhanga acquired a 14.63 percent stake worth Sh1.03 billion through his investment firm Kenbe Investments. Byaruhanga, who served under President Yoweri Museveni from 2016 to 2021, has built an extensive business empire spanning real estate, hospitality, and manufacturing.

    Meanwhile, other politically connected individuals have also invested in the bank’s financial ecosystem.

    National Assembly Majority Leader Kimani Ichung’wah and Thika Town MP Alice Ng’ang’a, both key Ruto allies, bought shares in HF Group, which is part of the same investment circle as Sidian’s major shareholders.

    Former Kenya Revenue Authority chair Anthony Mwaura, his spouse and daughter also bought a Sh1.6 billion stake in HF Group, making the family the second-largest shareholder of the listed mortgage firm. Mr Mwaura previously chaired the United Democratic Alliance’s National Elections Board, overseeing the campaign that propelled President Ruto to State House.

    The interconnected web of shareholders raises uncomfortable questions about whether the bank has become a vehicle for politically connected individuals to access government funds.

    ## The Government Jackpot

    What transformed Sidian from a struggling lender into a financial powerhouse was not organic growth or innovative banking products. It was a series of government contracts that brought billions of shillings in deposits flooding into the bank’s coffers.

    In August 2024, Sidian Bank was selected as one of six lenders to handle payments under the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF), which processes close to Sh200 billion annually. The bank stood out conspicuously as the only Tier 3 lender at the time in a lineup dominated by heavyweights including KCB Bank Kenya, Co-operative Bank, Absa Bank Kenya, Equity Bank and Diamond Trust Bank.

    The selection raised eyebrows. How did a small bank with limited infrastructure and a history of losses beat out four other large banks and nine mid-sized competitors to win a contract of such magnitude?

    Government officials claimed the decision followed consultations with employers, but critics questioned whether the process was transparent. Under the now-defunct National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), payments were routed through only four banks. Under the new SHA framework, Sidian suddenly found itself handling a piece of the country’s largest health financing scheme.

    The bank moved quickly to clarify that it was only facilitating collections and remitting funds directly to SHA accounts, insisting it did not hold or manage SHA funds. But the optics were terrible, especially given the timing of the ownership changes.

    In addition to SHIF contributions, Sidian Bank was also authorized to receive housing levy funds, the statutory 1.5 percent salary deduction intended to finance affordable housing initiatives. This gave the bank access to another major revenue stream from government collections.

    But perhaps the biggest windfall came from the National Social Security Fund. By the end of 2024, NSSF had placed about Sh800 million with Sidian Bank, making it the single largest beneficiary among 11 lenders that shared Sh2.696 billion in fixed and term deposits from the provident fund.

    This was a stunning reversal from 2023, when Co-operative Bank topped the NSSF placement list with Sh2.664 billion, followed by KCB with Sh1.94 billion and NCBA with Sh1.35 billion. Other beneficiaries in that year included Absa with Sh1.294 billion, National Bank of Kenya with Sh1.027 billion and Equity Bank with Sh827 million.

    In 2024, these major banks received little or nothing from NSSF. Instead, Sidian walked away with the lion’s share. NSSF did not respond to queries about why it shifted most of its term deposits to Sidian Bank.

    In November 2024, Nairobi Governor Johnson Sakaja further boosted Sidian’s fortunes by directing all Level 4 and 5 public health facilities in the county to transfer their accounts from Co-operative Bank to Sidian Bank. The move gave the lender a significant shot in the arm in deposit mobilization, with hospital revenues providing a steady inflow of cash.

    When questioned by the Senate Committee on Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations, Mr Sakaja defended the decision by claiming Sidian had a cheaper interest rate and gave a better offer. He insisted that the bank’s ownership structure did not matter, saying every bank has owners and that what matters is good service.

    But the timing raised questions. The directive came just as Sidian’s new shareholders were pushing to elevate it into a mid-tier institution by 2028, and the additional deposits would be crucial to achieving that goal.

    ## The Financial Transformation

    The influx of government money transformed Sidian’s balance sheet almost overnight. Customer deposits rose significantly from Sh43.5 billion in September 2024 to Sh59.8 billion in June 2025 and further to Sh78.1 billion in September 2025. This represented an 80 percent increase in just one year.

    Rather than lending out the deposits to businesses and consumers, Sidian channeled much of the fresh inflows into Treasury bills and bonds. The bank’s stock of government securities surged from Sh19.3 billion in September 2024 to Sh48.6 billion in September 2025, a 152 percent increase.

    This strategy of parking deposits in risk-free government securities bolstered the bank’s earnings dramatically. Interest income from government securities jumped 134.7 percent to Sh3 billion from Sh1.3 billion, helping to offset a 9.2 percent drop in interest income from loans.

    The bank’s net profit surged 5.1 times from Sh287.26 million in the nine months to September 2024 to Sh1.47 billion in the same period of 2025. This was despite the fact that its loan book remained essentially flat at Sh25.1 billion, with management attributing the stagnation to a sluggish economy.

    By September 2025, the Central Bank of Kenya officially reclassified Sidian as a Tier 2 bank, denoting a market share of between one and five percent. The bank had achieved in two years what typically takes a decade of organic growth.

    But the rapid transformation came at a cost to taxpayers. By placing billions in government deposits with Sidian, which then invested them in Treasury bills and bonds, the government was essentially paying the bank to hold its own money. The interest earned by Sidian on these securities was ultimately being funded by taxpayers.

    ## The Gachagua Allegations

    The controversy exploded into the public domain in January 2025 when Rigathi Gachagua, who had been impeached in October 2024, appeared on KTN News and made explosive claims about a shadowy scheme involving a senior official in President Ruto’s administration.

    Gachagua alleged that a powerful figure had snapped up a financial institution to funnel billions from the Housing Levy and SHIF contributions. He claimed to have inside knowledge because he was present when these arrangements were being made.

    While Gachagua refused to name the bank or the official, his cryptic revelations sparked intense speculation on social media, with Sidian Bank’s name dominating the conversation. Kenyans on X unearthed past advertisements positioning Sidian Bank as a collection point for SHIF contributions, lending credence to the theory that Sidian was the institution in question.

    Gachagua claimed that nearly Sh100 billion from the Housing Levy and SHIF was parked in a single bank, and that the bank had been purchased by a senior official through proxies immediately after the 2022 election.

    The timing of Gachagua’s allegations was significant. He had been impeached just months earlier on charges of corruption, incitement of ethnic divisions, and undermining national unity. Gachagua contended that his ousting was a strategic move to silence him and obscure financial malpractices involving government programs.

    In subsequent interviews and church appearances throughout 2025, Gachagua escalated his attacks on the Housing Levy and affordable housing program, calling it “the worst fraud against the people of Kenya.” He alleged that government officials were diverting the levy to sell construction materials such as cement, steel, and iron sheets for personal gain.

    He further claimed that NSSF money was being diverted to fund private projects like the Bomas of Kenya and the Rironi-Mau Summit road, benefiting individuals connected to the government.

    President Ruto has consistently defended his administration’s programs, embracing his “Zakayo” nickname and vowing to push ahead with his agenda. “Even if they call me Zakayo, so long as I deliver, I have no problem,” he said in January 2025.

    Lands, Housing, and Urban Development Cabinet Secretary Alice Wahome dismissed Gachagua’s allegations and challenged him to back his claims with evidence. “For somebody at the level of deputy president, a former deputy president, to tell Kenyans that there is somewhere my ministry is sitting behind the scenes and making some illegal contracts, I would want him to tell the EACC where that is,” she stated.

    ## Questions of Propriety

    While there is no evidence that President Ruto or any senior official directly owns shares in Sidian Bank, the web of connections between the bank’s major shareholders and the current administration raises serious questions about political patronage.

    The fact that the bank’s ownership transformation occurred immediately after the 2022 election, and that its fortunes changed dramatically once these new shareholders came on board, suggests more than coincidence.

    The selection of Sidian to handle SHIF payments and housing levy collections, despite its small size and limited infrastructure, also raises questions about the criteria used by government agencies in awarding these lucrative contracts.

    The massive shift of NSSF deposits from major banks to Sidian in 2024, without any public explanation, further deepens suspicions of favoritism.

    Civil society organizations and anti-corruption watchdogs have called for comprehensive investigations into Sidian Bank’s ownership and operations. They advocate for forensic audits of SHA fund allocations and disbursements, transparent disclosure of the bank’s shareholders and beneficiaries, and independent inquiries into alleged collusion between Kenyan officials and the bank’s owners.

    The Central Bank of Kenya has flagged Sidian for having inadequate core capital adequacy ratios, with stress tests revealing potential vulnerability to loan defaults. This suggests that despite its rapid growth, the bank may still face regulatory challenges that could require additional capital injection from its shareholders.

    ## The Broader Implications

    The Sidian Bank saga highlights a troubling pattern in Kenya’s financial sector, where political connections often matter more than business fundamentals or competitive merit.

    The Housing Levy and SHIF have been controversial since their inception, with critics arguing they burden salaried workers while offering little tangible benefit. The Federation of Kenya Employers warned in January 2025 that these deductions, combined with PAYE and other taxes, devour up to 45 percent of workers’ paychecks.

    If billions from these programs are indeed being channeled through banks owned by politically connected individuals who then invest the funds in government securities, it raises fundamental questions about the purpose of these levies and whether they are being used as intended.

    The government’s privatization agenda has also come under scrutiny, with critics alleging that public assets are being undervalued and sold to politically connected buyers. More than 10 state parastatals have been earmarked for privatization, including KICC, JKIA, Kenya Seed Company, and National Oil Corporation of Kenya.

    The lack of transparency around these transactions, combined with the Sidian Bank example, has fueled public distrust in the government’s economic management.

    As Kenya heads toward the 2027 election, the Sidian Bank controversy is likely to remain a flashpoint. Gachagua has vowed that if elected president, he will scrap the Housing Levy, hand over all completed housing units to county governments, and use rental income to refund Kenyans their deductions.

    For now, Sidian Bank continues to grow, buoyed by government deposits and protected by politically connected shareholders. But the questions about how it got there, and who is benefiting, are unlikely to go away anytime soon.

    The bank’s transformation from struggling lender to mid-tier powerhouse in less than three years stands as a stark reminder that in Kenya’s banking sector, political connections can be worth more than decades of hard work and sound business practices.

    Whether this represents legitimate business success or something more sinister remains to be seen. What is clear is that the Kenyan public deserves answers about how their money is being managed, and whether the banking system is being used to enrich a politically connected elite at taxpayers’ expense.

  • Hospitals Threatens Closure As Govt Delays SHA Payments Forcing Patients to Pay Cash

    Hospitals Threatens Closure As Govt Delays SHA Payments Forcing Patients to Pay Cash

    A healthcare catastrophe is unfolding across Kenya as hundreds of private and faith-based hospitals teeter on the brink of collapse, with patients increasingly turned away unless they can pay cash despite being fully registered members of the Social Health Authority.

    The crisis has reached breaking point, with facilities collectively owed more than Sh76 billion in unpaid claims by SHA, leaving hospital administrators with an impossible choice: continue treating patients on credit while drowning in debt, or demand upfront payment and risk violating government directives.

    At the epicenter of this disaster is a digital health insurance system that promised universal healthcare coverage but has instead become a bureaucratic nightmare, trapping patients between empty hospital coffers and their constitutional right to medical care.

    Dr. Brian Lishenga, chairman of the Rural and Urban Private Hospitals Association of Kenya, revealed that the payment crisis has escalated dramatically since SHA’s inception in October 2024, with some facilities now going five months or more without receiving a single shilling from the authority.

    “It’s like being in a bad marriage that you cannot leave,” Dr. Lishenga told this writer, describing the untenable relationship between healthcare providers and the government’s flagship health insurance program.

    The backlog is particularly severe for high-cost medical interventions, including inpatient surgical procedures, renal dialysis, cancer treatment and maternity services, some dating back six months with no resolution in sight despite repeated assurances from the Ministry of Health.

    Behind the staggering financial figures are real people facing real emergencies with diminishing options.

    Sylvia, who requested to use only her first name, found herself in a nightmare scenario at a Machakos hospital where her cousin had been rushed following a caesarean section emergency. Despite the life-threatening situation, the family was told SHA was not working and demanded a Sh13,200 down payment before treatment could begin.

    “We don’t have that money,” Sylvia said, her voice strained with anxiety as she made frantic calls to friends and relatives outside the hospital ward where her cousin waited in pain. “I have seen on the internet that the president said we should go to the hospital and we will be treated for free. This is not free.”

    Her story is being replicated thousands of times across the country, particularly in rural areas and urban estates where lower-level private facilities serve communities that cannot afford to travel to distant public hospitals.

    The consequences extend far beyond inconvenience. Without drugs, laboratory reagents or functioning equipment, hospitals are forced to turn away emergency cases or provide substandard care, raising the specter of preventable deaths.

    One Level 3A facility owner, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of government retaliation, described a descent into financial ruin that reads like a business horror story.

    Owed Sh15 million by SHA over five months, the hospital owner had purchased Sh8 million worth of medical equipment on credit to comply with new government facility classifications, only to find himself unable to make the required Sh354,000 monthly payments to suppliers.

    The equipment suppliers, tired of empty promises, moved to auction the hospital’s assets. In a desperate bid to prevent total collapse, the owner surrendered his anaesthesia machine at a substantial loss just to buy time.

    “I gave it to them with the hope that SHA will pay. I don’t know what I will do when they come again next month,” the hospital owner said, his resignation palpable. “I agreed to give it away at a loss, but what do I do?”

    The facility, like hundreds of others, continues to receive patients daily. With 29 million Kenyans now registered for SHA and educated to expect free services, hospital owners cannot refuse care without risking closure by government authorities who have demonstrated a hair-trigger response to facilities attempting to charge patients out-of-pocket.

    “Patients are entitled. Our biggest headache is that we cannot ask them to pay in cash,” the facility owner explained. “I know of some facilities that tried that and some patients called SHA and that resulted in their closure. There was no investigation done.”

    The pharmaceutical supply chain has also collapsed for many facilities. The hospital owner revealed that pharmaceutical companies have blacklisted his facility after months of non-payment, meaning drugs can now only be purchased with upfront cash the hospital doesn’t have.

    “That is why we don’t have drugs,” he said. “We cannot tell this to patients. We agree to see them but sometimes we don’t even have reagents for lab tests.”

    With monthly running costs exceeding Sh1 million, including Sh200,000 in rent, Sh354,000 in equipment debt, and Sh450,000 in staff salaries, the mathematics of survival have become impossible without SHA payments.

    Some staff members have already been terminated, while others have agreed to stay on despite reduced salaries, creating a workforce crisis that compounds the medical emergency.

    The Ministry of Health has maintained a firm stance that hospitals are at fault for unpaid claims, not the government.

    In an interview last week, Health Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale insisted that SHA conducts payments every 14th day of each month and that unpaid claims result from missing documentation or errors flagged automatically by the digital system.

    “Those that have not been paid either have a missing document or something was not done correctly, and the system flags it. Hospitals should stop claiming they do not know why their claims have not been paid. The system automatically informs them,” Mr. Duale said.

    But hospital administrators paint a vastly different picture of a system that rejects claims without explanation, provides no mechanism for dispute resolution, and leaves facilities trapped in an information black hole.

    “We don’t know why we haven’t been paid. I have duly filled the claim forms. I have followed up with SHA via email, and in person,” the Level 3A facility owner said. “When I get to their branch they say that they can’t see our attachments yet, on our end, all attachments are up to standard.”

    The digital portal itself has become a source of frustration, with hospitals reporting that system changes occur without notice, sometimes rendering previously submitted claims inaccessible or incompatible with new requirements.

    More alarmingly, the Rural and Urban Private Hospitals Association revealed that over 10,000 inpatient beds and 3,500 maternity beds have been mysteriously deleted from the SHA portal without explanation, despite hospitals holding valid licenses from the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Council.

    “We are gravely concerned that facilities have had their bed capacity deleted and downgraded in the SHA portal despite having valid KMPDC licences,” Dr. Lishenga said.

    For maternity cases, which form a substantial portion of claims at lower-level facilities, the verification process has descended into absurdity.

    “For a maternity case for instance, we have even asked SHA officials to do the due diligence and call the women asking them if they delivered in our facilities,” the facility owner explained. “Instead, they are rejecting claims without verification or an explanation.”

    Complicating the crisis is an aggressive government campaign against fraudulent SHA claims that has seen over 1,400 facilities shut down or suspended since the program’s inception.

    In August 2025, CS Duale suspended 40 hospitals following a forensic audit, with an additional 45 facilities degazetted shortly thereafter. The crackdown uncovered ghost hospitals, inflated bed capacities, and fictitious claims totaling Sh10.6 billion.

    The government’s determination to root out fraud, while necessary, has created a climate of fear and suspicion that hospital associations say is ensnaring legitimate providers alongside criminal operators.

    “Any healthcare provider whose information is used to defraud SHA will be held personally liable,” Duale warned, adding that facilities would be surcharged to recover funds already paid on false claims.

    The Kenya Association of Private Hospitals criticized the ministry for “weaponizing SHA fraud controls” and threatening closure rather than working collaboratively to resolve payment disputes with legitimate facilities.

    The Auditor General’s March 2025 report revealed fundamental problems with SHA’s digital procurement process, including unbudgeted and non-competitive procurement, undefined scope of work, and questions about who actually owns the system being managed by a private consortium.

    These systemic weaknesses have created an environment where the line between genuine claims and fraudulent ones has become hopelessly blurred, with hospital owners saying they are being punished for a broken system they did not create.

    SHA has reportedly paid Sh50 billion of the Sh93 billion in claims submitted since October 2024, a payout ratio that hospital associations say demonstrates the fundamental insolvency of the scheme.

    “This is a sign that SHA is not collecting enough money to reimburse hospitals,” Dr. Lishenga said, accusing the Ministry of Health of publishing misleading reimbursement figures without disclosing total claims submitted, approved claims, or actual payout ratios.

    The financial gap is compounded by Sh33 billion in arrears inherited from the defunct National Hospital Insurance Fund, which remain unpaid more than five months after President William Ruto directed their settlement.

    In counties where the government is piloting its digital healthcare superhighway program, including Mombasa, Kirinyaga, Embu and Nandi, facilities report persistent non-payment that has left them unable to participate in primary healthcare services.

    A Parliamentary committee report in November 2025 documented 19 critical failures in the SHA system, including inconsistent reimbursements, biometric challenges for patients without national IDs, and the absence of a functional claims management office required under the Social Health Insurance Act.

    The committee found that some facilities had received no disbursements whatsoever, while erroneous payments to others, including Sh16 million mistakenly sent to a private hospital instead of Nyeri County Referral Hospital, remain unrecovered.

    Faced with financial annihilation, hospital associations have begun directing members to demand cash payment from patients, effectively undermining the entire premise of universal health coverage.

    In September 2025, RUPHA issued a directive to over 700 member facilities to suspend SHA services and revert to out-of-pocket payments, describing the authority as “a bad borrower and a bad debtor.”

    “We have proved that SHA is a bad borrower and a bad debtor. From today, all medical services at this facility for Social Health Authority beneficiaries will be offered on a cash basis unless otherwise stated,” the association’s notice read.

    The Kenya Healthcare Federation took the extraordinary step of informing SHA that private hospitals would no longer treat civil servants unless they paid cash, following nine months of non-payment for services rendered to government employees and their families.

    For patients like James Nyau, a road accident survivor requiring weekly physiotherapy, SHA membership has proven worthless despite being a fully paid member.

    “Every week I pay Sh1,100 for a single physiotherapy session, plus other costs that SHA doesn’t cover. I’ve skipped sessions because of the cost,” Nyau said, highlighting the gap between SHA’s promised benefits and actual coverage.

    Samuel Gitau, an Eastleigh resident, echoed the sentiment: “My son was unwell recently, and I had to pay Sh1,100 for his treatment. Sometimes, you just don’t have the money. Insurance could make a big difference, but right now, it doesn’t.”

    Legal experts and civil society organizations warn that the SHA payment crisis represents a violation of multiple constitutional provisions and statutes.

    Article 43 of the Constitution guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of health, while Article 47 ensures the right to fair administrative action. The Fair Administrative Action Act requires reasons for all adverse decisions, while the Public Finance Management Act demands lawful and accountable use of public funds.

    “By rejecting claims without explanation and withholding payments, SHA is breaching all these principles,” noted one civil society analysis of the crisis.

    The High Court in May 2025 quashed CS Duale’s decision to form a committee to verify pending bills owed to hospitals by the defunct NHIF, ruling that the government’s delay tactics were unconstitutional.

    Yet hospitals report that nothing has changed on the ground, with the payment freeze continuing unabated despite court orders and repeated government promises.

    Hospital administrators and medical associations are united in their warning: without immediate intervention, Kenya’s healthcare system faces systemic collapse.

    “No one is listening to healthcare providers. If this continues, there will be a crisis in the system soon,” the Level 3A facility owner said. “We feel like the government knows what they are doing.”

    Dr. Lishenga was more direct: “Unless there is a substantial move to settle liabilities, we will move to out-of-pocket payment. We have no other way. How do we keep the facilities open? You cannot have three-quarters of hospitals that have not paid their workers for the last three months and expect that health care will be normal.”

    The stakes extend beyond hospital finances to the very survival of patients who depend on private and faith-based facilities for care. With public hospitals already overwhelmed and understaffed, the closure or dysfunction of private facilities would trigger a healthcare emergency affecting millions of Kenyans.

    As hospitals run on empty coffers and patients face impossible choices between bankruptcy and suffering, the promise of universal health coverage increasingly resembles a cruel deception rather than the transformational reform it was meant to be.

    For the facility owner still negotiating with creditors over his remaining equipment, the future is measured in weeks, not months.

    “I don’t know what I will do when they come again next month,” he said, his words a testament to the desperation that now defines healthcare delivery in President Ruto’s Kenya.

    This publication reached out to CS Duale and SHA CEO Mercy Mwangangi for comment on the specific allegations raised by hospital owners, but neither had responded by the time of going to press.

  • Inside Nairobi’s Sh37 Million Gold Scam: How a U.S. Investor Was Duped

    Inside Nairobi’s Sh37 Million Gold Scam: How a U.S. Investor Was Duped

    Kenya, January 31, 2026 – Detectives from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) are probing a sophisticated gold fraud scheme in which a United States national was allegedly defrauded of KSh 37 million after being lured into what he believed was a legitimate gold purchase in the affluent Kilimani area of Nairobi.

    The case highlights growing concerns around precious metals scams, investor vulnerability and regulatory gaps in Kenya’s informal gold market.

    According to police, the American national, identified in court filings as David White Odell, travelled to Kenya with the understanding that he would buy 150 kilograms of gold from individuals posing as credible dealers.

    He recalled being shown gold nugget samples and even witnessing smelting operations during at least one meeting designed to build trust. “And so I witnessed an operation where they were smelting. They had 150 kg there in nugget form, and they did the smelting there at the compound,” Odell told investigators.

    In one conversation with journalists at Central Police Station, Odell described how access to a purportedly secure vault was controlled by combination codes shared between him and one of the suspected dealers, reinforcing the illusion of a genuine transaction. “Both had joint combinations… he put in two, everybody turned their back, and then I put in mine, and that was that,” he said.

    The deal reportedly began in December 2025 after Odell was introduced to the suspects as gold dealers operating from a residential property along Rosewood Avenue, Kilimani, described by investigators as the “safe house and nerve centre” of the syndicate.

    Despite paying the upfront amount, the agreed transport plans changed, with scammers insisting on using a private jet for shipment, a condition not part of the original agreement.

    After communication broke down, the complainant became suspicious and reported the matter to police.

    DCI officers later raided the Kilimani premises on January 28, 2026, gaining entry during the complainant’s presence.

    Investigators seized metallic bars from a safe as evidence and forwarded samples to the Ministry of Mining for analysis. Laboratory tests determined that the material was not gold but brass, a cheap yellow alloy often used to mimic the appearance of precious metal.

    Gold fraud in Kenya is not isolated to this case alone. Similar schemes have been uncovered by authorities over recent years, some involving large sums and sophisticated operations:

    In April 2025, DCI arrested 11 suspects and seized about 350 kg of fake gold in a Nairobi scam involving more than KSh 70 million in fraudulent transactions.

    In May 2025, four individuals were arrested in Runda following reports of a KSh 25.8 million fake gold deal targeting a foreign national.

    In September 2025, police apprehended a suspect in Lang’ata over a KSh 4.5 million fake gold sale, reinforcing the recurring nature of these schemes in Nairobi.

    Fraud experts note that scammers often go to great lengths to feign legitimacy, including assaying samples in front of victims, arranging staged storage facilities, and even alleging seizures by customs to complicate deliveries.

    The Kilimani gold scam underscores the risks foreign and local investors face when engaging in high-value commodity deals outside formal regulated markets.

    Kenya’s gold trade, while attracting global interest due to discoveries in counties such as Migori, Turkana and Kakamega, remains largely informal, with limited oversight on intermediaries, certification processes and safeguards against fraud.

    For legitimate traders and buyers, this environment raises concerns about due diligence, title verification, and the reliability of physical inspections.

    Financial regulators and mining authorities have repeatedly urged investors to verify licensing, assay certificates and chain of custody for precious metals, steps that can mitigate exposure to fraud.

    The DCI is now seeking two suspects, Paul Chogo and Collins Onyango, believed to be at the centre of the Kilimani scaffold network, even as the investigation may lead to broader revelations about mechanisms used by fraud rings targeting foreign capital.

  • The Mystery of Oketch Salah and The Business He Was Doing With Raila

    The Mystery of Oketch Salah and The Business He Was Doing With Raila

    How a Migori Businessman Leveraged Proximity to Kenya’s Political Icon to Build a Gold Mining Empire

    Three months after the death of former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, questions continue to swirl around Mohammed Abdi Jama, better known as Oketch Salah, the self-styled adopted son who has emerged from the shadows to position himself at the intersection of Kenya’s most powerful political and business networks.

    At the heart of the mystery lies a simple question that has captivated and divided the nation. What business was Salah really conducting with Raila, and how did a relatively unknown figure from Migori transform himself into a man who now arrives at political events by helicopter, dines with presidents, and claims intimate knowledge of Kenya’s most revered politician’s final wishes?

    The answer, investigations reveal, lies in the lucrative and politically connected world of gold mining in Nyatike, where fortunes are made not just underground but in the corridors of power.

    Salah’s family background offers the first clue to understanding his trajectory. Born to Abdi Salah, a wealthy businessman who owned Migori’s first storey building in the 1970s and ran a successful bakery, young Mohammed grew up in relative privilege. The family, part of the Somali immigrant community that settled in Migori through Mandera, integrated fully into Luo society. Salah became fluent in Dholuo, attended Ombo Primary School and later Kangeso Secondary School, and built the cultural bridges that would later serve his ambitions.

    But his path was far from linear. After his father’s death and burial in a Migori cemetery, Salah moved to Mombasa, where he worked as a loader for a transport company in Miritini before being promoted to supervisor. From there, he made his way to Somalia and eventually to the United States under the Temporary Protected Status program, a humanitarian provision that Congress created for nationals from countries facing armed conflict or disasters.

    It was during this period abroad that Salah accumulated capital that he would later wire back to Kenya. When President Donald Trump’s administration ended the protected status for Somali immigrants in March this year, Salah had already returned to Kenya with a fortune and a plan.

    The gold rush in Nyatike provided the perfect opportunity. The Migori Greenstone Belt, an extension of the gold-rich Tanzanian Craton, has long been one of Kenya’s most productive gold regions. With an estimated production of 34 tonnes per year generating approximately 67 billion shillings, the area attracts investors from around the world. But success in this sector requires more than geological knowledge. It demands political connections and government goodwill.

    This is where Raila Odinga entered the picture, and where Salah’s story takes a calculated turn.

    Sources familiar with the arrangement say Salah initially befriended former Nyatike MP Onyango Anyanga while the politician was still in Parliament and close to Raila. Through Anyanga, who later fell out with the ODM leader so spectacularly that he vowed to denounce his party membership, Salah gained his crucial introduction to the former Prime Minister.

    What followed was a masterclass in leveraging political proximity for business advantage. Salah registered a gold mining company and began telling potential partners and investors across Africa that Raila was not just his mentor but a shareholder in his ventures. His social media pages, which only became active in late September 2025 as Raila’s health declined, became a carefully curated showcase of access and influence.

    Photos showed Salah with Raila on flights, enjoying meals, dancing at events, and visiting foreign capitals. Unlike many Muslims, Salah was photographed enjoying hard drinks and shisha with the political elite, a detail that former schoolmates say reflects his pragmatic approach to business and networking. The images served a dual purpose: they cemented his credentials as Raila’s confidant while simultaneously advertising his access to power for business purposes.

    The strategy worked spectacularly. Salah secured meetings with African leaders, including Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, framing his visits as business missions focused on mining and energy. For a private Kenyan citizen with no formal government position, such access raised obvious questions about the networks and interests at play. Was he genuinely Raila’s adopted son, or was this designation a convenient business card that opened doors across the continent?

    Dr. Oburu Oginga, Raila’s elder brother who now leads ODM, has publicly endorsed Salah, calling him “a son of Raila” and highlighting his role during the former Prime Minister’s final days in India. At Salah’s son Abdinoor’s wedding at Serena Hotel on October 25, just ten days after Raila’s death, Oburu told the gathering that Salah “was taking care of Raila until the day he breathed his last.”

    But Raila’s own family tells a starkly different story. His daughter Winnie Odinga has been unequivocal in her rejection of Salah’s claims. In a recent television interview, she dismissed him as someone she “would like to believe nobody really knows” and suggested he should be “rushed to Mathare or the DCI” for making false and dangerous statements about her father. Her sister Ruth Odinga, Kisumu Woman Representative and Raila’s sister, was equally devastating in her assessment, admitting she cannot even place who Salah is despite his claims of intimate family ties.

    The contradictions extend to Salah’s professional credentials. While he styles himself as “Dr. Oketch Salah” and claimed to be Raila’s personal physician, investigations by multiple media houses have found no trace of his name in the Kenya Medical Practitioners, Dentists and Pharmacists Council registers. The real Raila family doctor was Dr. David Oluoch Olunya, a respected neurosurgeon who attended to the former Prime Minister for over two decades.

    Oketch Salah and Raila Odinga.
    Oketch Salah and Raila Odinga.

    Some of Salah’s claims strain credulity entirely. Reports have credited him with performing brain surgeries on hippopotamuses in Muhuru Bay, heart operations on hyenas in Seme, stopping coronavirus spread among animals in the Serengeti and Maasai Mara, and upgrading the Raboral VRG vaccine, all supposedly done “using pure talent, not textbooks.” Medical professionals describe these claims as fantastical.

    Yet despite these red flags, Salah has successfully inserted himself into Kenya’s political machinery in ways that suggest either genuine connections or sophisticated manipulation. He attended State House functions alongside President William Ruto and Oburu Oginga during celebrations for broad-based government legislators. He has pledged to financially support ten youths from Jacaranda Bunge la Wananchi with 50,000 shillings each, plus motorcycles for men and hairdressing equipment for women, mirroring Raila’s 2022 campaign promise of a 6,000 shilling monthly stipend.

    Most controversially, Salah claimed at an ODM meeting in Bondo that Raila wanted the party to endorse President Ruto in the 2027 presidential race, a statement that has split ODM down the middle and thrust him into the eye of a political storm. Neither Government Spokesperson Isaac Mwaura nor State House Spokesman Hussein Mohamed has commented on who Salah is or whether he holds any official government position.

    The silence from State House is particularly telling given Salah’s documented visits and the fact that when Raila died in India, President Ruto stated he had been briefed by both the family and “his friend who was in India.” Multiple sources suggest Salah was providing intelligence from Raila’s inner circle to government operatives, much as critics now accuse Junet Mohamed of having done during the 2022 elections.

    Political analyst David Makali draws parallels between Salah’s operations and those of Mohamed Noor, the feared oil tycoon and State House agent during the Moi era who wielded enormous power through his proximity to the presidency. “The pattern is familiar,” Makali says. “Position yourself close to a political figure, claim special knowledge and access, and monetize that proximity. The question is always: who benefits, and what is being traded?”

    For Salah, the benefits appear substantial. He now travels by helicopter, maintains multiple business interests including his gold mining operations in Nyatike, and has positioned himself as a kingmaker within ODM factions supporting the broad-based government. His financial backing of pro-government ODM politicians has become an open secret in political circles.

    But the arrangement raises troubling questions about the final months of Raila Odinga’s life. Why was Salah, rather than long-time aide Maurice Ogetta, present during critical moments in India? In his own statements, Salah revealed that the security officer present when Raila had a health scare at his Karen home was Francis Ogolla, not Ogetta, contradicting earlier accounts and fueling speculation about who controlled access to the ailing leader.

    Activists and Raila supporters have noted Salah’s shifting and contradictory accounts of the former Prime Minister’s final days. Some claim he is traveling across the country distributing money to quell dissent and questions about what really transpired in India. Others point to allegations that Salah was secretly recording Raila using high-tech surveillance equipment, pens, buttons, and other discreet spying gadgets, then forwarding information to unnamed masters.

    The broader implications extend beyond one man’s alleged opportunism. Salah’s story illuminates the murky intersection of business and politics in Kenya, where mining licenses, government contracts, and political influence are often traded in ways that benefit a connected few while excluding the communities most affected.

    In Nyatike, where artisanal miners dig 400 feet underground in dangerous conditions for a fraction of the profits, the gold sector generates billions while locals struggle. County officials complain that bureaucratic processes and national government involvement mean the county sees little benefit despite hosting such lucrative operations. Artisanal miners capture only 25 percent of the gold value, with 75 percent remaining in waste materials later collected by those with “advanced technology,” a category that likely includes well-connected businessmen like Salah.

    The question of what business Salah was really doing with Raila may never be fully answered. The former Prime Minister took many secrets to his grave. But the evidence suggests a transactional relationship in which Salah provided companionship, assistance, and perhaps intelligence during Raila’s declining years, while extracting in return the ultimate business asset: proximity to power.

    Whether Salah was genuinely devoted to Raila or skillfully exploiting an aging politician’s need for support may be less important than understanding the system that allowed such arrangements to flourish. In a country where political connections can transform a Migori businessman into a player on the national stage, the Oketch Salah phenomenon is less an aberration than a symptom.

    Attempts to reach Salah for comment were unsuccessful. His social media pages continue to post photos from political events and business meetings, each image a testament to a proximity he claims as family ties but which others see as something far more calculated.

    As Kenya heads toward the 2027 elections with ODM fractured and Raila’s legacy contested, the shadow of Oketch Salah looms large. His gold mining ventures in Nyatike continue. His political influence appears to be growing. And the questions about what really happened during Raila Odinga’s final days, and who benefited most from that access, remain largely unanswered.

    In the end, the mystery of Oketch Salah and the business he was doing with Raila reveals an uncomfortable truth about Kenyan politics. Power, proximity, and profit form a triangle in which the lines between family, friendship, and transaction blur beyond recognition. And in that ambiguity, fortunes are made while the public is left to wonder who was serving whom, and at what cost.

  • Ruto Woos Luo Nyanza With Billions Ahead Of 2027

    Ruto Woos Luo Nyanza With Billions Ahead Of 2027

    NAIROBI, Kenya Jan 30 – Kisumu is emerging as one of the biggest winners of large-scale government development projects after President William Ruto announced multi-billion-shilling investments in housing, healthcare, transport and youth empowerment during his latest tour of the city.

    Speaking to a huge crowd in Kisumu, President Ruto unveiled a series of projects that he said would transform the lakeside city into a major economic and development hub.

    The announcements come as the President intensifies his visits to the wider Nyanza region, a move widely seen as part of efforts to win local support ahead of the 2027 General Election, where he is seeking re-election.

    Among the key projects is the construction of 14,000 affordable housing units across Kisumu County, with 2,000 units already underway in Kanyakwar.

    President Ruto said the housing programme is not just about shelter but also job creation, noting that many young people are already earning from the construction works.

    The President also announced the construction of 20 new modern markets and 200-bed hostels for youths, aimed at boosting small businesses and supporting young people working and studying in the city.

    In matters health, President Ruto revealed that the government will spend Sh3 billion to upgrade Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and Referral Hospital to a level-six facility.

    Once complete, the hospital will offer advanced treatment similar to Kenyatta National Hospital, Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, and other top referral hospitals in the country.

    “This hospital will serve not just Kisumu, but the entire region,” Ruto said, adding that the upgrade will reduce the need for patients to travel to Nairobi or Eldoret for specialised care.

    Sports infrastructure is also set for a facelift, with the President announcing Sh950 million for the construction of a new modern stadium at Moi Stadium, Kisumu.

    “The facility will be ready to host national celebrations and major sporting events, starting with this year’s Jamhuri Day celebrations,” President Ruto said.

    On transport, President Ruto confirmed plans to extend the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) from Naivasha to Kisumu and onward to Malaba, linking Kenya to Uganda and boosting regional trade.

    He said he will return to Kisumu later this month to officially launch the railway extension works.

    The President also announced Sh450 million in grants for youth businesses, urging young people to organise themselves and take advantage of the funding to grow enterprises and fight poverty.

  • Three KDF Recruits Die During Training in Eldoret

    Three KDF Recruits Die During Training in Eldoret

    Three Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) recruits have died during a training exercise at the Defence Forces Recruits Training School (DFRTS) in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu County.

    In a statement issued on Friday, January 30, KDF stated that the recruits developed medical complications while participating in a routine endurance exercise.

    They were immediately attended to by on-site medical personnel and later evacuated to Eldoret Regional Hospital for advanced care.

    “Immediate medical assistance was administered by on-site medical personnel, after which the affected recruits were evacuated to Eldoret Regional Hospital for advanced medical care. Regrettably, they were pronounced dead despite concerted efforts by the attending medical teams,” the statement read.

    KDF noted that the next of kin have been formally notified and an investigation launched in line with military procedures to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident and enhance the safety of recruits undergoing training.

  • US Expands Military Base in Kenya

    US Expands Military Base in Kenya

    The United States has begun a $70 million runway expansion at a military base in coastal Kenya, reinforcing its counter-terrorism footprint in Africa.

    The project is underway at Manda Bay airbase in Lamu County, a Kenya Defence Forces facility that hosts US troops and serves as a key operational centre against Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group active in Somalia and the wider region.

    The expansion follows Washington’s 2024 designation of Kenya as its first major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally in sub-Saharan Africa, a move that deepened defence and diplomatic cooperation without a formal security treaty.

    The US Department of State awarded a $71.3 million (Sh9.2 billion) contract in July 2024 for the design and construction of the expanded airfield.

    Once complete, the new runway will nearly triple the length of the existing strip, which is more than 30 years old and cannot accommodate larger aircraft required for modern military and humanitarian missions.

    Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Musalia Mudavadi described the project as a foundational investment in long-term economic and security stability.

    “With reliable security the economy is going to grow, jobs will be created,” Mudavadi said during the ceremony.

    The expanded runway, expected to be completed by mid-2027, will support a wider range of aircraft and missions, including rapid response deployments, logistics operations and joint efforts against terrorism, piracy and other threats to regional stability.

    The US expands its military base in Kenya.
    The US expands its military base in Kenya.

    Speaking at the project’s groundbreaking on Thursday, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said the upgrade showcased both countries’ resolve to deter attacks and protect shared interests.

    He described the base as a concrete symbol of joint defence efforts and a clear message to hostile actors.

    “We have to show those who would attack us that we are resolved to defend ourselves,” he said.

    During his three-day visit, Landau also praised Kenya’s role in international security efforts, particularly its leadership of the United Nations-backed mission in Haiti.

    He stated that Kenya had played a central role in deploying forces and planning a new gang-suppression operation aimed at restoring order and supporting Haiti’s national police.

    Kenya currently leads the multinational mission seeking to curb gang violence that has overwhelmed large parts of the Caribbean nation.

  • Raila’s 72-Hour Burial Wish Caught Family Off Guard, Ida Opens Up

    Raila’s 72-Hour Burial Wish Caught Family Off Guard, Ida Opens Up

    NAIROBI, Kenya, Jan 30 – The family of veteran opposition leader Raila Odinga was surprised by his request to be buried within 72 hours of his death, his widow Mama Ida Odinga has revealed.

    Speaking during a memorial event showcasing Raila Odinga memorabilia, Mama Ida said she had no prior knowledge of the short burial timeline, which is unusual in Kenyan funeral traditions.

    “We didn’t expect Raila to die at this time. It came to us as a surprise, and with it came another surprise that he had asked to be buried within 72 hours. I don’t know when he wrote this message or whether he wrote it in Kenya or somewhere else,” she said.

    The tight schedule forced the family to rush funeral preparations to ensure the request was honoured. Mama Ida expressed gratitude to President William Ruto for intervening and helping the family meet the timeline.

    “For us to beat that time, we are most grateful to His Excellency President William Samoei Ruto, who stood in strongly to make sure that his will was honoured,” she said.

    Reflecting on her 52-year marriage to Raila, Mama Ida described him as a devoted husband, father, and family patriarch.

    “Living as Raila’s wife was great fun. We had our good times and bad times, but it was the best thing that happened to me,” she said.

    She added that the family—including the late Fidel Odinga, Rosemary Odinga, Raila Junior, and Winnie Odinga—remains committed to carrying forward Raila’s legacy and fulfilling his vision for Kenya.

    Mama Ida also thanked Kenyans and the international community for their messages of condolence, noting that mourners continue to visit the family homes in Nairobi and Bondo.

    “We are still receiving visitors and messages, and our homes remain open,” she said.

    In a related development, President William Ruto recently nominated Mama Ida Odinga as Kenya’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), pending parliamentary approval. If confirmed, she would play a central role in global environmental diplomacy, with UNEP headquarters located in Nairobi, Kenya.

    Mama Ida is a veteran educator and civic leader with extensive experience in women’s empowerment, education advocacy, and social justice initiatives. She also has business experience, including involvement in East African Spectre, a liquefied gas cylinder manufacturing company.

    She has been recognized with numerous awards, including Honorary Doctor of Letters degrees and Kenya’s highest civilian honour, Elder of the Order of the Golden Heart (EGH), for her service to the country and community.

  • Safaricom Faces Explosive Market Abuse Claims as Ethiopia’s Telecom Giant Threatens Return to Monopoly

    Safaricom Faces Explosive Market Abuse Claims as Ethiopia’s Telecom Giant Threatens Return to Monopoly

    Ethiopia’s telecoms liberalisation hangs in the balance after the state-owned incumbent unleashed a blistering attack on Safaricom, accusing the Kenyan operator of flagrant market misconduct and threatening to reverse reforms that ended a century of monopoly control.

    In an extraordinary escalation that could reshape the Horn of Africa’s telecoms landscape, Ethio Telecom has warned that continued violations by Safaricom Ethiopia risk forcing authorities to reconsider the competitive framework introduced just three years ago, potentially restoring single-operator dominance in a market of 120 million people.

    The bombshell came as Firehiwot Tamiru, who has steered Ethio Telecom for seven years, delivered a scathing rebuke of Safaricom’s operational practices during a results briefing on Thursday, declaring that the competitor’s conduct falls below international standards and amounts to systematic abuse of market regulations.

    The explosive row erupted after M-PESA Ethiopia publicly alleged that Ethio Telecom had blocked access to its newly launched Lehulm mobile money platform, preventing users on the state operator’s network from transacting. Safaricom channeled the complaint through its financial services subsidiary, triggering regulatory scrutiny and international attention.

    Ethio Telecom has categorically rejected the accusations, insisting it acted only after repeated infractions threatened customer security and critical national infrastructure. The company has demanded a formal apology from Safaricom for making unsubstantiated claims before domestic and international audiences.

    The dispute has now escalated into a formal corporate confrontation, with Ethio Telecom’s chief executive dispatching an official letter demanding retraction of the allegations. When Safaricom responded by redirecting the matter to M-PESA Ethiopia, tensions intensified further, with the state operator accusing its rival of attempting to exploit its customer base without proper infrastructure investment.

    Tamiru told reporters that verbal warnings had previously been issued to Safaricom over its market behavior, but the infractions continued unchecked, forcing the state operator to take decisive protective measures. Her comments represent the most aggressive public stance Ethio Telecom has taken since the market opened to competition.

    The chief executive issued a stark warning that appeared to question the viability of Ethiopia’s duopoly experiment. She insisted there exists no international precedent permitting one operator to commandeer a competitor’s customers without establishing requisite digital systems and infrastructure, suggesting Safaricom had attempted precisely such an overreach.

    Her remarks strike at the heart of Ethiopia’s telecoms reform agenda, which saw Safaricom Ethiopia awarded a nationwide license in 2022 after a competitive bidding process that attracted global attention. The Kenyan consortium, which includes Vodafone and Vodacom, paid $850 million for market entry and committed billions more in infrastructure investment.

    The liberalisation marked a watershed moment for Ethiopia, ending Ethio Telecom’s stranglehold over fixed line, mobile, internet and international gateway services. For decades, the monopoly structure allowed government to maintain strategic oversight while channeling revenues into public expenditure, but chronic underinvestment and service deficiencies ultimately prompted reform.

    Safaricom Ethiopia positioned itself as a catalyst for digital transformation, leveraging M-PESA’s formidable reputation across East Africa to accelerate financial inclusion. The mobile money platform rapidly gained traction, but Thursday’s revelations suggest the expansion has triggered fierce resistance from the entrenched operator.

    Tamiru emphasized that digital security remains paramount, declaring that safeguarding customers and critical infrastructure constituted a non-negotiable responsibility. She stressed that Digital Ethiopia must remain safe and secure, implying Safaricom’s approach had jeopardized those objectives.

    Although Safaricom subsequently issued an apology, Ethio Telecom’s chief executive made clear the state operator would not share its subscriber base with the competitor. She left the door open for collaboration, but only on terms that respect market regulations and conform to international norms.

    The confrontation raises fundamental questions about the sustainability of Ethiopia’s competitive telecoms environment. With Ethio Telecom now explicitly warning that the liberalisation framework could be reconsidered, investors and industry observers face the prospect of a dramatic policy reversal that would eliminate competition barely three years after its introduction.

    The standoff also exposes deeper tensions over market conduct in a sector where the state retains overwhelming legacy advantages. Ethio Telecom controls the vast majority of subscribers, infrastructure and distribution channels, while Safaricom struggles to establish equivalent reach despite substantial capital commitments.

    Industry analysts warn that any regression to monopoly would deal a devastating blow to Ethiopia’s economic reform credentials and could trigger contractual disputes with Safaricom’s consortium partners. The telecom license represents one of the largest foreign direct investments in Ethiopian history, and its value depends entirely on competitive market access.

    For Safaricom, the dispute threatens to tarnish its regional expansion strategy and raises uncomfortable questions about due diligence before entering one of Africa’s most challenging operating environments. The company has staked significant resources and reputation on Ethiopian success, making retreat or failure particularly costly.

    The allegations of market abuse, infrastructure deficiencies and regulatory overreach now sit before Ethiopian authorities, who must determine whether Ethio Telecom acted legitimately to protect national interests or wielded incumbent power to frustrate genuine competition. Their verdict will determine whether Ethiopia’s telecoms future remains competitive or reverts to centralized control.